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    <title>AliasFleet Blog</title>
    <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog</link>
    <description>Articles on email routing, protocol standards, and inbox privacy.</description>
    <language>en-US</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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    <item>
      <title>CDJapan data breach: 791,111 customers affected</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/cdjapan-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/cdjapan-data-breach</guid>
      <description>Neowing&apos;s second report on the CDJapan breach raises the count to 791,111 customers, with 360,538 old card records taken and 490 card submissions skimmed.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Neowing Corporation disclosed on 18 November 2026 that a breach of its [CDJapan](https://www.cdjapan.co.jp/) shopping site exposed 791,111 customer membership records and 360,538 historical credit card records. The same report states that skimming code on the credit card entry page is highly likely to have captured 490 card submissions between 6 and 13 November. CDJapan is the international store of Neowing, a Tokyo company, selling anime, J-pop and games to customers outside Japan. The breach is the subject of a second report on the incident. It corrects the first notice, dated 13 November, which put the affected count at 285 cards. No card misuse has been confirmed.

## Sequence of the intrusion

Access began on 5 November 2026 at about 14:55 JST. An attacker used a vulnerability in a product image page on the shopping site to gain unauthorised external access. Neowing Corporation is based in Nihonbashi, Tokyo. It runs the site under president Fumio Katagiri, and the company has not named the vulnerability. It has not named the attacker.

The bulk extraction took place the next day. Between 13:04 and 14:15 JST on 6 November, historical credit card information and customer membership information left the database in a single extraction. The window lasted 71 minutes. The company states that the extraction happened only once. No further exfiltration has been confirmed.

Later on 6 November, at 21:06 JST, the credit card information entry page was tampered with. Malicious scripts designed to steal card details were placed on the page. The scripts stayed there until 19:52 JST on 13 November. That is a span of seven days. Orders placed from a PC were exposed to the tampered page. Orders from smartphones or other devices were not affected.

## Records in the bulk extraction

The bulk extraction took two sets of records. The first set holds 360,538 historical credit card records. These cover cards registered or used between 2005 and 2018. Each record holds a card number, an expiry date and a cardholder name. The company states that all of these cards have expired, and that the stored records held no security codes at any point.

The second set holds 791,111 customer membership records. These belong to customers with a history of card registration. Each record holds a name, an email address, a telephone number and a partial address. The address is limited to country, city or municipality, and postal code. No address detail more specific than the city or municipality was included in any of the 791,111 membership records extracted on 6 November.

![Neowing Corporation's second report on the CDJapan breach: 360,538 historical card records and 791,111 member records leaked, with no secondary damage confirmed](/blog/cdjapan-data-breach/notice.png)

The skimming took a different set of data. The tampered page was displayed 1,152 times. In 490 of those displays, the customer went on to submit card information. The company considers those 490 cases highly likely to have leaked. The submissions included card numbers, expiry dates, cardholder names and security codes.

The two thefts call for different responses. The historical card records are old and expired. The membership records attached to them hold current contact details for 791,111 people. The skimming records are few in number but current. They hold full card details, including security codes.

## Differences from the first notice

The [first report](https://www.cdjapan.co.jp/info/20261113) went up on 13 November 2026. It put the affected window at 9 to 11 November. It counted 285 cards entered or changed in that time. The second report moves the start of the skimming back three days, to 6 November, and adds the bulk database extraction from the same day. The first report did not mention the extraction at all. The end of the skimming window also moved. The code stayed on the payment page until 19:52 on 13 November.

The second report follows an investigation by an independent cybersecurity investigation firm. The company has not named the firm. [Privacy Affairs](https://www.privacyaffairs.com/cdjapan-data-breach/), in its 19 November 2026 report on the second notice, notes a further difference. The first notice said the affected access route had been blocked on 11 November. The skimming code stayed live until 19:52 on 13 November. That reading comes from Privacy Affairs, not from the company, and the first notice itself was not re-read live for this article. What the [second report](https://www.cdjapan.co.jp/info/20261118) states directly is that all unauthorised external access routes have now been completely blocked. All detected code has been removed.

The correction matters for customers who entered card details on a computer outside the first notice's window: those who entered them on 6 to 8 November, those who entered them on the morning of 9 November before noon, and those who submitted them after 17:00 on 11 November through 19:52 on 13 November. Under the first report, those customers had no reason to think they were affected. Under the second report, they are inside the skimming window. They should check the card used, even though the first notice gave them no cause to think the card was at risk. Anime News Network also covered the second report. Privacy Affairs described it as the only other outlet it found covering the story at publication time.

## Per-service addresses and leak tracing

AliasFleet provides one email alias per service. A customer who signed up to CDJapan with a dedicated alias would see any phishing message arrive on that alias. The alias names CDJapan as the source before the message is even opened. The alias can be paused in one click. Pausing stops the phishing at that address while the real inbox stays untouched.

The [leak-tracing guide](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/which-website-leaked-my-email) explains how the arriving address identifies the source. AliasFleet does not remove an address from a breach dump. No service can do that. What per-service aliases change is what the next breach gets. They also change how clearly the leak can be traced. The 791,111 membership records in this breach hold names, email addresses and phone numbers. A phishing message built from those records can name the customer and the store, which gives the message a convincing opening line. A dedicated alias gives that message away at a glance.

## Precautions stated in the notice

The notice lists precautions for affected customers. Customers who placed an order during the skimming period should review credit card statements for unfamiliar charges. Any suspicious transaction should be reported to the card issuer listed on the back of the card at once. Customers should beware of phishing emails and text messages impersonating the company or card companies. The leaked email addresses, names and other personal information may be misused for fraudulent messages that impersonate the company or a card issuer. The company states that it will never ask customers to provide a password or card information by email or SMS. Links in unfamiliar emails or text messages should not be clicked.

Customers who use the same password for other online services should change those passwords as a precaution. The notice states that no password leakage has been confirmed in this incident, so the password advice is precautionary rather than a response to a confirmed leak. The phishing warning is the more direct risk. The [breach response guide](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach) covers the password and phishing steps in order.

One point in the company's reassurance needs care. The historical card records are described as expired. That is true of the cards as they stood between 2005 and 2018. Privacy Affairs notes, citing Citi, that a renewed card often keeps the same number. Only the expiry date and security code change. A customer who still holds the same card account should ask the bank whether a new number is warranted. The word expired should not be treated as the end of the matter.

[Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) lists no CDJapan breach as of this writing. The check will not yet show this incident.

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Regulatory reports and company measures

Neowing submitted its initial report to Japan's [Personal Information Protection Commission](https://www.ppc.go.jp/en/) on 13 November 2026. It has since submitted an additional report reflecting the latest investigation findings. The company is also submitting reports to relevant overseas data protection authorities, including those in the EU and the UK. It continues to report and consult with the National Police Agency's cybercrime reporting desk while the investigation runs and the notification of customers continues. The company has not given a breakdown of affected customers by country. The number of EU and UK customers among the 791,111 is not known.

In cooperation with its payment processing company, Neowing has requested enhanced monitoring for unauthorised use of the exposed card numbers. Individual customer notification is underway by email or other appropriate means, and the company states that it will continue to fulfil orders as usual. Customer inquiries go to CDJapan Customer Support at info@cdjapan.co.jp.

As a measure to prevent recurrence, the company states that it has fixed the identified vulnerabilities. It has also strengthened its security monitoring systems. Once the investigation is complete, it will permanently and irreversibly delete all historical credit card information from 2005 to 2018 remaining in its database. The notice does not explain why card data from as far back as 2005 was still held. The company has not confirmed Privacy Affairs' suggestion that the 2018 cut-off fits the timing of Japan's revised Installment Sales Act, which took effect in June 2018.

## Unanswered questions in the investigation

Several facts remain unstated. The company has not named the vulnerability in the product image page. It has not said how the skimming code was planted. It has not attributed the attack to any actor. It has not said whether card payments are back on, or how many of the 791,111 customers have been notified so far.

No confirmed misuse has been reported. The absence of confirmed misuse two weeks after the intrusion is a statement about what the investigation has found so far. It is not a guarantee.

The second report corrects the first notice on both the count and the window. The 285 figure and the 9 to 11 November window described a small, recent problem. The full picture is a bulk extraction of nearly 800,000 customer records and a week of live skimming. Customers who were told nothing on 13 November may now find they were affected after all, because the skimming window in the second report starts three days earlier.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Phishing</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Applying for a Credit Card</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-applying-for-a-credit-card</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-applying-for-a-credit-card</guid>
      <description>A card application hands your email to comparison sites, lenders and marketers before any account exists. One alias per round keeps the follow-up contained.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Protecting an email address during a credit card application means separating the shopping stage from the account stage. A comparison or pre-approval form sends the address to lenders and marketers before any card exists, so one alias per application round contains that follow-up. Once the card is opened, the account takes a permanent dedicated address, because statements, fraud alerts and account recovery depend on the address on file. The rules cited are American.

## The application funnel

A credit card application passes through three stages: comparison, in which the applicant enters contact details, an income band and spending habits into a comparison site to find cards that may fit; pre-approval, in which a lender or a comparison tool checks the credit file and returns an indication of eligibility; and the formal application, in which the applicant submits full details to the chosen issuer, and the issuer runs a hard credit inquiry.

Exposure increases as the funnel narrows: at comparison the address goes to a site that is not a lender, at pre-approval to that site and its lending network, and at the formal application to the issuer, where it becomes the account contact channel. The same pattern appears in [loan quotes](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-getting-loan-quotes) and [insurance quotes](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-getting-insurance-quotes). The card funnel adds the pre-approval layer.

## What comparison sites do with the address

A comparison site is a marketplace, not a lender. [NerdWallet states in its help centre](https://support.nerdwallet.com/en/articles/16531964-how-nerdwallet-shares-your-information-with-lenders) that information submitted through its pre-qualification tool "is shared with third-party lending partners, not held exclusively by NerdWallet", and those lenders "may use your information to contact you about their products". The same page states that lenders "may reach out by phone, email, or text" and that "NerdWallet does not control the volume or timing of lender outreach". [NerdWallet's privacy policy](https://www.nerdwallet.com/assets/blog/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/NW-Privacy-Policy-January-2025.pdf), effective 30 January 2025, lists the same collection on registration and pre-qualification.

Deletion after submission does not undo the sharing: once a deletion request is processed, NerdWallet will no longer share the data going forward, but "lenders who already received your information prior to deletion may retain it subject to their own privacy policies". The address cannot be recalled after submission, so containment has to happen before it. Credit Karma works on the same model, recommending financial products to applicants.

## Pre-approval and the credit check

Pre-approval is a check, not a promise. [Experian defines it](https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/does-preapproval-affect-your-credit) as a lender determining that a person meets criteria that make the person a strong candidate for a card, and states that "it doesn't guarantee final approval". For credit cards, the check "typically involves a soft credit inquiry", and [Experian's guide to pre-approved card offers](https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/what-is-a-preapproved-credit-card-offer/) draws the same line between an indication of eligibility and a final decision. [A soft inquiry](https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/what-is-a-soft-inquiry/) happens when a company such as a card issuer checks a credit report to preapprove a person for an offer, and soft inquiries do not affect credit scores because they are not attached to a specific application for credit. Reports can be checked at [AnnualCreditReport.com](https://www.annualcreditreport.com) before a round begins.

The hard inquiry comes with the formal application, when the issuer runs it "for a more thorough review of your credit along with your income, debt balances and other factors", according to Experian. According to Experian, it can reduce a FICO score by less than five points for most people, with the effect lasting 12 months.

[The FTC took action against Credit Karma in September 2022](https://consumer.ftc.gov/consumer-alerts/2022/09/ftc-orders-credit-karma-halt-deceptive-pre-approved-credit-offers?page=2), alleging that from at least February 2018 through April 2021 the company told users they were "pre-approved" or had "90% odds" of approval for cards and loans. The FTC states that for many of the supposed offers, nearly a third of the people who applied were rejected. The lenders' reviews showed up as hard inquiries on their reports. Under the settlement, Credit Karma paid $3 million and was barred from misleading claims about approval or approval odds.

## AliasFleet and the application round

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) is an email alias service. It creates forwarding addresses, one per site, so a leaked one can be paused without touching the rest. The free tier covers 10 active aliases, 50 MB of monthly forwarding bandwidth, 1 verified destination inbox and 3 personal subdomains, according to the [pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing). Pro, $7 a month under the Founder's Club against a $12 list price, adds unlimited aliases and 1 GB of monthly bandwidth, within the limits set out in [the guide on whether email aliases are safe](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe).

In the card-application funnel, AliasFleet's role is the application stage: one alias per application round, used on the comparison and pre-approval forms and paused when the round is over. That pause stops the lenders' follow-up without touching the real inbox or the card account. [The every-website guide](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/different-email-for-every-website) describes the same mechanism: a different address per site, so a leak names its source and a pause contains it.

The card account does not receive an alias: AliasFleet issues forwarding aliases rather than permanent mailboxes, and the account needs a permanent address tied to a verified identity for recovery, statements and fraud alerts. The alias is for the application and marketing stage only.

## Prescreened offers and the opt-out

Some card offers arrive without any application: under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the four credit bureaus may include a consumer's name on lists used for firm offers the consumer did not ask for, and the same law gives the consumer the right to opt out.

[The FTC sets out the two options](https://consumer.ftc.gov/articles/how-stop-junk-mail): opt out for five years, or opt out permanently. The five-year opt-out is done online at [optoutprescreen.com](https://optoutprescreen.com) or by calling 1-888-5-OPT-OUT (1-888-567-8688). The permanent opt-out starts the same way, but is complete only when the signed Permanent Opt-Out Election form is returned by post. Opting out removes the consumer's name from the lists the bureaus sell, with no effect on the ability to apply for or obtain credit, according to the FTC.

<Callout type="info" title="The opt-out and the alias cover different ground">
The bureau opt-out stops prescreened offers drawn from bureau lists, not follow-up from a comparison site or a lender that received the address from a form the applicant filled in. That follow-up is contained by the alias, not by the opt-out.
</Callout>

Requests are processed within five days, according to the FTC, but offers already in the pipeline can take up to 60 days to stop. The opt-out covers the bureau lists only, not the applicant's own bank, blanket mailings, or other data brokers' lists, so the address given to a comparison site is outside it.

## The card account and the permanent address

Once the card account is opened, the email rules change. The address on file becomes the channel for statements, legal notices and fraud alerts, and the issuer's terms treat it as a standing requirement. [American Express states in its consent statement](https://www.americanexpress.com/us/support/manage-my-account/consent.html), effective 24 October 2019, that a cardholder who consents to electronic delivery certifies that the cardholder "will provide and maintain a valid Designated E-mail Address", covering the cardmember agreement, billing statements and change-in-terms notices.

[Discover's paperless terms](https://card.discover.com/onlinepayments/info-about-paperless-statements.html) state the same requirement: statements and disclosures "will be delivered to your email address on file, sent to your Secure Inbox, posted on our website, or delivered through our Discover Mobile App", and the cardholder must "keep your e-mail address current". A confirmation email is sent to the address provided. If it does not arrive within 48 hours, the cardholder is told to call to verify the address.

Password resets, statements, fraud alerts and breach notifications run through the address on file, and losing access to it can mean losing the way back into the account. [The banking guide](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-banking) states the position in full: the bank gets a permanent real dedicated address used only for financial accounts, never a masked or relay alias, because recovery, statements and fraud alerts depend on it, and a credit card account is a financial account in the same sense. Two-factor codes and recovery at an alias are covered in [the guide on receiving two-factor codes at an alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-receive-two-factor-authentication-codes-at-an-email-alias) and [the account recovery guide](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery).

## The application-round setup

The setup has three parts, in the order the applicant meets them. First, before any form is opened, the applicant creates one alias for the round and labels it with the round, for example the month or the card being compared. The alias goes on every form in that round, and on no other site, so all the follow-up from the round arrives in one place. [The guide on how spammers get email addresses](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-do-spammers-get-your-email-address) and [the guide on whether websites can tell an alias is in use](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-websites-tell-you-are-using-an-email-alias) cover the habit this replaces and what the sites see.

Second, the applicant treats every pre-approval label as a marketing claim. The offer is checked against the card's terms before any formal application is submitted, and the formal application goes in only for the card actually chosen. Several formal applications in one round create several hard inquiries, which Experian notes are not combined into one for scoring purposes, unlike mortgage or auto loan rate shopping.

Third, once the card is approved, the applicant replaces the alias with the permanent dedicated address and updates the address on file with the issuer. Pausing the alias then stops the marketing follow-up from the round without affecting the account. The permanent address is the one the holder opens, because statements, fraud alerts and breach notifications are only useful if they are read, as [the second-address guide](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/do-you-need-a-second-email-address) states.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Credit Cards</category><category>Email Aliases</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Signing Up for Food Delivery</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-food-delivery</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-food-delivery</guid>
      <description>A food delivery app holds a home address, a payment method and order history. One alias per app keeps that mail contained and names the source.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Protecting an email address when signing up for food delivery means giving each delivery app a separate email alias instead of a primary address. DoorDash, Uber Eats and Deliveroo each collect a name, email address, phone number, delivery address and payment information at signup, and the alias keeps order mail, marketing and breach exposure contained to one app while the account is in use.

## What delivery apps hold after signup

A food delivery account links an email address to a physical front door. The courier receives the name and drop-off address for every order. The account also holds a payment method and a full order history. The email address is the account identifier, password reset route, receipt channel and marketing channel, all attached to that home address and payment method.

The three largest services collect the same core details, according to their own privacy policies, and differ only in the extras each policy lists.

| Detail collected | DoorDash | Uber Eats | Deliveroo |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Name, email address and phone number | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Home or delivery address | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Payment information | Card details processed by payment providers, last four digits stored | Payment or banking information | Card numbers collected by payment providers |
| Order history and items ordered | Yes, with transaction amounts and merchants | Yes | Yes, with order notes |
| Location data | Precise geolocation if the user consents | Precise or approximate location from order request to completion | Longitude and latitude on ordering |
| Extra sources | Activity and special instructions | Guest checkout covered | Date of birth for age-restricted items; data from fraud detection providers, advertising platforms and data brokers |

[DoorDash's consumer privacy policy](https://help.doordash.com/en-nz/legal/article/cx-privacy-policy-new-verticals-storefront), last updated 15 September 2025, lists the contact details above. [Uber's privacy notice](https://uber.box.com/public/static/rp6xgw5wusc0i0vdtvxcckjy5ra7np8c.pdf) covers order recipients on Uber Eats at account creation or guest checkout. [Deliveroo's privacy policy](https://deliveroo.com.qa/en/privacy) lists the same details on account creation. Deliveroo is now part of the DoorDash, Inc. group of companies.

DoorDash's policy also states that personal information is used to advertise its services on third-party websites and platforms. Deliveroo's policy states that it collects information from third parties, including fraud detection providers, online advertising platforms and data brokers. DoorDash offers an opt-out of sale or sharing.

## Two breaches of delivery data

Two confirmed breaches exposed the same combination: an email address next to a home delivery address and an order history.

In September 2019, DoorDash confirmed an unauthorised access to user data that had happened on 4 May 2019, through a third-party service provider. About 4.9 million consumers, Dashers and merchants who joined on or before 5 April 2018 were affected. The data accessed included names, email addresses, delivery addresses, order history, phone numbers and hashed and salted passwords, plus the last four digits of some consumers' payment cards and driver's licence numbers for about 100,000 Dashers, while full card numbers and CVV codes were not accessed. [TechCrunch](https://techcrunch.com/2019/09/26/doordash-data-breach/) and [The Register](https://www.theregister.com/security/2019/09/27/doordash-doesnt-just-pick-up-your-food-orders-it-delivers-your-data-to-hackers-too/949477) reported the disclosure, both quoting DoorDash's own statement.

In June 2020, Delivery Hero confirmed that its Foodora brand had been breached. The exposed data had been found online on 19 May 2020. Delivery Hero's security teams validated a database of about 480,000 email addresses, containing unique email addresses, encrypted password hashes, name, delivery address and phone number. Customers in 14 countries were affected. The data dated back to 2016. No financial data, clear-text passwords or geolocation data was exposed. The confirmation was reported by [Infosecurity Magazine](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/foodora-data-breach/).

A message that names a real restaurant, a real order and a real street address is harder to spot as fake than a generic phishing email. Order history records what a person eats, when they order and where they live.

## Why the address outlasts the password

A breached password can be changed. A breached email address cannot be withdrawn from breach data once exposed. Password resets, order confirmations, receipts, refund notices and marketing all go to it, and it stays in circulation in breach data and marketing lists after the password has been replaced.

The risk spreads when the same address is used elsewhere. If the delivery address is also the bank account address, a breach of the delivery app hands an attacker the exact address to target with phishing for the bank. A separate address for the delivery account breaks that link.

## Separate aliases for separate apps

An email alias is a dedicated forwarding address given to one service instead of a primary email address. Mail sent to the alias arrives in the real inbox, and replies go back through the alias so the real address stays hidden. [What an email alias is](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-is-an-email-alias) explains the mechanism in full.

Setup follows the same pattern as any other account: the user creates one alias for the app and enters it as the email address at signup. Order confirmations, receipts and password resets arrive at the alias. They forward to the real inbox. If the app is breached, the exposed address is the alias, not the primary inbox. If the alias starts receiving spam, the source is known: that alias was given to one app only.

Separate aliases make the source visible. One shared alias for DoorDash, Uber Eats and Deliveroo tells the user nothing when spam arrives. Three aliases, one per app, name the source. The same principle applies to shopping accounts, as described in [the guide to a separate email for online shopping](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-online-shopping).

The alias also limits the damage after a breach. The account password still needs changing, and the exposed address should still be checked on [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/), which lists 1,053 pwned websites and more than 17.8 billion pwned addresses. The primary email address was never in the breached database, so it does not join the lists that circulate afterwards. The steps for disabling a spammed alias are covered in [what to do when an alias starts getting spam](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-an-alias-starts-getting-spam).

## AliasFleet provision for delivery accounts

AliasFleet provides managed email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox. The Free tier includes 10 active forwarding aliases, 3 personal subdomains, 1 verified destination inbox and 50 MB of monthly forwarding bandwidth, with two-way reply forwarding included. The Pro plan is $7 per month under the Founder's Club, with a $12 list price, and adds unlimited aliases, vendor leak detection and tracker pixel and UTM stripping. The current pricing is published at [AliasFleet pricing](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing).

AliasFleet is not a disposable email service. Aliases are persistent forwarding addresses under the user's control, staying active until the user disables them. That matters for a delivery account, because the alias is the account recovery address. [How email aliases actually work](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work) describes the forwarding and reply mechanism, and [whether email aliases are safe](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe) covers what an alias does and does not protect. Ten free aliases cover several delivery apps with room left over, and each app gets its own.

An alias does not hide the home address or the payment method from the app, and it does not fix the app's security. It protects the email address only.

## Alias lifetime and account recovery

The alias for a delivery app must stay active for as long as the account is in use. A short-lived address is the wrong tool for an account holding a payment method and a home address, because the email address is how the account is recovered and order problems are resolved.

<Callout type="warning" title="Disabling the alias locks the account">
If the alias is disabled while the account is still active, password resets and refund notices stop arriving, and the user cannot prove ownership of the account by email. The app still holds the home address and the payment method. The alias is disabled only when the account behind it is closed or no longer used.
</Callout>

Two-factor authentication codes arrive at the alias too, since it is the account email address. [Receiving two-factor authentication codes at an email alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-receive-two-factor-authentication-codes-at-an-email-alias) explains how the codes arrive and what to check if one is delayed. [Whether an alias can be used for account recovery](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery) covers recovery in more detail.

## Signup timing and address changes

The alias is set up before the first order, at signup, when the app asks for an email address. The user creates the alias first, then enters it on the signup form, and the confirmation email arrives at the alias and forwards to the real inbox. [How to set up an email alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-set-up-an-email-alias) walks through the creation steps.

For an existing account, the email address can usually be changed in the account settings to the new alias. Order history and the payment method stay attached to the account, because only the email address changes. The old address remains in the company's past records and in any breach data already taken, so the change limits future exposure rather than erasing past exposure.

Some apps reject alias addresses at signup, usually because the alias domain appears on a blocklist. [When a service will not accept an alias email](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/when-a-service-wont-accept-your-alias-email) covers the workarounds, including using a subdomain or a custom domain.

## Order mail and the primary inbox

A delivery account generates more mail than the account itself. Order confirmations, courier updates, receipts and marketing arrive in a steady stream, and the retailer and carrier emails that follow an order form a separate stream. [How to protect email for delivery notifications](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-delivery-notifications) covers that notification stream and how to keep it out of the primary inbox.

A primary email address is a single point of failure. [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) states it directly: banking, shopping and personal accounts all share the same address, and a single third-party breach exposes it everywhere. One alias per app limits what a breach of the app can take from the user, and it names the source when the mail that follows is unwanted.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Email Aliases</category><category>Food Delivery</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Is CounterMail Safe? Diskless Servers, Closed Source</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-countermail-safe</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-countermail-safe</guid>
      <description>CounterMail runs diskless web servers and OpenPGP encryption with 4096-bit keys, but its closed-source code has never been independently audited.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[[CounterMail](https://countermail.com) is a Swedish encrypted email service that encrypts mail with OpenPGP on RSA 4096-bit keys and runs its web servers without hard drives, yet its code is closed source and no independent audit of that code or of its no-logs claim has ever been published. The service is also closed for new registrations, so most readers cannot open an account at all. The safety question therefore splits in two: the architecture is unusually hardened, and the verification is unusually thin.

## Registration and pricing

<Callout type="warning" title="Closed to new users">
CounterMail's services page states twice that the service is closed for new registrations, with a 10-day trial only for people who already know a CounterMail user.
</Callout>

The [services page](https://countermail.com/?p=services) carries the closed-registration statement twice, in prominent wording, and a reader without an existing CounterMail contact cannot open an account at all. [The Mailfence comparison](https://blog.mailfence.com/countermail-vs-mailfence/), updated in October 2025, records the same position: registration needs an invite code from an existing user.

Secondary reviews report a 7-day trial, while the provider's own page states 10 days. The primary source takes precedence, so this article uses 10 days.

There is no free tier. One plan covers three durations, with identical features and 4 GB of storage at each length.

| Duration | Price | Storage |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 6 months | $29 | 4 GB |
| 12 months | $49 | 4 GB |
| 24 months | $79 | 4 GB |

Payment runs by card through Stripe or by wire transfer, and Bitcoin appears at the same prices on the site, yet the changelog states that Bitcoin payment was disabled for new accounts in June 2024. Extra storage costs a one-time fee from $19 for 250 MB to $89 for 1.75 GB, no monthly subscription exists, and buying five or more accounts brings a discount starting at 15 percent. [Cloudwards](https://www.cloudwards.net/countermail-review/) records a 14-day money-back guarantee on top of the trial. It lists the absence of a free plan and of native apps among the main drawbacks. [NoKYC Score](https://nokycscore.com/service/countermail) records that no operating company is named on the provider's own pages and that no incidents are on record.

## History and features

Founder Simon Persson registered the domain in 2008 and opened the service in May 2010, after using Hushmail for years and deciding in 2007 that it could disable encryption for individual users. [The founder interview](https://www.unfinishedman.com/interview-simon-persson-founder-countermail-secure-email-provider/) records these dates and the Hushmail decision in his own words.

Mail runs through a webmail application, with IMAP access for third-party clients and no native mobile or desktop app of its own. SafeBox, a password manager, sits alongside the mail. Secure web forms, a calendar, an XMPP chat server, and custom domain support for a one-time $15 setup fee complete the package.

Premium accounts get up to 10 aliases, with @cmail.nu copies added automatically, and every new account also receives a random member alias, as [CounterMail's own support pages](https://support.countermail.com/kb/faq.php?id=15) confirm.

## Encryption and key storage

CounterMail encrypts mail with OpenPGP, the standard defined in [RFC 4880](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4880) of November 2007, with the key pair generated in the browser at signup. Incoming mail is encrypted to the user's public key on arrival. Mail to another OpenPGP user is end-to-end encrypted, while mail to anyone else travels under TLS only.

The keys are RSA 4096-bit keys, and the support pages accept self-generated RSA keys of 2048 or 4096 bits.

By default the private key lives on a CounterMail Key Server, inside a package encrypted with AES-256-CBC and indexed anonymously, while all crypto operations happen on the user's own computer and the password that decrypts the key is never stored. [The private-key protection paper](https://www.countermail.com/countermail_private_key_protection.pdf) from August 2017 sets out this design in full.

Storage on the provider's servers remains a trust decision the user cannot avoid at signup, and the user can delete the private key from CounterMail servers, which the founder recommends only for advanced users. Deleting it means the webmail interface can no longer display messages directly. Messages must be downloaded and decrypted locally instead.

Changing to a key the user already owns is also awkward: [the support FAQ](https://support.countermail.com/kb/faq.php?id=84) states that the user must send the keys to accounts@countermail.com from their CounterMail address, encrypted and signed with the old key. There is no password recovery. The private key is encrypted with the password, and both are needed to open the account.

OpenPGP encrypts the message body but not the subject line, so CounterMail adds an extra RSA and AES-CBC layer to encrypt subjects, as [TechRadar](https://www.techradar.com/pro/countermail) notes. Metadata still passes through the provider, as it must for any mail service to deliver mail. The question of [whether an email provider can read your emails](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-my-email-provider-read-my-emails) applies here as everywhere.

## Diskless servers and IP handling

CounterMail's web servers have no hard drives, boot from CD-ROM, and sit between the user and the mail servers as a filter. [The how-it-works page](https://countermail.com/?p=server) states that the web server does not log any IP addresses and that if someone steals it they will find nothing on it. The user's computer never has any direct contact with the mail servers.

The mail servers do use hard drives, but every message stored there was already encrypted on the user's computer before it arrived, so the diskless design protects the connection layer rather than the storage layer: it stops IP addresses and session data from being written to a disk on the internet-facing server.

CounterMail also strips IP addresses from the headers of outgoing mail and states that it never logs customer IP addresses. ProPrivacy describes the diskless servers as a filter that scrubs IP addresses before encrypted messages pass to the mail servers, which is a claim about the provider's own conduct rather than a fact an outsider can verify.

## USB key login

CounterMail offers login with a USB key as well as a password: a 512-bit key file sits on a USB 2.0 or 3.0 drive formatted to FAT32, and both the password and the key file are needed to open the account, with the option included free in all premium subscriptions. It protects the account even if the password is phished or guessed, because [credential stuffing](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-credential-stuffing-works) tries passwords leaked from other services, and a hardware key file blocks that whole class of attack.

## AliasFleet and CounterMail

AliasFleet provides managed, persistent forwarding addresses, and a CounterMail account can sit behind them as the destination inbox. Mail sent to an alias forwards to the CounterMail address, replies travel back through the alias, and websites never receive the CounterMail address itself. The free plan from [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing) includes 10 active aliases and 50 MB of monthly forwarding bandwidth.

This arrangement fits CounterMail well. The CounterMail address is hard to replace, because the account is closed to new registrations and losing access to the account means losing the address, so keeping that address out of circulation protects it.

CounterMail's own aliases also have a flaw that AliasFleet aliases do not. ProPrivacy reports that a deleted CounterMail alias can be registered again by someone else. An AliasFleet alias is disabled rather than recycled, so mail to a disabled alias stops instead of going to a stranger.

The alias layer changes what is exposed, not what CounterMail can read: mail forwarded to CounterMail is still mail held by CounterMail. An alias keeps the CounterMail address out of circulation. It lets the holder cut off a single alias when a service leaks it, as described in [how email aliases actually work](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work), [whether email aliases are safe](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe), and [different email for every website](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/different-email-for-every-website). Banking follows the same separation. A permanent real address is kept only for financial accounts, as described in [should you use a separate email for banking](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-banking). [Account recovery](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery) should never depend on an alias that can be disabled.

## Swedish jurisdiction

CounterMail is based and hosted in Sweden, a member of the 14 Eyes surveillance agreement, where a law passed in 2009, the FRA law, allows the National Defence Radio Authority to wiretap telephone and internet traffic crossing Sweden's borders for national security reasons, according to [ProPrivacy](https://proprivacy.com/email/review/countermail). Swedish ISPs have refused to cooperate with data retention directives, and Swedish authorities can also compel a provider of encrypted services to hand over information needed to execute a warrant.

CounterMail's answer to that jurisdiction problem is end-to-end encryption. Mail encrypted to the recipient's key is not readable from a warrant as long as the key handling holds. CounterMail's own pages do not discuss Swedish law.

The same review notes that CounterMail promises to delete all transaction data within two weeks. The site uses no cookies and no trackers, while the privacy policy itself is a short bullet list rather than a full policy.

## Verification limits

CounterMail's core problem is not a flaw in its design but the fact that the design cannot be checked. The software is closed source, no independent audit of the code or of the no-logs claim has been published, and ProPrivacy states this directly.

Smaller gaps sit next to the closed code: a thin privacy policy, no named operating company, a key-change process that asks the user to email keys to the provider, and recycled aliases. None of these proves wrongdoing, yet together they mean the service asks for more trust than its competitors while offering less evidence.

The safety claim is unverifiable, which is a narrower conclusion than unsafe. The encryption standard is open, and the private key handling is documented by the provider in its own paper, but what cannot be verified is whether the running code does what the documents say. A reader who accepts that gap gets a hardened mailbox with strong defaults, while a reader who does not should pick a provider whose code is public and whose no-logs claim has been audited.

CounterMail is the only provider in this site's safety series with this shape. [Is Mailfence Safe?](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-mailfence-safe), [Is Posteo Safe?](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-posteo-safe), [Is Runbox Safe?](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-runbox-safe), and [Is Atomic Mail Safe?](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-atomic-mail-safe) cover providers with different trade-offs.

## The findings in brief

CounterMail is a Swedish encrypted email service with OpenPGP encryption on RSA 4096-bit keys, diskless web servers that boot from CD-ROM and log no IP addresses, and USB-key login. Premium costs $29 for six months, $49 for twelve months, or $79 for twenty-four months. Storage is 4 GB, and there is no free tier. The private key is stored on CounterMail servers in encrypted form by default and can be deleted by the user. The software is closed source. It has never been independently audited, so the strongest claims about logging and key handling cannot be checked by anyone outside the provider. Anyone using any provider should check whether their address has already appeared in a breach. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) lists breaches, and [how to check if your email was leaked](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked) sets out the steps.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Secure Email</category><category>CounterMail</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Is Mailbox.org Safe? German Privacy, Opt-In Encryption</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-mailbox-org-safe</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-mailbox-org-safe</guid>
      <description>Mailbox.org is a German email service with ISO 27001 and BSI C5 credentials and opt-in encryption, but mail stays readable until Guard is switched on.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Mailbox.org is a paid email service run by Heinlein Hosting GmbH in Berlin, with servers in Germany under German data protection law and the [GDPR](https://gdpr-info.eu/). It holds ISO/IEC 27001 certification and a BSI C5 attestation, and Mailbox.org reports a Stiftung Warentest overall score of 1.8 with top marks for privacy. PGP and S/MIME encryption is supported but opt-in, not the default, so mail stays readable by Mailbox.org until Guard or the encrypted mailbox feature is switched on. There is no free tier, only a 30-day trial that blocks sending to external addresses until payment is received.

## Service overview

[Mailbox.org](https://mailbox.org/en/) is an email service focused on secure, advertising-free mail, in operation since 2014 and based in Berlin, Germany, according to [Privacy Guides](https://www.privacyguides.org/en/email/), which recommends it. The operator is Heinlein Hosting GmbH, part of the Heinlein Group. It runs on its own hardware in German data centres. [Mailbox.org states](https://mailbox.org/en/security/) that its servers are located exclusively in Germany, in Berlin, that German data protection law and the GDPR apply, and that it runs no advertising and exploits no user data.

The service is a full mailbox, not a forwarding-only product. It includes webmail, calendar and contacts, and on the higher plans Drive cloud storage, the Office suite and Meet video conferencing. Standard protocols work: IMAP, POP3 and SMTP access from external mail clients is supported.

## Certifications and independent testing

[Mailbox.org states](https://mailbox.org/en/press/bsi-c5-certification-mailbox-full-compliance-bsi-criteria-cloud-security-confirmed/) that it is ISO/IEC 27001 certified and holds a BSI C5 attestation, with data stored exclusively on redundant German servers in full GDPR compliance. The [BSI C5 catalogue](https://cloudfleet.ai/learning/data-sovereignty/what-is-bsi-c5/) is the German Federal Office for Information Security's cloud security criteria catalogue, and a C5 attestation is an auditor's report on the provider's controls, not a certificate issued by the BSI. Mailbox.org calls its C5 result a certificate, but the BSI states there is no C5 certification procedure, so attestation is the accurate description.

Stiftung Warentest, Germany's consumer testing organisation, recommends the mailbox Light plan for users who value privacy. According to mailbox.org, the service scored 1.8 overall, with top marks for privacy, ease of use and set-up. The test report is paywalled and was not read, so the score is reported as mailbox.org states it. Mailbox.org also holds the BSI IT Security Label for all three plans under the BSI guideline for secure email transport, TR 03108.

## Encryption options

Mailbox.org states that connections use SSL/TLS with DigiCert certificates, that the service was one of the first providers to secure its domain with DNSSEC and DANE/TLSA, and that HSTS, CAA, CSP, MTA-STS and X-XSS are in place. A TLS checker in webmail shows whether a message will be sent over an encrypted connection, and the @secure.mailbox.org alias makes TLS transport encryption mandatory: a message sent through it is only transmitted if encryption can be guaranteed.

Content encryption is available but opt-in. Mailbox.org supports PGP and S/MIME in webmail. Guard brings PGP into webmail, generating a key pair on the server and storing it encrypted with a password known only to the user. The [knowledge base explains](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/encryption/how-is-the-private-key-protected/) that this password is never stored on mailbox.org systems and that, until the Guard password is entered, the key files stay encrypted and inaccessible even to mailbox.org. The same article notes that this applies only if Guard has been activated. A separate encrypted mailbox feature encrypts newly arriving mail with the user's public key and is [fully compatible with Guard](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/security-privacy-article/encrypted-mailbox-in-combination-with-guard/). Users who want the private key on their own device can use the Mailvelope browser plugin, supported by mailbox.org in webmail.

<Callout type="warning" title="Opt-in encryption">
Guard encrypts and decrypts on the server, so it is not client-side encryption, where the provider never handles the keys. Neither Guard nor the encrypted mailbox is active on a new account by default, so mail stays readable by Mailbox.org until one is switched on.
</Callout>

## Signup and payment

Registration is anonymous, which Mailbox.org lists among its data protection measures. It accepts anonymous payment by cash sent by post or cash deposit into a bank account. Privacy Guides confirms cash by mail is accepted, and notes no cryptocurrency payment is available after BitPay suspended operations in Germany. A TÜV-certified data protection officer monitors compliance.

Account protection includes two-factor authentication with an authenticator app code, plus separate app passwords for email clients, created and blocked individually. Spam and virus filtering runs on arrival, with suspicious mail rejected outright rather than delivered to a spam folder.

## Mailbox.org with AliasFleet

Mailbox.org works well as a destination inbox, which is where AliasFleet fits. The Mailbox.org address itself should never be handed out to websites, shops or newsletters: every place that holds it can link the accounts together, and a leak exposes the mailbox directly. AliasFleet puts a separate forwarding alias in front of it for each service, so the Mailbox.org address stays private, and a single alias can be paused or deleted if it starts receiving spam without touching the mailbox or any other alias. [AliasFleet explains how this works](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work) in its guide to alias forwarding, and [the safety case for aliases](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe) covers why a separate address per site limits the damage from a breach.

The free AliasFleet tier covers 10 active forwarding aliases, 3 personal subdomains and 1 verified destination inbox. Monthly forwarding bandwidth is 50 MB, enough to protect the accounts that matter most. [Pricing is listed on aliasfleet.com](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), and the [documentation](https://aliasfleet.com/docs) covers setting up a destination inbox. For readers deciding [what an email alias is](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-is-an-email-alias) and whether to use [a different email address for every website](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/different-email-for-every-website), the rule is the same. The destination inbox is the vault and aliases are the addresses given away. An address can be checked against [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) before deciding which accounts need a fresh alias.

AliasFleet does not encrypt mail stored at Mailbox.org or change how it is stored there; Guard or the encrypted mailbox still has to be switched on for stored mail to be unreadable by the provider.

## Trial account

There is no free tier. New customers receive a free 30-day trial account, but the [knowledge base states](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/account/explore-mailbox-with-a-free-test-account/) that restrictions apply during the trial to prevent misuse by spammers. Sending is limited to 10 emails a day to other mailbox users, and sending to external email addresses is not possible. Receiving is restricted for mail from certain external senders, including social media platforms, payment services and verification codes. Email storage is limited to 100 MB and cloud storage to 10 MB. Trial accounts are automatically deleted after 30 days unless a payment has been received.

A second knowledge base article confirms the limit: an unpaid test account allows up to 10 emails a day to mailbox addresses, and sending externally returns a "Relay access denied" error. The [same article states](https://kb.mailbox.org/en/private/e-mail/mailbox-mail-sending-limit/) that a regular private account can send up to 10,000 emails a day. The restrictions lift on payment, so the trial is a restricted evaluation account rather than a working mailbox. [Account recovery codes](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery) sent to a trial mailbox may not arrive, so the trial does not suit an important account.

## Mailbox.org plans and prices

Three private plans are offered, with monthly prices taken from [mailbox.org's own product page](https://mailbox.org/en/product/admin/): Light costs 1 euro a month, Standard 4 euros, and Premium 12 euros. Annual billing lowers Standard and Premium to 3 euros and 9 euros a month respectively, according to independent reviews; that annual figure was not verified on a mailbox.org page this run.

| Plan | Monthly price | Mail storage | Drive storage | Mailbox aliases | Custom-domain aliases | Office and Meet |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Light | 1 euro | 2 GB | None | 3 | Family accounts only | No |
| Standard | 4 euros | 20 GB | 10 GB | 25 | 50 | Yes |
| Premium | 12 euros | 50 GB | 100 GB | Not stated | 250 | Yes, plus priority support, phone callback |

Standard is the entry point for a private user who wants a custom domain or the office suite. The service uses prepaid credit: the subscription is taken from a topped-up balance.

## Comparison with Posteo

The closest comparison is Posteo, the other German privacy mailbox, covered in [the AliasFleet Posteo article](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-posteo-safe). Both services host mail in Germany, accept anonymous signup and cash payment by post, and leave encryption opt-in rather than on by default. Posteo costs 1 euro a month with no custom domains and no office suite, while Mailbox.org charges 4 euros a month at Standard for custom domains, Drive, Office and Meet. Posteo collects no name, address, or IP at signup, while Mailbox.org publishes its ISO 27001 and BSI C5 record and the Stiftung Warentest rating.

## Summary assessment

Mailbox.org is safe by the standards that can be checked: German hosting under GDPR and ISO 27001 certification. It also holds a BSI C5 attestation. Mailbox.org reports a Stiftung Warentest score of 1.8 with top marks for privacy. Transport security is strong, and encryption is opt-in, so mail is readable by the provider until Guard or the encrypted mailbox is switched on. The 30-day trial cannot send mail outside Mailbox.org and restricts some incoming mail, so it does not test real daily use. Used as a destination inbox behind a separate alias for each service, with Guard switched on, it suits an account where German hosting and certified security matter more than encryption by default. Zero-access encryption without touching a setting needs a provider that encrypts stored mail by default. [The question of whether an email provider can read your emails](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-my-email-provider-read-my-emails) explains how that default differs across providers.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Secure Email</category><category>Mailbox.org</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SBC Medical Group Data Breach Exposes Customer Emails</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/sbc-medical-group-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/sbc-medical-group-data-breach</guid>
      <description>SBC Medical Group disclosed on 19 November 2026 that unauthorised access extracted information for 1,624,000 customers, with email addresses among the fields.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[SBC Medical Group Holdings Inc. (Nasdaq: SBC) disclosed on 19 November 2026 that unauthorised access to databases operated by its Japanese subsidiary extracted customer information. The largest affected category covers 1,624,000 customers, with records from 2010 to 2023 that include names, email addresses and passwords among the fields. SBC detected the access on 16 November 2026 and reported the database incident to Japan's Personal Information Protection Commission the same day. A second, separate incident, also on 16 November, affected clinic administrator accounts on Tribeau, a third-party reservation service used by 56 clinics that SBC provides management services to.

## The disclosure and the regulatory report

The disclosure appeared as a [Business Wire release](https://www.financialcontent.com/article/bizwire-2026-11-19-sbc-medical-group-reports-cybersecurity-incidents-in-japan) on 19 November 2026 at 04:39 UTC, and Jiji Press carried it in full through its [English wire](https://jen.jiji.com/20261118771303/). SBC Medical Group provides management services to medical corporations and clinics in Japan, working across aesthetic healthcare, dermatology, orthopedics, fertility treatment, gynecology, dentistry, hair loss treatment and ophthalmology. The release treats the database incident and the Tribeau incident as two separate incidents, and states no common cause. It names no attacker and makes no mention of ransomware or extortion.

## Data extracted in the database incident

The release sets out five categories of customer information, giving a count and a record period for each. The largest category is basic personal information without reservation or treatment information, for 1,624,000 customers, covering records from 2010 to 2023. The fields in that category are names, sex, telephone numbers, email addresses, passwords, addresses, dates of birth, patient card numbers, member IDs and survey responses, with all or some of these items present depending on the record.

| Category | Individuals | Period |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Basic personal information | 1,624,000 | 2010-2023 |
| Reservation requests through advertising, affiliate and campaign pages | 255,416 | 2007-2026 |
| Inquiries submitted through website forms | 217,769 | 2004-2026 |
| Treatment-monitor information | 4,513 | 2013-2026 |
| Reviews submitted directly to the group | 15,007 | 2015-2018 |

The reservation requests hold some or all of the basic information fields, together with the reservation-request information. The website inquiries hold some or all of the basic information fields, together with the content entered in the web inquiry forms. The treatment-monitor records hold some or all of the basic information fields, together with treatment descriptions and stored image file names, not the images themselves. The reviews hold some or all of the basic information fields, together with treatment names and review text.

Adding the five category counts gives 2,116,705. According to [Cybersecurity Market's analysis](https://cybersecuritymarket.com/sbc-medical-group-cyberattack-japan-customer-data-2026/) of the disclosure, the company has not established that the categories represent separate individuals, and the release gives no deduplicated total. One person who made a reservation request, submitted a website inquiry and left a review would appear in three categories, so adding the counts together would overstate what is known. Secondary reporting that states a single total for the incident is not supported by the release text. This article states the category counts and no combined total.

Employee information was also obtained. Account information for employees of the company's group and the medical institutions it supports was obtained, including names, IDs and passwords, involving approximately 20,000 records. For 459 employees, information provided at the time of employment was also affected, including bank account and pension-related information, withholding tax certificates and dependent exemption declarations.

Credit card information appeared in a small number of historical customer inquiries. According to the release, 14 individuals were affected in this way, and the company has confirmed that all of these credit cards were in a state in which additional payments could not be processed, such as having expired. The inquiry-form entries concerned run from 2010 to 2018.

## The Tribeau incident

The second incident stands apart from the database incident. On 16 November 2026, SBC was notified that clinic administrator accounts on Tribeau had been accessed without authorisation. Tribeau is a third-party reservation service used by 56 clinics to which the company provides management services. The platform operator grouped the accessed information in three sets. Reservation-only information covered 12,641 people: kana name, telephone number, age, requested treatment, special menu and optional notes. Three of those people had exchanged messages with a clinic, and their message contents, date of birth and sex were also accessed. Treatment-received information covered 6,804 people: reservation information, treatment name and date, and treatment fee.

According to the operator, the Tribeau incident included no email addresses, residential addresses, credit card information, passwords or electronic medical records. The operator also confirmed that the obtained information was not linked to case or review information, including photographs, on Tribeau. The company and the provider continue to investigate the access and its cause. Email addresses were therefore exposed in the database incident only, not in the Tribeau incident.

## Data outside the scope of the incident

As of the date of the release, the company has not confirmed that electronic medical records or information in the mySBC reservation site was acquired without authorisation. Clinical care systems and direct treatment histories fell outside the scope of the company-managed database incident. The treatment-monitor information included image file names, not the images themselves. The basic personal information category contains the fields needed to identify a person and contact them, and a reservation request, inquiry text or review can disclose a person's interest in a particular procedure.

## Email aliases after a breach

An email alias gives each service its own address, so a leak from one service exposes only the address used for that service. That address can be paused or deleted without changing the address used anywhere else. An alias does not recover data already extracted, change a password, or undo a breach. AliasFleet provides one alias per service, so a leaked alias points back to the service that leaked it.

## Protective steps for affected customers

The database incident obtained customer passwords, and the release does not state whether those passwords were hashed or stored in plain text, so the passwords are treated as compromised. [Changing a password only stops attackers if the new password is unique to that service](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/does-changing-your-password-stop-hackers), and the same change applies to every other service where the same password was reused: a leaked password can be tried against email, banking and shopping accounts in turn.

Exposure of an email address can be checked against breach records. A customer can check exposure with [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com), which records breaches by email address. The SBC incident is recent, so it may not appear in breach databases immediately, and an absence from the database in the first days after disclosure does not prove the address was unaffected. Anyone whose address was exposed should also [find every account linked to that email address](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-find-every-account-linked-to-your-email), since each account sharing the address is somewhere the leaked password may have been reused.

The leaked data hands an attacker a person's name, email address, telephone number and clinic relationship, enough to write a message that appears to come from SBC or from one of its clinics. Unexpected messages asking a customer to confirm details, pay a fee, download a form or follow a link should be checked against the clinic's published contact details rather than answered directly. The combination of [a leaked email address and password together raises the risk](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/email-breach-and-password-breach), because the attacker can reference real details to gain trust before asking for more.

Employees of the group and the supported medical institutions face a separate risk. Around 20,000 employee account records were obtained, and 459 employees had bank account and pension-related information affected. Those employees should change their work account passwords, check whether their work email address was exposed, and watch for targeted phishing that references their employment or payroll details.

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Investigation and response

Anomalous activity was detected by SBC's security monitoring system on 16 November, and the company moved to isolate the affected server and block unauthorised access. It set up an incident response team, preserved system logs, tightened access restrictions and monitoring, and decided to commission a detailed investigation by external cybersecurity specialists. After notification from the Tribeau operator, the passwords on all accounts of the clinics to which the company provides management services on that platform were invalidated, and communications from the attacking sources were blocked.

SBC reported the database incident to Japan's Personal Information Protection Commission on 16 November and said it will take appropriate and firm action, including consulting with the police. The release states:

> "As of the date of this release, the Company has not confirmed any fraudulent use or other secondary misuse of personal information resulting from the incidents."

The method of intrusion and the full scope remain under investigation, and no attacker has been named.

The relevant medical corporations have decided to suspend television and certain other advertising for a limited period, and the company expects new patient inquiries at the affected clinics may decline during that period. SBC expects to incur costs for customer notification, call centre operations, forensic investigation, legal and advisory services, compensation and other response measures, a portion of which may be covered by cyber insurance maintained by its Japanese subsidiary, subject to policy terms and limits. The company is currently unable to reasonably estimate the financial or other impacts of the incidents, and its assessment will continue as the investigation progresses.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Healthcare</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Can You Use an Email Alias for TikTok?</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-tiktok</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-tiktok</guid>
      <description>Yes, with one stable alias on your own domain as the signup address. TikTok links one email to one account and uses it for login and recovery.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[An [email alias](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-is-an-email-alias) can serve as the signup and recovery address for a TikTok account, provided it is a stable forwarding address on a domain the holder controls and stays active for the life of the account. TikTok links each email address to one account only and uses that address for login and password recovery, so the address chosen at signup keeps working as the key to the account. A Gmail plus tag does not hide the real address, and a short-lived inbox address fails at the first password reset, because email is the only recovery route when no phone number is on the account. The general case for [a separate email for social media](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-social-media) is covered elsewhere.

## Signup and the one-email rule

TikTok's help article on creating an account states the rule that governs the whole question: "Each phone number, email address, and social media account can only be linked to one TikTok account." The same article adds: "Make sure your email and phone number are valid as they're needed for log in and password recovery." One address serves as both the login credential and the recovery route, and it cannot be shared with a second account.

Signing up by email follows a short sequence. On the signup screen the holder selects "Use phone or email", switches to the email option and enters an address. TikTok sends a 6-digit code to that address, and once the code is entered the holder adds a birthday, sets a password and picks a username. That step needs no phone number, according to a check of TikTok's help centre and live signup page on 2 November 2026, reported by [Secria](https://secria.me/blog/create-tiktok-account-without-phone-number/).

That clean sequence does not hold in every case. Some users report being asked for a phone number after choosing email signup, and TikTok's public signup help documents no step to skip that request, as [HeyMark](https://heymark.ai/en/solutions/create-tiktok-account-without-phone-number/) reported on 27 October 2026. A phone-free inbox is a separate choice; the AliasFleet guide to [creating an email address without a phone number](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-create-an-email-without-a-phone-number) compares providers on it.

## Password recovery

TikTok's support page for resetting a password sets out the logged-out flow: tap "Use phone / email / username", choose "Email / Username", tap "Forgot password?", then reset the password with [phone number or email](https://support.tiktok.com/en/log-in-troubleshoot/log-in/reset-password). A code goes to the chosen method.

<Callout type="warning" title="Recovery depends on the address">
An account signed up by email with no phone number added has one reset route: the email. If that address stops working, no SMS fallback exists.
</Callout>

Both reset methods appear only when both are attached to the account. TikTok's page on email and phone numbers recommends keeping a mobile number on the account so access can be regained if the email is lost; the wording is a recommendation rather than a requirement. The same pattern applies across services, as the AliasFleet piece on [aliases and account recovery](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery) sets out. Where the email itself is lost, the holder files a recovery request and TikTok asks for the authentication method to be reset through a help form, a process Secria's reading of TikTok's help pages puts at up to 30 days.

## Gmail plus addressing

The Gmail side is documented by Google itself. Mail addressed to janedoe+school@gmail.com, janedoe+notes@gmail.com and janedoe+important.emails@gmail.com all reaches janedoe@gmail.com, according to Google's help page on [sending from a different address or alias](https://support.google.com/mail/answer/22370?ctx=gsidentifer). Dots follow the same rule, per Google's page on [dots in Gmail addresses](https://support.google.com/mail/answer/7436150). Subaddressing itself dates to [RFC 5233](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5233.html), published in January 2008, which defines it as detail information added to the local part of an address, usually after a "+" separator.

TikTok's own handling of a plus-tagged address remains unstated, and the outside reports do not agree with each other. In [its guide to multiple TikTok accounts with one email](https://toolrom.com/can-i-create-multiple-tiktok-accounts-with-the-same-email/), Toolrom describes a plus-tagged address as a distinct email address in TikTok's eyes, one that allows registration of a new account. Multilogin reaches the same conclusion in [its guide to running multiple TikTok accounts](https://multilogin.com/blog/how-to-run-multiple-tiktok-accounts-without-bans/), with a warning attached: TikTok treats plus variants as separate addresses, but has been known to reject the "+" format in some cases. Both accounts are third-party reports, not TikTok's own statement.

Acceptance at signup would still leave the privacy problem untouched. Every plus address contains the real address in plain view, so anyone holding it can see the underlying inbox and remove the tag with one line of code. The AliasFleet comparison of [plus addressing and real aliases](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/email-plus-addressing-vs-aliases) covers this in full: plus tags sort mail, real aliases protect it.

## Address shapes compared

What fits TikTok is a persistent forwarding alias on a domain the holder controls, one alias dedicated to TikTok and pointed at a destination inbox the holder opens every day. Because it is a genuinely distinct address rather than a variation of the real one, it meets the one-email-per-account rule while keeping the real address out of TikTok's hands. Because it stays active for the life of the account, the verification code and the later password reset both reach the holder.

| Address shape | What TikTok sees | What it hides | What happens at recovery |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Gmail plus tag | A modified form of the real address | Nothing; the tag is built on the real address | Codes arrive, and the base address stays visible |
| Alias on your own domain | An ordinary-looking address of its own | The real address | Codes arrive as long as the alias stays live |
| Short-lived inbox address | An address that works at signup | The real address | Fails once the inbox expires |
| Real primary address | The holder's main inbox | Nothing | Works, and TikTok holds the real address |

Whether a site can spot an alias and whether it refuses one are two different questions. Some websites recognise an alias from its domain, but recognition is not the same as rejection, as the AliasFleet piece on [whether websites can tell an alias is being used](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-websites-tell-you-are-using-an-email-alias) explains. TikTok publishes no list of refused alias domains, so no particular domain's acceptance can be guaranteed in advance; it has to be tested at signup.

## AliasFleet and TikTok

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) supplies managed, persistent email aliases, one per online account. Mail sent to an alias forwards to a verified destination inbox, and replies go out from the alias rather than the real address. An alias made through AliasFleet for TikTok matches the shape this article describes as the right one: a persistent forwarding address that remains in service until the holder pauses or deletes it. The TikTok alias needs to stay active for as long as the account exists, because TikTok uses it for login and password recovery, and a deleted alias stops forwarding. The free tier lists 10 active forwarding aliases, 3 personal subdomains, 1 verified destination inbox, 50 MB of monthly bandwidth and two-way reply forwarding. Pro costs $12 a month and adds unlimited active aliases and custom domains. The [setup guide](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-set-up-an-email-alias) covers the signup test. AliasFleet is not a short-lived inbox service, and it does not change TikTok's rules.

## Multiple accounts and enforcement

TikTok's Community Guidelines, in the Deceptive Behaviors and Fake Engagement section, effective 24 September 2026, state the position on multiple accounts:

> "You can have multiple accounts, for example, for fan content or creative expression, but not to deceive others or break the rules."

Deceptive account behaviour can lead TikTok to ban the account, ban additional accounts, or restrict posting and search visibility. Automation tools are prohibited, as is creating another account to get round a ban.

Enforcement figures give the scale. In the second quarter of 2026 in the United States, TikTok disrupted 30 covert influence networks and removed more than 76,000 accounts and 4.8 million associated posts, as reported by [Social Media Today](https://Www.Socialmediatoday.com/news/tiktok-us-shares-q2-account-enforcement-data/833907/) on 25 October 2026. Earlier, in the first four months of 2024, TikTok disrupted 15 influence operations and removed 3,001 associated accounts, according to [TikTok's own newsroom post](https://newsroom.tiktok.com/strengthening-our-approach-to-countering-influence-attempts-ca?lang=en-CA) of 24 May 2024. One alias attached to one genuine TikTok account is ordinary use. A network of accounts run through aliases to like, follow or comment on each other and inflate engagement counts as fake engagement, and that is the behaviour TikTok removes accounts for. The AliasFleet piece on [using an email alias for Facebook](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-facebook) notes the contrast with Meta's one-personal-account rule.

## When TikTok refuses an alias

No published TikTok rule covers alias acceptance, so a refusal is resolved by testing rather than by reading a policy. When a signup form refuses an alias, the refusal usually targets the part after the @ sign, checked against a list, which makes the domain the first thing to check rather than the alias itself. Switching to a different domain from the same provider often succeeds where the first one failed. A managed subdomain comes next, and an alias on a domain the holder owns is the strongest option. The AliasFleet piece on [what to do when a service will not accept an alias email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/when-a-service-wont-accept-your-alias-email) sets out the full fallback order. Testing should follow soon after signup: request a verification or reset message and confirm it arrives, because a domain that works today can still stop delivering later.

## Keeping the alias active

The holder creates one alias for TikTok on a domain they control and sends a test message to it to confirm it forwards. The alias goes on the account at signup, the 6-digit email verification is completed, and the password is unique to TikTok and stored in a password manager. Two-step verification is turned on with email and an authenticator app. A phone number is added as a second recovery route where the holder is willing to share one, because TikTok recommends it and because it is the only fallback if the email is lost. The full alias address is recorded with the account details. The address is checked against [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com), and the alias stays active for as long as the TikTok account exists. The alias functions as the key to the account, so it is kept active and recorded with the account details for as long as the account exists.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Aliases</category><category>TikTok</category><category>Privacy</category><category>Social Media</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Can You Use an Email Alias for Zoom?</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-zoom</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-zoom</guid>
      <description>Yes, a privacy alias works as a Zoom sign-in address. Zoom uses the email as the account identifier, so one alias gives one account its own separate identity.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Yes, a privacy alias works as the sign-in address for a Zoom account. Zoom uses the email address as the account identifier and allows one email per account, so an alias that receives mail passes the sign-up test. The word alias needs untangling: workplaces use it for a department distribution list shared by several people, not for a privacy alias that forwards to one inbox.

Zoom publishes no page that names privacy aliases or states an alias acceptance policy, so acceptance is inferred from the sign-up mechanics, a Zoom Developer Forum reply from 2025, and university practice, not from a Zoom policy. No Zoom account was created with an AliasFleet alias in this research, so the piece reports documented mechanics and forum evidence, not a first-hand signup test.

## How Zoom uses an email address

The [getting started guide for new users](https://support.zoom.com/hc/en/article?id=zm_kb&sysparm_article=KB0061316), updated on 14 November 2026, sets out the sign-up steps for a free account: visit the sign-up page, enter a birth year and an email address, click Continue, receive a verification code from no-reply@zoom.us, enter the code, a full name and password, and the Basic account is created. The test is whether the address can receive the code, and a privacy alias receives mail and forwards it, so it meets that test.

A Zoom Developer Forum reply from 9 April 2025 states: "Zoom requires an email for all account, it is the way it externally matches up accounts. Within it they can be main or alias, as long as there is somebody to read the messages. Emails can also be used by zoom for notifications and verification." The reply is on the thread [creating Zoom accounts for clients without emails](https://devforum.zoom.us/t/how-to-create-zoom-accounts-for-clients-without-emails-and-automate-app-access-for-webinar-creation/131181).

The same address then carries meeting invitations, account notices, password resets, and security mail. The [support page on changing the email associated with an account](https://support.zoom.com/hc/en/article?id=zm_kb&sysparm_article=KB0063624) states that a new address must not already exist in Zoom, and that confirmation emails go to both the old and the new address for confirmation.

## One email, one account

Asked whether three email addresses could sit under one Zoom account, a Zoom Community Champion replied on 11 February 2022: "Unfortunately, Zoom uses your email address as your unique identifier, so there is no way to alias multiple emails addresses to a single account." The thread is live as [Multiple email addresses](https://community.zoom.com/meetings-2/multiple-email-addresses-21646).

The rule cuts both ways: it stops a holder attaching a second address to an existing account, and it makes a second account straightforward, because that needs a second, different email address. A community reply on [two businesses and two separate accounts](https://community.zoom.com/billing-account-management-32/two-businesses-two-separate-accounts-68427?postid=154585) states that a user can sign up for as many free accounts as they like with unique email addresses, and multiple email aliases can point to the same mailbox. Joining a meeting is different from holding an account: a guest can join from a link.

## Two meanings of the word alias

[Wikipedia defines an email alias](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_alias) as an email address used for forwarding, and draws the line that matters: an email alias is different from a contact group, or distribution list, where a message sent to the group goes to all recipients listed. One address, one destination inbox, is an alias; one address, many recipients, is a distribution list.

Florida State University describes the setup on its page for [requesting a generic department Zoom account](https://servicecenter.fsu.edu/s/article/How-do-I-request-a-generic-department-email-account-for-Zoom?nocache=https%3A%2F%2Fservicecenter.fsu.edu%2Fs%2Farticle%2FHow-do-I-request-a-generic-department-email-account-for-Zoom): the department asks the IT service desk to associate a licence and send a Zoom creation invite for an email alias of a department generic email account or distribution list, which must already accept email externally. Activation uses "Sign up with password", not single sign-on.

St. Olaf and Carleton describe the same pattern in their guide to [activating a Zoom account for an alias](https://stolafcarleton.teamdynamix.com/TDClient/1893/StOlaf/KB/PrintArticle?ID=116298): the activation email is sent to everyone on the email alias list, and once active, anyone with the alias and password information can log in to schedule, modify and start meetings. A privacy alias belongs to one person and forwards to one inbox; a department alias belongs to a list, and the Zoom account behind it is a shared account with a shared password, so it suits a team account and not a personal account.

| Use of the word alias | Mail reader | Sign-in | Purpose |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Privacy alias | One person | One person, with the account password | Keeping the real address out of Zoom |
| Department alias | Everyone on the list or mailbox | Anyone with the shared password | One shared Zoom account for a team |

> A department alias is a shared login: anyone with the alias inbox and password can sign in.

## AliasFleet and Zoom

[AliasFleet](https://www.aliasfleet.com/) provides managed, persistent email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox, one per site or purpose. A Zoom alias created through AliasFleet receives the verification code, meeting invitations, password resets, and account notices, and forwards them to the destination inbox. The free tier, as listed on the AliasFleet homepage on 19 November 2026, covers 10 active forwarding aliases, 3 personal subdomains, 1 verified destination inbox, 50 MB monthly bandwidth, and two-way reply forwarding. Pro is $12 per month with unlimited active aliases. The difference between forwarding and alias control is set out in the piece on [email forwarding versus aliases](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/email-forwarding-vs-aliases).

AliasFleet does not change what Zoom does with the address: Zoom still sees one email address, uses it as the unique identifier, and sends all account mail to it. The alias changes what Zoom holds, the alias instead of the real inbox address, and what happens when that address leaks: a leaked alias names Zoom as the source, because no other site ever had that address. The alias must stay live while the Zoom account matters, because the reset route runs through it, as the piece on [whether an email alias works for account recovery](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery) states.

## Signing up with a privacy alias

The alias is created first, with a destination inbox checked regularly. The sign-up sequence then runs as Zoom documents it: a birth year and the alias address are entered on the sign-up page, and the verification code from no-reply@zoom.us arrives in the destination inbox through forwarding. The code, a full name and password are entered, and the Basic account is created with the alias as its sign-in email.

Before the alias is trusted with a live account, a test message is sent to it and its arrival confirmed, as the AliasFleet piece on [how email aliases actually work](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work) sets out.

If Zoom refuses the alias at sign-up, the likely cause is the domain, not the alias. The AliasFleet piece on [whether websites can tell an address is an alias](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-websites-tell-you-are-using-an-email-alias) describes the mechanism: a signup form takes the part after the @ sign and checks it against a list of known alias domains. Zoom publishes no alias blocklist and no refusal rate, so none is stated. The usual fix is an alias on a different domain, a managed subdomain, or a custom domain. A plus-tagged address is weaker, because the tag strips off in one line, as the piece on [plus addressing versus aliases](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/email-plus-addressing-vs-aliases) shows.

## Separate accounts and switching between them

Personal and work Zoom accounts need two addresses; two aliases supply them. The [support page on switching between multiple accounts](https://support.zoom.com/hc/en/article?id=zm_kb&sysparm_article=KB0073483), updated on 2 November 2026, states that users can store up to 5 sets of credentials and switch between accounts, and that each added account must already exist as a separate account.

The [support page on signing out and using a different Zoom account](https://support.zoom.com/hc/en/article?id=zm_kb&sysparm_article=KB0066743) states the same in reverse: a user signs out and signs back in with a different account, and meeting invites follow the account, not the inbox.

## Work accounts, single sign-on, and managed domains

The simple case is a personal Zoom account signed up by email. With single sign-on only, the email address must be changed in the identity provider first. On a managed domain, the Edit link on the Sign-In Email field is hidden, and the admin must update the address. A privacy alias cannot be dropped into a work account that the holder does not control.

## What an alias does not do for Zoom

An alias does not make a Zoom account anonymous: the account still carries a real name, entered at sign-up, which appears in meetings. The AliasFleet piece on [using an email alias for LinkedIn](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-linkedin) makes the same point: the alias changes the contact address, not the identity on the profile.

An alias does not add a second address to one Zoom account. The identifier rule blocks that. A holder who receives Zoom mail at several addresses still holds one account on one address; the others are only invite destinations. The fix is to give hosts the alias address, or to hold a second account on a second alias.

An alias does not remove the need for a second factor: email codes expire in minutes, so a slow delivery can arrive too late, and a deleted alias stops receiving mail at once; an authenticator app is stronger. The alias also does not protect the destination inbox itself: if the inbox behind the alias is taken over, the attacker can read the Zoom mail and the reset messages. A bank account is not a comparable case: the bank gets a permanent real dedicated address used only for financial accounts, never an alias.

[Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) listed 1,052 pwned websites and 17,858,376,246 pwned addresses on 19 November 2026, and an address can be checked there before it is relied on.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Aliases</category><category>Zoom</category><category>Privacy</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email for an Online Will Service</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-an-online-will-service</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-an-online-will-service</guid>
      <description>A will service holds identity documents, family details and asset lists. One dedicated alias, strong sign-in security and a legacy plan protect the account.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[An online will service is protected by giving it one dedicated email alias and keeping that alias active permanently, because the will, executor contact and future updates all depend on that address. The service holds a full legal name, date of birth and address, the names and dates of birth of beneficiaries, executors and guardians, and lists of property, bank accounts, investments, pensions, life insurance and vehicles, plus debts. [Caring.com's 2025 survey](https://www.caring.com/resources/wills-survey), run with YouGov across more than 2,500 American adults, found only 24% of respondents had a will, down from 33% in 2022. Most people have no will at all, and the people who do make one hand a single online service a complete picture of their family and their money.

## What a will service records

A will needs personal details, an asset list, beneficiary names, executor names and guardian choices. [GetWill's checklist](https://www.getwill.co.uk/guides/your-will-writing-checklist) lists full legal names, dates of birth, current addresses, property, bank accounts, investments, pensions, life insurance, vehicles, valuables, digital assets and business interests, plus debts such as a mortgage and loans. For each beneficiary the service needs a full name and relationship, and for charities a registered charity number. Executors need a full name, address and date of birth, and a backup executor in case the first choice cannot serve.

The Canadian service [It's Simple Will](https://www.itssimplewill.ca/resources/wills/canadian-will-preparation-checklist/) asks for the same categories, including full legal names matching official ID and approximate asset values. The pattern is consistent across services. A will service is not a newsletter signup. It is a structured record of a person's identity, family and wealth, stored under one login.

## Why the signup email matters

The email address is the recovery path for the whole account. Password resets go there, update reminders go there, and executor contact goes there. When the same address is also used for shopping, social media, forums and newsletters, every breach that touches any of those services exposes the address that guards the will account. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) lists 1,052 pwned websites and more than 17.8 billion pwned addresses in its database, which gives the scale of exposure a reused address carries.

The same address also receives the phishing. A will service account is a valuable target because the data inside it supports identity theft: full names, dates of birth, addresses, family relationships and asset details, all in one place. An attacker who controls the email account can request a password reset on the will service and read the draft will, the asset list and the executor details. The email account guards access to the will account.

## One dedicated alias for the will service

The first measure is to give the will service its own address and nothing else. One dedicated alias, used only for that service, keeps the account isolated from the address used everywhere else. When the alias appears in a breach, it points only at the will service. When it starts receiving spam or phishing, the source is known at once, and the alias can be disabled without touching any other account.

The alias for a will service has to stay alive. The will, the executor contact and future updates all depend on it. [GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/make-will) advises reviewing a will every five years and after major life changes, and each review runs through the email address on the account. An alias that lapses breaks that chain. A short-lived address must never be used for an account holding a legal document; the alias is the account address, and it stays active for as long as the will exists.

The alias has a limit. It hides the real inbox address from the will service and from anyone who sees the account, but it does not hide the account holder from the service itself, and it does not hide the will from the probate process. The will is a legal document. The executor, the court and the beneficiaries will see it. The alias protects the email address, not the identity of the person making the will.

<Callout type="warning" title="Keep the alias active">
The alias for a will service is a permanent address, not a short-lived one. When it lapses, update reminders and executor contact stop, and the link between the will and the email account breaks.
</Callout>

## Sign-in security for the email account

The alias forwards mail to a real inbox, and that inbox needs a strong, unique password and two-factor authentication. A password used on any other service is a weak point, because a breach anywhere else hands over a working password. Two-factor authentication adds a second check, usually a code from a phone or an authenticator app, so a stolen password alone does not open the account. Recovery details on the inbox also need to be current, so a locked-out account can be recovered without the will service address.

## How AliasFleet fits

AliasFleet provides dedicated email aliases that forward to a real inbox. A will service gets its own alias, used only for that service, and the alias stays active for as long as the will exists. When the alias appears in a breach or starts receiving unwanted mail, the source is visible at once, and that single alias can be disabled without affecting any other account. The free plan includes 10 active forwarding aliases and 1 verified destination inbox, and the Pro plan costs $12 a month with unlimited active aliases. [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) states that it does not read or store email contents: messages are processed in memory and forwarded to the destination inbox.

An alias does not secure the email account behind it, and it does not replace a legacy plan. The inbox still needs a strong unique password, two-factor authentication and current recovery details, and the executor still needs Apple Legacy Contact or Google Inactive Account Manager set up in advance.

## Legacy access for the email account

A will alone does not open an email account after death. [Trust & Will](https://www.trustandwill.com/learn/what-happens-to-your-email-account-after-you-die) explains that an email account can be listed as a digital asset in a will, and that the Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act gives executors access to digital assets after death in almost every US state. Access is not automatic, and the content of messages gets extra protection. [Kinly's guide to digital estate planning](https://kinlyplan.com/learn/digital-estate-planning) states that in almost every state an executor can generally manage digital accounts but can read message content only with written permission, given through a platform tool or in the will.

Apple's Legacy Contact lets a person choose one or more people to access data in their Apple Account after death. [Apple Support](https://support.apple.com/en-au/102631) states that the contact needs the access key generated at setup plus a death certificate to request access, and that data in iCloud Keychain, including passwords, passkeys and payment information, is excluded. Access lasts three years from when Apple approves the first request, after which the account is permanently deleted, as [Apple's request page](https://support.apple.com/en-us/102678) confirms. Apple states it cannot replace a lost access key, so a printed copy belongs with the estate papers.

Google's Inactive Account Manager works on a timer rather than a death certificate. The account holder picks a waiting period of 3, 6, 12 or 18 months of inactivity and names up to 10 trusted contacts, who are notified and can download the data allocated to them. The [setup guide](https://www.afterlife.ai/google-inactive-account-manager) notes that contacts receive a one-time data download, never the login, and that Google may delete an account after two years of inactivity under its separate inactive-account policy. The timer is the weakness to plan around: when the family needs access two weeks after a funeral and the timeout is 12 months, the tool cannot be hurried.

[Emergency Binder's guide for families](https://www.emergencybindernow.com/blog/digital-estate-planning-for-parents) makes the same point from the family's side: most families assume the executor can call Google or Apple with a death certificate and get in, and that often works for closing an account, while getting the contents is harder. The tools have to be set up before they are needed, and the executor has to be told they exist.

| Tool | Trigger | What the contact gets | Limit |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Apple Legacy Contact | Death certificate plus access key | Account data, excluding iCloud Keychain | Access ends after three years |
| Google Inactive Account Manager | 3, 6, 12 or 18 months of inactivity | One-time data download, never the login | Account may be deleted after two years of inactivity |

## Validity of the will

The email setup protects the account, but the will still has to be valid. An online will can be legally valid, as [Uswitch's guide](https://www.uswitch.com/life-insurance/guides/writing-a-will-online/) states, as long as it meets the required formalities. In the UK that means the document must be printed out and signed in the physical presence of two witnesses to be legally valid, even when the will was written entirely online. The witnesses must both be present when the maker signs, cannot be beneficiaries, and cannot be married to or in a civil partnership with a beneficiary.

The [RNLI's free online will-writing service](https://rnli.org/pages/testing/gg/leave-a-gift-in-your-will/free-wills-services/online-will-writing-service), run with Co-op Legal Services and Farewill, follows the same pattern: the online form takes about 15 to 20 minutes, a specialist checks the will, and the document must then be printed and signed in front of two witnesses. Electronic signatures for wills are not accepted. GOV.UK sets out the same requirements and adds that a will cannot be amended after it has been signed and witnessed; changes need a codicil, signed and witnessed in the same way, or a new will. The rules above cover the US and the UK; readers in other jurisdictions need local advice.

## Passwords and the order of work

Passwords do not belong in a will. Kinly states this plainly: a will that goes through probate is filed with the court, and once filed it is part of a court record. Passwords also change, while a will is hard to update. The password list belongs in a password manager with an emergency access plan, or in a separate sealed record that the executor can find, and the will itself should only say where that record is kept.

The will should also record the decision about the email account itself. When the executor is meant to read the email content, that consent should be written in the will, because without it the executor may be able to close the account but not read what is in it. When the account is meant to be deleted and never read, that should be written down too.

The work runs in this order:

1. The dedicated alias for the will service is created and used at signup.
2. The email account's password, two-factor authentication and recovery details are checked.
3. The platform legacy tool that matches the email provider is set up, and the executor is told it exists.
4. The will is completed, printed, signed in front of two witnesses, and the signed original is stored somewhere the executor can find.
5. The executor's email consent is written into the will, and passwords are kept out of it.

[J.P. Morgan's behavioural science piece](https://www.jpmorganchase.com/newsroom/stories/kreisler-will) notes that fewer than one in three American adults has a will, according to Pew Research Center, and that procrastination is the main barrier.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Email Aliases</category><category>Estate Planning</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Signing Up for Tutoring</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-tutoring</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-tutoring</guid>
      <description>A tutoring signup pairs a student with a stranger tutor. One alias per platform keeps payment and lesson mail contained and names the source if it leaks.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A tutoring signup pairs a student with a stranger tutor for one-to-one sessions. The protection is one alias per tutoring platform, the parent's address as the account address for a child, and tutor contact kept on the platform.

## Signup data collected

A tutoring account starts with a name, an email address and payment details. Preply's privacy policy, updated 1 June 2026, states that a registered student submits login credentials, first name, last name and email, and that Preply may also collect a phone number, Skype ID or social network ID, time zone, interface language, IP address and device type. The [Preply privacy policy](https://termsofuse.preply.com/terms_of_use/en_PrivacyPolicy.pdf) lists those fields as part of registration.

The address then carries booking confirmations, lesson reminders, messages from the tutor, payment receipts and password resets. A general course signup carries mostly course content and marketing mail, as the [courses guide](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-courses) sets out.

## Parental account for a child

For a child under 13 in the United States, the parent is the account holder, not the child. The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act requires operators of services directed to children under 13 to obtain verifiable parental consent before collecting personal information from the child. The [FTC COPPA FAQ](https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/resources/complying-coppa-frequently-asked-questions) states that covered operators must give parents direct notice and obtain that consent before collection, with limited exceptions. A court can hold an operator liable for civil penalties of up to $53,088 per violation. The COPPA Rule was amended in 2025, as the [Federal Register notice of 22 April 2025](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/04/22/2025-05904/childrens-online-privacy-protection-rule) records, adding biometric identifiers and government-issued identifiers to the definition of personal information and updating the notice, consent, security, deletion and retention obligations.

The [K12 Tutoring terms](https://tutoring.k12.com/terms-of-use/), last updated 21 July 2026, require a parent or legal guardian to create the account for a child younger than 13, and require a responsible parent or legal guardian to supervise all sessions for a student younger than 18.

Varsity Tutors states in its [privacy notice](https://www.varsitytutors.com/privacy), effective February 2025, that the site is not directed at children under 13, that parents may supply a child's name or age to facilitate the connection with a tutor, and that parents may review or have deleted personal information previously provided.

U Tutors Academy states that a child under 13 cannot register alone. A parent creates an account, adds the child as a profile with a display name, a username and a birth year, and the service does not ask for the child's email address. Its [children's privacy notice](https://practice.ututorsacademy.com/children-privacy) states that consent uses the card-payment method of the COPPA Rule, and the child cannot practise until the parent consents at checkout.

The parent's address is the account address. The child needs no address of their own for tutoring, and the alias for a platform is created on the parent's account.

## Tutor contact on the platform

The platform matches the student with the tutor, and the first contact happens through the platform.

Wyzant recommends in its tutor safety guidance that written communication happen via Wyzant Messages, because both parties are protected under its Terms of Use in scheduling misunderstandings, pricing questions, lesson cancellations and payment disputes. Those protections do not apply to communication outside the platform. The [Wyzant tutor safety page](https://support.wyzant.com/tutors/messaging/some-straight-talk-about-tutor-safety/) states that email addresses may be shared only if the student has payment information on file.

Varsity Tutors' privacy notice states that in matching it may share a student's information with the professional who will provide the tutoring, so that the professional can evaluate the engagement and personalise the instruction. The platform does that sharing under its notice, rather than the parent handing an address to a tutor.

Messages stay inside the platform's own messaging system, and the signup address remains the only address the tutor holds. A request from a tutor to move to personal email can be declined, because the platform already provides the channel.

## Learning platform leaks

Breaches of learning platforms have exposed email addresses. A tutoring record joins the address to a child's name, a subject, a schedule and a payment record.

Multicampus, a Samsung training subsidiary, reported unauthorised access to the cloud used for its Learning Platform on 9 November 2026. About 70,000 trainee records may have been involved, including names, phone numbers and email addresses. The company notified client companies and Korea's Personal Information Protection Commission on the night of 11 November. The [Multicampus breach record](https://breachhistory.com/blog/multicampus-data-breach-november-2026) notes that the exact scale was still under investigation.

A claim from the same month, still unverified, concerns a larger set of records. A threat actor claimed a database of more than 7 million student account records allegedly linked to HOCMAI, a Vietnamese online education platform, containing email addresses, names, phone numbers and residential addresses, offered as a free download. The [HOCMAI report](https://undercodenews.com/hocmai-data-leak-threat-actor-claims-exposure-of-more-than-7-million-vietnamese-student-accounts-raising-serious-child-privacy-concerns-video/) states clearly that the claim has not been independently verified and does not establish that HOCMAI experienced a confirmed security incident. The figures are therefore reported here as a claim, not as a confirmed breach.

Once an address is exposed, phishing mail can name the platform, the subject and the lesson schedule. A separate address per platform does not prevent the leak, but it makes the follow-on mail visible, because mail about one platform arrives at one address.

## One alias per tutoring platform

Each tutoring platform gets a separate alias, created before signup and labelled with the platform name. Booking confirmations, lesson reminders, tutor messages routed through the platform and payment receipts for that platform arrive through that alias and forward to the real inbox. Marketing from that platform stays in the same stream, apart from mail from other platforms and from the main inbox.

If unwanted mail starts arriving on the tutoring alias, the alias names the source. The parent can unsubscribe from marketing on that alias, filter it, or close it after the lessons end. The [therapy guide](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-therapy) uses the same structure, with a separate alias per therapy platform keeping session and billing mail in its own stream for the life of the care relationship.

The alias stays in place for the full run of lessons. Lesson reminders, schedule changes, tutor messages and payment receipts keep arriving while lessons continue, so the alias stays open until the lessons end, the account is closed properly, and any final receipts or records have arrived. Closing the alias during lessons would cut off login codes and lesson reminders.

## AliasFleet addresses for tutoring signup

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides email aliases as managed, persistent forwarding addresses. One alias serves one website, with a one-click control to disable an alias. For tutoring signup, a platform gets a separate alias, and booking, lesson and payment mail from that platform arrive through that alias. The alias stays open for the full run of lessons. If the alias starts receiving unwanted mail, it can be disabled after the lessons end. The main inbox address is never given to the platform, so marketing and breach follow-on mail for that platform never reach the main inbox directly.

The free tier includes 10 active aliases, 1 verified destination inbox and 3 managed subdomains, with 50 MB of monthly forwarding bandwidth, as listed on the [AliasFleet pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing). AliasFleet does not hold the tutoring record and does not replace the platform.

## What the alias cannot do

The alias is the account address, not anonymity from the tutor. The tutor still knows who the student is, because the parent gives a name, the child's age or school year, and payment details at signup. The alias keeps the address out of the tutor's personal contact list, but it does not hide the student from the tutor.

An alias does not stop a tutoring platform collecting the name, payment details and lesson history entered at signup. It does not make the student anonymous to the platform or the tutor, it does not remove data already shared or sold, and it does not encrypt the mail. An alias controls the handover of the address, nothing else.

No verified count of tutoring platforms that reject alias addresses at signup was found for this article. Some platforms may refuse an alias domain. That gap is stated here rather than filled with a guess.

An alias also does not replace checking what was already exposed. An address used for tutoring signups for years stays in past mail, and a check on [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) establishes what already happened before the alias system limits what happens next. A separate address per platform makes that check precise: a hit on one platform address points to one platform, while a hit on a main address shared across many platforms points everywhere at once. Each platform alias can be checked on its own, so a past exposure is traced to the platform it came from.

| Mail contained by the alias | What the alias does not change |
| :--- | :--- |
| Booking confirmations and lesson reminders | Name, payment details and lesson history held by the platform |
| Tutor messages routed through the platform | The tutor knowing the student by name |
| Payment receipts | Data already shared or sold |
| Password resets and login codes | The login credentials, which the alias only delivers |
| Marketing from that platform | Exposure from a past breach |

<Callout type="info" title="Closing the alias">
The alias stays alive while lessons run. It is closed only after the lessons end, the account is closed properly, and final receipts and records have arrived.
</Callout>

The setup contains the mail channel. The platform record, the tutor relationship and the payment history stay where the signup put them.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Tutoring</category><category>Email Aliases</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>KARTE breach leaks 79,249 emails and client data</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/plaid-karte-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/plaid-karte-data-breach</guid>
      <description>PLAID confirmed a 13 November intrusion into its KARTE platform leaked 79,249 account emails, integration keys and client data. KARTE remains shut down.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The PLAID KARTE data breach confirmed 79,249 KARTE account email addresses leaked after an intrusion on 13 November 2026, and client notices since then put tens of millions of customer records at risk. PLAID Inc. of Tokyo, operator of KARTE, confirmed the leak in a filing on 16 November 2026. All KARTE services have been shut down since 13 November, with no restart date decided.

PLAID Inc., listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange Growth market under code 4165, is not the United States financial data company also called Plaid. The 79,249 confirmed addresses are the KARTE account addresses of staff at client companies, not customer addresses.

## The intrusion

Early on 13 November 2026, a third party exploited a vulnerability in a PLAID server and stole the credentials used to connect to PLAID systems and databases, according to [PLAID's filing of 16 November](https://tdnet-pdf.kabutan.jp/20261116/140120261116581662.pdf). The attacker used the stolen credentials to read data out of the databases and other stores, then took over a PLAID account to reach the KARTE administration console. PLAID detected the unauthorised access at 08:59 Japan time the same day. It invalidated the stolen credentials, began shutting down its servers at about 14:27, switched all KARTE services to maintenance mode, and blocked communications from the source of the attack. PLAID said containment was complete by about 15:23 on 13 November, with no further unauthorised access found since the attack source was blocked.

On 13 November, PLAID issued a first notice of unauthorised access and stopped every KARTE function. On 15 November, PLAID said the affected environment had been cut off from the network and that it had begun contacting the customers concerned. On 16 November, PLAID published the TDnet filing confirming what had leaked. The [KARTE status page](https://status.karte.io) continued to show every component in major outage through 18 November.

## Data confirmed leaked

PLAID listed three categories confirmed to have leaked. The first is 79,249 email addresses registered to KARTE accounts. The second is the credentials used to integrate KARTE with external services, including secret keys and access tokens, for clients that had set up integrations through KARTE. The third is part of the customer data that client companies imported from their own records for use in KARTE, including data imported through KARTE's Linked Table feature. PLAID said the exact numbers for the second and third categories are currently under investigation.

The contents of the third category vary from client to client, because each client decides which fields to import, and PLAID said the imported data may include personal information depending on those fields. PLAID warned that if the credentials are not revoked, unauthorised access to the connected services may result in unintended data being written to them, data leakage or other damage, so it asked every client using KARTE integration features to revoke the relevant credentials as soon as possible.

![PLAID's 16 November 2026 notice, "Notice and Apology Regarding the Leakage of Information Potentially Including Personal Information Due to Unauthorized Access": the 13 November intrusion and the first confirmed leak category, 79,249 email addresses registered to KARTE accounts](/blog/plaid-karte-data-breach/notice.png)

## Client disclosures

Published client counts reached over 62 million records by 18 November, according to [SecurTek](https://securteksecurity.com/news/plaid-karte-breach-79249-emails-client-data), but that figure sums published maximums, not a victim count.

<Callout type="warning" title="Counting rule">
The client counts in this section cannot be added together. They cannot be added to the 79,249 confirmed KARTE account emails either, because one person can appear in several client lists at once. Each client figure is a maximum of records that may have leaked, not a confirmed count of records taken. The only confirmed total is PLAID's 79,249.
</Callout>

| Client company | Records reported | Data reported |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| DHC | About 19.11 million | Names, dates of birth, email addresses; no payment card data |
| JINS | Up to about 18.29 million | Member IDs, emails, surnames, DOBs, ages, genders, postcodes, prefectures; no passwords or cards |
| Golf Digest Online | Up to about 6.97 million | Member records |
| Shimamura | About 7 million | DOBs, gender, prefecture, postcode; about 50,000 family records; no names or emails confirmed leaked |
| Francfranc | Up to about 5.98 million | Member records, plus about 4 million online purchase records |
| RIZAP | Up to about 4.32 million | ZAP ID email addresses, about 60,000 with names |
| Club Tourism | About 4.06 million | Internet member records |

DHC, the cosmetics maker, disclosed on 18 November that about 19.11 million customer records had leaked after the KARTE access. The records included names, dates of birth and email addresses. No payment card information was included. DHC said PLAID notified it on 13 November. JINS Holdings, parent of the eyewear chain JINS, disclosed on 17 November that up to about 18.29 million member accounts may have leaked. PLAID told it on 15 November that its customer data had leaked from KARTE. [RIZAP disclosed on 17 November](https://finance.biggo.com/news/7dee54a2-935b-43e3-83a6-eea6d22776f6) that email addresses for up to about 4.32 million registrants of ZAP ID may have leaked. ZAP ID is the shared login for chocoZAP, RIZAP and their online shops, and about 60,000 of the records included a name. Passwords, payment data, addresses, phone numbers and birth dates were not included. [Shimamura disclosed on 17 November](https://cybersixt.com/originals/plaid-shuts-down-karte-platform-after-unauthorised-access) that about 7 million member records may have leaked, covering dates of birth, gender, prefecture and postcode, plus about 50,000 family records, and said that as of 15:00 on 17 November it had found no leak of names or email addresses.

Other clients reported smaller figures. The [SmartScope disclosure list](https://smartscope.blog/en/blog/japan-data-breach-list-tier-2026-09-10/) records CAMPFIRE at 5,819,779 member records and WealthNavi at about 910,000 customers. [Ain Holdings reported about 2.6 million members for AINZ and TULPE and AYURA](https://japancyberwatch.com/articles/japan-marketing-saas-breaches-2026). [MeetsMore reported 60,000 people whose name, email address, phone number or date of birth may have leaked, plus 3,398,469 members exposed by ID and prefecture only, and Schoo reported 27,088 business administrator email addresses](https://smtpedia.com/plaid-karte-breach-79249-emails-integration-keys-mineo/). OPTAGE, operator of the mineo mobile service, said on 16 November that mineo customer email addresses may have leaked; it has stopped using KARTE and will notify affected customers individually. [Nikkei Inc. said](http://www.nikkei.co.jp/nikkeiinfo/en/news/announcements/1576.html) it was notified by PLAID on 15 November and that email addresses, telephone numbers, gender and year and month of birth of Nikkei Online Edition users may have leaked, with the data processed so that it could not be restored; no card information was included and no misuse had been confirmed. Confidence Interworks, WORLD and Stripe International also reported exposure. Stripe noted that data from a service that stopped using KARTE in June was still held by PLAID.

Three financial firms also disclosed KARTE exposure, but their records contained no email addresses: MUFG Bank reported about 6.5 million records limited to gender, age and region, MUFG Trust Bank about 230,000 records noting only whether an email was registered, and Mitsubishi UFJ Morgan Stanley Securities about 280,000 records of gender and age classifications only.

## AliasFleet and the KARTE breach

AliasFleet provides one managed email alias per service, so each service receives a different forwarding address for the same inbox. When an alias appears in a breach, the address itself identifies the service that leaked it, and the alias can be paused or deleted without changing any other service's address. [Email aliases are a standing measure, not a response to a single incident](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe). AliasFleet does not prevent a vendor breach such as the KARTE incident, and it cannot remove an address from data that has already leaked. What it changes is the next leak: an address created for one service cannot be reused to impersonate the owner at another service, and a leaked alias can be closed while the other aliases keep working.

## PLAID's response and the KARTE shutdown

PLAID said it has contacted each affected client company individually and will continue to do so as new findings emerge. It reported the matter to Japan's Personal Information Protection Commission and is consulting the police. PLAID said it plans to commission an external security investigation and forensic analysis before resuming services, and that it will announce measures to prevent a recurrence based on the findings. It has not yet decided when KARTE services will resume. PLAID's status page showed at 10:59 Japan time on 18 November that it was still sending affected companies the leaked customer data on request, was working out how to contact the customers its investigation had identified, and had no date to restore KARTE. DHC said it is contacting affected customers individually, and OPTAGE warned mineo customers that suspicious emails may follow.

## Protective measures for affected people

PLAID warned that emails impersonating PLAID may be sent to the leaked KARTE account addresses, and said not to open links or attachments in unexpected emails or enter login information. The same caution applies to mail claiming to be from any client named in this article: a message that arrives soon after a breach notice and asks the recipient to click a link or confirm account details should be checked against the company's own published notice. For people whose address appears in the leaked data, the practical measures are the ones described in [what to do when an email address is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach): check whether the address appears in known breach data, and change the password on any service where the same combination was reused. Passwords were not reported as leaked in the JINS or RIZAP disclosures. The leaked email addresses are now available for phishing and credential stuffing where the same password was reused elsewhere.


Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Open questions about the intrusion

Several questions remain open. PLAID has not named the vulnerability that was exploited, and has not said how long the attacker was inside its systems before 13 November. The exact number of leaked integration credentials and affected imported client records are both still under investigation, and the full list of affected client companies is still growing. Client notices were still appearing on 18 November, including DHC's disclosure that day of about 19.11 million customer records. No confirmed misuse of the leaked data, and no external publication of it, had been reported by 18 November. PLAID said it will announce new facts promptly.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breaches</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Japan</category><category>KARTE</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>StubHub International breach may have exposed emails</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/stubhub-international-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/stubhub-international-data-breach</guid>
      <description>StubHub International warned customers that unauthorised access in late October and early November may have exposed names, email addresses and phone numbers.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[StubHub International has warned customers of a data breach affecting customers of the ticket resale platform, after unauthorised access to certain systems between late October and early November 2026. Names, email addresses, phone numbers and country or regional settings may have been accessed. The company, operated by Ticketbis S.L., has found no evidence that account passwords, banking information or payment card details were accessed, and no evidence that the exposed information has been used fraudulently. No victim count has been disclosed. The disclosure was made through customer notification emails rather than a public notice page, and the company did not respond to press questions about the scale of the incident.

## Customer notification emails

[Pollstar](https://news.pollstar.com/2026/11/17/stubhub-international-announces-data-breach/) reported the breach on 17 November 2026, and [The Register](https://www.theregister.com/cyber-crime/2026/11/18/stubhub-international-warns-customer-data-may-have-left-the-venue/5310775) followed on 18 November 2026 with details from the customer notification emails. The emails state that StubHub International detected unauthorised access to certain systems on its platform between late October and early November 2026. Pollstar described the same window. It reported that names, email addresses and phone numbers were exposed. Payment information and passwords were apparently not part of the breach.

The precise dates inside the late October to early November window have not been published. No attack vector has been disclosed. No public notice page from the company was available at the time of writing, so the customer notification emails, as quoted by The Register, are the only primary material for the disclosure. The Register asked StubHub International for more information, including how many customers were affected, and received no response.

## Data affected

The customer notification emails list four categories of information as potentially affected: names, email addresses, phone numbers and country or regional settings. The company describes the information as potentially affected and states that it may have been accessed. Exfiltration has not been confirmed, and the company has not stated that exfiltration is ruled out.

| Data | Status stated by the company |
| :--- | :--- |
| Names | May have been accessed |
| Email addresses | May have been accessed |
| Phone numbers | May have been accessed |
| Country or regional settings | May have been accessed |
| Account passwords | No evidence of access |
| Banking information | No evidence of access |
| Payment card details | No evidence of access |

The notification email states: "To date, we have found no evidence of unauthorised access to account passwords, banking information or payment card details. We also have no evidence that the compromised information has been used fraudulently." The statement records what the company has found so far. It does not confirm that the data was untouched, and it does not confirm that any data left the company's systems.

## Company apology and containment

StubHub International apologised for the intrusion in the notification emails. The company said it had addressed certain vulnerabilities while containing the incident and was continuing to monitor for suspicious activity. Outside cybersecurity experts are assisting with the ongoing investigation, according to The Register.

<Callout type="warning" title="Company warning">
The notification email warns: "However, there is a risk that third parties could use this information to attempt fraud, identity theft or phishing through emails, messages or calls that appear to come from StubHub International or other trusted organizations."
</Callout>

The warning covers email, messages and phone calls. It names fraud, identity theft and phishing: a message that looks as if it comes from StubHub International itself.

## Steps for notified customers

Customers who received the notification email can check whether their address appears in a known breach, using [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) or the steps in [which website leaked my email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/which-website-leaked-my-email). A result there confirms that the address is circulating in a known breach. It does not confirm that StubHub International data left the company's systems, because the company has not confirmed exfiltration.

The company says it found no evidence that passwords were accessed, so a StubHub password change is not required by this incident on its own. Customers who reused the same password on other services should change it on those services, because a reused password is the risk that travels between sites. Two-factor authentication on the StubHub account and on the email account behind it reduces the value of any credential an attacker holds.

Incoming messages need extra care in the weeks after the disclosure. Any email, text message or call claiming to be from StubHub International that asks for login details, payment information or a verification code should be treated as suspect. The safe route is to open the StubHub site or app directly rather than following a link in the message. Customers who receive a suspicious message can report it through the guidance in [how to check if an email is phishing](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-an-email-is-phishing), and the wider steps after any breach are set out in [what to do when your email is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach).

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Phishing risk

An email address on its own does not give an attacker access to an account. Paired with a name, a phone number and a country setting, it gives an attacker the material for a convincing impersonation. The attacker does not need the password when the target can be persuaded to hand over a code, click a link or call a number. The mechanics of how a leaked address is turned into a phishing lure are covered in [how phishing uses a leaked email address](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email).

StubHub International customers receive messages from the company often. They already expect emails from the company about orders, tickets and refunds. A fake order confirmation or refund notice fits the pattern of mail they already receive. The company itself says the exposed information could make subsequent scams more convincing. Customers who receive a message claiming to be from StubHub International in the weeks after this disclosure should treat it with more suspicion than usual. They should check any link or request against the address they already have for the company, rather than trusting the message in front of them.

## StubHub International ownership and history

StubHub International is a separate business from StubHub in the United States and Canada. Pollstar reports that the two companies are separate and unaffiliated. Digital Fuel Capital bought StubHub International from Viagogo in 2021, after the Competition and Markets Authority required the international business to be sold.

The company has had regulatory trouble in 2026 already. In June 2026, the Competition and Markets Authority fined Ticketbis £889,200 and ordered refunds exceeding £590,000 after finding that mandatory fees were omitted from upfront ticket prices.

The 2014 StubHub incident is a different case and should not be confused with this one. In July 2014, when StubHub was owned by eBay, a ring used credentials taken from other breaches to take over more than 1,000 StubHub accounts and buy tickets fraudulently. That was credential stuffing against customer accounts, not an intrusion into the platform's systems, and it involved a different company structure over a decade ago.

## Remaining unknowns

The investigation is ongoing, with outside cybersecurity experts assisting. What is still unknown is substantial: how many customers were affected, how the attackers gained access, whether any data was actually taken from the systems, whether a regulator has been notified, and which countries the affected customers are in. The company has not published a public notice page, and it has not answered press questions about the scale of the incident.

The confirmed facts at the time of writing are narrow. Unauthorised access happened between late October and early November 2026. Names, email addresses, phone numbers and country or regional settings may have been accessed. Passwords, banking information and payment card details show no evidence of access. Nothing more has been confirmed. The next facts will come from the company or from a regulator.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>StubHub</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Phishing</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Can You Use an Email Alias for Epic Games? Yes, With Care</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-epic-games</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-epic-games</guid>
      <description>An email alias works for an Epic Games account when the address is plain and stays live. Epic ties the account, its purchases and recovery to that address.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[An email alias works as the contact address on an Epic Games account when it is a plain name@domain address, the provider is not blocked by Epic, and it keeps receiving mail. Epic Games accepts such an address at signup. The address then carries verification mail, resets, two-factor codes, receipts and alerts for the life of the account. One Epic account unifies play across PlayStation, Xbox, Nintendo Switch, PC and mobile. Its email address holds the purchases, progress and recovery route. Signup is straightforward, but the address must still receive mail years later, when the library attached to it is worth keeping.

## What Epic Games accepts at signup

Epic documents three reasons a signup address is refused. The first is the shape of the address. Epic refuses sub-addresses. Its support page for the "email address you entered does not appear to be valid" error names john+123@gmail.com and j.ohn@gmail.com. A Gmail plus-address such as name+epic@gmail.com fails at the form. The [guide to what Epic accepts and blocks](https://tmailor.com/blog/en/article/40826-temp-mail-for-fortnite.html) records the same three reasons. It notes Epic gives no reason for refusing sub-addresses.

The second reason is the provider. Epic can block an email provider "for abusive behavior", in its own words. It does not publish which ones. Its Terms of Service and Epic Games Store EULA, as checked by Tmailor in July 2026, name no address type as banned. There is no blanket rule against aliases. The AliasFleet guide on [when a service will not accept an alias email](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/when-a-service-wont-accept-your-alias-email) covers the general pattern. The domain's reputation decides, not the fact that the address is an alias.

The third reason has nothing to do with email. United States trade restrictions bar account creation from Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Syria. Epic's own support pages could not be opened directly while this article was written. These rules rest on independent guides that quote them. The [Epic Games help centre](https://www.epicgames.com/help) is the entry point those guides cite.

## One address, one account

Epic permits one Epic Games account per email address, and a second account cannot be created on an address already in use. The rule shows up in console setup. Promoting a console account with an email already tied to another Epic account produces an "email already in use" error. The [guide to multiple Epic accounts on one email](https://orbispatches.com/gaming-faq/can-you-have-more-than-one-epic-account-with-the-same-email) describes the same failure.

Steam works differently: the same email address can be used on more than one Steam account, as the AliasFleet guide on [using an email alias for Steam](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-steam) covers. On Epic, one address means one account.

There is no way back from a split: Epic offers no account merging, and Player Support cannot merge two Epic Games accounts on request. Progress and purchases cannot be moved between accounts. A player who builds a library on the wrong account keeps the split.

## Console accounts without an email

The Epic account is where saved data lives, not the linked console account. The [Shared Wallet and cross-save guide](https://instafortnite.cz/articles/fortnite-shared-wallet-and-cross-save-explained/) puts it that way. Linking a PlayStation, Xbox or Nintendo account to an Epic account makes purchases and progress available across every linked platform, V-Bucks excepted. Unlinking removes access to that data from the console.

Console play creates a second problem. A player who starts Fortnite on a console and skips signing in gets a headless account, also called a nameless account. It has no email, no password, no display name and no first or last name. The console creates it automatically, as a [guide to nameless Fortnite accounts](http://orbispatches.com/gaming-faq/what-is-a-nameless-fortnite-account) defines it. It works on that console only. It cannot use features that need an email. A full account needs an email address not already in use on another Epic account. Nintendo adds a further lock. Only one Nintendo Account can link to an Epic account, and it cannot be switched after unlinking.

## V-Bucks and the Shared Wallet

V-Bucks, the Fortnite currency, do not follow the same rule. Purchased V-Bucks on PlayStation, Xbox, PC, mobile and cloud gaming pool into the Fortnite Shared Wallet. It is a single balance spendable across those platforms. V-Bucks purchased on Nintendo Switch are not shared with other platforms and cannot be used in the Fortnite Web Shop. The [guide to V-Bucks transfers between platforms](https://www.theclick.gg/do-fortnite-v-bucks-transfer-between-platforms/) sets out the same split.

Earned V-Bucks behave differently. Those earned through Fortnite Passes, Quest Packs or Save the World are shared across all platforms, including Nintendo Switch. V-Bucks purchased on PC by players in Korea are not shared.

The lock applies to the currency, not to what it buys. Any item purchased with V-Bucks is available on all platforms. The item belongs to the Epic account, not to the platform balance.

## AliasFleet and Epic Games

AliasFleet provides managed email aliases that forward mail to a permanent destination inbox. An Epic Games account can use one as its contact address. The alias receives verification mail, two-factor codes and purchase receipts, which are then forwarded to the destination inbox. The Free tier includes 10 active aliases, 50 MB of monthly forwarding and two-way reply forwarding. Pro at $12 a month adds unlimited active aliases, as listed on the [AliasFleet pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com).

AliasFleet does not change Epic's rules. One email still means one Epic account. An email change still needs the old inbox and still carries the 90-day cooldown. A blocked provider domain is still Epic's decision.

## Email verification and two-factor authentication

Email verification is the first gate. Epic states that two-factor authentication cannot be enabled until the email address is verified. Email is one of the two-factor methods Epic offers, alongside authenticator apps and SMS codes. Verification unlocks two-factor authentication. That unlocks gifting, competitive play and some free Epic Games Store titles.

Two-factor authentication is required to send gifts in Fortnite, to enter Fortnite competitive events, and to claim some free games on the Epic Games Store. An account whose email cannot be verified cannot use those features at all.

Email codes are the weakest second factor on offer. The AliasFleet guide on [receiving two-factor codes at an email alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-receive-two-factor-authentication-codes-at-an-email-alias) sets out why: codes expire in minutes, and a deleted alias stops receiving mail at once. The safer setup is an authenticator app as the main second factor. Email codes serve as a backup. The alias stays live regardless. Players under 13 get a Cabined Account, and the consent request goes to a parent's real inbox, not to an alias.

## Changing the address on an Epic account

Changing the email on an Epic Games account needs access to both the old and the new address. The account holder signs in, opens Account Settings, and clicks Edit beside the email address. Epic sends a 6-digit security code to the old address and a verification link to the new one. Both must be completed. The [guide to changing an Epic Games email](https://www.downelink.com/change-epic-games-email/) sets out the same steps. It notes the change cannot be done again for 90 days once the new email is verified.

<Callout type="warning" title="The 90-day cooldown starts at verification">
Once the new email is verified, the address cannot be changed again for 90 days. A mistyped address locks the account to it for three months.
</Callout>

Without access to the old inbox, the self-service route is closed. The account holder must go through Epic Support with proof of ownership: display name, account creation details, last login, games bought, and platform used. Epic then verifies identity manually. The [Epic account email security guide](https://www.sawahits.com/handle-your-epic-games-account-email/) puts the manual case at several days, against 5 to 15 minutes for a standard verified change. That timing is a third-party estimate, not an Epic figure.

## Getting back into the account

A linked console or social login is a side door back in after a takeover. When the email has been changed, signing in with a linked PlayStation, Xbox, Nintendo or social login often works while the email path is dead. Otherwise the route is a hacked-account request through Epic Games support, supplying the original email, display name, last login, purchase history and linked accounts. The [recovery guide for hacked gaming accounts](https://www.virtwave.com/blog/hacked-gaming-account-recovery-2026) records the same route and evidence list. The wait is days and ticket-based.

Epic does not allow buying or selling accounts. An email change after a purchased account changes hands can trigger a permanent suspension. A check of the address on [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) shows whether it has appeared in a breach. An alias limits the damage to the one service that received it.

## Testing the alias

The honest limit is the evidence. No verified report was found of a named alias provider being accepted or rejected by Epic. No figure exists for how often alias-based verification fails there. The rules above are documented. The reliability of any one alias with Epic is not. That is the reason to test it.

The test is to create the alias, register or move the Epic account to it, and confirm the verification email arrives. The account holder then requests a password reset and confirms that arrives too, signs in from a new device, and confirms the two-factor code arrives in time. An authenticator app is enabled as the main second factor while the alias is new. The alias is then left alone: it is not paused or deleted, and the destination inbox is not allowed to lapse. The AliasFleet guide on [using an email alias for account recovery](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery) states the same condition. Recovery succeeds only while the alias stays in service at least as long as the account it guards.

A short-lived address fails this test by design. Its inbox expires, and with it go the password reset, the email change and the recovery route. Epic does not transfer entitlements between accounts. A library on an account nobody can recover stays there.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Aliases</category><category>Epic Games</category><category>Gaming</category><category>Account Security</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Can You Use an Email Alias for PlayStation? Yes, One Alias</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-playstation</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-playstation</guid>
      <description>A PlayStation Network account takes one email address as its sign-in ID. A managed alias works for that role if it stays active for the life of the account.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[An email alias can serve as the sign-in ID on a PlayStation Network account: the sign-in ID is a single email address, and a managed alias is a valid email address, so it meets the requirement. The alias has to remain active for as long as the account is in use, because PlayStation sends password resets, recovery links and suspension notices to it, while digital purchases remain tied to the buying account. No published PlayStation rule against alias addresses was found.

## The sign-in ID

PlayStation defines the sign-in ID as the email address used to sign in to PlayStation Network. According to [PlayStation support](https://www.playstation.com/en-us/support/account/change-sign-in-id-email/), every account has one unique sign-in ID, and email is the primary channel between PlayStation Support and players. The support page gives three uses for the address: verifying the account, protecting the account details, and keeping the player informed about account information, and recommends an up-to-date, accessible address.

The sign-in ID differs from the online ID, the public name shown to other players. Unlike [Steam](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-steam), where the account name signs the user in and the email is a contact address, PlayStation makes the email address the credential itself.

Verification mail goes to the address given at account creation. The sign-in ID can be changed afterwards, on the console or through Account Management on the web. The PS5 path runs through Settings, Users and Accounts, Account, then Sign-in ID; the web path runs through Account Management, Security, then Edit beside Sign-In ID. PlayStation emails a verification link to the new address and a notice to the old one, and the change signs the account out on every device.

## One email address per account

A single email address serves a single PlayStation Network account, and two accounts cannot share one sign-in ID. The [Sony Account Terms of Service](https://www.account.sony.com/resources/lc/docs/sony_terms-of-service_en-gb.pdf) put the rule in direct terms: a user may not create two or more Sony accounts with the same sign-in credentials, including the same email address or phone number.

The rule allows one stable alias on one PSN account. Aliases used to open further accounts around Sony's policies sit outside it. A [Games Learning Society guide](https://www.gameslearningsociety.org/wiki/can-2-psn-accounts-have-the-same-email/) reports that opening multiple accounts with false information to circumvent Sony's policies could bring suspension or a ban. Sony's terms also allow termination in two cases: an account left unaccessed for two years or more, or one Sony cannot contact after detecting an invalid email address. A failed alias can therefore endanger the account itself, not only its recovery mail.

## Recovering the account

Recovery passes through the sign-in ID. PlayStation's [Account and Security page](https://www.playstation.com/en-us/support/account/) sets out the route: open the Account Management sign-in page, choose Trouble Signing in, then Recover Your Account, and enter the sign-in ID. PlayStation emails a secure link to that address, which the account holder follows to supply the requested information and set a new password. The same page covers a lost address: when the sign-in ID is forgotten or the recovery email cannot be opened, the account holder has to go through PlayStation Support.

Reset and recovery mail goes to the address on file. When that address stops forwarding, the mail never arrives and self-service recovery closes. The AliasFleet guide on [using an email alias for account recovery](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery) gives the general rule: an alias helps recovery while it works and blocks it when it fails. The PlayStation case carries higher stakes than most: the email address is the sign-in credential as well, so a lost inbox removes the login name and the recovery route together.

## Purchases and the account

PlayStation digital purchases are licensed to the buying account and do not transfer to another account. Sony's US terms, quoted in a [UMA Technology guide](http://umatechnology.org/what-happens-to-your-games-and-purchases-if-you-lose-access-to-your-psn-account/) on losing PSN access, say a PlayStation Store order buys a personal licence for private, non-commercial use, and that the licence is generally non-transferable. The same guide quotes the warning that deleting or closing an account may mean losing access to purchased content. A new account cannot recover the old library: the purchases remain with the original account.

Console sharing changes who can play the games. PS5 Console Sharing and Offline Play lets other users of the console play the buying account's games and media even offline, and activating a primary console does the same on PS4. Sharing depends on the owning account staying active on the console, and the licences still belong to the buyer. A dead alias that locks the holder out of the buying account locks the library as well, even with the games stored on the console. PlayStation Plus follows the same pattern: some benefits extend to the primary console, while others remain with the subscribing account.

## AliasFleet and PlayStation

AliasFleet supplies managed email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox. An alias made for PlayStation acts as the PSN sign-in ID, and PlayStation mail lands in the destination inbox. The alias remains active while the holder keeps it active, and one click switches it off if unwanted mail starts arriving. Switching it off also stops PlayStation mail, so an alias in use as a sign-in ID should stay switched on.

The Free tier covers 10 active forwarding aliases, 3 personal subdomains, 1 verified destination inbox, 50 MB of monthly forwarding bandwidth, and two-way reply forwarding, according to the [AliasFleet pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing). The Pro tier covers unlimited active aliases and 5 destination inboxes with 1 GB of monthly bandwidth, at $7 per month under the Founder's Club offer. AliasFleet does not open PlayStation accounts, manage PSN sign-in, or recover PSN accounts; PlayStation handles those functions. The product supplies the address and the forwarding; PlayStation supplies the account.

Setup matches any other service, as described in the AliasFleet guide on [how to use email aliases](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-use-email-aliases) and the guide on [how to set up an email alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-set-up-an-email-alias). The alias goes in as the sign-in ID at PSN account creation or at a sign-in ID change, and the PlayStation verification email arrives in the destination inbox. The same pattern works on other platforms, including [Netflix](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-netflix).

## The plus-address trick

Gmail plus addressing is the best-known way to reuse one inbox across two PSN accounts: a tag such as +psn goes before the @ sign, so name+psn@gmail.com and name@gmail.com both reach the same inbox. Reports say the method works with PlayStation in some cases and not in others. A Games Learning Society guide says plus-address aliases count as unique addresses on many platforms, including PSN, and adds that it might not always work because Sony's systems sometimes detect aliases. The detection claim comes from a third-party report, not from a PlayStation statement.

The tag stays visible in the address, so anyone who sees the sign-in ID can remove it and reach the real inbox. The method also ties the PSN account to one provider's addressing quirk instead of an address the holder controls. A dedicated alias avoids both problems: it is a full address in its own right and forwards to any inbox the holder picks. It should still serve one PSN account only, because Sony's terms forbid two accounts sharing sign-in credentials.

## Short-lived addresses for PlayStation

A short-lived address fails a PlayStation account after sign-up. It passes the first check, because PlayStation only needs it to receive the verification email, but it fails at the next password reset, recovery link or suspension notice, when the address no longer exists. The holder is left with the support route, proving ownership to PlayStation Support with account details.

<Callout type="warning" title="One alias, one account">
An alias used as a PSN sign-in ID must stay active for the life of the account. Disabling it or letting it expire cuts off password resets and recovery mail, and Sony may terminate an account it cannot contact. One alias serves one PSN account. Aliases must not be used to create extra accounts around Sony's rules.
</Callout>

A managed alias is a permanent forwarding address under the holder's control, kept active for the life of the account. A short-lived address expires by design. The AliasFleet guide on [what an email alias is](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-is-an-email-alias) describes the managed case. An expiring address should never serve as the sign-in ID for an account holding purchases.

## Two-step verification on PlayStation

Two-step verification on PlayStation does not use email: codes arrive by SMS or through an authenticator app once the feature is set up. PlayStation also supports passkeys as a sign-in method. Setup issues 10 one-time backup codes, and a verification code stays valid for 10 minutes after the sign-in attempt, according to PlayStation's Account and Security page. Two-factor codes sent to an alias are covered in the AliasFleet guide on [receiving two-factor authentication codes at an email alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-receive-two-factor-authentication-codes-at-an-email-alias).

Two-step verification uses a second check at sign-in. The password on the alias's destination inbox deserves the same attention. A compromised inbox lets an attacker reset the PSN password through the emailed link. Checking the alias address on [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com), which listed 1,052 pwned websites and 17,858,376,246 pwned addresses on 18 November 2026, shows whether it has appeared in a breach. An alias confines breach damage to the one service that received it. Alias safety generally is covered in the AliasFleet guide on [whether email aliases are safe](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe).]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Aliases</category><category>PlayStation</category><category>Gaming</category><category>Account Security</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Separate Alias Protects Email for a Home Cleaning Service</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-a-home-cleaning-service</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-a-home-cleaning-service</guid>
      <description>A cleaning service sends a stranger into the home on a recurring basis and holds keys and alarm codes. One alias per platform keeps its booking mail contained.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Protecting email for a home cleaning service means using one managed alias for each cleaning platform instead of the main personal address. A cleaning account holds the owner's name, email address, home address, phone number and payment details, and the platform shares personal information with the service professionals who carry out the booking. Cleaning takes place inside the home on a recurring basis, and the cleaner holds keys and alarm codes. A separate alias for each platform confines that platform's booking mail to one address and identifies the source of any leak from its list.

## Details collected at signup

[Handy's privacy policy](https://www.handy.com/privacy), last updated 22 June 2023, describes the data held by Angi Inc. and its affiliates. Identifiers run to full name, contact details including email address, mailing address and phone number, user account information, and credit or debit card information. Commercial information covers records of services purchased or considered, including details about the home such as the number of bedrooms and the servicing instructions.

[TaskRabbit's Global Privacy Policy](https://blog.dolly.com/privacy/), last updated 7 October 2024, describes the same pattern. Contact information runs to first and last name, physical address, telephone number and email address, and booking information covers the task, time, date and location.

Smaller cleaning firms collect the same categories in plainer language. [Handy Cleaners' privacy policy](https://handycleaners.com/privacy-policy/) lists name, address, date of birth, contact details, payment information and household details. The email address is the account on every one of these platforms: login, booking channel, receipt route and password reset route in one.

## Recipients of the booking details

Handy's privacy policy states that personal information is disclosed to service providers that assist with business operations, including payment processing, customer service, communications delivery, background check services, analytics and marketing, and to service professionals that perform and fulfil service requests and orders. Booking partners that support the services also receive information about the services booked.

TaskRabbit's policy states that personal information is used to contact the user and deliver transactional information, administrative notices and marketing notifications by email, SMS or push notification.

A cleaning booking is not a one to one exchange with a single cleaner. The address sits in the platform's records, in the records of the service professionals who fulfil the booking, in the systems of the payment processor, the background check provider and the communications provider, and in the records of any booking partner. Each copy is a separate place the address can leak from. The policies do not always state whether the email address itself reaches the individual cleaner or only the company, so this article states what the policies do say and claims no more.

## Background checks and their limits

Both large platforms screen the people they send into homes. [Handy's terms of use](https://www.handy.com/terms), last updated 8 July 2024, state that Handy checks the backgrounds of professionals via third party background check services, that screening happens solely when the professional applies to register and/or after a professional completes their first job, and that Handy cannot and does not warrant that screening information is up to date, with no obligation to update it.

The limits of that screening have been tested in court. In September 2016 the District of Columbia Attorney General sued Handy Technologies, alleging that the company misled consumers about the effectiveness of its background checks on the contractors it sends to clean homes. Between March 2015 and June 2016, 24 DC customers filed police reports alleging that cleaners booked through Handy stole property from their homes, according to [DCist](https://dcist.com/story/16/09/16/handy-cleaning-lawsuit/).

A background check vets the person, not the address. The platform still holds the email address, booking details still reach the service professionals through it, and a breach of the platform's records still exposes it.

## Keys and alarm codes

> Keys and alarm codes are handled separately from email and are never sent by email. The code the cleaner uses is arranged with the company office, through a dedicated user code, or through a lockbox the owner controls.

The cleaner holds the keys and the alarm codes, and returns on a recurring basis. Cleaning companies describe the arrangements in plain terms. [Happy Maids](https://happymaids.com/blog/top-3-safety-advantage-of-hiring-happy-maids/) advises leaving the alarm code and the disarm steps with the office rather than texting them to a cleaner, and creating a dedicated user code for the cleaning company where the panel supports separate user codes. A lockbox holding a key, a garage or door keypad code, or a key kept on file at the office are the arrangements the company lists. The safest are the ones the owner can change at any time.

[Broombook's key policy guide](https://broombook.com/guides/cleaning-business-key-policy) sets the same order of preference: a smart lock or keypad code first, then a lockbox at the client's home, then the client letting the cleaner in, with the company holding the key as the last resort. A key received by the company is tagged with a code that means nothing to an outsider, such as K-117. It is never tagged with a name or address. [Exclusive Pro Cleaning](https://exclusiveprocleaning.co.uk/keys-alarms-pets-letting-cleaner-while-you-are-work/) gives the same advice: give the cleaner their own alarm code where possible, do not share the main code, and tell the monitoring company the cleaner will be in the house at the agreed times.

## One alias per cleaning platform

The setup is one managed alias per platform: a separate forwarding address for Handy, another for TaskRabbit, another for any local cleaning service. Booking confirmations, receipts and reminders for one platform all arrive on that platform's alias. The alias is created before signup, labelled with the platform name, and stays active while the account exists and any booking, payment, claim or review is still open.

The arrangement confines a leak to one platform: a leak at one platform does not expose the addresses used elsewhere. It also identifies the source of unwanted mail: marketing mail or spam arriving on the alias given to one platform points to that platform. The alias can be paused or replaced once the platform is no longer used, without changing the main inbox address. The guide on [what to do when an alias starts getting spam](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-an-alias-starts-getting-spam) covers the pause and replace step, and the guide on [which website leaked an email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/which-website-leaked-my-email) covers tracing a leak back to its source.

A unique password on each cleaning account stops a leak at one platform from opening the others, and two factor authentication stops a password alone from opening an account.

## AliasFleet for cleaning service accounts

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides managed email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox. Each cleaning platform gets a separate alias, and every alias forwards to the same destination inbox, so booking mail from all platforms arrives in one place while each platform holds a different address. Replies travel back through the alias, so the destination address stays out of the platform's records. The free tier includes 10 active aliases, 1 verified destination inbox, 3 managed subdomains and 50 MB of monthly forwarding, according to the [AliasFleet pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing). Pro includes unlimited active aliases and vendor leak detection.

An alias does not make the cleaning platform secure, and it does not stop a platform from being breached. A breach of the platform's records exposes the name, home address, phone number and payment details alongside the alias, whatever address the owner gave. An alias does not hide the home address, the dates of the clean or the key and alarm arrangements from the platform or the cleaner, because both need those details to arrange the visit, and it does not stop the platform sharing the address with the suppliers who need it.

The banking rule is unchanged. A bank account keeps a permanent real address used only for financial accounts, because recovery, statements and fraud alerts depend on it. The cleaning alias covers the platform signup and its booking mail, never the bank account identity. An alias does not secure the key or the alarm code, because those are never sent by email.

## Recurring access and the vendor list

A cleaning service is a recurring subscription, so the platform holds the address month after month and the customer list grows with every booking. No breach of a cleaning platform's customer email list was found in this research, and this article claims none.

In November 2026, [Who Gives A Crap](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/who-gives-a-crap-data-breach) told customers that an unauthorised party had accessed a third party marketing software provider and may have viewed customer names, email addresses, phone numbers, postal addresses and total spending. Access began on 30 October, was detected on 31 October and was secured on 1 November. No victim count was published, and no payment details or passwords were involved. The company's own systems were not the entry point; a provider holding a copy of the customer list was.

## Phishing aimed at cleaning customers

A cleaning account also attracts phishing, because messages around a booking are expected and trusted: a booking confirmation, a rescheduling notice, a receipt and a review request all arrive by email, and a message that mimics one reads as routine. The [Federal Trade Commission](https://consumer.ftc.gov/articles/what-know-about-identity-theft) advises that personal information should not be given to someone who calls, emails or texts out of the blue. It also advises adding two factor authentication to accounts that offer it.

[Hong Kong's InfoSec guidance on spam](https://www.infosec.gov.hk/en/best-practices/person/protecting-against-spam-emails) states that spammers collect email addresses and verify that they are valid before sending spam, advises using separate email addresses for different purposes wherever feasible, and advises deleting mail from unknown senders rather than replying, because a reply confirms that the address is valid. US fraud prevention guidance at [efraudprevention.net](https://efraudprevention.net/home/education/default.aspx?a=350&z=0) gives the same separation advice: one address for important personal and financial accounts, and a separate address or email alias for lower priority registrations.

An alias does not stop phishing on its own, and it does not verify a sender. It makes the phishing visible: a message about a cleaning booking that arrives on the cleaning alias is in the right place, while a message about a booking that arrives on an address the platform never had is plainly wrong. The owner can also check the address on [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) after signup.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Home Cleaning</category><category>Email Aliases</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Signing Up for Babysitting</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-babysitting</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-babysitting</guid>
      <description>A babysitting account holds a home address, payment details and children&apos;s ages and routines. One alias per platform keeps booking mail contained.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Protecting an email address at babysitting signup means using one managed alias for each platform instead of the main personal address. Signup collects the parent's name, email address, home address, date of birth, phone number and payment card details, and the job posting adds the number and ages of the children, the schedule and the location. The platform then passes booking information to a sitter the family has never met, and care takes place in the family home. A separate alias for each platform confines that platform's booking mail to one address. It identifies the source of any leak and keeps the main inbox address out of the platform's records. The same pattern applies to [pet sitting signup](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-pet-sitting), but babysitting adds children's data, background checks and child-safety rules to the record.

## What a babysitting platform collects at signup

Account information under [Care.com's privacy policy](https://www.care.com/about/privacy-policy/), last updated 30 July 2026, runs to first and last name, email address, home address, gender, birthday and phone number. Payment information covers payment method details, including account number, expiration date, security code and billing address. A job posting adds the type of care, the schedule, the location, the hourly rate, the number and ages of children, and a narrative job description. Health information can also appear in a posting if the parent chooses to include it.

[Care.com's help centre](https://help.care.com/families/s/article/Do-people-see-my-personal-information?language=en_GB) states that the only private information publicly visible on the site is the parent's first name, the first initial of the last name, and the town and postcode area. Contact information stays private until the parent shares it with a provider through private messaging. Anything posted in a job posting is visible to site visitors and other members, and anything included in messages with other members is visible to them.

<Callout type="warning" title="Job posts are visible to all">
[Care.com's care seeker FAQ](https://www.care.com/en-ca/care-seeker-faq) repeats the warning: job posts are visible to all, and parents are told not to include a phone number, email address, last names, children's names, specific locations or addresses in them.
</Callout>

[Sittercity's privacy notice](https://www.sittercity.com/mobile/privacy) describes the same pattern on a second platform. It collects name, email address, postal address, zip code and mobile number, plus location, demographic information, photographs, video, and credit card and bank information. A visitor to the site sees a profile containing first name, last initial, age, city, state and photograph, and a connected user sees full contact information. The notice carries a last-revised date of 27 December 2019, so its stated practices may be out of date. On both platforms the email address is the account: login, booking channel, receipt route and password reset route in one.

## What the babysitter sees

Booking information goes from the platform to the sitter once a booking is made or accepted. Care.com's privacy policy states that information is disclosed to other registered users and corporate providers as part of the service, and that the contents of communications between care providers and care seekers count as sensitive personal information under its California section. The sitter needs the home address, the dates and the children's routine to do the work, so those details are shared by design, not by accident. The [Care@Work privacy notice](https://www.care.com/connect/careatworkeventcare/privacy) shows the same data flowing through employer sponsored care. The guide on [how to protect an email when booking vet care](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-booking-vet-care) deals with a different record, the pet medical record held by a clinic.

## How babysitting platforms check sitters

Both large platforms screen sitters in different ways, and the screening has stated limits. [Care.com's help centre](https://help.care.com/families/s/article/What-is-a-CareCheck-1) states that all individual caregivers who can be hired on the site must complete the Care.com Background Check, run by the vendor Sterling/First Advantage using the caregiver's legal name, permanent address, birth date and Social Security number. The check includes a Social Security number trace, a National Sex Offender Public Website search, a multi-jurisdictional criminal database search, and a federal and county criminal records search, with annual criminal checks while the caregiver remains active.

The same page states the limits plainly. Background check results are not shared with families. Successful completion of the check does not necessarily mean the caregiver has no criminal history. Checks are not always 100 percent accurate and may not reveal a person's entire criminal history. Employees of businesses who message families through the platform may not be background checked at all. Families can buy a more thorough check: the [Premium Background Check](https://www.care.com/about/safety/background-checks/premium-background-check/) adds driving record history and wider county and state research, and the [Continuous Background Check](https://www.care.com/about/safety/background-checks/continuous-background-check/) adds monthly monitoring of the sex offender registry and criminal databases for premium members. [Care.com's background check page](https://www.care.com/about/safety/background-checks/care-com-background-check/) gives the same list of searches and the same annual recheck.

Sittercity takes the opposite position. Its [terms of use](https://www.sittercity.com/mobile/terms), effective 24 October 2025, state that Sittercity does not screen users or conduct any identity or background checks, and does not employ, recommend or endorse users. Users are responsible for conducting any background checks themselves. A background check vets the person, not the address: the platform still holds the parent's email, booking details still reach the sitter through it, and a breach of the platform's records still exposes it. Vetting and email privacy are separate jobs.

## Setting up the alias for babysitting

The setup is one alias per babysitting platform, created before signup and used for that platform only. Booking confirmations, receipts, schedule changes and messages from the sitter all arrive on that alias and forward to the parent's inbox. The alias stays live while the family uses the service and while any booking, payment, claim or review is still open. If spam or phishing starts arriving at the alias, the parent pauses or replaces that one alias. The main inbox and every other account stay untouched. The platform's list is the only place that alias exists, so the source of the leak is named by the address itself.

Children's names, schools and routines stay out of email. The job posting carries the number and ages of children and the schedule, because the platform needs them to match a sitter, but the children's names, the school name and the daily routine stay out of email and out of the posting. Working details are handed over in person, not through a message that can be forwarded or copied. Vetting stays a separate step: interviews, reference checks and a supplemental background check, as described in [Care.com's background check guidance](https://help.care.com/families/s/article/What-is-a-CareCheck-1).

## AliasFleet for babysitting signups

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides managed email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox. A parent creates one alias for each babysitting platform and uses it at signup; mail forwards to the main inbox, and replies go back through the alias so the main address is never exposed. [AliasFleet's pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing) lists a Free tier with 10 active forwarding aliases, 3 personal subdomains, 1 verified destination inbox, 50 MB of monthly forwarding bandwidth and two-way reply forwarding, and a Pro tier at $7 a month under the Founder's Club price, with unlimited active aliases, 1 GB of monthly bandwidth and vendor leak detection. Vendor leak detection flags the alias when it appears in a breach. AliasFleet does not vet sitters, run background checks or verify identities; that work stays with the platform and the parent.

## Recorded exposures in the childcare sector

This research found no breach of Care.com or Sittercity customer email lists, and this article claims none. Children's data has been exposed in the wider childcare sector, and the data types involved match what a babysitting account holds.

In September 2025, the Kido International nursery chain disclosed a ransomware incident in which a criminal group claimed to have accessed and leaked personal data relating to about 8,000 children and staff, including photographs, dates of birth, home addresses and parent contact details. The group, identified in reporting as Radiant, posted sample profiles of ten children on a dark web leak site and later claimed to have deleted the stolen data, a claim that has not been independently verified. Two 17-year-olds were arrested on 7 October 2025 in connection with it. The full account is recorded at [Kido International cyberattack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kido_International_cyberattack).

The record that leaked was the ordinary account record: names, photographs, dates of birth, home addresses and parent contact details. The scale of breached email addresses in general is large. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) listed 1,052 pwned websites and 17,858,376,246 pwned addresses when checked on 18 November 2026, a count of account records rather than people, as [Password Statistics](https://www.passwordstatistics.com/) notes in its November 2026 summary.

## Children's information and the law

Children's personal information carries stronger legal protection than an adult's. In the United States, the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act is enforced by the Federal Trade Commission through the COPPA Rule. The [FTC's guide for parents](https://consumer.ftc.gov/articles/protecting-your-childs-privacy-online) states that the rule covers services directed to children under 13, and general-audience services that know they collect a child's personal information. Covered services must notify parents directly and obtain verifiable parental consent before collecting, using or disclosing a child's personal information. Personal information under the rule includes a child's full name, address, phone number or email address, physical location, photos, videos and audio recordings, government identifiers, biometric identifiers and persistent identifiers that track activity over time and across sites. The 2025 amendments took effect on 23 June 2025, with compliance due on 22 April 2026, and added separate parental consent for disclosures to third parties, according to the [COPPA summary](https://www.kiteworks.com/risk-compliance-glossary/coppa-childrens-online-privacy-protection-act/) and the [Microblink glossary](https://www.microblink.com/resources/glossary/childrens-online-privacy-protection-act/).

## Phishing aimed at families

An email address that a babysitting platform holds is also an address that can be phished. A message that names the platform, the children's ages or the booking dates looks like it comes from the service the family already uses. The alias does not stop phishing, but it changes what a phish can do: mail that arrives at the babysitting alias can only have come through that platform's list, so a message claiming to be from a different service and arriving at that alias is visibly wrong.

## Where an alias does not help

An alias limits exposure, it does not remove it. The platform still holds the parent's name, home address, phone number and payment details, and the sitter still receives the home address and the children's routine, because the service cannot work without them. An alias does not stop the platform sharing data with its vendors or payment processors, and it does not stop a sitter copying details out of a message. The alias names the source of a leak and contains the damage to one address.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Babysitting</category><category>Email Aliases</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Rakuten Securities breach may expose 4.47m accounts</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/rakuten-securities-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/rakuten-securities-data-breach</guid>
      <description>Rakuten Securities says data for up to 4.47 million accounts, including email addresses and withdrawal bank details, may have leaked from a test environment.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[On 17 November 2026, Rakuten Securities, an online broker, said customer information held in a test environment system may have leaked after unauthorised access by a third party. The possible exposure reaches two tiers. For up to about 4.47 million accounts, the data that may have leaked includes email addresses, declared income and withdrawal bank details. Login IDs for up to about 11.25 million accounts may also have leaked. None of this is confirmed. Every figure in the company's notice is stated as up to and may have been leaked.

![Rakuten Securities' 17 November 2026 notice, "Apology and Notice Regarding Possible Leakage of Customer Information": the possible leak dates, the two tiers of up to about 4.47 million and 11.25 million accounts, and the warning that its emails contain no URLs](/blog/rakuten-securities-data-breach/notice.png)

## Disclosure and timeline

The notice, titled "Apology and Notice Regarding Possible Leakage of Customer Information", went out on 17 November 2026. In it, the company said possible unauthorised access to part of its systems came to light on 16 November. Access was cut off. Checks after that pointed to information in a test environment system that may have leaked on 11 November. What caused the incident, and how the attacker reached the test environment, remain under investigation. The notice gives no answer to either question. It also leaves two others unanswered: why customer data sat in a test environment system at all, and why five days passed between the possible leak on 11 November and its discovery on 16 November.

[Rakuten Securities published its notice on 17 November](https://www.rakuten-sec.co.jp/web/info/info20261117-02.html). [NHK WORLD reported the disclosure the same day](https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/news/20261117de77429/), with [Jiji Press](https://jiji.com/jc/article?k=2026111701254&g=eco) and [Reuters](https://finance.yahoo.co.jp/news/detail/b92bd91afa7f7f7c68ece3c5e621fcfcae6f883d) covering it on 17 November as well. NHK reported that Rakuten Securities held more than 15 million customer accounts as of 2 November 2026. A total of about 15.72 million accounts is the figure Jiji Press headlined, a number reached by adding the two figures in the notice, 11.25 million and 4.47 million. The addition double counts, because accounts in the smaller tier also carry the branch code, customer code and login ID of the larger tier. The two figures describe different data items for overlapping accounts, so they cannot simply be added together.

## What data may have leaked

Two tiers of exposure appear in the notice. The first covers up to about 11.25 million accounts. For those accounts, the data that may have been taken stops at the branch code, the customer code and the login ID. The company said the login ID is separate from the Rakuten ID used across Rakuten Group services. The second tier covers up to about 4.47 million accounts, former customers who closed their accounts included. For those accounts, the data that may have been taken runs far wider, and the full list is quoted in [Cybersixt's report on the disclosure](https://cybersixt.com/originals/rakuten-securities-data-breach-may-have-exposed-4-47m-accounts).

| Data item | First tier (up to 11.25m accounts) | Second tier (up to 4.47m accounts) |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Branch code and customer code | Yes | Yes |
| Login ID | Yes | Yes |
| Name in kanji and kana | No | Yes |
| Date of birth | No | Yes |
| Address | No | Yes |
| Phone number | No | Yes |
| Email address | No | Yes |
| Employer | No | Yes |
| Bank account registered for withdrawals (bank, account number and holder) | No | Yes |
| Declared annual income and financial assets | No | Yes |
| Holdings by product | No | Yes |
| Date of last login | No | Yes |

Taken together, the second tier amounts to a near complete profile of an investor. It holds identity, contact details, employer, the bank account used for withdrawals, declared income and assets, and holdings by product. The email address in that set is the item that opens the next stage of the attack. A message sent to a verified address tied to a named person, a known broker, a known bank and a known income band is harder to dismiss than a generic message. Rakuten Securities warned customers about fake contact claiming to come from the broker. Cybersixt, reporting the notice, puts the warning this way:

> "Rakuten Securities says its emails contain no links and that it never asks for personal or login details by phone."

That warning is in the notice itself. What did not leak, as far as the company has confirmed, is the information needed to trade: Rakuten Securities said it has not confirmed any leak of login passwords, PINs or other information needed to execute trades. It has found no unauthorised logins or trades linked to the incident so far. That position is the company's own statement as of 17 November, and it may change as the investigation continues.

## Why the leaked email addresses matter

One address given to one service and reused across many services cannot be traced to a single source when it turns up in a breach file. An address given only to Rakuten Securities can be traced to Rakuten Securities. No other service holds that address. AliasFleet provides one dedicated email alias per service. Each alias forwards to the user's inbox, and the address handed to a service is unique to that service. When an alias appears in a leaked file, the user can close that alias, while the primary inbox address and the aliases used for other services stay the same.

The alias does not prevent a company from holding customer data, and it does not stop phishing messages sent to an address already given out. It limits the damage to one service, because the exposed address belongs to that service alone and can be closed in one step.

## Apology, customer contact and passkey requirement

Rakuten Securities apologised for the concern caused to those affected. It said it has identified the affected customers. Each of them will be contacted individually. The company said it will keep investigating the cause of the incident and the scope of its impact. It will put measures in place to prevent a recurrence and strengthen its security safeguards.

The company also moved to push customers toward passkey login. Passkey authentication is being made mandatory. More than 90 percent of customers who log in each day already use one, the company said. Passkey login uses fingerprint, facial recognition or another device based check instead of a typed password, so a leaked login ID alone does not open the account. Customers who have not set up a passkey are asked to do so, and they can also temporarily block trading and withdrawals themselves from the security settings page after logging in. [Daiwa Securities disclosed a separate breach in October 2026](/blog/daiwa-securities-data-breach), in which about 110,000 clients' names, email addresses and account numbers were exposed through a vendor's hacked inquiry server, with a different entry point and a far smaller possible scope.

## Customer guidance in the notice

Rakuten Securities set out several measures for customers in its notice. Any email, SMS, call or letter claiming to come from Rakuten Securities or its group companies should be treated as suspect. The company said its emails contain no URLs. It never asks for personal or login details by phone. Links in unexpected messages should not be clicked. Personal details should not be given over the phone to an unexpected caller. Customers who have not set up passkey login should do so. The company is making it mandatory. A login ID on its own is not enough to enter an account once a passkey is in place. Customers who want a stronger stop can temporarily block trading and withdrawals from the security settings page after logging in. The company offers that as a self service option.

The email address itself needs attention beyond this one incident, because an address that appears in a breach file can be reused for phishing for years, and the address in this file is tied to a known broker and a known income band. Checking whether an address appears in known breaches is the first step. The address should be treated as exposed, even while Rakuten Securities has not confirmed the leak. [How credential stuffing works](/blog/how-credential-stuffing-works) explains why a leaked login ID still matters without the password, because the same ID and password combinations get tried across other services. [How an exposed email address leads to identity theft](/blog/how-email-leads-to-identity-theft) sets out the longer chain, from a single leaked address to account takeover attempts elsewhere. [What to do when your email is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach) sets out the steps in order. [How phishing uses your leaked email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email) explains the messages to expect next.

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the checks and passkey setup above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Open questions and regulator reporting

The investigation is still open. The company has not named an attacker, a method of entry, or a reason why production customer data was held in a test environment. It has not confirmed whether any data actually left its systems, only that it may have leaked. It has not said whether the incident has been reported to Japan's Personal Information Protection Commission or the Financial Services Agency, and no regulator statement has been reported. The figures may also change. The notice gives ceilings, up to about 11.25 million accounts for login IDs and up to about 4.47 million for the full personal and financial set, and the company has said it will contact affected customers individually once it has confirmed who they are. Until the investigation reports, the position is the company's own: a possible leak, unconfirmed, with no passwords or trading credentials confirmed exposed and no unauthorised trades found so far.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breaches</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Japan</category><category>Phishing</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Trezor Skladon Data Breach Exposes 27,000 Orders</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/trezor-skladon-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/trezor-skladon-data-breach</guid>
      <description>A breach at Trezor shipping partner Skladon exposed names, emails, phone numbers and delivery addresses for 27,000 orders placed 9 August to 7 November 2026.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Trezor disclosed on 16 November 2026 that a data breach at its shipping partner Skladon exposed personal information linked to approximately 27,000 customer orders placed between 9 August and 7 November 2026. The exposed records include names, phone numbers, email addresses, delivery addresses and purchase details, and [Trezor](https://trezor.io/blog/news/data-breach-at-trezor-shipping-partner-skladon) believes the attacker exported the data. Trezor states its own systems were not compromised, no wallet backups, PINs or passphrases were involved, and customers in the United States were not affected because Skladon does not ship there. Some customers have already reported scam calls.

![Trezor's official notice on the Skladon breach, posted 16 November 2026: the affected orders, the data exposed, and the company response](/blog/trezor-skladon-data-breach/notice.png)

## The breach at Skladon

The breach took place on 7 November 2026 at Skladon, one of the companies that delivers Trezor orders. Skladon notified Trezor of the unauthorised access on 15 November, and Trezor published its disclosure the following day, on its blog and on X. The notice states that Trezor believes the attacker exported data for approximately 27,000 orders, and that the investigation is ongoing. Trezor emailed every affected customer it can still reach, and it informed the relevant data protection authority, which it has not named. A small number of customers who ordered between 9 and 14 August may also be affected, but Trezor states it cannot email them because their details had already been anonymised under its 90-day data retention policy, so it is reaching them through its X post and blog notice instead.

## What data was exposed

The exposed records contain full names, phone numbers, delivery addresses, email addresses, order dates, products purchased and prices paid, the full set of fields listed in Trezor's notice. The count of approximately 27,000 orders is Trezor's estimate, and it may change as the investigation continues. Trezor states that its own systems were not compromised and that customer devices are secure. No wallet backups, PINs or passphrases were involved, because neither Trezor nor Skladon holds them. The breach does not let an attacker move a buyer's cryptocurrency; the exposed data supports impersonation, because a caller who can quote an order can present as Trezor.

## Why the delivery address matters

Each exposed record ties a real name and a home delivery address to the purchase of a device built to store cryptocurrency. That combination lets a scammer quote the exact product and price a customer paid. An unsolicited message can then look genuine. Trezor warned customers to be alert to potential risks to their physical security. It also warned them to treat unexpected contact as suspicious. Letters carrying QR codes were also arriving, according to an X post by Trezor chief commercial officer Danny Sanders, reported by Unchained. Trezor's notice instructs customers who receive a threatening message, or one that makes them feel unsafe, to contact their local police first.

## A third partner breach in 2026

The Skladon breach is the [third time in 2026](https://cointelegraph.com/news/trezor-customer-data-exposed-in-3rd-partner-breach-this-year) that customer data has been exposed through one of Trezor's partners. Trezor's notice acknowledges that this is not the first time a partner incident has exposed customer contact details and addresses, and apologises to those affected again. In August 2026, shipping provider ShipMonk was breached. That incident first appeared to affect about 13,700 customers, and a later investigation found approximately 67,000 additional US customers, including records ShipMonk had said were deleted. [Decrypt](https://decrypt.co/383397/bitcoin-wallet-trezor-third-party-breach-customer-data) reports the total at 80,689 people. The two incidents are distinct, and a notice about one does not cover the other. In September 2026, a separate incident at Brevo, Trezor's marketing email provider, exposed 347,149 email addresses from Trezor's newsletter list, and attackers used Trezor's legitimate email channel to distribute a fake security warning urging recipients to install an app that requested their wallet backups, according to Decrypt. In each case the data sat with a vendor, and the vendor was breached.

## Email addresses and AliasFleet

A unique AliasFleet alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. The alias is the address handed to Trezor, so a future Trezor leak exposes the alias, not the primary inbox address. AliasFleet does not change the delivery address or phone number already exposed in this breach, and it does not hold wallet data, backups, PINs or passphrases. Closing the Trezor alias stops mail to it while other aliases keep working.

## What Trezor is changing

Trezor announced two changes with the disclosure. The first is Anonymous Pickup, a service the company has been building since early 2026. From 16 November, customers in 18 European countries can order with a nickname and an email address and collect the parcel from a locker or pickup point, so their name and home address never reach Trezor. Trezor states it is working on a United States launch as soon as possible. The second change is retention. Trezor states it is working to reduce its order-data retention period from 90 days to 45 days, with the goal of reducing it further. The exposed order window of 9 August to 7 November spans 90 days, the length of the retention period now in place. Trezor also states it is reviewing its third-party partner relationships and the security requirements it places on them.

## Advice for affected customers

The measures below follow the guidance in Trezor's notice. Customers who received Trezor's email and ordered between 9 August and 7 November 2026 should assume their order information was exposed. Customers who ordered between 9 and 14 August and received no email may also be affected. They should apply the same caution.

The first measure is to treat any unexpected contact about the order as suspicious. That covers calls, texts, emails and letters. A caller who quotes the exact product and price is not necessarily genuine. Those details are in the exposed records. Trezor states it will never cold-call a customer or ask for a wallet backup. Any such call is not from Trezor.

The second measure is to check concerns only through Trezor's official support site. Customers should never follow a link, QR code or phone number in an unexpected message. A wallet backup should never be shared. It should never be entered anywhere except on the Trezor device itself.

The third measure is to check whether the exposed email address appears in other breaches. A [guide to what to do when an email address is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach) sets out the password and account steps that follow a confirmed exposure. A [guide to how phishing uses a leaked email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email) explains how the exposed details are used in impersonation attempts. A [guide to whether someone can find a home address from an email address](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-someone-find-my-home-address-from-my-email-address) explains how addresses and email addresses connect in practice. Trezor's advice is to contact local police first if anything received contains a threat or makes the recipient feel unsafe.

If you ordered a Trezor between August and November, your address may be in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Unconfirmed facts and open questions

The investigation is ongoing, and several facts remain unconfirmed. Trezor has not disclosed how the attacker got into Skladon's systems, and no attack vector has been reported by any outlet. Skladon has published no statement of its own, so no account of the intrusion exists from the company that held the data. There is also no published evidence that the exported data has been sold or published anywhere. Whether it has been shared with other parties is unconfirmed. The risk so far is scam calls and impersonation, which Trezor confirms are already happening, and that is the full extent of the misuse on record. The count of approximately 27,000 orders is Trezor's current estimate rather than a final finding, and it may change as the investigation continues. No victim count by country has been published. Trezor states only that the breach is not limited to one region and that US customers are not affected, because Skladon does not ship to the United States. Trezor has informed the relevant data protection authority, but it has not named the authority, and whether the notification will lead to any regulatory action is unknown. Trezor states it will update its notice as it learns more.

The limits of the announced changes are also part of what remains open. The retention cut from 90 days to 45 days is work in progress, not a change already in effect, and the exposed order window shows why the current 90-day period matters: it spans exactly the length of the retention period now in place. Anonymous Pickup covers 18 European countries, and the launch in the United States has no stated date. Customers outside those 18 countries still give a home address with an order. The service still requires an email address and a nickname, so it removes the name and home address from the order without removing every identifier. Trezor states it is reviewing its relationships with third-party partners and the security requirements it places on them. No outcome from that review has been published. The small group of customers who ordered between 9 and 14 August cannot be contacted individually, because their details had already been anonymised, so they learn of the incident only through Trezor's X post and blog notice. Whether the estimate of approximately 27,000 orders includes that group is unstated, since Trezor says only that the group may also be affected. No regulator has commented publicly, and no enforcement action has been announced. All confirmed facts so far come from Trezor's notice, the only primary source, and no independent account of the intrusion exists. Until the investigation closes, the confirmed facts are the ones in Trezor's notice: the dates, the order window, the data types, the belief that the data was exported, and the warning that scam contact has already begun. The notice remains the only primary source.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breaches</category><category>Trezor</category><category>Phishing</category><category>Cryptocurrency</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Best Google Workspace Alternatives in 2026</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/best-google-workspace-alternatives</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/best-google-workspace-alternatives</guid>
      <description>Google Workspace alternatives compared on price, storage and privacy, from Microsoft 365 and Zoho Workplace to Proton, Lark, Fastmail and Nextcloud.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The shortlist of Google Workspace alternatives in 2026 has eight services: Microsoft 365, Zoho Workplace, Proton, Lark, Fastmail, Infomaniak kSuite, Nextcloud Hub and ONLYOFFICE, against Google Workspace Business Starter at $7 per user per month on annual billing. They differ on price, on scope, and on privacy and data control. Microsoft 365 Business Basic is $7.00 per user per month on annual billing, matching the entry price of Google Workspace Business Starter, and Zoho Workplace Standard is $3 per user per month on annual billing, the cheapest full suite verified for this guide. Proton Mail Essentials costs $6.99 per user per month on annual billing and is the privacy-first option, with end-to-end and zero-access encryption. Lark Starter is free for up to 20 users with 100 GB of shared storage.

Fastmail covers email only, and ONLYOFFICE covers documents only. Infomaniak kSuite is a Swiss-hosted full suite priced in Swiss francs, and Nextcloud Hub is a self-hosted suite with a free open source edition. Prices in this guide were read from provider pages in October and November 2026, except where a section states otherwise. Each section states where a figure was not verified against the provider page.

## Google Workspace coverage and pricing

Google Workspace bundles Gmail on a custom domain with Drive storage, Docs, Sheets and Slides, Meet video calls, Calendar, Chat and an admin console. Business Starter is $7 per user per month on annual billing, or $8.40 month to month. Standard is $14 per user per month, or $16.80 flexible, and Plus is $22, or $26.40 flexible. Pooled storage runs to 30 GB per user on Starter, 2 TB on Standard and 5 TB on Plus, and Business plans are capped at 300 users.

Every Business plan includes Gemini after a price rise in early 2025. No free business tier exists. A 14-day trial and introductory pricing for the first 20 users for 12 months are reported in several guides. Plans and limits are listed on the [Google Workspace pricing page](https://workspace.google.com/pricing/).

More than 11 million paying Workspace customers were reported by Google in Alphabet's fourth quarter 2025 earnings. That figure comes from [a secondary comparison](https://www.aboutchromebooks.com/google-workspace-integration-usage-rates/) and was not checked against the earnings release for this guide, so it is carried here as reported rather than verified. A customer base of that size is one reason teams compare alternatives at all: the product is the default in its category. The switching question is usually price, privacy or data control rather than a missing feature. No verified survey or churn data was found to measure those reasons.

## Entry prices and scope

Entry prices and the scope each service replaces are set out in the table below, with Google Workspace listed first for comparison. All prices are list prices from the provider pages linked in each section, read in October and November 2026.

| Service | Entry price per user per month | Free tier | Replaces |
|---|---|---|---|
| Google Workspace | $7 annual | None | Whole suite |
| Microsoft 365 | $7 annual | None | Whole suite |
| Zoho Workplace | $3 annual | Mail Free, up to 5 users | Whole suite |
| Proton Mail | $6.99 annual | None | Email and calendar |
| Lark | $0 annual | Starter, up to 20 users | Whole suite |
| Fastmail | $3 annual | None | Email only |
| Infomaniak kSuite | CHF 1.76 annual | my kSuite, 1 address | Whole suite |
| Nextcloud Hub | $0 self-hosted | Community Edition | Whole suite |
| ONLYOFFICE | $0 cloud Startup | DocSpace Startup | Documents only |

## Microsoft 365

Microsoft 365 comes closest to a full replacement for Google Workspace. Business Basic is $7.00 per user per month paid yearly, matching the entry price of Google Workspace Business Starter. Basic includes web and mobile versions of Word, Excel, PowerPoint and Outlook, plus Teams, Exchange email and 1 TB of OneDrive storage per user. Desktop apps come with Business Standard at $14 per user per month, or the Standard with Copilot bundle at $23.50, while Business Premium with Copilot costs $32.00. The versions without Teams cost less: Basic $5.40, Standard $20.30 and Premium $28.80 per user per month.

[Microsoft raised prices on 1 July 2026](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/blog/2025/12/04/advancing-microsoft-365-new-capabilities-and-pricing-update/). Basic rose from $6 to $7 and Standard from $12.50 to $14, while Premium held at $22 before Copilot was added to the published prices. The 300-user cap on Business plans matches Google Workspace. Plans are listed on the [Microsoft 365 business plan comparison](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/business/compare-all-microsoft-365-business-products).

<Callout type="note" title="How the Microsoft figures were checked">
Microsoft's own plan comparison page returned readable text on 17 November 2026, but the price table is not in the fetched copy, so the prices in this section rest on dated independent reads of that page from September to November 2026, which agree with each other. The no-Teams Standard and Premium with Copilot prices were read directly from [Microsoft's Copilot pricing page](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/copilot/pricing/business-without-teams) the same day, while the no-Teams Basic price of $5.40 rests on dated independent reads.
</Callout>

Against Google, the trade-off is the desktop apps and the Copilot charge. A team working mostly in a browser gets the same $7 entry price and a comparable bundle. A team wanting desktop Office and AI assistance pays $23.50 or more, above Google Workspace Standard at $14, where Gemini is included. Microsoft [states the primary mailbox entitlement for the three Business suites rose from 50 GB to a maximum of 100 GB for eligible users](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/exchange/understanding-the-new-100-gb-mailbox-entitlement-for-microsoft-365-business-suit/4548243) in a 2026 rollout, delivered as an added 50 GB service plan.

## The alias layer

Switching suites does not change the address problem. Every suite in this guide gives each user one mailbox. That mailbox address is then handed to every service the user signs up for, so when one of those services leaks, the same address appears in the leak, and the leak is traceable only to the mailbox, not to the service. AliasFleet adds a separate managed alias for each website, so a leak is traceable to its source and the alias can be paused or deleted without changing the real inbox. An [email alias](/blog/what-is-an-email-alias) is a forwarding address that delivers to the real inbox, and [how email aliases actually work](/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work) explains the mechanism.

The AliasFleet Free plan includes 10 active aliases and 1 verified destination inbox. Monthly forwarding is 50 MB, with two-way reply routing included, and Pro costs $12 per month, or $7 per month in the Founders Club, and includes up to 3 custom domains. The full list is on the [AliasFleet pricing page](/pricing). AliasFleet does not replace a mailbox or a suite, since it sits in front of whichever mailbox the reader chooses, whether that is Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, Zoho or Proton. Readers comparing the suites in this guide can also compare alias services in the [Best SimpleLogin Alternatives](/blog/best-simplelogin-alternatives), [Best Firefox Relay Alternatives](/blog/best-firefox-relay-alternatives), [Best AnonAddy Alternatives](/blog/best-anonaddy-alternatives) and [DuckDuckGo Email Protection Alternatives](/blog/duckduckgo-email-protection-alternatives) guides, and the [/compare index](/compare) and [AliasFleet vs SimpleLogin](/compare/aliasfleet-vs-simplelogin) pages show how the alias services compare directly.

## Zoho Workplace

Of the full suites in this guide, Zoho Workplace is the cheapest. Workplace Standard is $3 per user per month billed annually, or $4 month to month, and Professional is $6 annually or $7 monthly. Standard covers mail, calendar, WorkDrive storage, Writer, Sheet, Show, Cliq chat and Meeting, with 30 GB of mail storage per user. Zoho Mail Lite is $1 per user per month on annual billing only, with 5 GB of storage.

Mail Lite+ costs $1.25 with 10 GB. Mail Premium is $4 per user per month annual only. Up to 5 users on one domain get Mail Free, in select data centres. All of the plans are listed on the [Zoho Workplace pricing page](https://www.zoho.com/workplace/pricing.html).

Zoho is a large suite from a vendor outside the Google and Microsoft ecosystems, so a team that depends on Microsoft file formats or Google integrations tests compatibility before committing. The 15-day free trial applies to the top plan. At $3 per user per month, 20 people cost $60 a month, against $140 for Google Workspace Starter or Microsoft 365 Basic.

## Proton

For privacy first, Proton is the option in this guide. Mail Essentials is $6.99 per user per month billed annually, or $83.88 per year, and $7.99 month to month. The plan covers 15 GB of storage per user, 3 custom domains, 10 addresses per user, calendar, Drive and a document editor. Proton Mail encrypts with end-to-end and zero-access encryption, so mail content is encrypted before it reaches Proton's servers.

Proton is based in Switzerland. A 30-day money-back guarantee is stated on Proton's pricing page. A 14-day business trial is reported in secondary sources and was not verified on that page for this guide. The Mail Essentials plan is listed on the [Proton business mail pricing page](https://proton.me/business/mail/pricing).

Suite depth and the email client are Proton's limits. Proton Workspace Standard, which adds the full suite, appears at $12.99 per user per month in secondary comparison tables and was not provider-verified for this guide. IMAP access needs the Proton Mail Bridge app, as reported in secondary sources. A team that wants the strongest encryption guarantee and a Swiss jurisdiction gets it here, while a team that wants the deepest office suite looks at Microsoft 365 or Zoho first. Proton's approach to email privacy is closer to the reason many readers compare mail services in the first place, and the [Is Gmail safe](/blog/is-gmail-safe) guide covers how Gmail handles the same questions.

## Lark

Lark offers the most generous free start in this guide. Lark Starter costs nothing for up to 20 users, with 100 GB of shared storage, 1,000 automation runs per month and one-to-one video meetings. Basic is $6 per user per month billed annually, covers up to 500 users and includes 5 TB of storage. Pro is $12 per user per month billed annually, covers up to 500 users, includes 15 TB of storage and group video for up to 500 attendees. Mail, calendar, documents, spreadsheets, chat, meetings and approval workflows are all in the suite. The tiers are listed on the [Lark plans page](https://www.larksuite.com/en_us/plans).

ByteDance owns Lark, and data residency is the main concern reported for buyers in the United States and the European Union. The free tier is usable for a small team, which makes Lark the cheapest way to test a full suite. A team that needs a specific data residency guarantee checks the terms for its region before committing.

## Fastmail as the email-only option

Fastmail covers email and nothing else. Business Basic is $3 per user per month billed annually, or $4 monthly, with 6 GB of storage and no custom domain. Standard is $5 per user per month annually, or $6 monthly, with 60 GB of storage, custom domains and Masked Email. Professional is $9 annually, or $10 monthly, with 150 GB of storage and a retention archive.

There is no free tier, although a free trial is reported in secondary sources. Fastmail is Australian, headquartered in Melbourne. The plans are listed on the [Fastmail pricing page](https://www.fastmail.com/pricing/).

With no documents, storage drive or meetings, Fastmail leaves a switching team needing a second service for those. The Masked Email feature in the Standard plan is the closest direct parallel to the alias approach in this guide, because it hands out a separate address per service that can be turned off. For email alone, Standard at $5 undercuts Proton Mail Essentials at $6.99 and Google Workspace Starter at $7.

## Infomaniak kSuite

The Swiss-hosted full suite in this guide is Infomaniak kSuite. Standard is CHF 1.76 per user per month billed annually, with 2 custom-domain addresses per user, unlimited mail storage and 50 GB of kDrive storage. Business costs CHF 7.33 per user per month, with 5 addresses and 3 TB of kDrive. The first year is half price at CHF 3.67.

Enterprise is CHF 13.83 per user per month, with 10 addresses and 6 TB of kDrive. The first year is CHF 6.92. Billing runs in Swiss francs only, so the dollar cost moves with the exchange rate. The plans are listed on the [Infomaniak kSuite page](https://www.infomaniak.com/en/ksuite).

Infomaniak hosts in Swiss data centres. The company is reported to be [majority-owned by a public-interest foundation since May 2026](https://news.infomaniak.com/en/infomaniak-foundation-sovereign-cloud/). One address, 20 GB of mail storage and 15 GB of kDrive come with a reported free my kSuite tier. The Standard price of CHF 1.76 is the lowest entry price for a full suite in this guide, although the exchange rate and the smaller ecosystem are the trade-offs. Another European mail provider is covered in the [Is Kolab Now safe](/blog/is-kolab-now-safe) guide, for readers weighing the same question.

## Nextcloud Hub

Nextcloud Hub covers the self-hosted option. The Community Edition is free open source software under the AGPLv3 licence, charging no licence fee and no per-user fee. The cost is the server, the storage and the maintenance. The team pays for those itself.

Files, Talk calls, calendar, contacts and office documents through Collabora Online are covered by the suite. An Enterprise subscription with support [starts at €71.29 per user per year](https://nextcloud.com/pricing/) for the Standard tier, from 100 users. The Hub and the Community Edition are described on the [Nextcloud site](https://nextcloud.com/).

No other option in this guide puts the data on the team's own hardware, which is the strongest data control available here. It is also the only option that needs real administration, since updates, backups, security patches and uptime are the team's job. Collabora Online Development Edition is free for testing and small teams with no service level agreement, as reported in secondary sources. Without an administrator, updates, backups and patches go unmanaged.

## ONLYOFFICE

ONLYOFFICE covers documents only, with no email, calendar or meetings, so it replaces one part of the suite rather than the whole bundle. DocSpace cloud Startup costs nothing for up to 3 admins, 12 rooms and 2 GB of storage, and it allows unlimited users and guests. Business is $20 per admin per month, with unlimited rooms and 250 GB of storage per admin, while the Docs community edition is free open source software under the AGPLv3 licence. The Docs software-as-a-service Business plan is reported at $8 per user per month. The cloud plans are listed on the [ONLYOFFICE pricing page](https://www.onlyoffice.com/pricing).

For a team that already has email and only wants document editing with strong Microsoft format compatibility, ONLYOFFICE is the right pick. On its own it is not a Google Workspace alternative, because it has no mail or calendar. A mail-only service such as Fastmail or Proton Mail Essentials pairs with it.

## Selection by requirement

Zoho Workplace Standard at $3 per user per month is the cheapest full suite, while Microsoft 365 Business Basic at $7, the same entry price as Google Workspace Starter, is the closest full replacement, covering email, storage, meetings and office apps. Proton Mail Essentials at $6.99 is the privacy-first pick, with Infomaniak kSuite as the Swiss-hosted full-suite alternative at CHF 1.76. The free start is Lark Starter for up to 20 users with 100 GB of shared storage, or Zoho Mail Free for up to 5 users, and the self-hosted pick is Nextcloud Hub. The email-only pick is Fastmail Standard at $5, and ONLYOFFICE is the documents-only pick, paired with a separate mail service.

## Switching costs

No price list shows the switching cost, and moving mail, calendar, documents and shared drives takes time. A failed migration removes the saving from the cheaper plan. The reported trials cover 14 days for Google and Proton and 15 days for the Zoho top plan, and the trial period is the window in which a team tests real mail and real documents before cancelling anything.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Comparisons</category><category>Business Email</category><category>Privacy</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Can You Use an Email Alias for PayPal?</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-paypal</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-paypal</guid>
      <description>An email alias works for PayPal when it is permanent, live, and confirmed. Business accounts hold up to 8 addresses; personal accounts hold 3.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[An email alias can serve as the address on a PayPal account, provided the alias is a permanent forwarding address that stays live and is confirmed inside PayPal. Any working email address qualifies as an account address, so a forwarding alias that keeps delivering mail satisfies the condition. The totals PayPal sets are 8 email addresses on a business account and 3 on a personal account. An added address cannot take money until confirmation is complete.

The address on a PayPal account matters more than the address on a shopping or forum account, because PayPal is a money account. It functions as the login address, the notification address, and the recovery route for password resets and sign-in codes. An alias keeps the real inbox address out of circulation, but the identity of the account holder stays exactly as PayPal holds it.

## Address limits on PayPal accounts

The limits are totals for each account, not allowances on top of a primary address. PayPal's help page gives 8 email addresses for a business account and 3 for a personal account. Money sent to any address on the account reaches the same PayPal balance, so a buyer or a client who pays the alias is paying the account itself. A payment sent to an address that has not been added can still be claimed, by adding that address to PayPal. The figures come from [PayPal's help page on payment addresses](https://pep.paypal.com/ie/cshelp/article/what-email-address-should-my-customers-use-to-send-payments-help275), and the recovery of a payout sent to an unlinked address is described in [Freecash's support guide on wrong PayPal addresses](https://freecash.com/academy/en/support/withdrawal/issues/wrong-paypal-email-address).

PayPal's help pages are locale mirrors, so the figures may vary by country. A single address can sit on one PayPal account at a time. Account guides report that an address attached to one account cannot be added to a second until it has been removed from the first. Money sent to an address owned by someone else, who then claims it, cannot be recovered. The primary email cannot be removed until another address has been made primary.

## Adding and confirming an address

The path for adding an alias is the same as for any address. On the web, the holder opens Settings. From Emails, the holder clicks +Add, types the address, and clicks Confirm. In the app, the route runs from the profile menu through Contact info to Emails, where Add a New Email begins the same confirmation. [PayPal's help page for adding, removing, and updating an email address](https://pep.paypal.com/mh/cshelp/article/how-do-i-add-remove-or-update-an-email-address-on-my-paypal-account-help135) sets out the steps.

Adding and confirming are two separate steps. PayPal sends a confirmation email to the new address without being asked, and the holder follows the link, enters the PayPal password, and clicks Confirm. Confirmed addresses take payments, which then appear in the PayPal balance, while an address that has not been confirmed cannot receive money. The flow is set out on [PayPal's help page for confirming an email address](https://www.paypal.com/ar/cshelp/article/how-do-i-confirm-my-email-address-help138?locale.x=en_AR).

Delivery is tested before money depends on the alias. After the alias is added, a verification or reset message is requested, and its arrival in the destination inbox proves the forwarding route works end to end. A forwarding route has more parts than a plain mailbox, so a failure in any one of them looks the same from PayPal's side: a confirmation email that never arrives.

## Login and recovery through the address

The address on the account carries password resets, sign-in codes, dispute notices, and payment notifications. Two-step verification adds a second check at sign-in, set up with an authenticator app through a web browser rather than the PayPal app, as set out on [PayPal's help page for two-step verification](https://www.paypal.com/pn/cshelp/article/what-is-2-step-verification-and-how-do-i-turn-it-on-or-off-help167). An emailed code still goes to the address on file, so an alias that stops forwarding breaks sign-in as well as the reset route.

Deleting the alias breaks the route immediately. A password reset requested after the deletion never reaches the holder, and the account stays open while the holder has lost the email route PayPal uses for sign-in verification and dispute handling. The same permanence condition applies to recovery addresses generally, as set out in the AliasFleet guide to [using an email alias for account recovery](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery), and the address is worth checking against [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) for any appearance in a breach file.

The AliasFleet position is that a bank receives a permanent real address used only for financial accounts, never an alias, because recovery, statements, and fraud alerts depend on it, as set out in the guide to [a separate email for banking](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-banking). PayPal is not a bank. It accepts a forwarding alias as an account address, provided the alias stays live for the life of the account.

## AliasFleet and PayPal

AliasFleet provides managed, persistent email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox, one alias per site. The PayPal alias is created before the PayPal account is opened, or before the account email is changed to it, and it stays active while the PayPal account is live. Every alias has its own pause switch, and replies go out from the alias rather than from the real inbox address. The mechanism is described in the AliasFleet guide to [what an email alias is](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-is-an-email-alias).

The free tier covers 10 active aliases, 3 personal subdomains, 1 verified destination inbox, and 50 MB of monthly forwarding bandwidth, while Pro is listed at $12 per month, currently $7 per month under the Founder's Club, with unlimited active aliases, as listed on the [AliasFleet pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing). The figures were read from the live pricing page on 17 November 2026.

AliasFleet holds no money, processes no transfers, and reverses no payments. PayPal's rules are outside its control, so it cannot release an address held by another PayPal account or recover a PayPal account whose alias has been deleted. Deleting an alias stops forwarding at once, which is why the PayPal address has to be changed first, before the alias closes.

## Identity confirmation and the name on the account

An alias changes the address PayPal holds. The identity PayPal holds stays the same. Under the Customer Identification Process, PayPal confirms name, address, and date of birth, or company information for a business account. National databases are checked first, and where that check fails the holder is asked to upload documents showing legal name and date of birth. The process is set out on [PayPal's help page for confirming identity](https://www.paypal.com/nz/cshelp/article/how-do-i-confirm-my-identity-cip-help606).

An alias is therefore no route to a PayPal account under a different name. The legal name on the account must match the documents PayPal asks for, and a mismatch found during an identity check puts the account at risk of limitation. Secondary guides report that one person is generally allowed one personal account and one business account, and that opening further accounts to work around a restriction risks suspension of all of them. The same pattern holds for money transfer accounts generally, as set out in the AliasFleet guide to [protecting the email on a money transfer app](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-a-money-transfer-app).

## Delivery failures and confirmation problems

A confirmation email that never arrives usually has one of a short list of causes. PayPal's own help page names two of them: the message is sitting in the spam folder, or the address was entered wrong. The same page advises adding service@paypal.com to the address book, and gives the resend path as Settings, then Email, then Confirm beside the address. Those checks are set out on PayPal's help page for confirming an email address.

A custom domain introduces another cause. A troubleshooting guide for PayPal confirmation failures states that incorrect SPF, DKIM, or MX records on a custom domain can block PayPal mail, and that chained forwards and forwarding loops can break delivery without any visible error. The points are set out in the [iTechHacks guide to PayPal confirmation failures](https://itechhacks.com/fix-paypal-email-confirmation-not-sending-or-working-issues/) and in the [UMA Technology guide to the same problem](https://umatechnology.org/15-ways-to-fix-paypal-email-confirmation-not-sending-or-working-issues/), which adds that confirmation codes expire and that only the newest code validates.

PayPal has published no statement on domain whitelisting or on alias domains specifically, and none is claimed here. What the guides report are delivery failures rather than rejections, and the checks that follow are the spam folder, the domain records on a custom domain, filters and forwarding loops, and one fresh confirmation request instead of several in a row.

## Phishing mail and the destination test

PayPal publishes rules that genuine PayPal mail follows. The help page on spotting phishing states that a PayPal email always opens with the holder's first and last name or business name, never with "Dear user" or "Hello PayPal member". The sender is checked against service@paypal.com, and a password is asked for only on PayPal's own login page. Anything suspicious goes to phishing@paypal.com. The message is then deleted. Those rules are set out on [PayPal's help page for spotting phishing mail](https://www.paypal.com/cz/cshelp/article/how-do-i-spot-a-fake-fraudulent-or-phishing-paypal-email-or-website---help164?locale.x=en_CZ).

PayPal's own page gives phishing@paypal.com as the reporting address, while some secondary guides cite spoof@paypal.com instead. The same page names the common spoofed messages: an account about to be suspended, a payment received for an order, and an overpayment asking the seller to ship goods and return the difference. A payment that exists shows in PayPal activity.

With a dedicated PayPal alias, those rules become a mechanical test. All PayPal mail arrives at the alias and nowhere else, so a message that claims to be from PayPal and arrives at any other address betrays itself by its destination alone. A spoofed message can copy the logo, colours, and layout of genuine mail, so the design of the message proves nothing. Two further tells come from a secondary guide to PayPal phishing. PayPal never asks by email for a full name, card number, bank details, or identity document number, and PayPal sends no emails with attachments, as set out in the [DoNotPay guide to PayPal phishing mail](https://donotpay.com/learn/paypal-phishing-email-report/).

| Check | Genuine PayPal mail | Warning sign |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Recipient address | Sent to the alias on the PayPal account | Sent to any other address |
| Greeting | First and last name, or a business name | "Dear user" or "Hello PayPal member" |
| Sender | service@paypal.com | A different domain |
| Request | No password, code, or payment requested by email | A password, code, fee, or shipment requested |
| Attachment | None | Any attachment |

<Callout type="warning" title="The address test">
A message that claims to be from PayPal and arrives at an address other than the one on the PayPal account is not from PayPal, whatever it says. The destination address is the check, not the wording of the message.
</Callout>

The test has a limit: a spoofed message sent to the PayPal alias itself passes the destination check, because the alias is the address PayPal also uses. The greeting, the sender domain, and the request still have to be checked, and an account action is verified by logging in to PayPal directly instead of following a link.

## Short-lived inbox addresses

A short-lived inbox takes mail for a set period, usually minutes or hours, and then stops, while the address on a PayPal account has to receive a sign-in code or a password reset months later. An account opened with one works at first, with the confirmation arriving, the account opening, and the first payment confirming. The failure arrives later, once the inbox has closed and a reset or a code has nowhere to go. The account survives, but its own recovery route no longer reaches it. Shopping accounts show the same permanence pattern, as set out in the AliasFleet guide to [using an email alias for Amazon](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-amazon).

No public PayPal policy on short-lived inbox domains was found, and whether PayPal blocks these domains makes no difference to the outcome. A permanent forwarding alias works whether or not a block exists, while a short-lived inbox fails the account later even when it passes signup today.

An email alias works for PayPal when it stays permanent, confirmed, and live for the life of the account. It then serves as the login address, the payment address, and the recovery route, and it gives every message that claims to be from PayPal a test based on its destination.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Aliases</category><category>PayPal</category><category>Account Security</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Coinone customer data leaked in MetaM support breach</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/coinone-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/coinone-data-breach</guid>
      <description>Coinone disclosed on 15 November 2026 that an attacker breached its support provider MetaM, exposing emails, passwords and ID numbers from support chats.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The Coinone data breach exposed customer support records held by MetaM, the outsourced provider that runs the South Korean crypto exchange's support. Coinone disclosed the incident on 15 November 2026, three days after an attacker accessed MetaM's servers at about 04:00 KST on 12 November. The records may include names, email addresses, passwords, resident registration numbers, bank account numbers and crypto wallet addresses. Only customers who contacted Coinone support are affected, and Coinone has disclosed no victim count.

![Coinone's official notice on the MetaM support breach, posted 15 November 2026: the intrusion time, the data items that may have been exposed, and the company response](/blog/coinone-data-breach/notice.png)

## The intrusion and the disclosure

Coinone posted its official notice, "개인정보 유출 사실 관련 안내" (Notice on personal information leak), at 08:00 KST on Sunday 15 November 2026. The notice states that an external attacker accessed MetaM's servers at about 04:00 KST on Thursday 12 November, and viewed or extracted the customer support information stored there. MetaM reported the incident to Coinone at about 09:20 KST the same day. The [Coinone notice](https://coinone.co.kr/info/notice/5950) is the primary source for the intrusion time, data list and scope.

MetaM posted its own notice a day earlier, on 14 November. According to Yonhap reporting, MetaM spotted suspicious activity after a support-service outage at 06:03 on 12 November, and reported the incident to the Korea Internet and Security Agency (KISA) at 03:44 on 13 November. MetaM isolated the affected servers, blocked suspicious IP addresses and brought in security specialists. The [Herald Business](https://biz.heraldcorp.com/article/10937299) and [Gadgets360](https://www.gadgets360.com/cryptocurrency/news/coinone-warns-of-potential-exposure-of-passwords-ids-and-crypto-wallet-addresses-data-breach-crypto-frauds-12333273/amp) reports both carry the MetaM timeline and the 11-field data list.

Coinone dates the intrusion to about 04:00, while MetaM's account starts with the 06:03 outage, so the two accounts do not line up exactly. Coinone states that the exact timing and route are still being investigated with the vendor and outside specialists.

The public notice came about 70 hours 40 minutes after Coinone learned of the incident. Under article 39 of the enforcement decree of South Korea's Personal Information Protection Act, a company must notify affected people within 72 hours of learning of a leak. [Alphabiz reported](https://www.alphabiz.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=198170) the gap and the 72-hour rule, so the notice fell inside the legal window.

## Support records exposed

The exposed records are information customers gave during chat and phone support sessions. Coinone's notice lists 11 fields that may have been exposed: phone number used for the consultation, name, email address, date of birth, bank account number, password, resident registration number, ID document issue date, home address, wallet address and transaction ID (TXID).

The notice is explicit that this list covers everything that could have been exposed, not what was exposed for any one customer; support conversations differ, so the actual items vary by person. A lookup service and individual notices are planned.

A resident registration number is Korea's national ID number and cannot be changed the way a password can; the ID document issue date is also a fixed identity anchor. Combined with a name, date of birth and home address, those fields are the material Coinone warned could be used for identity theft, while the bank account number and wallet address add direct financial value.

The password field stands out because some customers gave support their password during an interaction, and that password was stored in the support record. Coinone's notice does not say whether its agents asked for passwords or customers offered them. [Cointelegraph reported](https://cointelegraph.com/news/coinone-data-breach-phishing-identity-theft-customer-information) the disclosure and the phishing and identity theft warning that followed it.

Whether the data was only viewed or actually taken out is not settled; Coinone's wording covers both, and neither company has confirmed exfiltration.

## Customers affected

Only customers who contacted Coinone's support centre are affected. Coinone has not said how many did so or what date range the records cover, so the number affected is unknown.

Coinone states that its account, trading and wallet systems run separately from MetaM's servers, with no direct intrusion confirmed, and that the leaked partial information alone is not enough for a third party to log in or withdraw assets, because all logins use two-factor authentication. No customer funds have been reported lost.

## Coinone response and support changes

Coinone reported the incident to three authorities: the Korea Internet and Security Agency, the Personal Information Protection Commission and the Financial Supervisory Service. The company says it blocked the IP addresses used in the attack and the access route to the customer centre, strengthened real-time monitoring of abnormal logins and transactions, and moved outsourced support to email only while the investigation continues. It is also reviewing MetaM's security management with the vendor. The notice also sets out the compensation route under Korean law: customers who suffer harm can claim damages, up to five times the loss where the company was grossly negligent, or statutory damages of up to 3 million KRW where the amount of harm is hard to prove.

## Regulatory context

Cointelegraph reported that the Financial Services Commission found security deficiencies at 130 of 555 financial firms it reviewed in October 2026, and that the regulator would allow crypto exchanges to suspend withdrawals when a hack is suspected.

The Coinone incident is also the third security scare at a Korean exchange in under three weeks, according to Coindaro, after Bithumb on 27 October and Gopax on 6 November; Coinone's own notice does not confirm that context.

## Steps for affected Coinone customers

Customers who gave a password during a support interaction should change it, and change the same password anywhere else it is used. They can also lock their account from the same menu and should check their registered withdrawal addresses.

Customers should also watch for login, order or withdrawal attempts they did not make and report them to Coinone's service operations team.

> Coinone states in its notice that it never asks for passwords, OTP numbers or authentication codes by phone, text or email, and never asks for crypto withdrawals or wallet address changes. Any message making such a request does not come from Coinone.

The same applies to messages quoting details from an earlier support conversation: that detail is now in attacker hands, so it no longer proves the sender is genuine.

The leaked email addresses change the phishing risk. An attacker who knows a customer's name, email address and support case details can write a message that reads like a real follow-up from Coinone. Customers should check the sender address rather than trusting the display name, and reach the exchange through its own site or app rather than a link in an email. [How phishing uses a leaked email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email) explains the pattern in detail, and [what to do when your email is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach) covers the wider steps.

If you contacted Coinone support, your address may be in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## The support-chat pattern

The Coinone breach is a vendor breach, and the vendor held a type of data that gets less attention than customer databases. Support records sit in a different system, run by a different company, and hold whatever customers typed or said while solving a problem, including passwords, account numbers and ID numbers.

[Daiwa Securities](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/daiwa-securities-data-breach) and [Citizen Watch](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/citizen-watch-data-breach) both lost customer data through Scala Communications, a vendor that ran their inquiry servers, and [Sompo Japan](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/sompo-japan-data-breach) lost records through the same vendor. In each case the outsourced provider, not the company's own systems, was the entry point.

Coinone's case adds one detail: the data was not collected by a form or a system but volunteered in conversation. A customer who tells a support agent a password to speed up a fix has put that password into a record the customer never sees again.

An alias limits the damage from the email field in a support record. If a customer contacts support from the alias used for that service, the exposed address is the alias, not the customer's real inbox, and the next leak can be traced to the service that leaked it. The alias does not protect the other fields: the password, ID number, bank account number and wallet address were given in the same conversation and are exposed regardless of the email address used. The password and ID fields need their own protection: unique passwords per service, and no ID number given to a support agent unless the service genuinely needs it.

## Questions without answers yet

No victim count has been disclosed, and no date has been given for the lookup service or the individual notices. The exact intrusion route is under investigation, and the first intrusion time differs between Coinone's 04:00 account and MetaM's 06:03 outage. MetaM serves other companies and named no other client, so whether other firms' records were also exposed is unknown. No attacker attribution, ransom claim or sale of the data has been reported.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>Cryptocurrency</category><category>South Korea</category><category>Email Privacy</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Fandango data breach exposed card details and emails</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/fandango-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/fandango-data-breach</guid>
      <description>Fandango told regulators on 13 November 2026 that card details from checkout transactions between 8 and 11 October could be accessed by an unauthorised party.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Fandango Media notified the California and Vermont attorneys general on 13 November 2026 of a data breach affecting its ticketing checkout page. An unauthorised party could access payment card information from certain transactions between 8 and 11 October 2026. The exposed data includes payment card numbers, CVVs, expiration dates, billing ZIP codes and customer email addresses. Fandango determined on 30 October 2026 which customers may have been affected, and no national victim total has been published.

## Unauthorised access to the checkout page

Fandango, a major US online movie ticketing platform, sells tickets through its website and app for 31,000 US cinema screens, including at AMC, Regal and Cinemark, according to [BleepingComputer](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/fandango-says-hackers-stole-payment-card-details-from-checkout-pages/). The company also operates the movie review website Rotten Tomatoes. The breach affected the website checkout page, and neither the company notice nor the reporting mentions app purchases.

The [company notice](https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/Fandango%20-%20Individual%20Notice%20Template_Redacted.pdf), filed with the [California Attorney General](https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/databreach/list), states the exposure in plain terms:

> "Our investigation identified evidence that an unauthorized party could access payment card information associated with certain transactions on our checkout page from October 8-11, 2026. Fandango determined on October 30, 2026 that your information may have been impacted in this incident."

![Fandango's data breach notice filed with the California Attorney General: the "What happened?" and "What information was involved?" sections, confirming the 8-11 October checkout access and the card and email data exposed](/blog/fandango-data-breach/notice.png)

The notice does not say when the issue was first detected, how it was found, or how the unauthorised party reached the checkout page. The California Attorney General lists the breach date as 8 October 2026 and the reported date as 13 November 2026, and customer notifications were reported as going out from 16 November.

BleepingComputer reported the incident on 16 November 2026. It described the mechanism as card skimmer code injected into Fandango's checkout page. According to that report, the code intercepted payment card details entered when customers placed orders and sent the data to the attackers. The company notice does not use the word skimmer and does not describe the mechanism. The skimmer characterisation comes from BleepingComputer, not from Fandango.

## Card details and email addresses exposed

The company notice lists five data items that may have been affected:

| Data item | Exposed |
| :--- | :--- |
| Payment card number | Yes |
| CVV (security code) | Yes |
| Expiration date | Yes |
| Billing ZIP code | Yes |
| Email address | Yes |

The same notice lists what was not involved: first and last names, any government-issued identification information, Social Security numbers, and other account information. The absence of names limits the exposure but does not remove the risk. A card number with its CVV, expiration date and billing ZIP code is enough for unauthorised online purchases, and BleepingComputer notes that the compromised information could be used for unauthorised purchases on online stores. The exposed email address adds a second risk, because the address is now held by the same party that holds the card details, which could make targeted phishing to that address possible. The way a leaked address is used for phishing is explained in [how phishing uses your leaked email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email).

The exposure was limited to certain transactions, not every purchase on the site.

## Fandango response and customer notifications

Fandango says it promptly resolved the issue, investigated with cybersecurity specialists, and further enhanced its processes and protections. The notice does not describe what was changed. The company is offering affected customers 24 months of credit monitoring services from IDX at no charge, including 24 months of credit and CyberScan monitoring, a $1,000,000 insurance reimbursement policy, and fully managed identity theft recovery services. Enrolment must be activated by 13 February 2027. Customers enrol at [app.idx.us](https://app.idx.us/account-creation/protect) or by calling 1-866-200-0940, Monday to Friday from 6 am to 6 pm Pacific Time, excluding US holidays. The notice was sent by IDX on Fandango's behalf, under the subject line "Fandango - Notice of Security Incident".

Fandango states that it is not currently aware of any fraudulent use of the exposed information as a result of this incident. That is a statement about what the company knows so far, not a guarantee that no misuse has occurred. BleepingComputer reports that it contacted Fandango to learn more, including the number of affected customers, and would update its report with any response. The incident is also recorded on the [cisonews.net incident page](https://www.cisonews.net/incidents/fandango-media-2026-11) and the [Privacy Unpacked tracker](https://privacyunpacked.com/breaches/company/fandango-media/), both of which confirm the timeline, the 18 Vermont residents and the IDX offer details.

## Scale of the breach

No national victim total has been published. The only count in the public record is 18 Vermont residents, recorded by the Vermont Attorney General on 13 November 2026. The California filing gives no number, and BleepingComputer reports that Fandango has not shared the number of affected customers. No source has published a transaction count or a victim total, so the scale cannot be stated.

## Steps for affected ticket buyers

The notice advises customers to review credit reports and financial accounts for suspicious activity, and to report unauthorised transactions to the card issuer or bank promptly.

1. Customers who bought tickets on Fandango's website between 8 and 11 October 2026 should check the statements for every card they may have used. That includes cards they no longer use regularly. Any transaction that is not recognised should be reported to the card issuer, which can block the card and issue a replacement. A replacement card ends the use of the exposed number, CVV and expiration date together.
2. Customers who received the notice should enrol in the IDX monitoring offer before the 13 February 2027 deadline, using the enrolment code in their own notice. The enrolment link in the filed copy of the notice is app.idx.us, and the phone number is 1-866-200-0940. A notice that points to a different website or asks for card details does not match the filed copy and should be treated as suspicious.
3. Customers can obtain a free copy of their credit report from each of the three major credit reporting agencies at [AnnualCreditReport.com](https://www.annualcreditreport.com), and can place a fraud alert or a security freeze on their credit file. The notice's Exhibit B explains both options: an initial fraud alert is free and stays on file for one year, while a security freeze is free and prevents new credit from being opened without a PIN.
4. The exposed email address needs attention of its own. Customers should expect phishing messages that reference Fandango, the ticket purchase, or the breach itself, and should not click links or call numbers in unsolicited messages about the incident. The [Federal Trade Commission's identity theft site](http://www.identitytheft.gov/) carries the reporting steps the notice cites.

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the statement checks and monitoring enrolment above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## The exposed email address

The exposed email address is the part of this breach that keeps working after the card is replaced. A card can be cancelled and reissued. An email address that has been exposed stays exposed, and it can be used for phishing for years. The breach also shows why the address matters: the exposed set pairs a working email address with full card details, which lets an attacker write a message that names the service, the purchase window and the card, and looks like a genuine follow-up from Fandango.

AliasFleet provides one email alias per service, so the address handed to Fandango is used only for Fandango. If that alias appears in a later breach or phishing campaign, the source is identifiable from the address itself, and the alias can be paused or deleted without touching the customer's real inbox or any other service. That does not protect the card details in this incident, which were entered at checkout regardless of the email address used. It limits what the exposed email address can be used for next, and it is explained in [different email for every website](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/different-email-for-every-website).

## Undisclosed details

Several facts remain undisclosed. The notice gives no attack vector, no detection date, and no account of how the unauthorised party reached the checkout page. It does not say whether the exposed data was limited to cards entered manually at checkout or also included stored payment methods. It does not say whether the app was affected. It gives no victim total and no transaction count, so the scale of the incident cannot be stated.

The timing is documented. Exposure ran from 8 to 11 October 2026. Fandango determined which customers may have been affected on 30 October, nineteen days after the exposure ended. The filings with the California and Vermont attorneys general followed on 13 November, and customer notifications were reported as going out from 16 November, just over five weeks after the exposure ended.

The facts that would change this picture are a victim total from Fandango, a description of how the checkout page was reached, and any confirmed report of fraud using the exposed data. None of those has been published.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>Payment Security</category><category>Email Privacy</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Hosting on Airbnb</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-hosting-on-airbnb</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-hosting-on-airbnb</guid>
      <description>A host account address carries payouts, tax forms and guest disputes, so one dedicated alias for Airbnb keeps hosting mail apart from the main inbox.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Email protection for an Airbnb host is the practice of giving the host account a dedicated forwarding alias that receives payouts, tax documents, identity checks and guest messages while keeping the host's main address off the platform. Airbnb typically releases a payout within 1 business day after check-in, and the same address receives login alerts, tax forms and dispute notices, so the alias remains in service for the life of the hosting account.

The address on a host account functions as a money address rather than a marketing address. Payouts, tax forms and dispute notices all travel through it, and [Airbnb states](https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/14) that a host can miss an email notification when the account has an incorrect email address or outdated notification settings.

## Host account addresses

[Airbnb account settings](https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/280) hold the email address beside the legal name, phone number, physical address, emergency contact and identity verification status. The same address receives login alerts and multi-factor codes when a login comes from a new place or device. Reservation notices, account activity, legal updates, security and privacy notices and customer service requests are notifications that cannot be turned off.

A host who registers the same address for shopping, newsletters and forums hands the address that controls the payout account to every one of those senders. [One alias per website](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/different-email-for-every-website) contains that exposure to the site where the address leaked, because the address in a stolen file belongs to that site and to nothing else. The address on the host account controls access to payouts. Keeping it apart from shopping and newsletter mail limits the number of senders who hold it.

## Platform scale and rental fraud

Airbnb ended 2025 with more than 9 million active listings and more than 5.5 million hosts, who have welcomed over 2.5 billion guest arrivals, according to [Airbnb figures reported in October 2026](https://www.usecarly.com/blog/airbnb-statistics/). Each listing brings enquiries and messages from strangers, and notifications about each message go to the address on the account. A dedicated host alias is handed to one platform, while an address that also serves shopping and newsletters is handed to hundreds of senders.

Rental fraud figures record the scale of the surrounding market. The [Federal Trade Commission reported in December 2025](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/data-visualizations/data-spotlight/2025/12/rental-scams-hit-home-65-million-reported-losses) that people reported nearly 65,000 rental scams between January 2020 and June 2025, with about $65 million in losses and a median reported loss of $1,000. Those figures cover rental scams generally, not Airbnb hosts specifically, and no count of hosts who lost payouts to phishing was found in this research. A rental enquiry gives the recipient an address that can be kept, shared or sold on, as the [AliasFleet rental agents guide](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-contacting-rental-agents) records.

## Phishing messages aimed at hosts

Mail designed to look like Airbnb mail is the main threat to a host address. [Airbnb states](https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/971) that fraudulent emails often include the Airbnb logo and an imitation Airbnb address in the From line, and may contain text taken from real Airbnb emails, such as a payout confirmation or a request to update a profile. The aim is the account password or bank account details, and a captured login lets an attacker change the payout details and receive the next payment.

Airbnb publishes the only domains its mail comes from, including @airbnb.com, @host.airbnb.com, @e.airbnb.com and @support-email.airbnb.com, and names @bnb.com and @reservation-airbnb.com as lookalikes. A message from any other domain is not from Airbnb, whatever the From line displays. [Airbnb account security guidance](https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/501) adds that a host password should be unique and different from the passwords for email, social media and banking, and that multi-factor authentication applies when a login comes from a new place or device or when sensitive account information is edited.

<Callout type="warning" title="Airbnb never calls about payouts">
Airbnb states that it will never call to ask a host to change a payout method or share one-time codes, account passwords, or payment or payout details. A call that asks for any of those is not from Airbnb, even when the caller ID looks like Airbnb support.
</Callout>

Hospitality phishing is documented beyond Airbnb itself. [Microsoft Threat Intelligence reported on 13 March 2025](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/03/13/phishing-campaign-impersonates-booking-com-delivers-a-suite-of-credential-stealing-malware/) that a campaign tracked as Storm-1865, running since December 2024, impersonated Booking.com and targeted hospitality organisations with false guest reviews, account verification requests and ClickFix pages that installed credential-stealing malware, including XWorm, Lumma stealer, VenomRAT, AsyncRAT, Danabot and NetSupport RAT. The campaign impersonated Booking.com rather than Airbnb, and it is cited here as adjacent evidence of phishing pressure on hospitality accounts.

Airbnb reported in August 2024 that its dedicated team detected and mitigated almost 2,500 third-party phishing domains globally in 12 months, in its [partnership announcement with the International Association of Financial Crimes Investigators](https://news.airbnb.com/joining-forces-with-top-financial-crimes-association-to-combat-travel-scams). Imitation Airbnb websites can be reported at [airbnb.com/report-phishing](https://www.airbnb.com/report-phishing). Airbnb states that the report does not create a support request or send a confirmation.

## The dedicated host alias

The pattern is one alias per platform. A host creates an alias for Airbnb, gives Airbnb that alias, and mail to the alias forwards to the main inbox. Mail arriving on the Airbnb alias identifies its source at a glance, because no other sender holds that address.

The host pattern differs from the travel booking pattern in one respect: the end point. A travel booking alias stays live until the trip and any refund, compensation or dispute window close, then it is paused, as the [AliasFleet travel bookings guide](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-use-email-aliases-for-travel-bookings) records. A host alias has no such end while the account exists. The [AliasFleet account recovery guide](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery) states the general rule behind it: recovery through an address succeeds only while the alias stays in service at least as long as the account it guards, and a closed alias leaves no working route back into the account. Payouts, tax documents and guest disputes all depend on the same route, so the host alias stays live for the life of the hosting account, and past the last stay until the final tax form has arrived.

## AliasFleet hosting aliases

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com/) provides managed, persistent forwarding addresses, with one alias per online account and mail to each alias forwarded to a destination inbox chosen by the account holder. Replies go out from the alias rather than the real address. An alias can be paused when it turns noisy. The live homepage lists the free plan at 10 active forwarding aliases, 3 personal subdomains, 1 verified destination inbox, 50 MB monthly bandwidth and two-way reply forwarding. Pro lists unlimited active aliases at $12 per month.

A host alias is one of the 10 on the free plan, and a host who lists on several platforms uses one alias per platform. AliasFleet does not verify listings or hosts, does not hold deposits and does not change the address on an existing Airbnb account, so a host who adopts an alias still updates the address in Airbnb account settings. AliasFleet also does not control the Airbnb database, and pausing the host alias does not delete the hosting record held by Airbnb.

## Payout timing and tax documents

Payout notices, tax forms and dispute notices all arrive on the host address. [Airbnb states](https://www.airbnb.com/resources/hosting-homes/a/how-youll-get-paid-for-hosting-20) that the money earned from hosting is typically released within 1 business day after check-in, and that stays of 28 nights or longer are paid in monthly instalments starting within one business day after check-in. In certain instances, a new host can wait until 1 business day after checkout for the first payouts. Delivery after release depends on the payout method:

| Payout method | Typical delivery after release |
| :--- | :--- |
| Fast Pay | 30 minutes or less |
| Payoneer prepaid debit Mastercard | 24 hours or less |
| PayPal | 1 business day |
| Western Union | 1 business day, varies by country |
| Bank transfer | 3 to 5 business days |
| International wire | 3 to 7 business days |

Tax documents travel the same route. Airbnb requires taxpayer information from every individual who receives payouts for hosting. Its [US tax FAQ](https://www.airbnb.com.mt/help/article/3165) states that failure to provide it can freeze payments or block the listing calendar. The 1099-K threshold is now more than $20,000 in gross transactions and more than 200 transactions in a calendar year, reinstated by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, and the 1099-MISC and 1099-NEC threshold rises from $600 in 2025 to $2,000 from the 2026 tax year. Those are US thresholds, and hosts in other countries face different local rules. Airbnb's [electronic delivery consent](https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/487) states that tax forms remain available electronically for one year, and that other communications will not be resent if an email is undeliverable because of an incorrect address. A host who stops hosting still receives a tax form in January for the previous year, so the address must stay correct and monitored past the last guest.

## Guest contact rules

Airbnb policy prohibits hosts from soliciting a guest email address through the Airbnb messaging system or mail alias after a booking, and from selling, sharing or using guest contact information for marketing communications or signing guests up for a contact list. The updated policy applies to reservations made on or after 20 November 2026, and the [policy page](https://www.airbnb.ie/help/article/4169) records the earlier version for reservations made before that date. Hosts may not ask guests for contact information prior to booking, and all guest communication prior to booking must stay on Airbnb.

The policy keeps host and guest contact inside Airbnb messaging. A host who moves a guest conversation to a personal address loses the platform record of the exchange, and a guest who moves a host off the platform loses AirCover, which applies only to stays booked through Airbnb. AirCover for Hosts includes $3 million USD host damage protection and $1 million USD host liability insurance, and applies only to eligible Airbnb stays.

## Bounds of alias protection

An alias separates the contact channel, not the booking record. It does not hide the booking from Airbnb, and it does not hide the name, payment details or travel dates from the platform. It does not verify a listing or a payment, and it only limits which address a sender holds. A listing that was false before an alias was used remains false after it.

Some services reject alias addresses, usually shared alias domains rather than aliases in general, and a custom domain sidesteps most of that, as the [AliasFleet guide to alias safety](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe) records. The bank keeps a permanent real dedicated address, never an alias, because recovery, statements and fraud alerts depend on it reaching the holder directly, and the [AliasFleet second address guide](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/do-you-need-a-second-email-address) states the same rule for money, government and anything that must be reached reliably for years. The payout method itself, a bank account or PayPal, is separate from the email address, and the alias covers the mail route, not the money route.

## Phishing reports and account recovery

A suspect message is checked without clicking its links. Airbnb states that the best way to confirm an email is authentic is to check that it comes from one of the listed official Airbnb domains, and that a host who is unsure should navigate to the Airbnb website directly or open the app and log in from there. An imitation website is reported at the Airbnb phishing report page, and a host who clicked a link, shared personal information or engaged with a suspicious call should contact Airbnb directly, and contact the bank when payment information was shared.

In the United States, the FTC accepts reports at ReportFraud.ftc.gov, and the FTC rental scam analysis is the source for the rental scam figures in this article. A host who sent identity documents to a suspicious address checks breach data, for example through [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/). A clean result does not prove the address was never shared, and a breach result does not prove the hosting account itself was exposed. Mail on the Airbnb alias came from a sender who held that address, but the alias does not reverse a payment already made.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Airbnb</category><category>Email aliases</category><category>Hosting</category><category>Privacy</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Signing Up for a Budget App</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-a-budgeting-app</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-a-budgeting-app</guid>
      <description>A budgeting app signup hands an email address to the app, an aggregator and the bank. One alias per app isolates that address if the list is sold or breached.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Signing up for a budgeting app creates a four-way data-sharing arrangement. The user, the app, a financial-data aggregator and the bank all receive the email address entered at signup, and the bank link moves transaction data through the aggregator. Giving each budgeting app its own alias isolates that signup and, if the app's list is sold or breached, the alias itself points to the source.

## The signup data flow

The address supplied at signup identifies the account, carries recovery messages, and receives receipts, breach notices and marketing. YNAB's terms place registration details under the company's privacy policy and record the user's authorisation for the company to reach data held by the relevant third-party provider, including personal identity information and transaction records. The address therefore lives in at least three places: the app, the aggregator and the bank's record of the authorised connection.

YNAB charges [$109 per year or $14.99 per month](https://www.fincomparelab.com/guides/ynab-pricing/), and a 34-day free trial requires no card on direct signup.

## Financial data aggregators

A budgeting app generally does not talk to a bank directly; an aggregator stands in the middle, pulls balances and transactions, and passes them on to the app. Plaid's homepage states that it connects 12,000 financial institutions in 20 countries and that 1 in 2 banked adults in the US use Plaid. For US and Canadian accounts YNAB names Plaid and MX as its providers, and for UK accounts Plaid Financial Ltd., an FCA-authorised payment institution with Firm Reference Number 804718. Finicity, Yodlee and Salt Edge do the same job for other apps.

Under this model the app never holds bank credentials: a token and the data it permits go to the app, the connection stays with the aggregator, and the account stays with the bank. Because each party's privacy policy governs only its own copy, the signup address falls under three policies rather than one. A [documentation review of YNAB, Monarch, PocketSmith and Lunch Money](https://money.editorialdeskmedia.com/guides/budgeting-app-security-privacy), read on 29 October 2026, found read-only bank connections described by both YNAB and Monarch, and both companies stating that they do not sell financial data, with a note that advertising-related sharing may count as a sale or share under some state privacy laws.

## OAuth and screen scraping

Two methods connect an app to a bank. With OAuth the user signs in on the bank's own website or app, approves the connection, and the bank issues a secure token to the aggregator. The credentials never pass through the aggregator at all. Without OAuth the credentials go in through the aggregator's interface, encrypted in transit and in storage, for the aggregator to set up the connection. In older connections that is screen scraping, where software signs in with the stored credentials and reads the data off the page.

<Callout type="warning" title="Bank credentials">
Bank login credentials belong with the bank, not with an app that screen-scrapes. A bank-authorised API connection keeps the credentials at the bank and hands the aggregator a token instead. Where a bank offers OAuth through the aggregator, no credential storage is involved at all.
</Callout>

On 22 October 2024 the US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau finalised its Personal Financial Data Rights rule under Section 1033 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Banks, credit unions and card issuers must make covered data available to authorised third parties through standardised APIs. The rule requires API access. Covered data runs to at least 24 months of transactions plus basic account-verification information such as name, address, email address and phone number. The rule was challenged in court within hours of finalisation; on 29 October 2025 a federal court in Kentucky enjoined enforcement while the Bureau reconsiders it. The Financial Data Exchange, recognised by the CFPB as a standard-setting body in January 2025, reports 114 million active US and Canadian customer connections on its standard.

## Email aliases for budgeting apps

AliasFleet supplies email aliases that forward to a destination inbox of the user's choosing. One alias per budgeting app gives the app and the aggregator an address that exists for that signup alone: a permanent forwarding address under the user's control, pausable or deletable at any time, with 10 active aliases on the free tier.

No bank credentials sit in the alias, no bank connection runs through it, and the aggregator still receives the same bank data. What changes is the address held by the app and the aggregator. If the alias turns up in a breach or begins collecting spam, the address itself identifies the source. The primary inbox remains unexposed. The bank keeps a permanent real dedicated address used only for financial accounts, because recovery, statements and fraud alerts depend on it. That separation is the subject of the guide on [whether to use a separate email for banking](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-banking); the alias belongs to the app, not the bank. Setup is covered in the guide on [how to set up an email alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-set-up-an-email-alias). The wider case for an alias instead of a primary address is covered in the guide on [whether it is safe to give an email address to apps](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-it-safe-to-give-your-email-address-to-apps).

## The Money Forward disclosure of 2026

Money Forward, maker of the household-budget app Money Forward ME, disclosed on 1 May 2026 that GitHub authentication credentials used in software development had leaked and a third party had used them to copy repositories. Its first report listed 370 Business Card records, cardholder name and the last four digits of the card number, as possibly leaked, and stated that no leak from the production database had been confirmed. Bank-account linkage was suspended for a time as a precaution.

Connections began to return on 12 May 2026 and had been restored with every financial institution by 5 June. The final scope arrived on 23 June 2026: personal data of up to 62,901 people may have leaked. Most of the records were internal management numbers that cannot identify anyone on their own; alongside them were 1,807 employee email addresses and 24 customer email addresses. No intrusion into the production database was confirmed, and no secondary harm from misuse was confirmed either. The 62,901 figure comes from the company's 23 June 2026 report, published in Japanese and tracked in full by the English incident record cited below.

The data came from a development repository, not from the production system holding household-budget data. The [Money Forward incident record](https://kkm-mako.com/en/articles/moneyforward-security-incidents/) tracks the full breakdown, the [company's first report](https://corp.moneyforward.com/news/info/20260501-mf-press-1/) is the primary source for the disclosure dates, and an [analysis of the incident](https://standard.or.jp/en/column/accounting-system-leaks/) records the suspension and staged resumption.

## The Plaid settlement of 2022

Plaid agreed in January 2022 to pay $58 million to consumers. The payment went to consumers who had a bank account linked to any of its approximately 5,000 client apps. The class action alleged that Plaid collected "more financial data than was needed" and took bank login credentials through its Plaid Link interface, "which had the look and feel of the user's own bank account login screen". The class period ran from 1 January 2013 to 19 November 2021. Plaid denied wrongdoing, but it still had to change some of its business practices.

The class action alleged the aggregator used by many budgeting apps had gathered more data than the apps needed and had shown users a login screen that looked like their bank's. Plaid's homepage now states that a user connecting through Plaid controls who has access to their financial data. YNAB's terms show the same structure today: the user gives YNAB a limited power of attorney to fetch account information as the user's agent, with the retrieval running through Plaid or MX. The [Engadget report on the settlement](https://www.engadget.com/plaid-must-pay-58-million-to-users-of-venmo-robinhood-and-other-apps-085908511.html) records the terms, and the [YNAB terms](https://www.ynab.com/terms) were last modified on 9 April 2026.

## Data held by each party

| Party | What it holds | Source |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| The budgeting app | The signup email address, the budget, and copies of imported transactions | YNAB terms |
| The aggregator | The bank connection, the token or stored credentials, transaction data, and identity information passed from the bank | [Plaid](https://plaid.com/), YNAB terms |
| The bank | The account, the transaction history, and the record of the authorised connection | [CFPB Section 1033 advisory](https://www.alstonconsumerfinance.com/financial-services-advisory-cfpb-finalizes-open-banking-rule-on-consumer-financial-data-rights/) |
| The regulator | The Section 1033 rule, finalised in 2024 and enjoined in 2025, with no current enforcement | [Section 1033 technical guide](https://ozoneapi.com/blog/technical-guide-to-cfpb-section-1033/) |

Only the email address appears in every row, identifying the account at the app, the identity data at the aggregator and the verification data at the bank. The alias is therefore attached to the address, not to the bank connection, which the token or the stored credentials govern.

## Account closure and connection revocation

Closing the budgeting app account leaves the aggregator connection in place: a separate authorisation between the aggregator and the bank, ended only by disconnecting the account inside the app, inside the bank's own connected-apps settings, or both. YNAB retains account data for a period after expiry unless the user deletes it. Deleting the alias stops mail to that address, but data already held by the app or the aggregator remains.

An app can also shut down while a user still has data inside it: Intuit closed [Mint](https://www.engadget.com/intuit-is-closing-down-mint-its-popular-free-budget-tracking-app-054145229.html), which had 3.6 million active users in 2021, and moved users to Credit Karma. Mint stayed available until 23 March 2024, and Credit Karma's support page states that the new experience "does not offer the ability to set monthly and category budgets". The transfer option closed on 3 May 2024. An address handed to a budgeting app can therefore outlive the app, which is one more reason to give each app its own alias, deletable when the app closes, so the primary inbox never travels into the migration.

While the app is linked the alias stays live, so account recovery and breach notices keep arriving. Once the app account and the bank connection are confirmed closed, the alias can be deleted. The address can then be checked at [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com), which lists the breaches an address appears in and the data each one exposed. The same check is described in the guide on [how to check if an email was leaked](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked). Other financial apps follow the same pattern: the guides on [protecting an email for a money transfer app](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-a-money-transfer-app) and [protecting an email for a stock trading app](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-a-stock-trading-app) use one alias per app.

## Limits of email aliases

An alias narrows the exposure of the email address and does nothing else. It does not cut what the aggregator collects from the bank, it does not anonymise transaction data, and it does not stop the app sharing data under its own policy.

No public figure gives the share of bank connections that still run on stored credentials rather than OAuth, so the article gives no percentage. The [open banking guide](https://www.lycore.com/technology/fintech-open-banking-apis/) reports that most modern connections use OAuth, with smaller banks and credit unions the most likely to lack it. The [Plaid bank sync explanation](https://blog.synceipt.com/blog/how-plaid-bank-sync-works/) draws the same line. Major banks send users to their own login pages, while smaller institutions take credentials through the aggregator's encrypted interface. The method only becomes visible at the moment of linking, when the sign-in screen turns out to belong to the bank or to the aggregator.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Budgeting Apps</category><category>Open Banking</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Is Migadu Safe as a Destination Inbox for Your Domain?</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-migadu-safe</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-migadu-safe</guid>
      <description>Migadu hosts email from Switzerland, priced by usage rather than per mailbox, with no ads and no tracking, but no end-to-end encryption or mailbox 2FA.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Migadu-Mail GmbH, a bootstrapped Swiss company founded in 2014, operates Migadu, paid email hosting for custom domains. Its mail servers are in France, not Switzerland. Stored mail is not end-to-end encrypted, mailbox sign-in has no second factor, and the service runs no ads and no tracking. Pricing is flat per account by usage quotas, with unlimited mailboxes, addresses and domains on every plan.

## The Swiss company behind Migadu

[Migadu-Mail GmbH](https://www.migadu.com/about/), the operator, is registered in Switzerland at Rohnen 587, CH-9414 Schachen, and works fully remotely. Founded in 2014, the company turned profitable shortly after founding, with no outside capital, and says it grew mostly by word of mouth. By its own account it serves hundreds of thousands of users.

The service is standards-based [email hosting](https://www.migadu.com/) for SMTP, IMAP4 and POP3 and webmail, with no proprietary protocols or clients. A Migadu account hosts mail for domains the account holder owns. Migadu offers no addresses on its own domains and refuses mail for free top-level domains, which it states are involved in fraud, spam and phishing. Mailboxes are backed up continuously, with support from the postmasters maintaining the system.

## Flat pricing and usage quotas

The [pricing page](https://www.migadu.com/pricing/) states the model in its own words: plan prices are flat per Migadu account, additional addresses cost nothing extra, and usage across all active domains and mailboxes counts together towards plan quotas. An account may have unlimited mailboxes, addresses and domains, with limits applying to the whole account, not each mailbox. The four plans, at list prices corroborated across independent sources checked in September and October 2026, are:

| Plan | Price | Storage | Incoming per day | Outgoing per day |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Micro | $19 per year | 5 GB | 200 | 20 |
| Mini | $9 per month or $90 per year | 30 GB | 1,000 | 100 |
| Standard | $29 per month or $290 per year | 100 GB | 3,000 | 500 |
| Maxi | $99 per month or $990 per year | 500 GB | 10,000 | 2,000 |

Storage limits are soft, so full storage never causes mail to bounce. Daily limits carry a tolerance of up to 25 percent, past which incoming mail is deferred and outgoing mail is refused. The Micro plan bills annually only and excludes multi-administrator access. The free plan Migadu offered for over five years was replaced by Micro. A free trial needs no credit card, with a refund within 14 days. The per-plan figures are corroborated reads from the three sources below: Migadu's own pricing table is script-rendered and was not read directly. They agree across [iTechGuides](https://www.itechguides.com/products/migadu/), [Dupple](https://dupple.com/learn/best-business-email-hosting) and a [third review](https://nanopo.st/email-forwarding/migadu/).

By contrast, [Fastmail](https://www.fastmail.com/pricing/) charges per user, its Standard plan at $5 per user per month billed annually, and [Zoho Mail](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-zoho-mail-safe) also prices per seat. The model suits accounts with many addresses and modest volume, not bulk or transactional mail. Human email use only is allowed, rate limits apply per mailbox, domain and account, and intentional limit crossing can lead to a permanent ban.

## Encryption of stored and transmitted mail

End-to-end encryption does not exist on Migadu, and stored mail is not encrypted in a way that keeps it from the operator. Migadu states this plainly on its [page of drawbacks](https://www.migadu.com/procon/). The page argues that email runs on plain text protocols, that encrypting stored mail with keys held on the same storage would be encoding rather than encryption, and that encryption would block spam and virus scanning, search indexing and password recovery. For sensitive mail, Migadu recommends GPG with correspondents or pulling mail locally by POP3 and encrypting it there. All traffic to and from Migadu, and within the service, uses current encryption standards, protecting mail in transit with TLS.

By contrast, [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/support/proton-mail-encryption-explained) stores all inbox mail with zero-access encryption, so Proton cannot read stored mail, and mail between Proton users is end-to-end encrypted by default. [Tuta](https://tuta.com/) encrypts mail, calendars and contacts end to end by default. Migadu offers neither. An account holder who needs stored mail unreadable to the provider uses one of those services, or GPG on top of Migadu. The question of [whether an email provider can read mail](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-my-email-provider-read-my-emails) has a plain answer here: Migadu can.

<Callout type="info" title="Mail stays readable by the operator">
Migadu states that it does not access, analyse, scan or share user data, and that it has no interest in mail content. That is a policy statement, not a technical guarantee: the mail is stored in a form the operator can read, so protection rests on company policy and the law, not on cryptography.
</Callout>

## Mailbox sign-in controls

Mailbox two-factor authentication does not exist on Migadu. The same drawbacks page carries the heading "No mailbox 2FA (yet!)" and explains that IMAP clients do not support second factor authentication, that IMAP connections happen too often for a token prompt, and that webmail-only two-factor authentication would leave IMAP, POP3 and SMTP unprotected. The company is working on sandboxing a username and password pair to webmail use only. App-specific passwords are available through mailbox identities, and Migadu states that these are commonly presented as two-factor authentication. They are not.

A Migadu mailbox is protected by a single password. Strong unique passwords matter more here than on a service with two-factor authentication; a reused password is the likeliest route in. Mailbox two-factor authentication is a requirement. Migadu does not meet it. The [guide to email safety for two-factor codes](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-email-safe-for-two-factor-codes) explains why a mailbox receiving reset codes needs stronger sign-in controls.

## Privacy policy and advertising

Migadu states that it does not access, analyse, scan or share user data. The homepage states that there are no ads, not even its own, and no tracking. Under the [privacy policy](https://www.migadu.com/privacy/), Migadu minimises the personal data it requires to the bare essentials, uses cookies only for working sessions, and employs no tracking or analytics cookies. Personal data is never disclosed to third parties except payment data handled by Stripe and PayPal, including transfers to the United States.

Processing takes place under the EU General Data Protection Regulation and the Swiss Federal Data Protection Act. The policy lists GDPR data subject rights, including access, rectification, erasure, restriction, portability and objection, and states that personal data is deleted within 30 days of contract termination unless the law requires it. Comparisons of [Migadu with Tuta](https://www.europeanstack.io/en/compare/migadu-vs-tuta) and [with GMX](https://www.europeanstack.io/en/compare/gmx_mail-vs-migadu) record the same shape and gaps on encryption and mailbox two-factor authentication.

## AliasFleet and Migadu

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides email aliases that forward mail to a destination inbox, and Migadu is a host where that destination inbox can live. Aliases can point at an address on a domain hosted by Migadu, so sign-ups and receipts arrive at a Migadu mailbox with a separate address per site. AliasFleet does not host mailboxes and does not replace Migadu: it controls which addresses exist; Migadu stores the mail that arrives. The pairing fits because Migadu charges per account rather than per address. The limit of the pairing is the limit of Migadu itself: forwarded mail is stored in a form Migadu can read, so the privacy gain of aliases stops there. An account holder deciding [whether email aliases are safe](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe) weighs the two layers separately: an alias protects the address and the host protects the mailbox.

## Governing law and server location

The mail servers are not in Switzerland. Migadu states that its current data centres are in France and finds EU privacy law more elaborate and restrictive than Swiss law. Migadu-Mail GmbH is a Swiss company. Its [terms](https://www.migadu.com/terms/) are governed by the laws of the Canton of Appenzell Ausserrhoden, and legal actions are brought in a court of that canton. The company answers under Swiss law, the stored mail sits under EU law in France, so both the GDPR and the Swiss data protection act apply.

The privacy policy names Stripe and PayPal as payment sub-processors, with payment data transferred to the United States, and names no infrastructure sub-processors. No transparency report on government requests was found on Migadu's public pages. No public record of a Migadu data breach was found in this research pass, which is no guarantee that none occurred. Breach exposure for an address can be checked on [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com).

## Independent assurance and uptime record

No published independent security audit, ISO 27001 certificate or SOC 2 report for Migadu was found. The privacy policy states that Migadu checks GDPR compliance through regular audits of its data protection practices, that controllers may request audit evidence on reasonable notice, and that its data centre providers hold international security certifications. The data centres are not named and no audit report is published. Assurance therefore rests on the company's own statements and its privacy policy, thinner evidence than a published audit report.

Migadu offers no service level agreement in its default offer. Its drawbacks page states this openly. Enterprise pricing with an SLA starts at $5,000 a month. The terms state that Migadu makes no guarantees about the reliability of the service or the security of user data despite best efforts. A third-party uptime study recorded migadu.com as unreachable for about 20.5 hours from 25 to 26 October 2026, from that study's own probing, not one published by Migadu. Mail delayed by an outage is not lost under normal email behaviour: sending systems retry for up to 48 hours. The [Kolab Now safety assessment](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-kolab-now-safe) covers a provider that publishes more on assurance; a [review of Migadu's plans and outage record](https://digitalhosting.com/providers/migadu) gives the same outage finding with its probing method stated.

## Use as a destination inbox

Migadu is a paid hosting service, not a free inbox service, and that distinction is why it works as a destination inbox. Its terms require a valid permanent email address for registration; temporary email addresses result in account termination. An account holder choosing a destination inbox for a domain they own gets unlimited addresses across many domains for one flat price, standard protocols, no ads, no tracking, from a company operating since 2014.

The same account holder accepts operator-readable mail, no mailbox two-factor authentication, and no published independent audit behind the security claims. There is no SLA by default. Those limits are stated, not hidden: Migadu publishes them on its own drawbacks page, and the decision trades a low price for many addresses against the stronger guarantees of encrypted providers. An account holder who wants many addresses on one domain at low cost and accepts operator-readable mail finds Migadu fits; one who needs mail the provider cannot read, mailbox two-factor authentication, or a published audit will not.

[Different email for every website](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/different-email-for-every-website) explains the addressing pattern behind the Migadu pricing model; [whether a second email address is needed](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/do-you-need-a-second-email-address) covers the simpler case.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Safety</category><category>Email Hosting</category><category>Privacy</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Protect the Email on Your Money Transfer App</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-a-money-transfer-app</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-a-money-transfer-app</guid>
      <description>A money transfer account moves cash, so the email on it is a target. A dedicated alias, strong sign-in checks and off-email verification reduce the risk.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Email protection for a money transfer app means securing the address behind password resets, sign-in codes and confirmations: one permanent alias per app, sign-in checks, sender checks and off-email payment verification. The FTC states that [sending money through a payment app is like sending cash](https://www.ftc.gov/paymentapps).

## Scale of payment app fraud

Fraud through payment apps reached a large scale in 2024, when the [FTC Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book 2024](https://www.ftc.gov/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-2024), published on 10 March 2025, recorded 90,571 fraud reports naming a payment app or service, with reported losses of $391 million. The total rose from 65,320 reports in 2023, as reported in the [Banking Dive account of the FTC figures](https://www.bankingdive.com/news/bank-transfer-fraud-losses-crypto-federal-trade-commission/743219/).

Email was the most common contact method, named in 25 percent of reports that stated one. The registered email address is the route for password resets and sign-in codes, so a compromised inbox threatens the money account directly.

## The Zelle enforcement case

On 20 December 2024, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau sued Early Warning Services, the operator of Zelle, together with Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo, alleging that hundreds of thousands of customers lost more than $870 million through Zelle fraud since the network launched, as recorded in the [CFPB enforcement record](https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/actions/early-warning-services-llc-bank-of-america-na-jpmorgan-chase-bank-na-wells-fargo-bank-na/).

On 4 March 2025 the bureau filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, and the court dismissed the case with prejudice the next day, so the allegations were never decided. That record covers both the filing and the dismissal.

## Inbox access and account takeover

Account takeover often begins in the inbox rather than in the transfer app. A password reset link goes to the registered email address, and a sign-in code often goes to the same address or a linked phone. An attacker with inbox access can request a reset, read the code, and then change the account password and the linked bank details. Venmo states that changing the email password may help, since access to the email could allow changes to the Venmo account, as set out on the [Venmo login security page](https://help.venmo.com/cs/articles/login-security-vhel151).

Reuse of one address across services widens the exposure. A single address used for shopping, social media, newsletters and a transfer app gives a breach in any one service a path to the money account. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) lists the breaches in which an address appears. A hit on the transfer address calls for two steps at once: the password changes, and every available sign-in check is turned on.

## Fake confirmations and payment redirection

Payment redirection needs no account access, because a fake confirmation email claims a payment is pending, on hold, or waiting for an account upgrade, and asks the recipient to send money, pay a fee, or click a link to release the funds. In the Zelle version, a fake buyer claims to have paid, and a fake email says the money is on hold until the account is upgraded to a business account. The [Zelle business account scam account](https://www.theotherstream.com/zelle-business-account-scam-sellers/) describes sellers who received the fake email from a Gmail address. A fake support agent then coached the sellers to send $500. [Zelle states](https://www.zelle.com/how-to-avoid-phishing-scams) that no upgrades exist and that the only domain it uses is @zellepay.com.

Under other brands, Venmo states that a payment which only arrives after shipping and tracking upload is not a Venmo feature, and that Venmo only emails from addresses ending in venmo.com, as set out in the [Venmo common scams guide](https://help.venmo.com/cs/articles/common-scams-on-venmo-vhel167). Cash App support never asks for a sign-in code or PIN, or requires a payment, a purchase, a remote access download or a test transaction. Those rules are quoted in the [F-Secure guide to Cash App scams](https://www.f-secure.com/en/articles/12-cash-app-scams-to-know-and-how-to-avoid-them). Cash App states that verified emails come from @cash.app, @square.com, @surveys.squareup.com or @squareup.com, as set out in the [Cash App guide to social engineering attacks](https://cash.app/help/us/en-US/6489-protecting-you-from-social-engineering-attacks).

## A permanent alias for each transfer app

A dedicated alias gives each transfer app an address used nowhere else, forwarding to the real inbox so transfer mail still arrives in one place, as explained in [how email aliases actually work](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work). The address itself belongs to one app only. That separation has three effects. A breach at another service cannot expose the transfer address, because the address was never given to that service. Mail on the transfer alias from any sender other than the provider is suspect on its face. A confirmation arriving at a different alias warns at once that the message is fake or that the address has spread.

![The AliasFleet Create Alias form: a random alias preview, generation method, alias address and forward-to inbox for a new alias](/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-a-money-transfer-app/alias-creation.png)

Permanence matters as much as separation, because a money account needs a stable address for password resets, statements, dispute notices and future sign-in checks, and an address that stops working can lock the account holder out. The alias therefore stays alive permanently. If it starts to receive spam or phishing, it is disabled in one click and replaced with a fresh alias for the same app, and the provider account is updated to the new address before the old one is closed. No published study was found that measures the effect of alias separation on payment app fraud, so no figure is claimed for that effect. For bank accounts themselves the rule is stricter, since the bank receives a permanent real address rather than an alias, as explained in the [guide to a separate email for banking](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-banking).

## Sign-in checks for the app and the inbox

Two-factor authentication on the transfer app is the first check. PayPal describes the mechanism plainly: with two-step verification enabled, sign-in needs both the password and a different code each time, and PayPal will never ask for that code over the phone, email or text. That rule appears on the [PayPal account security page](https://www.paypal.com/us/security/protect-your-account). Venmo applies the same rule to its six-digit code, and Wise offers two-step verification, which it describes as a necessary layer of security on the account and states helps stop access even when the password is known, as set out in the [Wise two-step verification guide](https://wise.com/help/articles/2960083/what-is-step-verification).

The inbox needs the same treatment, because it guards the reset path. A unique password for the email account closes the simplest route in, and two-factor authentication on the email account adds a second barrier. A code that arrives without a sign-in attempt suggests that someone else may be trying to enter the account. The response is to change the email password and review recent sign-in activity.

## Sender checks

Every payment message is checked against the provider published rules before any link is clicked or any reply is sent (see table).

| Provider | Genuine sender domain | Rule stated by the provider |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Zelle | @zellepay.com | No upgrades; no Gmail, AOL or Yahoo address is used |
| Venmo | venmo.com | Mail uses the full name or business name; the code is never requested |
| Cash App | @cash.app, @square.com, @surveys.squareup.com, @squareup.com | Support never asks for a sign-in code or PIN |
| Wise | wise.com | Genuine mail uses the first name; links lead to wise.com |

The entries in the table rest on the providers' own pages, as stated on the Zelle phishing page, in the Venmo common scams guide, in the Cash App guide to social engineering attacks and in the [Wise phishing guidance](https://wise.com/help/articles/2932695/watch-out-for-phishing).

The check covers the sender domain, the greeting and the request. A generic greeting such as Dear user is a warning sign. Venmo states that its mail typically uses the full name or the business name. A request for a password, a sign-in code, a PIN or a payment to release funds is a warning sign on every provider listed here. Wise states that it will never ask for a password, login details over a phone call, or one-time passcodes, or ask for money to be moved to a safe account, as set out in the [Wise scam awareness guide](https://wise.com/gb/blog/scam-awareness). The [FTC phishing guidance](https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/how-recognize-and-avoid-phishing-scams) adds the general rule: a legitimate company will not email or text with a link to update payment information.

## Payment verification outside email

Payment instructions are verified through a channel outside the email thread. A new bank detail, a changed recipient, or a request to send money to a different account is confirmed by opening the app directly. The recipient can also be called on a number already held. Replying to the message that carried the new details does not confirm anything, because email is the channel the attacker can fake.

<Callout type="warning" title="Payment instructions">
A payment is confirmed inside the app or the bank account, never from a screenshot or an email, because a screenshot is easy to fake and an email can be forged.
</Callout>

The [NCSC phishing guidance](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/phishing-scams) describes phishing as scam email, text or calls designed to lead the victim to a website that steals bank details.

## Reporting a suspicious message

A suspicious message is left unclicked, and the account is checked inside the app. Venmo asks that a suspicious email be forwarded as an attachment to phishing@venmo.com and then deleted, per the [Venmo reporting page](https://help.venmo.com/cs/articles/reporting-fake-or-suspicious-messages-or-emails-vhel245). The FTC asks that a phishing email be forwarded to reportphishing@apwg.org, and a phishing text to SPAM (7726). A loss or an unauthorised transfer is reported at once to the bank or the app, then to the FTC at [ReportFraud.ftc.gov](https://reportfraud.ftc.gov) and to the FBI at the [Internet Crime Complaint Center](https://www.ic3.gov).

Recovery turns on who sent the payment. When a scammer moved the money using the account holder login or a code obtained by trickery, the transfer is generally an unauthorised transfer under Regulation E, which sets error-resolution duties for the institution holding the account, though how those duties apply to a payment app as opposed to the bank is contested, since the CFPB's Zelle allegations on this point were never decided, as set out in the [Regulation E error-resolution rule](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-12/chapter-X/part-1005/subpart-A/section-1005.11). When the account holder sent the payment personally because of a lie, the law as written does not promise a refund, and any money back depends on the bank's or app's own policy. The [Recording Law guide to payment app scams](https://www.recordinglaw.com/us-laws/scams-and-fraud/zelle-and-payment-app-scams/) explains that distinction. Provider rules differ by country and by app, and refund outcomes vary by whether the transfer was authorised or unauthorised. The email checks here cover the inbox side of the risk only, under US federal rules (Regulation E) and UK guidance from the NCSC and Wise UK.

## Email aliases and money transfer accounts

AliasFleet provides email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox. A separate alias can be created for each money transfer app, following the [guide to creating aliases](https://aliasfleet.com/docs/email-aliases/creating-aliases), and each alias can be disabled in one click when it starts to receive unwanted mail. The Free plan includes 10 active aliases and 1 verified destination inbox, and the Pro plan costs $12 per month with unlimited active aliases, as listed on the [AliasFleet homepage](https://aliasfleet.com). AliasFleet does not hold money, process transfers, or reverse payments. Recovery after a loss stays with the bank or the transfer provider.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Money Transfer Apps</category><category>Account Security</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email for a Stock Trading App</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-a-stock-trading-app</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-a-stock-trading-app</guid>
      <description>A trading account holds money, and its email address is the recovery path. One dedicated alias per broker plus strong login controls keeps that path isolated.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Email protection for a stock trading app is the practice of isolating the email address on a brokerage account from the address used for every other service, and of locking the account with a strong passphrase, multi-factor authentication and account alerts. The email address on a trading account receives password reset links, login codes, trade confirmations and withdrawal notices, so control of that address is close to control of the money and securities in the account. The guidance here comes from United States regulators; broker regulation and recovery procedures in other countries differ.

## The email address as a recovery path

Password resets, login codes, trade confirmations, withdrawal notices and account change alerts all arrive there. The Securities and Exchange Commission's updated investor bulletin on protecting online investment accounts gives 12 or more characters with symbols, numbers and upper and lower case letters as the shape of a strong password. The bulletin is published at [Investor.gov](https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/general-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletins/updated-2).

FINRA Regulatory Notice 21-18, published in April 2021 after roundtable discussions with 20 firms, records that many firms had moved away from using email addresses as authentication factors because of the prevalence of email account breaches. The notice is available from [FINRA](https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/21-18).

## How account takeover works

FINRA's investor alert of 7 April 2026 defines a customer account takeover as criminals stealing usernames, passwords or multi-factor authentication codes to gain unauthorised access to personal accounts, including online financial accounts. Phishing emails, fake websites, social engineering and stolen credentials are the routes it lists into an account. The alert is published by [FINRA](https://www.finra.org/investors/insights/customer-account-takeovers).

## Phishing aimed at trading accounts

The FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center counted 193,407 phishing and spoofing complaints in 2024, the highest total for any crime type in its annual report. Reported losses across all internet crime complaints reached $16.6 billion that year, and investment fraud accounted for $6,570,639,864 of it. Those figures are in the [FBI IC3 2024 Internet Crime Report](https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2024_IC3Report.pdf).

The SEC updated its investor alert on phishing, smishing and vishing on 23 April 2026. Fraudsters pose as an investment firm or another trusted service, the alert states, and send emails that ask the reader to reply, click a link to a website that mimics a legitimate site, or open an attachment. Investors are advised to enable multi-factor authentication for all online investment and financial accounts and to contact the firm directly through a verified telephone number when a message looks suspicious. The full alert is on [Investor.gov](https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/general-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-alerts/dont-get-ished-tips-protect-your-investment-and-financial-accounts-phishing-smishing-and-vishing). CISA lists a suspicious sender address, a generic greeting and a spoofed hyperlink as common indicators of a phishing attempt, in its guidance on [avoiding social engineering and phishing attacks](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/avoiding-social-engineering-and-phishing-attacks). The SEC also warns that con artists use the names of real SEC employees to trick victims into giving access to brokerage accounts, in its alert on [government impersonators](https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/govimpersonatorsalert.htm). The Federal Trade Commission publishes consumer guidance on [online privacy and security](https://consumer.ftc.gov/identity-theft-and-online-security/online-privacy-and-security), including advice on recognising phishing messages.

## The Robinhood data security incident

On the evening of 3 November 2021, an unauthorised third party obtained access to certain Robinhood customer support systems by socially engineering a customer support employee by phone. Robinhood disclosed the incident on 8 November 2021. The intruder obtained a list of email addresses for approximately five million people and full names for a different group of approximately two million people. About 310 people had further personal information exposed, including name, date of birth and zip code. Robinhood stated that no Social Security numbers, bank account numbers or debit card numbers were exposed and that no customers lost money as a result of the incident. The disclosure is in the [Robinhood newsroom](https://robinhood.com/newsroom/robinhood-announces-data-security-incident-update/).

The data taken was email addresses, not money. A dedicated alias per broker limits that exposure to the alias for that broker: mail arriving at that address from any other sender names itself as unrelated to the broker, and a breach of the broker exposes only that one alias.

## A dedicated alias per broker

A dedicated alias is a forwarding address created for one broker and used nowhere else. Trade confirmations, statements, password resets and alerts from that broker go to the alias, and the alias forwards them to the real inbox. The address on the trading account is therefore different from the address on every other account, and a leak at one broker exposes only that broker alias.

The alias also sorts the mail, since trade confirmations and statements arrive on the broker alias while mail for other services arrives on other addresses. A phishing email that claims to come from the broker but arrives at a different alias fails the check immediately. The broker was never given that address. The broker sends a verification message to the alias when the address is entered on the trading account, and the message arrives in the real inbox through forwarding, which confirms the account.

No study in the sources measures how much a dedicated alias per broker cuts account takeover rates. The protection is a mechanism argument, not a measured outcome: containment, with the exposed address traceable to one broker and replaceable without changing the address on every other account.

## Identity verification and the limits of an alias

The contact address changes with an alias. The identity on the account does not change, and the account holder is not hidden from the broker. FINRA Rule 2090 requires firms to use reasonable diligence to know the essential facts about every customer when opening and maintaining an account, and anti-money laundering programmes must include a Customer Identification Program with risk-based procedures for establishing the true identity of each person who opens an account. Those obligations are set out in FINRA Regulatory Notice 21-18. Account opening for a trading app therefore still requires a legal name, date of birth, address and a tax identification number, and the broker verifies those details.

An alias also does not stop a broker-side breach. The Robinhood incident exposed the addresses the broker held, and an alias held by the broker would have been exposed in the same way.

## The permanent alias rule

The trading alias stays active for as long as the account holds money or securities, because the alias is the recovery address: closing it can cut off password resets, trade confirmations, withdrawal notices and fraud alerts. It remains active from account opening until the account is closed and the funds are withdrawn. The same permanence rule governs bank accounts, where the address on file is a permanent address used only for financial accounts, as the AliasFleet guide on [separate email addresses for banking](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-banking) explains.

<Callout type="warning" title="An email change followed by a wire request">
FINRA recorded firms identifying a change in a customer email address followed by a request for a third-party wire as an anomaly indicating an account takeover. An unexpected email change notice on a trading account is a reason to contact the broker at once, before any transfer is authorised.
</Callout>

A guide to insurance quotes explains that a quote alias remains active until the purchase decision is reached. Policy mail then moves to a permanent address used only for financial accounts. That guide is the AliasFleet article on [protecting email when getting insurance quotes](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-getting-insurance-quotes). A trading account has no equivalent handover point: the account itself is the financial account, and the alias is its permanent contact address from opening to closure.

## Account controls

The alias is one control among several, and it does not replace the others. The SEC bulletin on protecting online investment accounts lists the controls that matter: a strong passphrase or password, two-step verification, account alerts, different passwords for different accounts, caution on public computers and public wireless networks, and regular checks of account statements and trade confirmations. FINRA states that most firms embraced multi-factor authentication as a key control that significantly reduces the likelihood that bad actors can take over an account, and the regulators stress it more than any other control.

Account alerts use the email address to report account activity. The SEC bulletin lists the alerts worth turning on: account logins, failed login attempts, password changes, personal information changes, securities transactions, transfers of money or securities, and the addition or deletion of an external financial account. Because the passphrase is unique to the trading account, a breach of another service does not expose the broker login. The destination inbox needs its own unique passphrase too, because the inbox is the recovery path for the trading account and for every other account that forwards to it.

## Measures after a suspected compromise

The SEC's updated investor alert on identity theft and data breaches sets out the steps for compromised personal financial information. Contact with the investment firm comes first, to ask what steps will protect the account. Fraudsters who have taken control of an account may reset the password, transfer funds, or execute trades. The password or passphrase for any investment or financial account associated with the compromised information is then changed to a strong passphrase of at least 12 characters. The alert also advises closing compromised accounts, activating two-step verification, monitoring accounts for suspicious activity, and placing a credit freeze or fraud alert on the credit file. The full alert is on [Investor.gov](https://investor.gov/additional-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-alert-identity-theft-data-breaches-your). The FTC reporting and recovery service is at [IdentityTheft.gov](https://identitytheft.gov).

Have I Been Pwned lets a person check whether an email address appears in a known data breach, at [haveibeenpwned.com](https://haveibeenpwned.com). Broker-specific procedures differ by firm and change over time, so the procedures for changing an email address, enabling passkeys and setting alerts are not verified broker by broker here; the broker's own security settings are the source for those details.

## AliasFleet for a stock trading app

AliasFleet provides email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox, with a separate alias available for each broker so the address on each trading account is different. A control disables an alias, and disabling the alias stops mail arriving on it. The free plan includes 10 active aliases, 1 verified destination inbox and 3 personal subdomains, and Pro costs $12 per month with unlimited active aliases, 3 custom domains and 5 destinations. Those figures are stated on the [AliasFleet homepage](https://aliasfleet.com) and in the [AliasFleet plan limits guide](https://www.aliasfleet.com/docs/account-billing/plan-and-usage). AliasFleet does not provide a mailbox: it forwards mail to a destination inbox the account holder already owns, and replies sent from an alias keep the primary email address hidden through an encoded reply route. It does not replace multi-factor authentication, account alerts or a strong passphrase, and it does not verify identity on behalf of the broker. The trading alias stays active for as long as the account holds money, because the alias is the recovery address for that account.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Financial Accounts</category><category>Brokerage Security</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Is Kolab Now Safe? Open Source, No Zero-Access by Default</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-kolab-now-safe</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-kolab-now-safe</guid>
      <description>Kolab Now is open-source Swiss email with TLS, Perfect Forward Secrecy and optional PGP, but stored mail has no zero-access encryption by default.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Kolab Now is an open-source email and groupware service run by Apheleia IT AG from Bern, Switzerland. The company has operated it since July 2013. Ordinary stored mail has no zero-access encryption by default, so the provider holds the keys and can read it. Mail in transit is protected by TLS with Perfect Forward Secrecy, stored data sits on hardware-encrypted systems, and the web client supports OpenPGP encryption.

## Service and operator

Kolab Now is the managed version of [Kolab](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolab), a free and open source groupware suite built on IMAP, covering mail, calendars, contacts, tasks and file storage. The operator is Apheleia IT AG of Bern, Switzerland. Data is hosted in Switzerland on dedicated hardware in a dedicated datacentre rack, with no ownership ties to another country, according to the [Kolab Now](https://kolabnow.com/) homepage. The same page describes the service as built on 100 percent free and open source software, states GDPR and PCI compliance, and states that user data is not used for machine learning. [EuropeanStack](https://www.europeanstack.io/en/products/kolab_now) found no public ISO 27001 or SOC 2 certificate on the pages reviewed for this article.

The [terms of service](https://kolabnow.com/content/page/tos) describe all of the software as open source or free software, record that no proprietary component stops a user setting up a personal server and moving data away, and state that the monthly fee pays for the service, with no third party revenue streams and no sale of personal data.

## Encryption in transit and at rest

Transport encryption is TLS with Perfect Forward Secrecy, and storage encryption is hardware encryption of the systems holding the data. The Kolab Now knowledge base records that Perfect Forward Secrecy is configured, that SSL/TLS encrypts data in transport, and that all systems are hardware encrypted. [The knowledge base article on encryption](https://kb.kolabnow.com/documentation/encryption) carries the date 16 September 2019.

The limit is in storage. Default storage carries no zero-access encryption, so the provider holds the keys and can read ordinary stored mail. [CyberInsider](https://cyberinsider.com/email/best-encrypted-email/), in a review updated 12 November 2026, states that Kolab Now does not encrypt incoming emails at rest with zero-knowledge keys by default, and that strict privacy users should pair it with a local desktop client. The same review records that all user data sits exclusively on full-disk encrypted servers in Switzerland, so the question is who holds the keys, not whether the disks are encrypted.

<Callout type="info" title="Full-disk encryption is not zero-access encryption">
Full-disk encryption protects stored data when a disk is stolen or taken out of the server. The provider can still read stored mail. It holds the decryption keys, and the mail is readable while the system runs. Zero-access encryption is different. It keeps the provider itself from reading stored mail.
</Callout>

ProPrivacy tested the TLS configuration in 2019 and reported a Qualys SSL Labs score of A+. [The ProPrivacy review](https://proprivacy.com/email/review/kolabnow) appeared on 15 November 2019, so the A+ result is a test result from 2019, not a current score.

## OpenPGP in the web client

OpenPGP encryption is available in the web client, and the user sets it up by hand. A key pair is created, the keys are imported into the web client, encryption is enabled in the settings, and the encrypt option is selected when a message is composed. The knowledge base article on encryption explains that a message encrypted at sending is also encrypted in the data saved to disk, and that the recipient needs the private key to read it.

The same article carries the central warning. The web client lets the server hold a copy of the public and private keys, and true end-to-end encryption can only really be achieved by client encryption. A message protected by web client PGP is therefore safe from other parties, but the provider holds the key material, so the protection differs from encryption where only the user holds the keys.

The stronger setup keeps the keys local. The user generates and holds the keys on a local machine and uses a desktop client. [GnuPG](https://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/c14.html) documents the creation of a key pair, including the passphrase that protects the private key and the revocation certificate. The terms of service state that Kolab Now is not responsible for the encryption keys.

## Jurisdiction and legal access

Kolab Now operates under Swiss law. It sits outside the United States and the European Union. Swiss privacy law restricts third party access to stored data strictly. The terms of service state that no third party will get access to user data without a duly authorised warrant issued by a Swiss judge. Only the minimum logs needed to improve the service and resolve issues are kept.

The warrant requirement is a legal protection, not a technical one. A Swiss judge can still order access, and the provider can comply by handing over readable mail, because stored mail carries no zero-access encryption. Jurisdiction raises the bar for access without removing the provider ability to read stored mail.

A warrant canary is a statement, published regularly, that a provider has not received legal process it would be forbidden to disclose, and the statement is withdrawn once such process arrives. [The Electronic Frontier Foundation](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/warrant-canary-faq) explains that canaries often appear alongside a transparency report. Kolab Now publishes no formal warrant canary, and the transparency statistics stand as the published record of requests.

## Transparency reporting

Annual statistics on requests from the authorities are published by Kolab Now, though reporting was irregular for several years before restarting in January 2026. [The transparency report for 2025](https://blogs.kolabnow.com/2026/01/13/transparency-reporting), published 13 January 2026, states that the company used to report every year, missed several reports, and wants to restart the routine. Its 2025 figures are 5 administrative requests, 1 of them rejected, and zero retroactive metadata, all-data, and live interception requests.

[The statistics for 2019](https://blogs.kolabnow.com/2020/01/03/our-statistics-for-2019) report zero administrative requests, zero retroactive metadata requests and zero live interception requests, alongside 5 extrajudicial requests from private and public third parties, none of which were formal legal orders.

The reporting gap drew criticism in older reviews. The ProPrivacy review recorded in 2019 that the transparency statistics had not been updated since 2015, and treated the stale report as a warrant canary concern. The criticism was fair at the time, and the January 2026 restart answers it in part. The missing years remain unanswered: the company says it missed several annual reports, and this article did not establish which years between 2021 and 2025 lack a published report. The archive is on the [Kolab Now blog privacy tag](https://blogs.kolabnow.com/tag/privacy), which lists the 2025, 2021, 2020, 2019 and 2018 statistics posts.

## Clients and access

Kolab Now provides no native mobile or desktop apps of its own. Access is through the web client in a browser, or through third party clients using open protocols. CyberInsider counts the absence of mobile apps as a drawback, and records full support for IMAP, POP, SMTP, CalDAV and ActiveSync. The Kolab Now homepage lists synchronisation with Android and iPhone, plus Thunderbird, Outlook, eM Client, Apple Mail and Apple Calendar.

Open protocols mean the user is not tied to one client and can move to a desktop client for stronger PGP handling. The trade off is two-factor authentication: the ProPrivacy review states that enabling it stops the user syncing the account with a third party email client via IMAP, DAV or ActiveSync, leaving the user with the web client alone, the same client that stores PGP keys on the server.

## Pricing and storage

Kolab Now is a paid service with no permanent free tier and a 30-day free trial. CyberInsider, updated 12 November 2026, puts the email-only plan at 5.00 CHF per month and the full Kolab plan at 9.90 CHF per month, with 5 GB or more of storage. Shared calendars, tasks, notes, file storage and document editing come with the full plan, and the figures are from CyberInsider, dated 12 November 2026. The [Kolab Now pricing page](https://kolabnow.com/pricing) lists the current plans.

Support is the weak point in the older review. The ProPrivacy review reports that the team did not answer two pre-purchase questions, and that support for issues not directly caused by the service costs 2.00 CHF per ticket. That picture dates from 2019.

## Suitability

Kolab Now fits a user or a small team that wants a full groupware suite under Swiss jurisdiction, built on open-source code, with open protocols and custom domain support as the Kolab Now homepage states, and that accepts stored mail readable by the provider by default. It fits a family or a small company sharing calendars and folders and moving away from Google Workspace.

The fit is weaker where default zero-access encryption is the requirement. CyberInsider contrasts Kolab Now with Proton Mail, where stored mail uses zero-access encryption and Proton states that nobody else can access the contents stored in the inbox, including Proton. A user who wants that default picks a provider with zero-access encryption built in, rather than adding PGP by hand. [Is Mailfence Safe?](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-mailfence-safe) covers a provider with the same opt-in encryption shape, where OpenPGP is switched on message by message.

Before choosing Kolab Now as a destination inbox, a reader can check whether the address they plan to use already appears in known breaches. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) searches breach data for an email address and reports whether it appears in known breaches. An address in the results has been exposed in a breach. [How to check if your email was leaked](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked) explains how to read the result and what to do for each breach it names.

## AliasFleet and Kolab Now

AliasFleet supplies email aliases that forward to a destination inbox, and Kolab Now serves as that destination inbox for the user. A separate alias is created for each website, and mail sent to the alias arrives in the Kolab Now inbox. An alias that starts receiving unwanted mail is disabled in one click, and the Kolab Now address itself is never given to the website. [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com/) lists 10 active forwarding aliases on the free plan, with one verified destination inbox and two-way reply forwarding. The Pro plan at 12 dollars per month adds unlimited aliases, custom domains and PGP encryption of forwarded mail.

Kolab Now protects the inbox with Swiss jurisdiction and open code, and AliasFleet keeps the Kolab Now address out of circulation, so a breach at one website exposes only the alias for that website. AliasFleet does not change how Kolab Now stores mail, and it adds no zero-access encryption to the Kolab Now inbox. Mail forwarded by AliasFleet is processed in memory and not stored on disk, according to AliasFleet.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Secure Email</category><category>Kolab Now</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>NHN Dooray breach exposes client emails and work files</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/nhn-dooray-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/nhn-dooray-data-breach</guid>
      <description>NHN Dooray confirmed a breach of its Dooray! platform on 14 November 2026, after attackers took over client accounts and leaked work data and employee details.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[NHN Dooray confirmed on 14 November 2026 that attackers breached some client accounts on Dooray!, and that business data and employee personal information leaked. The incident ran from about 22:00 on 12 November to the early morning of 13 November. No victim count was disclosed.

Dooray! combines projects, drives, messengers and calendars in a single cloud service used by companies and public institutions. [eDaily](https://en.edaily.co.kr/news/eda202611155223/) reported that the platform was recently used to develop Gukbang I-eum. That platform serves about 300,000 military personnel. The reporting does not say data from that military platform was among the leaked data. eDaily and Global Economic reported the notices; this article relies on their reporting rather than the notice text.

## Dooray! customers named in the reporting

[Global Economic](https://www.g-enews.com/article/ICT/2026/11/2026111319410653883d7a510102_1) named Woori Financial, the Ministry of National Defense, the Korea Aerospace Administration and the National AI Commission among Dooray! customers. None of those organisations has been named as affected, and no report says their data leaked.

## Password recovery and open API access

The attacker used two routes, according to eDaily. The first route ran through password recovery. The attacker repeatedly entered verification codes during the recovery process, changed the passwords of some accounts, and then logged in without authorisation. The report does not say how many codes were tried, how many accounts were taken over this way, or why repeated entry was possible.

The second route ran through an open API vulnerability. Some authentication keys leaked through the vulnerability, and API calls by unauthorised third parties exploiting it were confirmed. No technical detail was published. The report gives no count of leaked keys, and no account of what the unauthorised API calls retrieved.

The attacker changed account passwords and used leaked API keys to take over the accounts.

## Client work and employee details obtained

The leaked data covers two groups. The first group is work content from some client companies, held in projects, drives, messengers and calendars. An NHN Dooray spokesperson confirmed the leak to eDaily:

> To date, we have confirmed that business-related data, including emails and messages from some client companies, as well as personal information such as employee IDs, names, and contact information have been leaked.

Project files, drive documents, messenger threads and calendar entries can carry internal discussions and client details.

The second group is employee personal data. eDaily reported that the IDs, names, external email addresses, phone numbers, departments, job titles, positions and company names of client company employees were leaked. An external email address is the address an employee uses outside Dooray! The leak therefore connects a work identity to an address that can be contacted directly and matched against other data sets. NHN Dooray warned that leaked email addresses and phone numbers could be used for phishing and smishing. A [breach of email addresses](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/email-breach-and-password-breach) puts the name, employer, department and job title alongside the address.

No passwords appear in the reported leaked data. The attacker changed some account passwords during the attack. A changed password is not a leaked password, and no source lists passwords among the leaked data. No number was given. No source states how many accounts, employees or client companies were affected. The scope is described only as some client accounts and some client companies, and the investigation into the extent of the damage was still under way when eDaily reported the story.

## Regulator notifications

NHN Dooray published a first notice on 13 November. That notice said an external account-access attempt had been confirmed in the early morning of 13 November. It announced emergency measures to protect private and public client accounts. Global Economic reported that the notice did not disclose whether the intrusion had succeeded, whether information had leaked, or how many client companies were affected. The leak was confirmed on 14 November. eDaily reported it on 15 November.

| Date | Event |
| --- | --- |
| 13 November 2026 | NHN Dooray published a first notice on an external account-access attempt and revoked all service API and administrator API keys. |
| 14 November 2026 | NHN Dooray confirmed that business data and employee personal information had leaked. |
| 15 November 2026 | eDaily reported the confirmed leak. |

NHN Dooray blocked the IP addresses used in the attack. It strengthened the password-reset verification process. It revoked all existing service API and administrator API keys and suspended the related functions. That closed the second attack route. External system integrations and automation that depended on those keys broke with it. Global Economic reported that the API functions would resume once safety was confirmed. No restart schedule had been decided by 13 November.

NHN Dooray reported the incident to two regulators. The security breach went to the Korea Internet and Security Agency (KISA), and the personal information leak to the Personal Information Protection Commission. It notified the affected client companies and individual account holders of the details of the incident. A spokesperson promised cooperation with the relevant authorities. Its work now is to identify the cause, prevent recurrence and restore client data.

## Steps stated for Dooray! users

NHN Dooray changed the passwords of the affected accounts and recommended that other users change their passwords and set up two-factor authentication. Users were told to check whether a notice had arrived from NHN Dooray or from their employer. Affected companies and account holders were notified directly. The guide to [whether changing a password stops hackers](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/does-changing-your-password-stop-hackers) sets out what a password change can and cannot do after an account takeover.

Password reuse is the main risk here. An attacker who changed an account password through recovery codes has shown that the recovery process can be abused. A user who reuses the same password elsewhere hands the same risk to other accounts. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) lists breaches by email address. Checking the affected address there shows whether it has appeared in earlier breaches, and the guide to [whether Have I Been Pwned is safe](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-have-i-been-pwned-safe) explains how to read the results.

The phishing risk lasts longer. The leaked details let an attacker send convincing messages, and names and job titles do the rest. They make the messages look as if they come from inside the organisation. [Phishing messages built on leaked email addresses](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email) are harder to spot than generic spam because they use real details. Unexpected messages asking for credentials, payments or document access should be checked through a separate channel, since replying to the message itself proves nothing. NHN Dooray also named smishing in its warning, since phone numbers leaked alongside the email addresses. The guide to [checking whether an email is phishing](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-an-email-is-phishing) covers the checks to run before opening any link.

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Open questions in the NHN Dooray investigation

eDaily described the investigation into the extent of the damage as under way, and the investigation was still open. Global Economic quoted an NHN official saying the specific damage was still being confirmed and would be shared as it was identified. The reports to KISA and the Personal Information Protection Commission put the incident under the Korean regulators for security breaches and personal information leaks.

Several facts remain unknown. The number of affected accounts and people has not been disclosed, and the full list of affected client companies has not been published. The technical detail of the open-API vulnerability has not been described. No attacker has been named, no motive has been stated, and no confirmed misuse of the leaked data has been reported.

The [NTT Docomo breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/ntt-docomo-data-breach) offers a comparison. Disclosed earlier in November 2026 with up to about 300,000 customer records affected, it shows how much more detail an investigation can produce once it has progressed. A collaboration platform holds two kinds of data at once: the work itself and the identity of the people doing it. For the affected employees, the practical consequence is a higher risk of targeted phishing at their external email addresses. The practical response is the one NHN Dooray gave. Change the password and turn on two-factor authentication. Treat unexpected messages with suspicion until the company says more.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>South Korea</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Arara exposed 81 million emails in a week of major breaches</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/this-week-in-email-privacy-2026-11-16</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/this-week-in-email-privacy-2026-11-16</guid>
      <description>Arara Message, Nitori, MUJI, SignalTalk, AXA Direct Japan, ezTravel and World Triathlon: the email privacy stories of 10 to 16 November 2026.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Seven data breach stories in which email addresses were exposed form the email privacy roundup for 10 to 16 November 2026. Paycloud Holdings reported 81,329,467 email addresses taken, or possibly taken, from the Arara Message email delivery service. Nitori Holdings disclosed a possible leak of up to 37.62 million customer records. The MUJI operator, Ryohin Keikaku, admitted at a press conference that full credit card numbers it should have deleted were retained without encryption. SignalTalk, AXA Direct Japan, ezTravel and World Triathlon also reported breaches. Seven further stories appear in the final section of this roundup.

| Story | Records affected | Data exposed |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Arara Message | 81,329,467 email addresses taken or possibly taken | Email addresses, some with further attributes |
| Nitori | up to 37.62 million records may have leaked | Names, email addresses, home addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth |
| MUJI | up to about 27.26 million records may have leaked | Email addresses, dates of birth, gender, member IDs, plus card numbers in about 1.09 million MUJI Card records |
| SignalTalk | 1,855,578 members | Passwords and registered email addresses |
| AXA Direct Japan | about 597,000 MyAXA accounts may have been affected | Names, addresses, dates of birth, email addresses, telephone numbers |
| ezTravel | more than 690,000 members | Names, email addresses, phone numbers, purchase and order details |
| World Triathlon | no victim count disclosed | Names, email addresses, postal addresses, medical data |

## Arara Message follow-up

A third report from Paycloud Holdings, dated 6 November 2026, put the Arara Message total at 81,329,467 deduplicated email addresses taken or possibly taken. The total splits two ways. 34,285,087 of them were email-only and 47,044,380 carried additional attributes. Those addresses came from 97 servers and up to about 380 companies. Between 28 and 30 October 2026, up to about 7.13 million phishing emails impersonating credit card companies went out through the service. The service has been shut down since 31 October. SEGA put its own figure at 2,196,044 newsletter email addresses leaked through Arara, in a disclosure on 9 November. Of those, 92,273 carried distribution-related information, and the addresses went out in 11 mailings sent between 2 July and 28 October 2026. The full account is in [Arara Message data breach follow-up](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/arara-message-data-breach-followup).

## Nitori breach

On 9 November 2026, Nitori Holdings reported a possible leak of up to 37.62 million customer records, following unauthorised access confirmed on 6 November. The intrusion was dated to mid-to-late October by a third-party investigation. Names, kana readings, email addresses, home addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, gender and member numbers were among the records, while login passwords and credit card information were not compromised. Nitori reported the incident to Japan's Personal Information Protection Commission. Customers were warned about phishing emails and calls impersonating Nitori, delivery companies or online malls. The full account is in [Nitori data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/nitori-data-breach).

## MUJI follow-up

President Shimizu Satoshi apologised at a Ryohin Keikaku press conference on 12 November 2026. According to [Kyodo News](https://english.kyodonews.net/articles/-/91173), the company admitted at the conference that full credit card numbers it should have deleted had been kept with no encryption or other proper protection. A credential stuffing attack on the online store was disclosed in the fourth report of 9 November. Credentials obtained from breaches unrelated to Ryohin Keikaku were used in the attack, which affected about 270,000 member accounts. In the same report, the group with names, addresses and phone numbers grew from about 520,000 to about 750,000, and about 440,000 cash-on-delivery recipients were added. Full card numbers are held in about 1.09 million MUJI Card records, and about 345,000 of them are still valid. Up to about 27.26 million MUJI app customer records may have leaked, including email addresses. Suspension of the online store dates to 6 November, and reopening has been postponed indefinitely. Individual notifications began on 10 November. The company covers card reissue fees. The full account is in [MUJI data breach follow-up](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/muji-data-breach-followup).

## SignalTalk breach

On 7 November 2026, SignalTalk disclosed that the passwords and registered email addresses of all 1,855,578 Maru-Jan members had been downloaded by about 15:00 on 4 November. The service resumed at 16:00 on 7 November. Members were offered 3,000 points each, claimable until 24:00 on 20 November 2026. The warning to members was to expect mail impersonating Maru-Jan, because the leaked addresses give senders the exact addresses to target. The full account is in [SignalTalk data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/signaltalk-data-breach).

## AXA Direct Japan breach

About 597,000 MyAXA accounts may have been affected, according to a second report from AXA Direct Japan on 13 November 2026. Names, addresses, dates of birth, email addresses and telephone numbers were exposed. Credit card information was not included. Detection of the suspicious access came about 08:30 on 9 November, blocking followed at 10:53 the same morning, and MyAXA was restored on 12 November. Its roadside-assistance provider, Prestige Core Solution, detected its own intrusion on 29 October and told AXA on 2 November. Across its clients, up to about 5.5 million Prestige records may have been taken, a figure that is not AXA's count, and no misuse had been confirmed as of 13 November. The full account is in [AXA Direct Japan data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/axa-direct-japan-data-breach).

## ezTravel breach

Unusual external network activity targeting the membership system was detected by ezTravel on 7 November 2026, and the company issued a statement on 9 November. More than 690,000 members are affected after deduplication. The data that may have been exposed covers names, email addresses, phone numbers and purchase or order details, while credit card numbers, security codes, login passwords, passport numbers and national ID numbers were not exposed. The company warned that scammers may impersonate customer service or bank representatives to obtain card details or verification codes. Taiwan's Ministry of Digital Affairs said on 11 November that more than 10 Taiwan businesses had been hit in recent attacks, affecting more than 1 million personal records, with nearly half of the attacks AI-linked. MODA did not say whether ezTravel was included in that tally. The full account is in [ezTravel data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/eztravel-data-breach).

## World Triathlon breach

A memo to national federations dated 13 November 2026, signed by Secretary General Jon Wyatt, confirmed the incident at World Triathlon. An unauthorised party exploited a flaw in the Metabase reporting tool and accessed TRI databases. Complete database tables were copied on 6 November. A hacking forum post offered the data on 7 November. The breach was identified and the tool shut down on 8 November. Names, email addresses and postal addresses were taken. Medical data provided by athletes for event medical delegates, including allergies, illnesses and medication, was downloaded. TRI account passwords were stored hashed. All were reset and every user was signed out. No financial data was accessed. Lookalike email domains have already been used by fraudsters to request payments to new bank accounts. Swiss Police received a report of the incident, as did the Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner, with reports also made under EU GDPR and UK GDPR. The full account is in [World Triathlon data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/world-triathlon-data-breach).

## Email aliases and data breaches

AliasFleet provides email aliases that forward mail to a verified destination inbox, and two-way reply and Quick Send do not use Gmail Send As. An alias does not stop an address appearing in a breach and does not remove an address from a breach. A separate alias can be used for each service, so an address exposed in one breach is not the address used for another service.

## Additional stories from the week

The week also brought breach articles covering seven further stories. Some client accounts at [NHN Dooray](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/nhn-dooray-data-breach) were breached by an external party between about 22:00 on 12 November and the early morning of 13 November, and work emails, messages and employee email addresses leaked. All service API and administrator API keys were revoked. On 12 November 2026, [TSMC](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/tsmc-data-breach) confirmed via [SEC Form 6-K](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1046179/000104617926000800/a20261112statementregardin.htm) that some current and former employee data was posted on an external website. Sellers claimed about 46,000 records, 6.9 GB and 3 BTC (about $220,000). TSMC found no evidence its own systems were compromised. At [Chainstack](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/chainstack-data-breach), an internet-exposed test Grafana instance with default administrator credentials unchanged gave the entry point, and member email addresses and password hashes may have been exposed. Chainstack assesses with high confidence the attacker used ARTEX. Five systems at [SPH Media](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/sph-media-data-breach) were hit by cyberattacks, and the exposure was predominantly email addresses, 9 per cent of the database. No payment card or financial data was involved. A server supporting the Migrant Worker Primary Care Plan was accessed without authorisation at [Fullerton Health](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/fullerton-health-data-breach), and names, Foreign Identification Numbers, dates of birth, mobile numbers, email addresses and residential addresses may have been affected. No medical or financial records were involved. Analytics vendor TripleWhale was accessed without authorisation from 30 October to 1 November, exposing names, email addresses, phone numbers, mailing addresses and total spend at [Sneak Energy](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/sneak-energy-data-breach). No payment details, order details or passwords were involved. Sneak Energy said it was one of more than 65,000 companies affected. Off-chain servers at [MapleStory Universe](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/maplestory-universe-data-breach) were accessed without authorisation, exposing partial email addresses, the first 12 characters per ChosunBiz, wallet addresses and nicknames, and API keys for 328 Builder Center applications. No assets were moved or stolen.

Checking whether an address appears in a breach is covered by the guide on [how to check if an email was leaked](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked). The response after an address appears in a breach is covered by the guide on [what to do when an email is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach).]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breaches</category><category>Privacy</category><category>Email Aliases</category><category>Weekly Roundup</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>World Triathlon breach exposes athlete medical records</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/world-triathlon-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/world-triathlon-data-breach</guid>
      <description>World Triathlon confirmed a breach exposing athlete contact and medical records through a Metabase flaw, with no victim count disclosed yet.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[World Triathlon confirmed a data security incident in which an unauthorised party exploited a flaw in the reporting tool Metabase, entered the organisation's databases and copied member, athlete and entrant records, including medical data supplied for event medical delegates. The governing body disclosed the incident in a memo to national federations dated 13 November 2026, signed by Secretary General Jon Wyatt. No victim count has been disclosed.

No public statement page from World Triathlon itself was read for this article. The memo reached the public through national federations. [Triathlon Ireland](https://www.triathlonireland.com/news/data-security-incident-at-world-triathlon/) republished the full message on 13 November 2026. [bitcomme](https://bitcomme.com/world-triathlon-data-breach-exposed-athlete-medical-information-and-more/) reported the disclosure on 15 November, and [the5krunner](https://the5krunner.com/2026/11/15/quick-read-world-triathlon-breach/) and the [Royal Gazette](https://www.royalgazette.com/running-triathlon/sport/article/20261115/bermuda-triathletes-have-data-stolen-from-governing-body/) covered it the same day. World Triathlon, based in Lausanne, Switzerland, governs triathlon internationally and has 172 affiliated national federations organised into five continental confederations, according to bitcomme.

## Chronology from 6 to 13 November 2026

The access route was a security flaw in Metabase. According to the memo, the unauthorised party used that flaw to reach TRI databases and repeatedly extracted names, email addresses and postal addresses, including the National Federation contact list.

On 6 November 2026 the attacker copied complete database tables, and a day later, on 7 November, a post on a hacking forum claimed to offer the data for download. World Triathlon identified the breach on 8 November and shut the tool down the same day. The memo is dated 13 November, five days after the shutdown.

![World Triathlon's memo to national federations: the "What Happened" and "Data Involved" sections, confirming the Metabase flaw, the 6 November table copy and the medical data taken](/blog/world-triathlon-data-breach/notice.png)

The memo does not say how the breach was detected, and whether anyone downloaded the data from the forum post is unconfirmed.

## Categories of records copied

| Data category | What the memo says was copied |
| --- | --- |
| Member, athlete and entrant records | Names, contact details, country, National Federation, entries and results history |
| Technical official and coach records | Positions, evaluations and certifications |
| National Federation and Confederation contact details | Contact details |
| Medical data for event medical delegates | Allergies, illnesses and medication, given as examples in the memo |
| TRI account passwords for the NF Portal and Entries | Copied in hashed form |
| Financial data | Not accessed |

The UK National Cyber Security Centre notes that criminals use breach data to make phishing messages appear legitimate, as reported by bitcomme. The federation contact list is also a verified list of staff contacts for payment fraud. World Triathlon warned that fraudsters have already used lookalike email domains to request payments to new bank accounts.

## Medical declarations supplied to event delegates

The medical data in the copied records covers information athletes provided for medical delegates at events, for example allergies, illnesses and medication. Event pages state that medical information provided at entry is saved in the athlete's profile and passed to the medical team at each event the athlete enters, according to bitcomme. Whether other medical records were affected, such as therapeutic use exemption applications, is not stated in the memo.

The memo gives allergies, illnesses and medication as examples of the medical data downloaded. Passwords can be changed after a reset; the medical information in the copied records stays in the athlete's profile for future events.

Athlete medical data has been targeted before: in 2016 the Russia-linked group Fancy Bear leaked therapeutic use exemption information from the World Anti-Doping Agency database, according to bitcomme. Bermuda triathlete Tyler Smith, quoted by the Royal Gazette, called the medical data access disappointing. He questioned whether the governing body needs to store that data at all. The Royal Gazette named Smith, Erica Hawley, Nick Pilgrim and Oliver Hayward among the Bermuda athletes who may have had data compromised, along with longtime member and Olympic champion Dame Flora Duffy.

## Hashed NF Portal passwords

TRI account passwords for the NF Portal and Entries were stored in hashed form, so the original password is not retrievable from the hash alone, according to the memo. World Triathlon reset all of those passwords and signed every user out. The reset matters because the hashed passwords were still copied, and a copied hash can be attacked offline. How well hashes resist cracking depends on the algorithm and the strength of the original password, yet the memo does not specify the algorithm, so the practical risk from the hashed passwords cannot be assessed precisely.

Anyone who reused the same password on another account should change it there. The [guide to whether changing a password stops hackers](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/does-changing-your-password-stop-hackers) explains why a reset only helps if the new password is unique to that account. No financial data was accessed, according to the memo. The fraud attempts using lookalike domains show the stolen contact data is already being used to request payments to new bank accounts.

## Notification of affected coaches, athletes and officials

The copied data covers National Federation coaches, age-group and elite athletes, technical officials and staff, according to Triathlon Ireland. Each affected person is to be emailed directly by World Triathlon. Triathlon Ireland told its members that anyone affected will receive an individual notice from World Triathlon directly, and that queries should go to technology@triathlon.org.

No victim count has been disclosed, and any figure circulating elsewhere should be treated as unconfirmed unless World Triathlon publishes it.

## Guidance for people whose data was copied

World Triathlon said affected individuals will be notified directly by email, and guidance from World Triathlon and the National Cyber Security Centre, as reported by bitcomme, is to confirm any notice through official channels rather than links in a message, and to expect targeted phishing, since the stolen records include entries and results a scam message could reference. Accounts should be checked for unauthorised activity, and other exposures checked through tools such as [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com).

The phishing risk here is specific to the records copied. [Phishing messages built from leaked email addresses](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email) work because the sender knows real details about the recipient. A message that references a real race entry and a real federation is harder to spot than a generic scam, and the [guide to checking whether an email is phishing](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-an-email-is-phishing) covers the checks that still work.

<Callout type="warning" title="What to do if your data was copied">
Confirm any breach notice through official channels rather than links in a message. Verify payment requests independently, by phone or direct message with the known contact. Change reused passwords on the other accounts where they were used, and report anything suspicious to technology@triathlon.org.
</Callout>

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Forensic investigation and Metabase context

World Triathlon shut down the affected tool, preserved evidence, reset all NF Portal and Entries passwords, signed every user out, and changed the credentials of the affected databases, according to the memo. It reported the incident to the Swiss Police, the Swiss Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC), and under EU GDPR and UK GDPR. It engaged a cybersecurity firm for a forensic investigation. The memo also asked federations to brief staff and members, review their own notification duties under national law, and report anything suspicious to technology@triathlon.org, with legal questions directed to legal@triathlon.org, according to bitcomme. German outlet tri-mag.de and Spain's Triatlón Noticias have also reported on the incident, according to bitcomme.

World Triathlon has not identified which Metabase vulnerability was exploited or which version of the software it was running. That is stated plainly in the bitcomme report. It is the main open question on the technical side of the incident. Metabase is a reporting tool, and the flaw in it was the access route into the TRI databases. The specific vulnerability is unconfirmed.

Separate Metabase reporting provides context only. On 6 August 2026 Metabase disclosed that attackers had used a previously unknown vulnerability against its cloud service, and it released patched versions. The flaw was an unauthenticated SQL injection in the tool's password-reset endpoint that can give an attacker administrator access, and it is tracked as CVE-2026-72898 with a severity score of 10.0 out of 10. The cloud service was patched. Self-hosted installations must be upgraded by their operators, and on 4 November Singapore's Cyber Security Agency warned the flaw was being actively exploited in self-hosted instances. All of that comes from the bitcomme report. None of it proves CVE-2026-72898 caused the World Triathlon breach, and the article does not claim that it did. Bitcomme also reports about 11,000 self-hosted Metabase instances online in October per Dataminr, with 4,309 potentially vulnerable, a figure that is Dataminr's, reported second-hand, and context only.

The [guide to what to do when an email is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach) covers the steps that apply while an investigation is still open.

## Facts not yet disclosed

No victim count has been disclosed. The specific Metabase vulnerability and version are unidentified, and the method of detection is unstated. Whether the data offered on the hacking forum on 7 November was downloaded by anyone is unconfirmed, as is whether medical records beyond the event-delegate declarations were affected, and the hash algorithm for the copied passwords is unstated. No findings from the forensic investigation have been published, so until World Triathlon or the investigation publishes more, each point stays open, and those gaps decide how serious the exposure turns out to be.

## AliasFleet and the World Triathlon records

AliasFleet provides one email alias per service. A leak of an address used for one service points back to that service only. The alias forwards to the user's real inbox, and the user can pause or delete it if it starts receiving spam or phishing. The World Triathlon records pair a name and email address with race entries and results, which is the material for a convincing targeted phishing message. An alias used only for World Triathlon entries would have limited the exposure to that one address. AliasFleet does not prevent a breach at the organisation holding the data, and it does not remove medical records or other data already held by that organisation. What it changes is the address the organisation holds. The [guide to how email aliases actually work](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work) explains the mechanism, and the [guide to how data breaches happen](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-data-breaches-happen) covers the pattern: a flaw in a connected tool giving access to the databases behind it.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Phishing</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AXA Direct Japan discloses MyAXA breach affecting 597,000</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/axa-direct-japan-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/axa-direct-japan-data-breach</guid>
      <description>AXA Direct Japan disclosed unauthorised access to its MyAXA portal and a roadside-assistance provider, with about 597,000 accounts possibly affected.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[AXA Direct Japan disclosed unauthorised access to its MyAXA customer portal and to Prestige Core Solution, an outsourced roadside-assistance provider, in a second report published on 13 November 2026. About 597,000 MyAXA accounts may have been affected, and the data that may have been exposed includes names, addresses, dates of birth, email addresses and telephone numbers. The company confirmed that unauthorised access to, and leakage of, some customer information did take place, and stated that credit card information was not included for MyAXA. No misuse of the information had been confirmed as of the disclosure. AXA Direct Japan is the Japanese general insurance arm of AXA, and MyAXA is its customer portal, where policyholders manage their insurance online. The company published a [first report on 12 November 2026](https://www.axa-direct.co.jp/company/official_info/announce/2026/261112.html) and a fuller [second report on 13 November 2026](https://www.axa-direct.co.jp/company/official_info/announce/2026/261113.html), and [AD HOC NEWS summarised the disclosure in English](https://www.ad-hoc-news.de/boerse/news/corporate-news/axa-stock-japan-unit-discloses-myaxa-data-breach-affecting-597-000/70505763) on 13 November 2026.

## How the intrusion unfolded

On 9 November 2026, AXA Direct Japan detected suspicious access to MyAXA at about 08:30 and blocked the access at 10:53 the same morning. The investigation then confirmed that a third party had accessed customer information without authorisation. The company suspended the related web services after detecting the access, and restored MyAXA on 12 November 2026 after confirming its safety. The first report, published on 12 November 2026, confirmed the unauthorised access and stated that the cause and the extent of the impact were still being investigated. The second report, published on 13 November 2026, added the number of accounts that may have been affected, the types of data involved, and the details of the second incident at the roadside-assistance provider.

The second incident has a separate timeline. Prestige Core Solution, the company to which AXA Direct Japan outsources part of its roadside-assistance work, detected unauthorised access to its own systems on 29 October 2026. On 2 November 2026, it told AXA Direct Japan that some AXA customer information held by the provider had been taken outside its systems. AXA Direct Japan has not published a count or a list of data types for the Prestige side. The range of customers affected and the information involved are still being examined, and the company stated that it will report further details when they are known.

## Records in scope

The second report lists five items of MyAXA data that may have been exposed: customer names, addresses, dates of birth, email addresses and telephone numbers. The count attached to that list is about 597,000 accounts, described by the company as the number that may have been affected. The notice confirms that unauthorised access to some customer information, and leakage of some of that information, did take place. It does not state that all 597,000 records were taken, so the 597,000 figure is the population at risk, not a confirmed exfiltration count. The company is still identifying the affected customers and confirming the details, and stated that it will contact affected customers individually as confirmation proceeds.

The five data types together are the material for impersonation. A name, address, date of birth, email address and telephone number allow a message to address the recipient by name and quote real personal details, and the email address provides the channel for sending that message. A message that claims to come from AXA Direct Japan, a bank or a delivery company can be checked against the company's own published notices rather than trusted on its own wording. The [phishing guide](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email) describes how a leaked email address is used after a breach: the address becomes the target list, and the other leaked details become the material that makes each message convincing.

## Data not mentioned in the notice

AXA Direct Japan stated in the second report that credit card information was not included in the MyAXA data. That exclusion applies to the MyAXA side of the incident. The notice does not mention passwords at all. It neither states that passwords were exposed nor states that they were not, so no claim about MyAXA passwords can be made either way until the company says more. Policy numbers and bank account details are also not listed in the MyAXA notice.

The Prestige side is separate from the MyAXA side on this point. Prestige International, the parent company of Prestige Core Solution, disclosed on 2 November 2026 that up to about 5.5 million records across its clients may have been taken, a maximum that includes duplicate records, with the number of unique people still under review. That figure covers all of Prestige's clients, not AXA alone, and it is not an AXA number. [Japan Cyber Watch reported](https://japancyberwatch.com/articles/prestige-international-roadside-assistance-breach-insurers-2026) that the Prestige records include names, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, vehicle registration and chassis numbers, accident and breakdown details, and bank account information for some people. Prestige's second report, on 6 November 2026, added that credit card numbers of three people had been taken, written into reception records. Those card numbers belong to the Prestige-wide incident, not to AXA specifically, and AXA's own statement that credit card information was not included applies to MyAXA.

## The Prestige incident

Prestige Core Solution runs the roadside-assistance system. It takes calls and dispatches help on behalf of insurers, car leasing companies and others. Prestige International detected unauthorised access to the group business system on 29 October 2026. It revoked the credentials that had been misused. The access continued, so the company stopped the system on 30 October 2026. Roadside assistance has continued through alternative operations since then. The company is investigating with outside specialists. It is reporting to Japan's Personal Information Protection Commission and consulting the police.

AXA Direct Japan is one of several clients that have disclosed their exposure through Prestige. Sony Assurance, ENEOS, Nippon Car Solutions and Sompo Japan have each published their own notices, with different figures and different levels of detail. ENEOS put its exposure at up to 8,500 contracts. [Sompo Japan](https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUB053QJ0V01C26A1000000/) put its figure at about 65,000 records. Nippon Car Solutions passed on what Prestige told it about the cause: flaws in the web application's access control and in how credentials were managed. That cause statement concerns Prestige, and it is not the cause of the MyAXA intrusion, which AXA Direct Japan has not explained. The customers affected through Prestige did not choose the contractor. They bought car insurance or a lease, and the company behind the roadside desk was a supplier to the company they bought from.

## Company response and service status

AXA Direct Japan's response, as described in the second report, covers five actions: blocking the unauthorised access route into MyAXA and applying the necessary security measures, strengthening monitoring for unauthorised access, investigating the cause and the extent of the impact, stopping customer-data transfers to Prestige Core Solution and working with the provider on containment, and reporting to the relevant authorities and cooperating with them. The first report also warned customers to be careful about suspicious contacts, and not to open suspicious links in email or SMS messages or to enter passwords and authentication codes in response to them.

MyAXA is back in service. It was restored on 12 November 2026 after the company confirmed its safety. Some web functions for the roadside-assistance service provided by Prestige remain suspended. Roadside assistance itself continues by telephone and through alternative operating procedures, so drivers who need help can still reach it. The company has published contact points for customers. The MyAXA contact centre can be reached on 0120-999-935, and a separate line, 0120-975-986, covers roadside assistance. Affected customers are to be contacted individually as the company confirms who is affected.

## What MyAXA customers can do

AXA Direct Japan advised customers to be careful about suspicious contacts and not to open links in email or SMS messages or enter passwords and authentication codes in response to them. Customers who use MyAXA should change their MyAXA password. [Changing a password after a breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/does-changing-your-password-stop-hackers) closes the most direct route an attacker could take with the exposed data, and any other account that shares the MyAXA password should get a new, different password as well. Customers should also expect messages that use the leaked details. A message that quotes a real name, address and date of birth can look genuine, so links in unexpected messages should not be opened, and passwords and authentication codes should not be entered through a link in a message. The [what to do after a breach guide](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach) sets out the steps in order: check whether the address appears in known breaches, change the passwords on the affected accounts, and then limit the damage the next leak can do. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) is the reference database for the first step.

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Where the investigation stands

The investigation is still open on both parts of the incident. AXA Direct Japan stated that the cause of the unauthorised access and the full extent of the impact are still under investigation, and that no misuse of the information or secondary damage had been confirmed as of 13 November 2026. The Prestige side is further from resolution: the range of AXA customers affected through the provider and the information involved are still being examined, with no AXA-specific figures published yet. Three facts are still missing. The first is how many of the 597,000 MyAXA accounts had data actually taken, rather than merely put at risk. The second is how the attacker reached MyAXA, which the company has not explained. The third is the AXA-specific scope of the Prestige incident. Until those facts are published, the description of the incident is the company's own: about 597,000 accounts may have been affected, some leakage is confirmed, no misuse has been confirmed, and the investigation continues.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Japan</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>One Alias per Subscription Box Protects Your Email</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-a-subscription-box</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-a-subscription-box</guid>
      <description>A subscription box holds a payment method, a shipping address and an email address. One alias per box keeps billing, shipping and marketing mail contained.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Protecting the email address used for a subscription box means giving the box a separate email alias instead of the primary inbox address, and disabling that alias at cancellation stops the box from reaching the primary inbox. A subscription box is a recurring-payment account holding an email address, a shipping address and a payment method on file, and it keeps charging on a schedule until the subscriber cancels. The alias receives the billing receipts, shipping notices and marketing mail for that box.

## What a subscription box account holds

A subscription box account holds more than a login. Signup collects a name, an email address, a postal address, a telephone number in many cases, and payment card details, and the account builds a record over time of order history, delivery history, preferences and total spend.

The email address is the account identifier. Password resets, delivery notices, billing receipts and marketing mail all go to it, and the address stays attached to the account through the subscription and the retention period after it ends. When the same address is used for several boxes, the subscriber cannot tell from the inbox alone which box shared the address or which box sent a given message. A guide to [using an email alias for Amazon](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-amazon) covers the same problem for one-off shopping. A box adds a recurring charge and a standing delivery relationship. A subscriber who has used one address for years can start with the guide on [how to find every account linked to your email](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-find-every-account-linked-to-your-email). Each box then moves to its own alias.

## Use and sharing of the email address

Box services state in their privacy policies that the email address is used for more than delivering the box. HelloFresh, a meal-kit subscription service, collects first and last name, email address and mailing and billing addresses. Its privacy policy, effective 7 July 2026, states that pixel tags, also known as clear GIFs, may be embedded invisibly in emails to record whether an email is opened or forwarded, and that personal information is shared with service providers, affiliates and third-party advertising partners for marketing and interest-based advertising. The full policy is on the [HelloFresh privacy page](https://www.hellofresh.com/about/privacy).

BarkBox, the dog-product subscription box run by BARK, states in its [privacy policy](https://bark.co/policies/privacy-policy) that contact information includes name, postal address, email address and telephone number, sourced from the customer, social media account providers and data brokers. The stated recipients are service providers, co-marketing partners and select affiliates that may provide or facilitate offers. Subscriber information, including customer ID, purchase history and the reason for ending a subscription, is shared with service providers and co-marketing partners. The policies describe sharing with partners, not an outright sale of the address, and no sale is documented in the policies cited. The guide on [how to check what a site does with your email first](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-what-a-site-does-with-your-email-first) covers checking a service before signing up.

## Breach exposure for subscription boxes

On 7 November 2026, Who Gives A Crap published an [incident notice](https://us.whogivesacrap.org/pages/november-2026-incident-notice). The notice stated that a US-based marketing software provider had told the company on 6 November 2026 that an unauthorised party accessed its systems. Those systems held information from the Australian, UK and US stores. The provider said access began on 30 October 2026, was identified on 31 October and was secured on 1 November 2026. The information involved was customers' first and last names, email addresses, phone numbers, mailing addresses and the total amount spent. Payment details, order details and passwords were not included, and Canadian customers were not affected. The company said it did not know whether the information was copied or downloaded, had no evidence of misuse so far, and disclosed no affected-customer count. AliasFleet covered the incident in the [Who Gives A Crap data breach](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/who-gives-a-crap-data-breach) article.

The breach did not happen at the box company. It happened at a marketing vendor: an email address given to a toilet-paper subscription ended up in the systems of a marketing software provider that held customer information to analyse the effectiveness of the company's marketing spend.

An older case exposed payment data as well. FabFitFun, a seasonal subscription box company, published a [breach notice](https://ago.vermont.gov/sites/ago/files/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/2020-05-29-2020-05-29-FabFitFun-Inc-SBN-to-Consumers.pdf) in May 2020 stating that malicious code was placed on the Shop portion of its website on 2 May 2020 and found on 6 May 2020, and that customers who completed a purchase there between 2 and 6 May 2020 had name, address, phone number, email address, credit card number, CVV code and card expiration date exposed. A later class action alleged the same pattern across signup windows of 26 April to 14 May 2020 and 22 May to 3 August 2020. The case settled for $625,000, with an estimated class of 441,160 members, according to the [settlement report](https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/privacy/data-breach/fabfitfun-to-pay-625k-to-settle-class-action-claims-over-2020-web-security-incident/comment-page-1/). FabFitFun denied wrongdoing, and the figures describe the class and the fund, not confirmed misuse of any individual's card.

## Cancellation and win-back mail

Cancellation stops the deliveries and the charges, but it does not delete the account record. The company keeps the email address under its retention policy, and win-back mail can follow, bringing return offers and surveys asking why the subscriber left. BarkBox's policy states that the reason for ending a subscription is collected as subscriber information, material a win-back campaign can draw on. No verified figure exists for post-cancellation marketing mail volumes.

An alias contains this problem: the win-back mail goes to the alias, not to the primary inbox, and disabling the alias at cancellation leaves the win-back sequence nowhere to go. The same approach works for free trials, covered in the guide on [how to protect your email for free trials](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-free-trials), and for loyalty programmes, covered in the guide on [how to protect your email for loyalty programs](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-loyalty-programs). A box differs because the payment method stays on file and deliveries keep coming until cancellation, so the alias stays live until the subscription ends.

## Cancellation rules

The FTC amended its Negative Option Rule in October 2024 to require cancellation to be as easy as signup. On 8 July 2025, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated the amended rule, holding that the Commission had failed to conduct a preliminary regulatory analysis required under section 22 of the FTC Act, and the FTC then opened a new rulemaking. The [FTC document](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/p064202negativeoptionruleanprm.pdf?LinkSource=PassleApp) defines a negative option as a term under which a customer's silence or failure to act is treated as acceptance. The Restore Online Shoppers' Confidence Act and section 5 of the FTC Act still apply, and cancellation procedures vary by company.

## One alias per box

The method is one alias per subscription box. Each box gets its own forwarding address for signup, login, billing, shipping and support contact, and all mail for that box arrives through it. The primary email address is never given to the box company.

Billing, shipping and marketing mail for one box are contained in one place, unwanted mail on the alias points to the responsible box because no other service uses that address, and disabling the alias at cancellation stops the win-back mail. The guide on [using a different email for every website](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/different-email-for-every-website) explains the general principle. If a box refuses the alias at signup, the guide on [when a service wont accept your alias email](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/when-a-service-wont-accept-your-alias-email) covers the usual causes and the reported workarounds.

<Callout type="tip" title="One alias per box">
One alias per box keeps billing, shipping and marketing mail for that box in one place. Disable the alias at cancellation.
</Callout>

## Signup, subscription and cancellation

At signup, the subscriber creates the alias before opening the box account, uses it as the account email, and keeps the order confirmation and the first billing receipt, which confirm the alias works. During the subscription, the subscriber watches the alias for mail that does not belong to the box: a shipping notice is expected, as covered in the guide on [how to protect your email for delivery notifications](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-delivery-notifications), while a third-party offer on the box alias is a sign the address has been shared, with the steps for that case in the guide on [what to do when an alias starts getting spam](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-an-alias-starts-getting-spam). At cancellation, the subscriber cancels through the company's flow first, then checks the final charge is the last one. The alias is disabled after that. Disabling the alias before cancelling can block the confirmation mail and the final receipt.

## After a breach

If a box company announces a breach, or a vendor breach like the Who Gives A Crap incident is reported, the subscriber checks whether the alias for that box was involved, against the data fields listed in the company notice. If the email address is listed, the subscriber assumes it is now in circulation and watches for phishing mail that uses real details, such as name and home address, to look convincing, a risk Who Gives A Crap warned its customers about in its incident notice.

The subscriber also checks the address on [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/), which records whether an email address appears in known breaches, following the guide on [how to check if your email was leaked](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked). If payment card details were exposed, as in the FabFitFun notice, the subscriber contacts the card issuer and monitors statements. Identity theft can be reported through [IdentityTheft.gov](https://www.identitytheft.gov/).

## AliasFleet and subscription boxes

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com/) provides email aliases that forward to a primary inbox. A subscriber creates one alias per subscription box, gives that alias to the box company, and disables it in one click at cancellation. The Free plan includes 10 active aliases. AliasFleet does not hold the subscriber's payment card details, does not process box payments, and does not delete data held by the box company. The guides on [are email aliases safe](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe) and [how email aliases actually work](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work) cover the general case.

## What an alias does not do for a subscription box

An alias does not protect the payment card, delete data the company already holds, or stop the company sharing the alias with its vendors. The alias is a different address, not a different identity, and the company still has the subscriber's name, shipping address and payment details.

| Area | What the alias does | What the alias does not do |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Email address | Keeps each box on its own address and stops its mail after cancellation | Does not remove the address from the company record |
| Payment card | Card details sit with the box company or its processor | Does not protect card numbers or CVV codes in a breach |
| Sharing with vendors | Shows which box shared the address when outside mail arrives | Does not stop the company sharing the alias with vendors |]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Email Aliases</category><category>Subscriptions</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email for Coupon and Deal Alert Sites</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-coupon-and-deal-alert-sites</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-coupon-and-deal-alert-sites</guid>
      <description>Coupon sites run on affiliate commissions, and the address is part of the deal. One alias per site keeps the mail contained and names the source if it leaks.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Protecting an email address on coupon and deal alert sites means keeping the address given at signup separate from a primary inbox. One email alias per coupon site contains the mail, names the source if the address leaks, and can be paused or deleted when the deals stop being worth the mail. Coupon sites are free because they earn affiliate commissions when a user clicks through and buys, and the address collected at signup is tied to browsing and purchase behaviour, shared with affiliate networks and marketing partners, and used to send targeted offers.

## The affiliate commission model

A coupon site does not sell coupons. It earns a commission when a user clicks a deal link and completes a purchase, paid by the retailer to the site or to the affiliate network that tracked the click. The email address keeps the user returning for the next deal, and it also serves as a persistent identifier that ties clicks and purchases to one person.

Rakuten states in its privacy policy that it collects the email address, browsing and search history, the coupons searched, viewed or clicked, and the URLs of pages visited through its browser extension. The policy states that Rakuten discloses information to affiliate networks when a user clicks through to a merchant. That disclosure lets purchases be accounted for and cash back paid. The data is also used to build a profile of preferences and send personalised offers, and the full policy is published on the [Rakuten privacy policy page](https://www.rakuten.com/help/article/privacy-policy-360002114027).

Honey, owned by PayPal, describes the same mechanism on its data page: the extension sees user checkouts on sites where it offers Honey Gold, so it can compare them against transactions reported from affiliate networks to confirm it receives its commission.

> "This is how Honey makes money." Honey states this on its [data and privacy page](https://www.joinhoney.com/data-and-privacy).

The same page states that Honey never sells user information. CouponCabin takes the opposite position: its privacy policy states that under the California Consumer Privacy Act it sells or shares identifiers, geolocation and inferences with advertising and marketing partners. That finding comes from a comparison of nine coupon extensions published by [SimplyCodes](https://simplycodes.com/blog/coupon-extension-privacy-comparison).

## Use of the signup address

The address given at signup serves three purposes. First, it is the account identifier, tied to purchase history, coupons clicked, stores visited and rewards balance. Rakuten lists the email address among the identifiers collected directly from the user, with commercial information such as products viewed, items added to cart and abandoned, and transaction history collected alongside it.

Second, the address is the marketing channel: Rakuten states that it may use the collected information to send email newsletters, rewards offers, discounts, promotion codes and event notices. RebatesMe states in its [privacy policy](https://rebatesme.zohodesk.com/portal/en/kb/articles/privacy-policy) that it shares personal information with affiliate partners and marketing partners, and that those disclosures may be considered "selling" or "sharing" under US state privacy laws.

Third, the address is shared with third parties that operate the service. Honey's privacy statement lists service providers, its parent company PayPal, and authorities as recipients, and states personal information is retained for the duration of the relationship plus 10 years. The statement is published on the PayPal Honey privacy page, linked in the table below.

An address given to one coupon site therefore links account activity, marketing and affiliate accounting to the inbox that also receives bank statements and work mail. The guide on [how spammers get an email address](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-do-spammers-get-your-email-address) describes how an address that circulates widely becomes a target, and a coupon signup is one of the widest circulations an address receives.

## Coupon extensions and browsing data

Many coupon sites also offer a browser extension, which collects more than the site does. A comparison of nine coupon extensions found that every one requests access to all websites the user visits. The permission is the baseline for the category: the extension needs to read checkout pages to test coupon codes, and the same access lets it observe browsing beyond shopping pages.

| Extension | Sale or sharing of personal information | Public record |
| --- | --- | --- |
| CouponCabin | Sells or shares identifiers, geolocation and inferences for targeted advertising under the CCPA | None found |
| Honey | States it does not sell personal information ([PayPal Honey privacy statement](https://www.joinhoney.com/privacy)) | Class action lawsuits; Google changed its affiliate ads policy in March 2025 |
| BeFrugal and SimplyCodes | State they do not sell user data | None found |

MegaLag's December 2025 follow-up video presented datarequests.org analysis suggesting Honey collected detailed browsing activity beyond shopping sites. A report on the follow-up, published by [9to5Google](https://www.9to5google.com/2025/12/22/honey-user-data-practices-reports/), notes the datarequests.org analysis. It found Honey tracked timestamps, location and the URLs of pages visited, attributed to specific user IDs. One had never created a Honey account.

## The Honey affiliate cookie dispute

In December 2024, the YouTuber MegaLag published an investigation alleging that Honey replaced content creators' affiliate cookies with its own at checkout, even when no coupon was applied. Class action lawsuits followed, and Google updated its Chrome Web Store affiliate ads policy in March 2025 in direct response. Honey later modified its extension to stop claiming affiliate revenue when no discount was applied.

PayPal disputes the allegations, and no court has found Honey liable. The SimplyCodes comparison records that in November 2025 PayPal secured a dismissal without prejudice of claims in the consolidated case, after the court found the plaintiffs had failed to plead traceable injury. The litigation continues.

## Exposure of deal site lists

A coupon site holds names, email addresses and purchase histories, and when that list is exposed the addresses become usable for spam and phishing. Newsletter subscribers are exposed alongside paying customers.

The documented case is Slickwraps, an online store for device wraps. In February 2020 the company suffered a data breach that exposed 858,000 unique email addresses across customer records and newsletter subscribers, plus names, physical addresses, phone numbers and purchase histories. The breach is recorded on [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/Breach/Slickwraps), which added it on 22 February 2020. The case shows why the newsletter list matters: a user who only signed up for deal alerts, and never bought anything, still had an address in the exposed data.

An address can be checked against breach lists with the method in the guide on [how to check if an email was leaked](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), and the site it came from can be traced with the method in the guide on [which website leaked an email](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/which-website-leaked-my-email). Both methods work better when each site received a different address, because the address itself carries the answer.

## One alias per coupon site

An email alias is a forwarding address that delivers mail to a primary inbox without exposing the primary address. The method for coupon sites is one alias per site: each site receives a different alias, so the mail from each site arrives under its own address and the sites cannot be linked through a shared address.

The method gives three results. First, containment: deal mail from one site stays under that site's alias, so the primary inbox is not filled with alerts and the volume from each site is visible separately. Second, source naming: if an alias receives mail from a sender the user never gave it to, or appears in a breach list, the source is the site that received that alias. Third, a kill switch: if the deals from a site stop being worth the mail, the alias can be paused or deleted and the mail stops at once.

The method is described in the guide on [how email aliases actually work](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work). It also fits alongside the guide on [whether to use a separate email for online shopping](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-online-shopping), which covers the same separation for retailers. The difference is scale: a user may sign up for many deal sites, and a separate inbox per site is impractical, while an alias per site is not.

## Privacy policy checks

A coupon site's privacy policy states what happens to the address. Four points answer most of the question. The first is what personal information is collected and who receives it. The second is whether the disclosure counts as a sale or sharing under privacy law, and whether the user can opt out. The third is how long the data is kept after the account closes. Honey states 10 years after the relationship ends.

RetailMeNot's shopping safety guide gives the same advice: policies differ, some companies share personal information with third parties and others do not, and the reader should understand what is agreed to before giving out personal information. The guide is published on the [RetailMeNot safety guide](https://www.retailmenot.com/blog/ultimate-online-shopping-safety-and-security-tips.html).

One point is reported second-hand. SimplyCodes reports that RetailMeNot's privacy policy permits sharing browsing behaviour with data brokers including Acxiom, Experian and LiveRamp, but the same comparison states it could not extract the full policy text from official sources. The claim is therefore reported here as SimplyCodes reports it, not as a direct reading of the policy. The broader point stands on the verified policies: sharing with affiliate networks and marketing partners is standard in this category. A data broker collects personal information from many sources and sells or licenses it, as the guide on [what a data broker is](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-is-a-data-broker) explains.

## Managing mail volume

The alias method makes the volume from each site visible: the mail under each alias shows how much that site sends, and a noisy site's alias can be paused without affecting the others.

The decision to keep or remove an alias is a judgement about value: a site whose deals are used regularly earns its alias, and a site whose mail is never opened, or whose codes never work, does not. Deleting the alias ends the mail from that site. The same logic applies to newsletters and loyalty schemes, which are covered in the guides on [whether to use a real email for newsletters](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-your-real-email-for-newsletters) and [how to protect an email for loyalty programs](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-loyalty-programs).

## AliasFleet and coupon sites

AliasFleet provides email aliases that forward mail to a primary inbox. A user can create a separate alias for each coupon and deal alert site, pause or delete any alias when the deals stop being worth the mail, and keep the primary address out of signup forms. The free plan includes 10 active aliases, and the Pro plan costs $12 per month. AliasFleet does not sell user data. An alias is a managed, persistent forwarding address under the user's control, not a short-lived inbox, and it does not stop a coupon site from collecting the address it was given or sharing it with partners; it limits the damage to that one address.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Coupons</category><category>Email Aliases</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Atomic Mail Is Free and Encrypted but Young and Unaudited</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-atomic-mail-safe</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-atomic-mail-safe</guid>
      <description>Atomic Mail is a free encrypted email service from Estonia with real AES-256 encryption, but it is young, unaudited and keeps 7-day logs.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Atomic Mail is an end-to-end encrypted email service operated by AtomicMail Systems OÜ, a company registered in Tallinn, Estonia. Its security whitepaper names a specific encryption stack, AES-256, ECIES, SHA-256, TLS 1.3 and scrypt, and stored mail uses zero-access encryption, so the company states it cannot read mailbox contents. The same documents that describe the encryption also state that mail logs are kept for 7 days, and no independent audit report has been published.

## Company and history

AtomicMail Systems OÜ, the company behind Atomic Mail, is registered in Tallinn, Estonia, and operates the service under EU law and the GDPR. Mail is stored in ISO 27001-certified data centres in Germany. The company published its [security whitepaper](https://atomicmail.io/security-whitepaper), version 1.0, in October 2024, which is the earliest dated record that can be checked independently. No founding record exists in a source that can be checked independently. The 2024 establishment year and 2025 public beta date come only from a Wikipedia article that has since been deleted, so neither date is stated here as fact. The only published figures came from the same deleted article, and no other source confirms them, so this article states no user count and treats the deleted figures as unusable. Atomic Mail is unrelated to Atomic Mail Sender and Atomic Mail Verifier, bulk-email tools sold by AtomPark Software, a different company. The [homepage](https://atomicmail.io/) lists the free plan.

## How Atomic Mail encrypts mail

Mail between Atomic Mail users is encrypted on the sender's device before it leaves, using a random AES-256 key wrapped with each recipient's public key through ECIES. The whitepaper names AES-256, SHA-256, ECIES, TLS 1.3 and scrypt. The [Windows app page](https://atomicmail.io/download-windows) adds RSA-2048. Stored mail uses zero-access encryption. The company states it cannot read mailbox contents, and encryption and decryption happen only on the client side. For recipients outside Atomic Mail, two routes exist. Password encryption locks the message locally with AES-256-CBC and sends the recipient a link to a decryption service, or the message goes out as a password-protected ZIP file. There is no OpenPGP support, so encrypted mail cannot be exchanged with Proton Mail or Tuta users in the standard way. The same gap appears in the [Mailfence trust review](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-mailfence-safe), where OpenPGP is opt-in rather than absent. Two-factor authentication is available, and attachments are capped at 25 MB.

## Audits and code access

Atomic Mail states that it undergoes regular security audits by third-party organisations. The claim appears in the whitepaper, on the [support pages](https://atomicmail.io/support) and in the company's [encryption explainer](https://atomicmail.io/blog/atomic-mail-encryption-explained-how-we-protect-privacy), but no auditor is named, no date is given, and no report is published. A named encryption stack is evidence of design, not evidence that the implementation matches it. The protocol is proprietary, sold under the name Atomic Encryption. The code is not open source, so nobody outside the company can check the implementation against the whitepaper. Proton Mail publishes audit reports and Tuta publishes its code, while Atomic Mail does neither, so its security claims rest on its own word. The post-quantum claim follows the same pattern. A company blog post says Atomic Mail is incorporating post-quantum cryptographic algorithms without naming one, and the whitepaper never mentions post-quantum cryptography at all. The claim is unsubstantiated.

## Logging and account data

Atomic Mail is not a no-logs service. The [privacy policy](https://atomicmail.io/privacy-policy) states:

> "We keep mail logs for 7 days, containing metadata such as the IP addresses of remote email servers and the SMTP sender and recipient addresses of messages sent and received."

Website logs keep visitor IP addresses and timestamps for up to 7 days as well. Outgoing mail shows Atomic Mail's IP address rather than the sender's, but who mailed whom is still recorded for a week. The stated reasons are troubleshooting and anti-spam work, and seven days is a short period but still amounts to logging. Posteo, by contrast, logs no IP addresses at all, as set out in the [Posteo trust review](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-posteo-safe). Signup asks for a name, username and password only, with no phone number or secondary email required. That keeps registration separate from any existing identity.

## Account recovery and the seed phrase

Account recovery runs through a BIP39 seed phrase, with no password reset available. At signup the account holder receives a seed phrase, encrypted with AES-256-CBC using a scrypt-derived key. Neither the plaintext password nor the unencrypted seed phrase is ever stored on Atomic Mail servers. The support pages state the consequence directly. Without both the password and the seed phrase, support cannot restore access. That removes a reset link for attackers to abuse. It also puts full responsibility on the account holder, because a lost seed phrase means a lost mailbox, permanently, and account deletion is permanent too. The seed phrase has to be stored somewhere safe and offline.

## Features and plans

Atomic Mail currently has no IMAP, SMTP or POP3 access, so it cannot be added as an account in Outlook, Thunderbird or Apple Mail. The support pages say the feature is planned for later in 2026, and until it ships, mail has to be read in the Atomic Mail apps or web app. Custom domains are not available on personal plans. They exist on Atomic Mail Business, from $3 per user per month on Starter and $6 on Standard, according to the company's own [business email page](https://atomicmail.io/business-email).

The free plan includes 10 aliases, rising to 15 on Plus, but the support pages state that aliases cannot be deleted or changed once created. Plus adds Hide My Email addresses and an AI suite. The free plan claims unlimited storage, but no cap is published and no independent test exists, so the claim is the company's, not a measured figure. Plus pricing is reported at $7 per month, or $5 per month billed annually, by the [Appscribed review](https://appscribed.com/software/atomic-mail-encrypted-email-review/), and could not be confirmed on Atomic Mail's own site, so it stays a reported figure. One subscription also unlocks Atomic VPN and Atomic GPT.

At that price Plus is not cheap next to the established options. [Proton Mail](https://proton.me/mail) offers a free plan with 1 GB of storage and a paid plan with 15 GB and a custom domain, and [Tuta](https://tuta.com) offers custom domains and open-source clients. Both are audited and open source. The case for putting aliases in front of any inbox is set out in the [aliases guide](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe).

## Deliverability and sender reputation

Reported user complaints centre on deliverability, which is typical of a young provider. The support pages acknowledge it indirectly, advising spam-folder checks and noting that some providers, such as Outlook, can be extra cautious. No scale can be put on the complaints. The review figures that once circulated came from a Wikipedia article that has since been deleted. What remains is the pattern: a young provider whose domain has not yet built a sender reputation, with mail landing in spam or going unrecognised during registration on some platforms. Testing delivery to the providers contacts use is the practical step before relying on the address. A second address for time-critical mail, such as the two-factor codes covered in the [guide on email for two-factor codes](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-email-safe-for-two-factor-codes), is worth keeping.

## Atomic Mail compared with Proton Mail and Tuta

Proton Mail [launched in 2014](https://home.cern/email-encryption-service-born-restaurant-one/) and Tuta was founded in 2011, while no independently confirmed establishment date exists for Atomic Mail, whose earliest verifiable record is its October 2024 whitepaper. Both are open source in whole or in part, both have published independent audits, both support custom domains on paid plans, and Tuta ships post-quantum encryption. Atomic Mail wins on free aliases and signup anonymity, and loses on every point that needs time and outside verification. The same contrast between a young provider and established names shows up in the [Runbox trust review](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-runbox-safe). The same series has also covered the mainstream providers, including [Gmail](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-gmail-safe) and [iCloud Mail](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-icloud-mail-safe), where the trade is different: no end-to-end encryption, but a decade or more of operation.

| Feature | Atomic Mail | Proton Mail | Tuta |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Established | Not independently confirmed | 2014 | 2011 |
| Free aliases | 10 | 0 extra addresses | Limited |
| Custom domain | Business only | Paid plans | Paid plans |
| IMAP | No, roadmap | Yes, via Bridge | No, by design |
| Open source | No | Clients open | Yes |
| Published audit | No | Yes | Yes |
| Post-quantum | Claimed, unnamed | No | Yes |

## Who Atomic Mail suits

Atomic Mail suits a reader who wants a free secondary address for signups, where 10 aliases and no phone number at signup matter, and who accepts that the provider is young and unaudited. It does not suit business use, desktop email client users, or anyone who requires an audited, open-source provider. It does not suit the accounts that matter most, such as banking, because a provider whose earliest verifiable record dates to October 2024, with an unaudited proprietary protocol and 7-day logs, is not yet a safe place to anchor them. The banking rule in the [guide on aliases for account recovery](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery) applies: the important accounts get a permanent real address, and aliases sit in front of everything else.

## Using Atomic Mail behind AliasFleet addresses

AliasFleet provides managed, persistent forwarding addresses. An Atomic Mail account can sit behind them as the destination inbox. Mail sent to an alias forwards to the Atomic Mail address, so websites never receive the Atomic Mail address itself. The free plan from [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) includes 10 active aliases. The alias layer changes what is exposed, not what Atomic Mail can read, and an alias keeps the Atomic Mail address out of circulation. It also lets the account holder cut off a single alias when a service leaks it. This pattern fits a young provider. Atomic stays the destination inbox, and the Atomic address itself is never handed out. Readers who give their address to apps and sites directly should read the [guide on giving an email address to apps](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-it-safe-to-give-your-email-address-to-apps) first.

## Overall assessment

Atomic Mail is a real company with a named encryption stack, zero-access storage, free aliases and anonymous signup. It also keeps 7-day logs, has published no audit, runs a proprietary protocol nobody outside the company can check, and lacks IMAP, custom domains on personal plans and PGP support. Its earliest verifiable record is a whitepaper dated October 2024, in a field where the trusted names have operated for more than a decade. The assessment is split: Atomic Mail is safe enough to try as a secondary inbox, and too young to trust with the accounts that matter most.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Encrypted Email</category><category>Email Providers</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>MapleStory Universe breach exposes partial user emails</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/maplestory-universe-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/maplestory-universe-data-breach</guid>
      <description>MapleStory Universe suspended all services on 12 November 2026 after unauthorised access to off-chain servers exposed partial email addresses and wallet data.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The MapleStory Universe data breach exposed partial email addresses and other user records after unauthorised access to part of the off-chain server infrastructure of the blockchain game project, which Nexpace operates as the blockchain subsidiary of Nexon. Services were suspended on 12 November 2026 for emergency inspection, and the company reported no assets transferred or stolen and no impact on its blockchain or smart contracts. The company has disclosed no victim count.

## The breach as disclosed

On 12 November 2026, the MapleStory Universe operations team posted on X that an outside party had gained unauthorised access to part of the project's off-chain server infrastructure and that an emergency inspection of all services was under way. [ChosunBiz](https://biz.chosun.com/en/en-finance/2026/11/13/FJFSLL5Q6BGKFDE3IPFSLWUIWY/) carried the statement on 13 November 2026. Maintenance began at 12:43 Beijing time on 12 November 2026, according to [KuCoin News](https://www.kucoin.com/news/flash/maplestory-universe-suffers-hack-user-data-partially-exposed), which carried an account of the official notice.

[TokenPost](https://www.tokenpost.com/news/technology/56108) reported that the intrusion came to light on 12 November 2026 and led to an emergency security review and the shutdown of the platform. Off-chain, in this context, means the ordinary internet servers that run game access and the website, rather than the blockchain itself. ChosunBiz reported that the attack struck that general server layer and not the core blockchain area.

The company said the access route had been blocked. The investigation continues, and no attack vector, attacker identity or claim of responsibility has been reported in any source read for this article.

## Records accessed

KuCoin News reported that records belonging to some users, starting at 07:26 on 5 November 2026, were accessed. Those records covered wallet addresses, nicknames, avatars, login histories, partial email addresses, linked social media account information, OpenAPI usage records, and transaction and service activity logs. ChosunBiz gave the same list and added login IP addresses and locations, stated as country and city, along with in-game item and token transaction histories. TokenPost also reported device information among the accessed data.

Only part of each email address was exposed. ChosunBiz reported that the first 12 characters of email addresses were exposed, while other reports describe the exposure as partial email addresses and give no character count. The 12-character figure comes from ChosunBiz alone. No source read for this article reported full email addresses.

How many users were affected is not known. The company referred to some users, and no outlet has published a victim count, so this article gives none.

## What the attackers did not reach

KuCoin News reported the categories of data that the company said were not exposed: real names, phone numbers, physical addresses, KYC data and payment card information. Wallet private keys were never uploaded to MapleStory Universe systems, so they formed no part of the accessed data.

The blockchain side of the project was also untouched, on the company's account. MapleStory Universe said the blockchain network and the smart contracts were not affected, and that a review of on-chain records and service operations wallets found no cases of assets being moved or stolen. TokenPost reported the same finding and added that operational private keys were not exposed. [Phemex News](https://phemex.com/news/article/maplestory-universe-suffers-offchain-server-breach-partial-user-data-exposed-no-asset-loss-103384) reported that no assets had been transferred or stolen.

> "There is no impact on the Blockchain network or the smart contracts, and after reviewing the on-chain (on the Blockchain network) records and the service operations wallets, we found no cases of assets being moved or stolen."

MapleStory Universe operations team, as quoted by ChosunBiz.

On the facts disclosed so far, the risk sits mainly with phishing and with attempts to connect a wallet address to a person. A breach that exposed a full name, a phone number and a payment card would point instead toward direct financial fraud and identity theft, so this incident falls in the first category.

## Phishing risk from partial addresses

A partial address cannot be used as a mailing address on its own, yet it still helps an attacker who holds the rest of the data from this breach. The first 12 characters often cover most of the username part of an address, and that username part is often a person's name or handle. Put beside a nickname, a wallet address, a login location and a linked social media account, the fragment helps an attacker choose a target. It also helps them write a message that reads as personal.

A message that names the user's nickname and refers to their wallet or game activity can pass a quick check. Generic spam would fail that check, especially when the sender address looks connected to MapleStory Universe. The exposed login locations add to that effect: a message that names the right city uses a detail the breach disclosed, which a generic message has no way to include.

Bulk spam is limited, because partial addresses cannot serve directly as a mailing list, but targeted attempts are a different matter: the combination of a partial address, a wallet address and a nickname is enough to anchor one, and the disclosed data gives such an attempt the personal details that make it harder to spot.

## Builder Center applications

The developer side of the project was also reached. The access also covered registration data and API keys belonging to 328 applications in the Builder Center, the developer centre. ChosunBiz reported the figure of 328 applications and the exposure of their API keys, and KuCoin News reported the same figure, adding that the exposed API keys cannot compromise assets.

The company said the affected APIs do not carry permissions that could affect customer assets, and that limit is the company's own assessment. According to ChosunBiz, the affected servers are being replaced and all leaked access privileges and developer API keys are being revoked. Developers who registered applications in the Builder Center should treat their old keys as compromised and wait for the project's instructions on replacement.

## A separate Web3Auth login disruption

The 12 November breach is not the only recent security incident touching MapleStory Universe, and the two should not be confused: a security incident at Web3Auth disrupted MapleStory Universe logins on 6 November 2026. Web3Auth is an external authentication provider, and the incident affected Keplr wallets.

[Gate News](https://www.gate.com/news/detail/web3auth-security-breach-disrupts-keplr-wallets-maple-story-universe-on-nov-25501864) covered that incident on 9 November 2026. It stated that no asset loss or private key exposure had been reported for MapleStory Universe users in it. It had a different cause and a different set of exposed data from the off-chain breach described in this article.

## What affected users can do

While the suspension is in place, affected users have no service to log into. The measures below therefore concern the data that was accessed rather than the game itself, and they follow published guidance for breaches of this type.

The first measure is a check of whether the email address appears in known breaches. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) holds a searchable record of breaches, and [the guide to checking whether an email address was leaked](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked) explains how to run the check and read the result. A partial address cannot be checked in the same way as a full one, so the check uses the full address used to register. A match on any breach is a reason to change the password on that service.

The second measure concerns passwords reused across services. [The guide to email breaches and password breaches](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/email-breach-and-password-breach) explains how an exposed address differs from an exposed password, and why a password reused elsewhere turns one breach into access to other accounts. MapleStory Universe has not reported that passwords were exposed here. Even so, a password reused on another service that has been breached stays at risk, and this incident is a reason to fix that reuse now.

The third measure is care with unsolicited messages about MapleStory Universe. Messages that claim the service has been restored, that offer compensation, or that ask the user to reconnect a wallet are checked against the official MapleStory Universe channels before any link is followed. [The guide to checking whether an email is phishing](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-an-email-is-phishing) lays out the checks that apply to that kind of message. No legitimate restoration notice asks a user to share a private key or a seed phrase. MapleStory Universe has said private keys were never held in its systems.

The fourth measure is attention to the accounts linked to the same email address. The accessed records include linked social media account information. That gives an attacker a starting point for finding the same person on other platforms. Unusual login alerts call for quick action. Unrequested password reset messages call for the same quick action, as do messages from contacts about strange posts.

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Service restoration and the investigation

The company has said it blocked the attack path, revoked compromised credentials and replaced the affected servers. ChosunBiz reported that the team is replacing the compromised servers with new ones, revoking all leaked access privileges and developer API keys, and plans to fully rotate internal operations keys as well before resuming services in phases. KuCoin News gave the same account of the steps and added that every operational key will be rotated before services come back.

The company has given no restoration date. TokenPost reported that services are expected to resume after the project rotates operational keys and completes security checks, and that is the full extent of the published timetable. Restoration is described as phased rather than a single return to service, and restoration news should be taken from the official MapleStory Universe channels.

## What the company has not said

Several facts remain unknown, and this article states them plainly rather than filling them in. How many users were affected remains undisclosed. No source read for this article states whether the accessed data was copied, downloaded or published externally. No attack vector has been disclosed. The intrusion window is unstated, because the 07:26 on 5 November 2026 figure marks the start of the accessed records, not necessarily the start of the intrusion.

No regulator notification has been reported. No evidence of misuse, or of the accessed data appearing for sale, has been reported either. The investigation continues, and later company statements may alter the picture. A follow-up disclosure that adds a victim count, an attack vector or evidence of misuse would need its own report.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Gaming</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Can You Use an Email Alias for Facebook?</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-facebook</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-facebook</guid>
      <description>Facebook accepts most forwarding aliases, but Meta may flag the address, demand identity checks, or disable the account at verification.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[An email alias for Facebook is a forwarding address used as the contact address on a Facebook account instead of the holder's real inbox address. Facebook accepts most forwarding aliases, because an alias is a working email address that receives the confirmation code Facebook sends when an address is added. Meta publishes no rule against email aliases and no list of blocked domains, so acceptance depends on the domain and on Meta's fraud and identity systems. The risk sits in verification and recovery: Meta may demand identity checks, and a code sent to an alias that has stopped forwarding has nowhere to go.

## Acceptance at registration

Facebook treats the email address on an account as a contact and verification channel. When an address is added, Facebook sends a confirmation message to it, and the account cannot be fully set up until that message is confirmed. A forwarding alias passes this test, because mail sent to the alias arrives in the destination inbox. The general mechanism is explained in the AliasFleet piece on [how email aliases actually work](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work). Short-lived inbox addresses are the ones that usually fail at this stage. Facebook publishes no list of refused domains, but [comparisons of short-lived inbox services report that Facebook refuses most known short-lived domains at registration](https://temp-mail.you/blog/temp-mail-for-facebook/). One comparison reports that [accounts created with short-lived addresses can work briefly and then get locked](https://mailboxtemp.com/blog/temp-mail-for-facebook/), with Facebook asking for a code sent to an address that no longer exists.

A forwarding alias belongs in a different category from a short-lived inbox address, because the alias is a persistent address tied to a real inbox. Facebook also weighs signals beyond the domain, including IP reputation and device information, so two people can have different outcomes with the same alias domain. No published rule says which alias domains Facebook accepts, so the acceptance of any particular domain cannot be guaranteed in advance. A domain that works today can be refused tomorrow, and the only way to know is to test it at sign-up or at the point of changing the address. The AliasFleet piece on [whether websites can tell an alias is being used](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-websites-tell-you-are-using-an-email-alias) covers the detection methods services use in general.

## Adding and changing the contact address

An alias can be added to an existing Facebook account through Accounts Centre. The route, reproduced by [an independent guide quoting Facebook's Help Centre](https://www.lilachbullock.com/how-to-change-your-email-address-on-facebook/), runs through Settings and privacy, then Settings, then Accounts Centre, then Personal details, then Contact info. From there the holder selects Add new contact, then Add email address, enters the address, and enters the confirmation code Facebook sends. The steps are reproduced in the same form by [independent guides that quote Facebook's Help Centre text](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/technology/tech-tips/how-to-add-or-remove-an-email-address-from-your-facebook-account-heres-a-step-by-step-guide/articleshow/134655400.cms). Facebook's Help Centre pages returned 403 errors to direct fetches during research for this article, so these steps are verified through the secondary sources that quote the Help Centre, not from Facebook's own pages.

To change an address, Facebook's Help Centre says to remove the email address associated with the account first and then add a new one. There is no single swap button. The practical order is to add and confirm the new address before removing the old one, so the account is never left without a working contact. An email address can be tied to only one Facebook account, so an address already tied to one account cannot be added to another.

## Verification at sign-in

The email address on a Facebook account is used again every time Facebook doubts a sign-in. A login from a new device, a password change, or behaviour Facebook's systems treat as suspicious can trigger a checkpoint that asks the holder to enter a code sent to the registered email address. An alias that forwards correctly passes it. An alias that has been paused, deleted, or pointed at an inbox the holder no longer controls fails it, and the account stays locked until another route is found. [Two-factor codes can also be received at an alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-receive-two-factor-authentication-codes-at-an-email-alias).

[Independent recovery guides](https://www.lilachbullock.com/facebook-account-recovery/) summarising Facebook's Help Centre say that when a code does not arrive, the holder should check the spam or junk folder, check the connection, wait a few minutes, and request a new code. That guidance assumes the address still works. With an alias, a code that never arrives can mean the alias itself has stopped forwarding, and the fix is at the alias provider, not at Facebook.

## Disable risk under Meta identity rules

[Meta's Terms of Service, effective 1 January 2025, require the holder to provide the same name used in everyday life and to create only one account for personal purposes](https://tostracker.app/document/meta-facebook/version/1270). The [authentic identity policy in Meta's Transparency Center](https://transparency.meta.com/policies/community-standards/authentic-identity-representation/) lists creating or maintaining multiple Facebook accounts as a reason to seek further information before restricting or permanently disabling a profile or account, and states that Meta may require identity verification, and that if verification is not completed, it may restrict access or permanently disable the account.

Nothing in either document mentions email aliases. The risk to an alias user is indirect: an alias is one signal among several that Meta's systems use to judge whether an account is authentic, and a change of contact address is one of the events that can trigger a check. The [Privacy Guides community thread on alias use with Meta](https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/simplelogin-or-protonpass-aliases-on-meta/42077) carries both outcomes. One user reports a family member's account disabled, with photo ID demanded, after replacing a Gmail address with a Proton Pass alias. Another reports switching to a DuckDuckGo alias as a secondary address, waiting a week, then making it primary with no disablement. A third reports switching without a problem, then finding that a security setting change asked for a code sent to the old address, which had already been removed.

The honest reading is that Meta does not ban aliases, and that the risk is concentrated in two moments: the first days after a new account is created with an alias, and the moment an existing account's address changes. Keeping a second contact method on the account, and changing the address in stages, are the patterns reported by users who had no problem. A second personal account is a different matter: an alias does not make one compliant, because the rule is one personal account per person.

## Regaining access after a lockout

Password resets go to the email address or phone number on the account. The recovery entry point is [facebook.com/login/identify](https://www.facebook.com/login/identify), where the holder enters an email address, phone number, full name, or username, and Facebook sends a code to a contact method on the account. If the alias still forwards, the reset works exactly as it would with a real address. If the alias has stopped working, the reset message has nowhere to go, and a deleted alias breaks the reset route in the same way. The AliasFleet piece on [aliases and account recovery](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery) states the same rule in general.

Facebook provides a route for holders who no longer have access to the email address or phone number on the account. The recovery flow offers a "No longer have access to these?" option, after which the holder enters new contact details that have never been used on the account and completes the identity checks Facebook asks for, which can include a government-issued ID. A separate route exists for accounts believed to be hacked, at facebook.com/hacked. The routes are summarised from Facebook's Help Centre by independent recovery guides.

When Facebook disables an account, the holder can appeal through the form Facebook provides, giving the full name on the profile, the email address or phone number linked to the account, and an ID document when asked. [One recovery guide reports that holders have 180 days to appeal a disablement](https://unban.help/blog/what-to-do-if-facebook-gets-disabled). The appeal is the only official route back.

## Forwarding aliases and other address shapes

A persistent forwarding alias is the shape that fits Facebook best. The alias stays active for the life of the account, mail to it forwards to a destination inbox the holder controls, and replies can be sent from the alias so the real address is never exposed. A dedicated alias service provides this shape with one alias per site, so the Facebook alias belongs to Facebook alone. That is the shape described in the AliasFleet guide to [separate addresses for social media](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-social-media), which argues for one alias per platform so that a leak at one platform cannot be joined to the records held by another. Facebook profiles numbering 533 million were exposed in a leak reported in April 2021. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) is the database AliasFleet cites for checking whether an address has appeared in a breach.

[Apple Hide My Email](https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/icloud/mm1a876f7aed/icloud) is another persistent shape. Apple's support pages state that Hide My Email generates unique, random email addresses that forward to the personal inbox, and that creating addresses manually requires an iCloud+ subscription. [Addresses created through Sign in with Apple use the @privaterelay.appleid.com or @private.icloud.com domains](https://support.apple.com/en-us/105078).

[Gmail plus addressing](https://aiemaily.com/blog/gmail-plus-addressing) is a weaker shape. Adding a tag after a plus sign in a Gmail address, such as name+facebook@gmail.com, creates a working address that delivers to the same inbox. The tag is visible in the address, so it does not hide the real username, and any sender can strip the tag. It works as a filter label for Facebook mail, but it is not a separate identity in the way a forwarding alias is.

| Address shape | How mail is handled | What it hides | Persistence |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Persistent forwarding alias | Forwards to a destination inbox; replies are sent from the alias | The real address; one alias per site | Stays active until paused or deleted |
| Apple Hide My Email | Generates random addresses that forward to the personal inbox | The real address | Persistent; manual creation requires an iCloud+ subscription |
| Gmail plus addressing | Delivers to the same inbox | Nothing; the tag is visible and the real username is not hidden | Lasts as long as the Gmail account |

An alias protects the address, not the account. A unique address per platform stops a leaked address from being joined to records held by other platforms, and it makes a phishing message that arrives on the wrong address easy to spot, but it does nothing for a reused password. The AliasFleet piece on [whether email aliases are safe](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe) sets out what aliases can and cannot do.

## AliasFleet on Facebook

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides managed, persistent email aliases, one per online account, with mail to an alias forwarded to a destination inbox and replies sent from the alias rather than the real address. The free tier lists 10 active forwarding aliases, 3 managed subdomains, 1 verified destination inbox, and 100 MB of monthly forwarding. Pro is priced at $12 a month. A Facebook alias created through AliasFleet is a persistent forwarding address, which is the shape this article describes as the safest for Facebook. AliasFleet is not a short-lived inbox service: its aliases stay in service until the holder pauses or deletes them, and a deleted alias stops forwarding, which is why the alias on a Facebook account should be kept active for as long as the account exists. The AliasFleet guide on [what an email alias is](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-is-an-email-alias) explains the forwarding mechanism, and the [setup guide](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-set-up-an-email-alias) covers creating an alias and confirming that mail to it arrives before it is used on an important account.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Aliases</category><category>Facebook</category><category>Privacy</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Can You Use an Email Alias for LinkedIn?</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-linkedin</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-linkedin</guid>
      <description>LinkedIn accepts an email alias once it is verified. The alias must stay live while the profile matters, because recovery and recruiter mail use it.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[An email alias can be used as the address on a LinkedIn account, provided the alias stays live while the profile matters. LinkedIn accepts any address that can receive mail and pass its confirmation step, and an alias is an ordinary address in that respect. LinkedIn publishes no policy naming alias or masked addresses, so acceptance follows from the documented mechanics rather than from a stated rule. Sign-in, password resets, security notices and recruiter contact all run through the address, so when it stops receiving mail, the reset route breaks, and the only way back into the account is identity verification with a government-issued ID.

## Registration and account addresses

Registration on LinkedIn requires an email address. Its [Privacy Policy](https://www.linkedin.com/legal/privacy-policy) states that creating an account requires data including a name, email address and/or mobile number, general location and a password. LinkedIn allows more than one address on a single account. Its help page on [managing an email address](https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/a519904) states that a member can add multiple email addresses and can sign in using either the primary address or an additional address. Only one address is primary at a time, and the primary address can only be replaced with a verified address.

## Adding a new address

The member adds a new address in the following sequence:

1. Open Me, then Settings and Privacy, then Sign in and security, then Email addresses under Account access, and click Add email address.
2. Enter the new address and the LinkedIn password. LinkedIn sends a verification code to the current primary address or asks for approval in the LinkedIn app.
3. Follow the prompts in the confirmation message LinkedIn sends to the new address.
4. Once the address is confirmed, click Make primary next to it, and the old address can then be removed.

The sequence depends on the new address receiving mail: the single test an alias has to pass.

## Confirmation and password resets

Confirmation is the step that decides whether an alias works on LinkedIn. An alias that forwards correctly passes it like any other address. A paused or deactivated alias does not, because the confirmation message never reaches an inbox the member can open. LinkedIn's help page on the [benefits of adding a second email address](https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/a521796) states that LinkedIn can only send a password reset link to confirmed email addresses on the account, so an unconfirmed address cannot receive a reset link or serve as a recovery route. LinkedIn may also ask for a verification code sent to the current primary address before accepting the new one, so a member who has already lost access to it cannot complete the add step from settings. Email two-factor codes sent to the alias arrive like any other message, with the two limits described in the AliasFleet piece on [two-factor codes at an email alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-receive-two-factor-authentication-codes-at-an-email-alias): short expiry and a deleted alias.

## Recovery without email access

The address on a LinkedIn account is the first route back in when a password is forgotten or access is lost. The reset message goes to a confirmed address on the account. If the alias on file stops working, through deletion, closure of the alias service, or loss of the destination inbox behind it, the reset message has nowhere to go. The AliasFleet piece on [whether an email alias works for account recovery](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery) states the general rule: recovery through an address succeeds only while the alias stays in service at least as long as the account it guards.

LinkedIn documents the recovery flow on its [no access to email address](https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/a1377116) help page:

1. Select Forgot password and enter the address or phone on the account.
2. Click "Can't access this email?" and, if no other address or phone works, "Don't have access to any of these?".
3. Enter a new email address for the account and verify identity with an image of a valid government-issued ID. LinkedIn's page on [verifying identity to recover account access](https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/a1342692) states that the check runs through Persona, LinkedIn's identity verification provider, and asks for a photo of a government-issued ID card, driver's licence or passport. The identity data submitted is generally permanently deleted within 14 days of submission. That route restores access through an identity check, where a working reset email restores it through a link, and it requires a government ID.

An alias used for LinkedIn must therefore be treated as load-bearing: it should not be deleted while the account is live, and it should not sit on a service or a domain that might disappear. The AliasFleet piece on [what happens to aliases when a service is cancelled](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-happens-to-your-aliases-if-you-cancel-your-alias-service) sets out the same point in general terms: cancelling a subscription and deleting an alias are different actions, and only deletion stops delivery outright. A second address on the account reduces the risk, because the backup address is what prevents a lockout when access to the primary address is lost, as covered in the AliasFleet piece on [whether a second email address is needed](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/do-you-need-a-second-email-address).

## Identity rules

An alias changes the contact address, not the person on the profile. LinkedIn's [User Agreement](https://hr.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement?trk=linkedin-tc_auth-button_user-agreement), effective 3 November 2025, states in section 2.1 that a member will only have one LinkedIn account, which must be in the member's real name, and that creating an account with false information is a violation of the terms. Section 8.2 bars creating a false identity or a member profile for anyone other than the member. None of that restricts the email address: the Agreement requires a real name and one account per person, not a particular kind of email address or an address containing the member's name. Using an alias as the account address is therefore consistent with the identity rules: the alias is a contact route, and the profile still carries the member's real name and work history. What the alias must not be used for is creating a second profile, or a profile under a false name.

## Notifications and recruiter contact

LinkedIn sends notifications to the primary address: job alerts, connection requests, messages from recruiters and security notices. A member who uses an alias as the primary address receives all of it through the alias, forwarded to the destination inbox, and it works as long as forwarding works. The risk is the same as with recovery, but quieter. A missed password reset announces itself at the next sign-in. A missed recruiter message does not: the message arrives, the alias fails to forward it, and the opportunity passes without the member knowing. LinkedIn's User Agreement, section 2.4, states that members agree to keep their contact information up to date, and that if contact information is out of date, the member may miss out on important notices. An alias avoids that problem in a different way: the alias belongs to the member, not the employer, so changing jobs does not take it away.

## Refusal at sign-up

LinkedIn publishes no alias blocklist and no statement that alias domains are refused at sign-up. No refusal rate is published either, so none is stated here. What can be stated is the general mechanism: a signup form that refuses an alias almost always refuses the domain behind it, not the alias itself. The AliasFleet piece on [when a service blocks an alias email](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/when-a-service-wont-accept-your-alias-email) sets out the mechanism: the form takes the part of the address after the @ sign, checks it against a list of alias or short-lived inbox domains, and stops the sign-up on a match. An email alias is not a disposable email service. It requires an account, points at an inbox the holder owns, and stays live for years until switched off. A signup form sees none of that: only a domain shared by thousands of users.

Research on alias detection gives the scale of the problem. A study presented at NDSS Symposium 2026, "One Email, Many Faces", evaluated the alias mechanisms of 28 email providers and 18 online platforms. Its published abstract states that platforms either failed to distinguish alias addresses or over-aggressively excluded all emails containing a specific symbol. The published abstract does not name individual platforms, so LinkedIn is not named. If LinkedIn does refuse an alias at sign-up, the usual fixes apply in order: a different domain from the same provider first, then a managed subdomain, then an alias on a custom domain the member owns. A custom domain has no place on a shared list, because nothing is shared about it.

Apple offers a comparable mechanism. [Hide My Email](https://support.apple.com/en-us/105078) generates unique, random addresses that forward to a personal inbox, using the domains @private.icloud.com or @privaterelay.appleid.com.

## LinkedIn exposure history

LinkedIn's own history gives a reason to keep the real address out of its database. In June 2021, data from [700 million LinkedIn profiles](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-social-media) was put up for sale, covering more than 90 percent of the platform's roughly 760 million users at the time. An earlier breach from 2012 exposed 117 million email and password combinations, which were sold in 2016. An alias on LinkedIn means the address in a future scrape or breach file belongs to LinkedIn alone, and cannot be joined to the member's accounts elsewhere. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) lists the exposures for any address a reader wants to check.

## AliasFleet and LinkedIn

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides managed, persistent email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox, one alias per site or purpose. A LinkedIn alias created through AliasFleet receives LinkedIn's confirmation message, notifications and reset messages, and forwards them to the destination inbox. The free tier covers 10 active aliases, with 1 verified destination inbox and 3 managed subdomains, as listed on the [pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing). The [docs](https://aliasfleet.com/docs) cover creating an alias and setting up a custom domain. An alias stays live until the holder pauses or deletes it. The mechanics are set out in the AliasFleet piece on [how email aliases actually work](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work): a forwarding rule, a reply mechanism and a kill switch.

LinkedIn accepts an alias as an account address once it is verified, and the alias keeps the real address out of a database that has leaked before. The condition is that the alias stays live for as long as the profile matters, because recovery, security notices and recruiter contact all depend on it.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Aliases</category><category>LinkedIn</category><category>Account Security</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Registering for a Conference</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-registering-for-a-conference</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-registering-for-a-conference</guid>
      <description>Conference registration exposes an email address to organisers, sponsors and badge scanners. One alias per conference keeps that mail separate and easy to stop.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Protecting an email address when registering for a conference means giving the registration an address separate from a main inbox. One alias per conference gives that registration its own address, so badge, ticket and sponsor mail all land in one place. The alias stays live until the event has ended and the follow-up mail the registrant still wants has arrived, then it is turned off.

## Registration address sharing

A conference registration address passes to more parties than the organiser. The registration platform collects the address first and passes it to the organiser, whose policy governs its use after registration. [Eventbrite's privacy policy](https://support.eventbrite.com/hc/en-us/articles/34860965420818-Eventbrite-Privacy-Policy), last updated 15 September 2026, states that when a person registers for an event, the organiser receives that information and may then send marketing or other communications under its own separate privacy policy. [Integrated Systems Europe's privacy policy](https://www.iseurope.org/privacy-policy) for its 2027 event, last updated 27 January 2026, lists the attendee data collected at registration, including name, email address, company name, telephone number, job role and, in some cases, passport number. [GDPR Article 13](https://gdpr-info.eu/art-13-gdpr/) requires the controller, when personal data is collected, to state the purposes and legal basis, the recipients of the data, the retention period, and the right to withdraw consent. [GDPR consent rules](https://gdpr-info.eu/issues/consent/) require consent to be freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous, and withdrawal to be as easy as giving consent. A [GDPR event FAQ](https://legalclarity.org/gdpr-event-faqs-attendee-data-consent-and-breaches/) adds that registering for a conference does not permit the organiser to hand attendee contact details to sponsors for their own marketing unless there is a separate, specific legal basis.

## Attendee lists

Many conferences publish a participant list of name, title and organisation, normally available to registered attendees only. [EDUCAUSE's event policies](https://events.educause.edu/cybersecurity-and-privacy-professionals-conference/2026/registration/policies-and-permissions) state that the participant list includes name, title and organisation for those who have opted in. The email address is not on that list, but the name, employer and job title it shows are enough to guess a work email address. The [Sports Video Group event registration policy](https://www.sportsvideo.org/our-story/event-registration-policy/) states that attendees opt in to an attendee directory that does not display email addresses, and that the registration email address may be shared with event sponsors, on a private and restricted basis, who are instructed not to use it for mass email distribution. One event's terms, published by the Cardiac Society through EventsAir, state that if a registrant consents to be included in the list of participants, "it is likely that sponsors may add you to their mailing lists and send promotional emails to you".

## Sponsor sharing after the event

The [RAK Energy Summit 2026 privacy policy](https://rakenergysummit.rak.ae/privacy/) states that participant details such as name, organisation, job title, email ID and mobile number "will be shared after the event to sponsors from relevant sectors as notified during registration". The same policy states that assistant data is kept for 48 months after the summit. Whether a specific conference shares registration data with sponsors depends on that conference's own policy; some share by default, some only with consent, and some not at all. ISE shares name, email address, country, company name and job role with its shareholders AVIXA and CEDIA and with sponsors and partners involved in a conference the attendee has attended, but only with consent given during registration, under GDPR Articles 6(1)(a) and 7. That consent is separate from the consent for event mail, and the [webinar registration guide](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-registering-for-webinars) describes the same split on webinar forms.

Once details pass to a sponsor, the sponsor holds them in a separate mailing system under its own retention rules, so an unsubscribe sent to the organiser does not reach the sponsor. How long sponsor mail continues after an event depends on each sponsor's retention rules, which are rarely published. ISE retains personal data only for as long as necessary to fulfil the purposes for which it was collected, while RAK keeps assistant data for 48 months. No public count exists of how many conferences share registration email addresses with sponsors by default versus by opt-in, so no proportion can be stated.

## Badge scans

A badge carries a QR code or an NFC chip, which an exhibitor scans to collect the attendee's contact record. [Certain's lead capture documentation](https://touchpoint-support.certain.com/hc/en-us/articles/360033132694-How-do-I-set-up-lead-capture-for-exhibitors) states that a scan gives the exhibitor the attendee's name, organisation, job title, phone number and email. [Ativ Software's BadgeScanner documentation](https://support.ativsoftware.com/support/solutions/articles/24000019960-i-d-like-to-use-the-free-badgescanner-lead-retrieval-how-do-i-need-to-set-up-my-qr-code-on-the-ba) states that the QR code printed on a badge must include the core contact information, usually first and last name, badge ID and email address, and that scanned contacts export to a CSV file for mail applications or CRM systems. A [recent analysis of conference apps and badge scanners](https://www.scieconf.com/conference-app-privacy-badge-data-surveillance/), published 31 October 2026, states that a badge scan typically hands the exhibitor the full contact record in seconds and that many attendees do not realise a scan often functions as consent to contact afterwards. The ISE policy treats a scan as consent: its section on Visit Connect states that by allowing an exhibitor to scan a badge, the attendee consents to share the contact information disclosed during registration, including email address and telephone number, and that contact information is not disclosed if the attendee does not allow the badge to be scanned. Some events let attendees choose what a scan shares, and the EDUCAUSE policies treat a badge scan as a separate opt-in from the participant list and vendor mail.

## Fake attendee lists

Scammers sell fake attendee lists, targeting attendees and exhibitors. The [Vacation Rental Management Association warning](https://www.vrma.org/member-and-event-attendee-list-scam-warning) states that fraudulent companies contact members, attendees and exhibitors offering attendee lists, that VRMA does not sell membership or conference attendee email contact information, and that no company is authorised to sell lists for its events. The same warning states that scammers scrape email addresses posted on websites, and that responding to these emails, even to unsubscribe, confirms a valid address. The pattern is the same across associations: [NYSAIS](https://www.nysais.org/sponsorship/fraudulent-attendee-email-lists/) does not sell, license or otherwise authorise the distribution of attendee lists, the [International Studies Association](https://www.isanet.org/News/ID/6644/categoryId/1/ISA-2026-Hotel-Reservation-Convention-Attendee-List-Scam-Warnings) does not rent or sell any email lists to third parties, and the [Society of Petroleum Engineers](https://www.spe.org/en/sales/exhibitor-scams-stay-safe/) does not rent, share or sell email addresses to third parties. An offer from a third party to sell an attendee list is therefore not genuine, and replying to it, even to unsubscribe, confirms the address is live.

## One alias per conference

The pattern is one alias per conference. The alias is created before registration and used on the form, in the event app and for any badge-linked account. All mail about that conference arrives on one address: confirmation, badge pickup, session changes, ticket and recording links, and post-event sponsor mail. The alias stays live until the event has ended and the follow-up mail the registrant still wants has arrived. It is then turned off, which stops the sponsor sequence without touching the main inbox or any other conference alias.

The alias forwards to the main inbox while live and is recorded with the conference name and event date. The badge, tickets and recordings all depend on mail arriving, so turning the alias off early can strand a badge pickup notice, a session change, a ticket reissue or a recording link. The [event tickets guide](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-buying-event-tickets) states the same rule for ticket purchases: the alias stays live until the event has taken place and any refund window has ended. The [travel bookings guide](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-use-email-aliases-for-travel-bookings) describes the same bounded pattern for booking aliases.

<Callout type="tip" title="Three checks before submitting the form">
Three checks before submission take a minute. The privacy policy section on sharing is read first, looking for the words sponsor, partner, third party and retention. The consent boxes are checked one at a time, with the sponsor-sharing box left unticked unless the sponsor mail is wanted. The event's opt-out from the participant list is used where the name and organisation need not be visible to other attendees.
</Callout>

An alias changes which address receives conference mail. It does not delete the data a sponsor already holds or stop a sponsor from keeping the copy it received. Turning off an alias stops future delivery to that address, but it does not erase the registration record, the CRM entry, or any list already exported from the event system. Deletion of a copy held by an organiser or a sponsor requires a request to that organiser or sponsor, with GDPR Article 17 as the basis where the GDPR applies. An alias also does not verify a sender: a message claiming to sell an attendee list is not genuine because it arrived on the conference alias. The [selling online guide](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-selling-online) makes the same point for marketplace mail: an alias contains a stream, it does not authenticate it.

## AliasFleet conference aliases

AliasFleet provides email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox, each of which can be paused or removed on its own. A conference alias is created before registration, used on the form and in the event app, and paused or removed after the event and its follow-up window have ended. The free tier includes 10 active aliases and 1 verified destination inbox. Pro, normally $12 per month, adds more aliases, custom domains and leak detection. The [pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing) lists the current tiers.

AliasFleet does not delete data held by an organiser or a sponsor, and it does not stop a conference from publishing a participant list. What it does is keep conference mail on its own address, so the post-event sponsor sequence can be stopped in one place. The [docs](https://aliasfleet.com/docs) describe alias creation and management.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Aliases</category><category>Conferences</category><category>Privacy</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Signing Up for Car Sharing</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-car-sharing</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-car-sharing</guid>
      <description>A car-sharing account holds a driving licence, a payment method and trip history. One dedicated alias per service keeps that account isolated.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A car-sharing account holds a driving licence, a payment method and a trip record. The email address on the account receives booking confirmations, licence verification, fines, tolls, damage claims and password resets. The protection is one dedicated alias per car-sharing service, tied to a personal inbox and kept live while the account exists. Signup collects a name, email address, phone number, driving licence details and a payment method, and the service keeps trip dates, times and locations.

## Data held by a car-sharing account

Signup for a car-sharing service collects more identity data than a typical account signup, because the service has to check that the person can legally drive its cars. [Turo's privacy policy](https://turo.com/us/en/policies/privacy) (last revised 31 October 2025) states that account registration requires a name, email address and password, and that profile data may include addresses, phone numbers, driver's licence number, date of issuance and issuing country or state, and date of birth. Identity verification data may include a photograph or scan of a driver's licence, passport or national ID card, and a driving record. Payment data includes bank account or payment card numbers, and trip data covers the date, time and amount of each trip.

[Zipcar's membership contract](https://www.zipcar.com/en-ca/membership-contract) (effective 31 July 2026) requires members to hold a valid driver's licence and authorises Zipcar to obtain driving records from the licensing jurisdiction. Members are billed by credit or debit card, and a past-due account may be suspended. The same contract states that some vehicles contain devices tracking location, distance travelled and fuel consumption.

Car sharing differs from ride-hailing in the data collected. A ride-hailing passenger hands over a payment method and a travel record, while a car-sharing driver also hands over a driving licence, and the account stays open to mail about fines and damage claims long after the last trip. The [guide to protecting email when signing up for ride-hailing apps](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-ride-hailing-apps) covers the passenger side.

## Car-sharing breaches

| Service | Breach date | Accounts affected | Data exposed |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Zoomcar | July 2018 | 3.6 million addresses | Names, email addresses, phone numbers, IP addresses and bcrypt-hashed passwords |
| HopSkipDrive | June 2023 | 155,394 drivers | Names, email and postal addresses, driver licence numbers |
| Zoomcar | June 2025 | About 8.4 million users | Names, phone numbers, car registration numbers, addresses and email addresses |
| Times Car | September 2026 | About 6.6 million accounts | Names, addresses, dates of birth, phone numbers, email addresses, driving licence information and licence photographs |

### Zoomcar breach of 2018

In July 2018, Zoomcar lost the data of about 3.5 million users, including names, email addresses, phone numbers, IP addresses and bcrypt-hashed passwords, and [CPO Magazine's report](https://www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/car-sharing-platform-zoomcar-hit-by-a-massive-data-breach-impacting-approximately-8-4-million-people/) states that the stolen data was listed for sale on an underground hacking forum. [Have I Been Pwned lists the 2018 Zoomcar breach](https://haveibeenpwned.com/Breach/Zoomcar) at 3.6 million affected addresses, with the breach dated July 2018. The two counts differ because CPO Magazine reports people affected and Have I Been Pwned counts affected addresses.

### HopSkipDrive breach of 2023

HopSkipDrive confirmed a breach affecting 155,394 drivers, with driver licence numbers among the stolen data ([TechCrunch](https://techcrunch.com/2024/02/05/hopskipdrive-says-personal-data-of-155000-drivers-stolen-in-data-breach/), 5 February 2024). The company told TechCrunch it first discovered the breach on 12 June 2023, after finding suspicious activity on third-party applications it used, and a forensic investigation dated the incident between 31 May and 10 June 2023.

### Zoomcar breach of 2025

Zoomcar is a peer-to-peer car-sharing marketplace operating in about 100 cities across India, Egypt, Indonesia and Vietnam, and other Asian countries, according to CPO Magazine. Its [Form 8-K filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1854275/000121390025054319/ea0245724-8k_zoomcar.htm), dated 13 June 2025, states that on 9 June 2025 the company identified unauthorised access, and that a third party accessed a limited dataset containing personal information of a subset of approximately 8.4 million users, including names, phone numbers, car registration numbers, addresses and email addresses. The filing states there was no evidence at the time that financial information, plaintext passwords, or other sensitive identifiers were compromised. CPO Magazine's report confirms the same figures. This was Zoomcar's second major breach, seven years after the 2018 incident.

### Times Car breach of 2026

Times Car is a Japanese car-sharing service run by Times Mobility, part of the Park24 Group. The company announced on 25 September 2026 that a third party had accessed its systems, and blocked the access the next day. Its [second report on the incident](https://share.timescar.jp/news/2026/0928/1815.html), published 28 September 2026, confirmed that about 6.6 million accounts were affected, covering current and former members, incomplete applicants, and corporate business service members. The exposed fields are names, addresses, dates of birth, phone numbers, email addresses, driving licence information, identity-verification document images including licence photographs, account passwords, and linked service IDs. The report states that credit card information was not exposed. [BleepingComputer's report](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/times-car-confirms-data-breach-affecting-66-million-user-accounts/) on the same day confirms the same figures and the same field list.

The [AliasFleet article on the Times Car breach](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/times-car-data-breach) lists every exposed field. A leaked password can be changed, while a photograph of a driving licence cannot be changed in the same way, so the image carries the longest exposure. Held next to a name, home address and date of birth, it is the kind of material used for identity fraud.

## The address the account holds

The email address on a car-sharing account creates three problems when it is the same address used everywhere else. The first is correlation. The same address on a car-sharing service, a bank account, a shopping account and a social account lets any one breach connect the accounts together. A separate address for every service breaks that link. The [guide to whether a second email address is needed](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/do-you-need-a-second-email-address) covers the general case.

The second problem is the phishing that follows a breach like Times Car. Whoever holds that database has a real name, a real address, proof of membership, and a photograph of a licence. A message claiming that licence verification needs updating, or that a damage claim is outstanding, carries the details from the breach. When that address is an alias used only for that service, the alias names the source, and the address can be paused or replaced once the account is safe.

The third problem is volume. Every trip brings a confirmation and a receipt, plus service updates and promotions. A dedicated address keeps that mail in one place, separate from the main inbox. The [guide to what to do when an alias starts getting spam](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-an-alias-starts-getting-spam) covers the sequence: identify the source, create a replacement, update the account, then pause or delete the old alias.

## One alias per car-sharing service

The setup is one alias for each car-sharing service, each forwarding to the same personal inbox. Turo gets one alias and Zipcar another, each forwarding to the same inbox. If Turo is breached, the exposed address is the Turo alias, which no other service holds, so it reveals nothing about the account holder's other accounts. The alias can be paused or replaced. The recovery path stays open as long as the alias forwards to an inbox the account holder controls.

Booking confirmations, receipts, fines and damage claims arrive at the car-sharing alias, and a filter sorts them without any rule touching the main inbox. Email two-factor codes also work through an alias. The [guide to receiving two-factor codes at an email alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-receive-two-factor-authentication-codes-at-an-email-alias) covers the timing and the cases where a service insists on SMS. An alias does not replace a password or a second factor; it limits what a breach exposes.

## Short-lived addresses

A short-lived address is the wrong tool for a car-sharing account, because the mail that matters arrives after the trip. Licence verification, fines, tolls and damage claims all need a reachable address, and some arrive months after the trip. An address that stops working after a week or a month leaves the account with no route for those notices, and a missed damage claim typically turns into a larger bill. Account recovery runs through the same address: a forgotten password is reset by a link sent to the address on file. The [guide to using an email alias for account recovery](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery) covers the general rules.

The alias should therefore be a managed, persistent address that stays live for as long as the account exists. This is not a disposable email setup: it is a permanent forwarding identity for one service, with pause and delete controls.

## Moving an existing account to an alias

A driver who already signed up with a personal or work address can change it in the service's account settings, and in most cases the service verifies the new address before the change takes effect. The new alias is created and tested before the change, so the verification code arrives somewhere the account holder can read it. Only then is the address on the car-sharing account changed, with the old address left in place until the new address is confirmed. A work address should be moved while it still works, because it is deactivated when employment ends.

## AliasFleet and car sharing

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides managed, persistent email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox. A driver creates one alias per car-sharing service, for example one for Turo and one for Zipcar, each forwarding booking confirmations, fines, damage claims and password resets to the same inbox. An alias that starts receiving spam can be paused, and a breached alias can be replaced while the account moves to a fresh address. AliasFleet does not store the driver's password, does not replace two-factor authentication, and does not prevent a car-sharing service from being breached. [Pricing](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing) starts with a free tier of 10 active aliases, and the [docs](https://aliasfleet.com/docs) cover setup.

An alias does not protect the rest of the account. The service still holds the phone number, payment details, licence data, location history and trip record, and none of that changes when the email address changes. A breach of the service exposes the trip data regardless of which address is on the account, as the Times Car and Zoomcar cases showed. The alias limits the exposure of the email address itself and keeps the account holder's accounts from being linked through a single shared address. It does not stop the service collecting the data, or phishing mail that uses details from a breach. The remaining controls are a unique password, two-factor authentication where the service offers it, and a check of known breaches. A driver who suspects the address on a car-sharing account has appeared in a breach can check it against [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com), which lists the 2018 Zoomcar breach. The [guide to what to do when an email is in a data breach](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach) covers the steps that follow.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Car Sharing</category><category>Email Aliases</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>MUJI admits card data it should have deleted may have leaked</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/muji-data-breach-followup</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/muji-data-breach-followup</guid>
      <description>Ryohin Keikaku apologised on 12 November 2026 for the MUJI breach, admitting card numbers it should have deleted may have leaked.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Ryohin Keikaku, the operator of MUJI, apologised on 12 November 2026 for a data breach in which up to about 27.26 million customer records including email addresses may have leaked, and admitted that full credit card numbers the company should have deleted were still on file and may also have leaked. The apology came at a press conference in Tokyo, three days after the company's fourth report on 9 November 2026 disclosed a separate credential stuffing attack on about 270,000 member accounts and postponed the reopening of the MUJI online store indefinitely. All figures in this article are the company's own wording of information that may have been accessed from outside, not confirmed exfiltration.

## The 12 November press conference

President Shimizu Satoshi held the press conference in Tokyo on 12 November 2026 and apologised for three points, according to [NHK World](https://www.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/news/20261112de75014/). He named the failure to prevent the unauthorised access, MUJI Card numbers that should have been deleted remaining in the company's systems and possibly leaking, and the closure of the MUJI online store with the delay in reopening it. Shimizu said part of the system had a vulnerability and that the company takes responsibility for what happened.

> "We must feel a deep sense of responsibility. There were shortcomings in our data management."

The quotation above comes from [The Japan Times](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/business/2026/11/12/muji-credit-card-leak/), which reported Shimizu's remarks at the press conference. The same report said the company would work to establish a framework under which unnecessary information is not kept. [Kyodo News](https://english.kyodonews.net/articles/-/91173) reported that the company said the card numbers had not been encrypted or otherwise properly protected when they were stored.

NHK World reported that the company will cover the reissue fees for affected cards and offer compensation based on its assessment of any damage confirmed. Kyodo News reported that the company is investigating whether the information has been misused and will contact affected customers individually if any damage is confirmed. The information given at the press conference was current as of 11 November 2026, according to the full transcript published by [TV Asahi](https://news.tv-asahi.co.jp/news_economy/articles/900204081.html).

## The fourth report

The press conference explained the fourth report, published on 9 November 2026. The report's main addition is a credential stuffing attack on the MUJI online store. Attackers tried to log in with email addresses and passwords obtained from breaches unrelated to Ryohin Keikaku. About 270,000 member accounts had unauthorised logins that were confirmed or possible. Purchase history, points and address-book details on those accounts could be viewed, according to the press conference transcript and the [JapanCyberWatch tracker](https://japancyberwatch.com/articles/muji-app-breach-card-numbers-old-perk-scheme-2026). The company says the passwords did not come from its own breach. That breach contained no passwords.

The same report raised the group with names, addresses and phone numbers from about 520,000, as reported by JapanCyberWatch, to about 750,000. It added about 440,000 cash-on-delivery recipients, covering orders from 2 January 2020 to 10 February 2025, whose names and postcodes may have been accessed. It also added about 120 customers who had registered a card in the app or the online store. Their card numbers may have been accessed in partial form, showing the first six and last two digits with the cardholder name.

Notifications to affected customers began on 10 November 2026, by email or postal mail. Credit Saison contacts MUJI Card members whose contact details the company does not hold. How these groups overlap has not been stated, so the figures are not added together into a single total.

## The retained card numbers

Credit Saison supplied the numbers between October 2000 and July 2021. The issuer passed them to Ryohin Keikaku so points could be credited when a customer paid with a MUJI Card. That use ended in July 2021, when the company moved to a different way of identifying cardholders and set a policy of deleting the full numbers it held. The numbers remained in its systems.

Whether the company kept them on purpose is not known. The Japan Times reported that the question is still under investigation.

Only members who joined the MUJI Card by July 2021 are in this group. Cards issued from August 2021 onward are not affected. Of the about 1.09 million records, about 345,000 hold numbers of cards that are still valid. The others belong to expired or cancelled cards. The records hold no cardholder names, no expiry dates and no security codes. JapanCyberWatch, reading the company material, reports a narrower linkage: about 168,000 of the valid numbers could be seen alongside the holder's email address, birth date and gender, and about 25,000 of those also alongside name, address and phone number. The linkage figures are JapanCyberWatch's reading of the company material.

The disclosure history runs in four reports. The first report, on 30 October 2026, said card details were not included. The [second report](https://prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/000001880.000000987.html), on 4 November 2026, corrected that. The third report, on 6 November 2026, announced the suspension of the MUJI online store and part of the MUJI app. The press conference added the reason: the data should have gone when its purpose ended in July 2021, and it did not. AliasFleet covered the first disclosure in the article on the [first MUJI disclosure](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/muji-data-breach), including the 27.26 million record figure and the original exclusions, and covered the widening to 1.09 million card records in the article on the [second report](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/muji-data-breach-second-report).

## MUJI disclosure chronology

| Date | Event |
| --- | --- |
| 29 October 2026, about 01:00 | Intrusion begins, according to Credit Saison |
| 30 October 2026 | First report: up to about 27.26 million records may have leaked |
| 4 November 2026 | Second report: scope widens to 1.09 million card records |
| 6 November 2026, 16:00 | Third report: online store suspended and most app functions stopped |
| 9 November 2026 | Fourth report and indefinite postponement of reopening |
| 10 November 2026 | Individual notifications to affected customers begin |
| 12 November 2026 | Press conference in Tokyo and public apology |

## The credential stuffing attack

The second attack began with login attempts, not with a break-in. Attackers sent large numbers of login attempts to the MUJI online store, using email addresses and passwords believed to have come from other services. The unauthorised access was detected in the early hours of 29 October 2026. On 7 November 2026 the company grasped the position on the unauthorised logins and the scope of the information involved. The fourth report disclosed the attack two days later, on 9 November 2026.

The fourth report, which disclosed the attack, also postponed reopening indefinitely. Ryohin Keikaku closed the online store at 16:00 on 6 November 2026 and stopped most MUJI app functions, leaving only the member card barcode on display. The first plan was to reopen within one to two days. Physical stores trade normally, and customers can still earn and use points in store with the barcode.

All customers will be asked to reset their passwords when the online store reopens, according to the press conference. The company also asks customers not to reuse passwords from other services. The reason follows from how the attack worked: the passwords came from breaches at other companies, so one password used in two places turns a leak at the first into an account takeover at the second. The way a leaked email address is used to build convincing impersonation mail is covered in [how phishing uses a leaked email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email), and the general steps after a breach notice are covered in [what to do when your email is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach).

## What customers were told to do

Credit Saison has strengthened monitoring of the affected cards. The company tells affected customers to check their credit card statements and to contact the card issuer about any use they do not recognise. MUJI Card members can ask Credit Saison for a reissue, and the company will cover the reissue fees. A notice received by a customer should be read carefully, because it states which data was involved for that customer.

The company also warns about mail and phone calls that pretend to come from MUJI or a card company. It states that it never asks for credit card information by email or phone. A message claiming to be from MUJI is safer checked by opening the app or the official site directly, rather than by clicking a link in the message. The leaked records pair email addresses with dates of birth, and for about 750,000 people with names and addresses as well, which makes impersonation mail easier to build. No company report lists passwords, but changing a password reused on other services is the step that limits the credential stuffing risk.

NHK World reported that information of some former members had not been deleted, despite internal rules requiring deletion after a certain period. [How to protect your email for loyalty programs](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-loyalty-programs) covers keeping one address per program.

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## What the company still has not said

The investigation is open, and several points remain unstated. How the attackers entered the systems on 29 October 2026 has not been stated. The press conference declined to give details of the countermeasures, on the grounds that doing so could invite further attacks. Whether the data left the company's systems, or was published anywhere, has not been stated either.

On misuse, the last company position dates from 4 November 2026: no leak to the dark web and no damage from misuse had been confirmed. The 12 November reporting does not restate that position.

Two other points are unresolved. The reason the card numbers were not deleted after the July 2021 scheme change is still under investigation. No date has been given for reopening the online store or restoring the suspended app functions.

The company has not stated how many of the credential stuffing login attempts succeeded. It has said only that unauthorised logins were confirmed or possible on about 270,000 accounts. There is no way for an individual customer to check whether a specific record is included. The only route is the individual contact that began on 10 November 2026. Any further company report could change the scope again. The figures here are the company position as of 11 November 2026, as stated at the press conference, not a final count.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breaches</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Japan</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Sneak Energy confirms customer data breach via TripleWhale</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/sneak-energy-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/sneak-energy-data-breach</guid>
      <description>Sneak Energy told customers on 12 November that unauthorised access to vendor TripleWhale exposed names, email addresses, phone numbers, addresses and spend.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Sneak Energy confirmed a customer data breach on 12 November 2026 at TripleWhale, its US analytics provider. Access from 30 October to 1 November 2026 exposed first and last names, email addresses, phone numbers, mailing addresses and total spend. Payment details, order details and passwords were not accessed.

Sneak Energy's own storefront and payment systems were not breached, and the company has not disclosed how many of its customers were affected. Sneak Energy is a Manchester energy drinks company founded in 2018 by Jonny Teeling and Will Peirce and led by chief executive Ashley Read. The access window opened on 30 October 2026, the same day the company opened early access and general sales for its limited-edition Dungeons & Dragons collection of themed drinks and merchandise, produced with permission from Wizards of the Coast. The notice reached customers by email, and its wording is known through verbatim quotes carried by [Geek Native](https://www.geeknative.com/244332/dungeons-dragons-partner-sneak-energy-reports-customer-data-breach-starting-on-launch-day/), which reported the breach on 12 November 2026.

## Data taken in the breach

The customer notice listed five categories of personal information and three exclusions. The notice, quoted by Geek Native, stated:

> "The personal information involved was your first and last name, email address, phone number, mailing address and the total amount you've spent with Sneak Energy. Importantly, there was no access to payment details, order details or passwords."

| Data type | Exposed |
| :--- | :--- |
| First and last name | Yes |
| Email address | Yes |
| Phone number | Yes |
| Mailing address | Yes |
| Total amount spent with Sneak Energy | Yes |
| Payment details | No |
| Order details | No |
| Passwords | No |

The exposed fields combine into a set that supports impersonation. A name, an email address, a phone number and a home address together allow a message to quote details that match the recipient's real records, and a total spend figure can be quoted to make a fraudulent refund or delivery message match the recipient's spending with Sneak Energy. The mechanism is described in guidance on [how phishing uses a leaked email address](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email), which explains how exposed contact details are used to build messages that appear to come from a company the recipient already buys from. The exposure does not allow direct account takeover, because no passwords were exposed, and it does not allow money to be taken directly, because no payment details were exposed. The data can be used to gain trust before a request for payment details or login credentials.

## Breach timeline

On 30 October 2026, an unauthorised party gained access to systems holding customer data at TripleWhale. On the same day, Sneak Energy opened early access and general sales for its Dungeons & Dragons collection, a range of four themed drinks alongside a glow-in-the-dark shaker, T-shirt and hoodie. The launch date of 30 October had been reported by [Stack3d](https://www.stack3d.com/2026/10/sneak-dungeons-and-dragons-collection/) on 28 October, and the Halloween collaboration was covered by [Asian Trader](https://www.asiantrader.biz/dungeons-dragons-sneak-energy-halloween-partnership) the same day.

On 31 October 2026, the provider identified the intrusion. On 1 November 2026, the provider secured its systems, closing the access window after about 48 hours. Those two dates come from the public incident notice published by Who Gives A Crap, a second company affected by the same TripleWhale incident, which recorded that access began on 30 October, was identified on 31 October and was secured on 1 November.

On 3 November 2026, TripleWhale alerted Sneak Energy to the breach. On 6 November 2026, the same provider alerted Who Gives A Crap, which published its own incident notice on 7 November. On 12 November 2026, Sneak Energy emailed its customers with the details. Nine days passed between TripleWhale's alert to Sneak on 3 November and Sneak's customer email on 12 November, and no reason for that gap has been stated.

## TripleWhale and the vendor scope

TripleWhale is a United States analytics provider for e-commerce businesses, and it processes store data for retailers. One intrusion into its systems therefore reached customer records belonging to many separate companies at once. Sneak Energy noted in its notice that it is one of more than 65,000 companies affected by the incident. That figure counts companies on the TripleWhale side, and it is not a count of Sneak Energy customers, for which no figure has been disclosed.

Who Gives A Crap provides an independent check on the same incident. Its public notice, published 7 November 2026, describes the same access window, the same five categories of exposed data and the same three exclusions, and it states that the company does not know whether the information was copied or downloaded. Who Gives A Crap did not name the provider in its notice, and its Canadian customers were not affected, according to the provider. The company disconnected the provider from its systems and changed access credentials. The full notice is published on the company's site at [Who Gives A Crap](https://uk.whogivesacrap.org/pages/november-2026-incident-notice), and [The Register](https://assets.theregister.com/2026/11/09/202613/?td=keepreading) covered the notice on 9 November 2026.

## Measures stated for affected customers

Sneak Energy advised customers to ignore unexpected emails, calls or text messages referencing Sneak, TripleWhale, order numbers or home addresses, and to type official website addresses directly into a browser rather than clicking links in messages. Customers with questions can contact [email protected] with the subject line "Data incident". No password change is needed for a Sneak Energy account because of this incident, and no payment card needs to be cancelled on the basis of this breach alone, because no passwords or payment details were exposed.

The same guidance applies in general terms to any breach that exposes an email address. Affected customers can check whether the address appears in other known breaches through [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com), and guidance on [what to do when an email address is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach) covers the password work: if the same password was used on the Sneak account and on any other service, the password should be changed on those other services, because the exposed email address makes credential stuffing attempts against other accounts more likely. Messages that quote a real home address or a real spend total deserve extra care, because those details are the ones that make a phishing message convincing.

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Questions still open

Several facts remain unknown. Sneak Energy stated that it does not yet know whether the unauthorised party copied or downloaded the information during the access window. The notice does not clarify whether shoppers who ordered during the Dungeons & Dragons launch weekend had their newly entered details synced to TripleWhale in real time, or whether the exposure was limited to existing customer records. The launch weekend was the busiest sales period in the window. Customers who bought then are the ones most likely to expect genuine messages from Sneak Energy in the days after.

No attack vector has been disclosed, and no attacker or group has been identified or has claimed responsibility. No public statement from TripleWhale itself was found at the time of writing, so the vendor's own account of how the access happened and how many records were involved is still missing. No regulator notification by Sneak Energy has been reported, and no evidence of misuse of the data, or of the data appearing for sale, has been reported either. The Register's coverage of the Who Gives A Crap notice, published 9 November 2026, confirms the same gaps on the other affected company's side: the provider was unnamed there and no customer count was given.

## AliasFleet and leaked email addresses

AliasFleet provides one email alias per service, so each website a customer signs up to receives a different address that forwards to the same inbox. When a vendor breach exposes the address a customer gave to one service, the exposed address identifies that service as the source, and the alias can be paused or deleted without changing the address used anywhere else. AliasFleet does not prevent a vendor breach, and it does not remove an address from a file an attacker already holds. What it changes is the next step: the exposed address cannot be reused to impersonate the customer at other services, because no other service has that address.

The exposed data came from a vendor the customer never signed up with directly, and the customer has no control over that vendor's security. The address handed to Sneak Energy was the single point of contact the vendor held, and it is now in the hands of an unauthorised party alongside a name, a phone number and a home address. A separate alias per service keeps that exposure contained to one service.

The confirmed facts are the window, the data types, the exclusions and the dates of the alerts. TripleWhale has not published its own account, Sneak Energy has not given a customer count, and whether the data was copied remains unknown. Customers who received the 12 November email should treat unexpected messages quoting their Sneak Energy details with care and contact the company through the address given in the notice.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Phishing</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>An Email Alias Works for Amazon When the Address Stays Live</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-amazon</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-amazon</guid>
      <description>An email alias works for Amazon when the address is permanent and stays live. One stable alias serves a buyer account; each seller account needs its own.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Amazon accepts a forwarding address as the address of an account, provided that address keeps delivering mail to an inbox the holder controls for the life of the account. One address belongs to one account, and that address receives order mail, refunds, password resets and sign-in codes. A forwarding address that keeps working meets the requirement. An inbox that stops receiving mail after a short period does not, because a reset or a code sent months later has nowhere to arrive. The wider case for keeping shopping mail apart from a main inbox is set out in [Should You Use a Separate Email for Online Shopping](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-online-shopping).

## A single address for each account

Two people sharing one login share one account, one order history and one set of payment methods. Two separate order histories require two accounts, and two accounts require two addresses. Amazon Family connects two separate accounts while their orders stay apart, as described in the [SolveYourTech guide to changing an Amazon email address](https://www.solveyourtech.com/how-to-change-my-email-on-amazon-a-step-by-step-guide/). An alias supplies the second address without a second inbox, because it forwards to the same destination inbox while Amazon records a distinct address.

Amazon attaches each account to one email address and refuses to share an address between accounts. The help page for the "E-mail address already in use" error states that the same email address cannot be used for multiple Amazon accounts. That page appears when a shopper tries to open an account, or to move an existing account, onto an address already attached to another Amazon account. For a shopper opening a new account, the page gives three options. The first is to try another address. The second is to try an email alias, after checking with the email provider whether alias creation is supported. The third is to use a mobile number. For a shopper moving an existing account, the remedy is to free the address by signing in to the other account and changing its address. Amazon therefore names the alias itself as a way past the collision, as stated on [the Amazon help page for the error](https://digprjsurvey.amazon.co.uk/csad/help/node/T7fVvVo3XDuCvKDF8N).

## Mail the address receives

Security mail travels to the account address: password resets, sign-in codes and two-step verification codes sent by email. The timing problem with emailed codes is set out in [Can You Receive Two-Factor Authentication Codes at an Email Alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-receive-two-factor-authentication-codes-at-an-email-alias), and alias-based recovery is covered in [Can You Use an Email Alias for Account Recovery](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery). The address remains the main route to the holder for the life of the account. A phone number on the account gives a secondary route for some steps.

The address also carries the whole purchase. Amazon's Privacy Notice, last updated 30 June 2025, states that Amazon uses personal information to take and handle orders, deliver products and services, process payments, and communicate about orders and promotional offers, and to communicate with customers by phone, email and chat. Order confirmations, delivery updates, return labels and refund confirmations therefore travel to that address, as set out in the [Amazon.com Privacy Notice](https://www.amazon.com/-/zh_TW/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=GX7NJQ4ZB8MHFRNJ).

## Replacing the address on an existing account

Two checks belong before the change. The alias must not already sit on another Amazon account, and forwarding must work, which is worth testing first. Closing either account before knowing which one holds the orders and memberships is the mistake to avoid: closure is permanent and order history goes with it.

An existing account can move to an alias through Your Account, then Login and security, then Edit next to Email. Amazon sends a one-time code to the new address, and the change cannot finish until that code is entered, so the new inbox must be reachable before the change starts. Once the change completes, the new address becomes the sign-in address and the destination for order mail, while orders, Prime membership, payment methods and digital purchases stay in place. The steps are set out in the SolveYourTech guide to changing an Amazon email address.

## Short-lived inboxes on Amazon

Whether Amazon blocks short-lived inbox domains at signup is not settled by a public Amazon statement. No public Amazon policy on these domains was found. Tmailor checked Amazon's official register page and recorded no public policy found, as [Tmailor](https://tmailor.com/blog/en/article/40534-sites-that-block-temp-mail.html) records, while 1TempMail states that Amazon actively blocks these domains during core account signup, as [1TempMail](https://www.1tempmail.com/blog/temp-mail-for-amazon/) claims. The two secondary sources conflict, and neither is Amazon, so the article states the conflict rather than picking a side.

Whether Amazon blocks these domains does not change the outcome for a buying account. A short-lived inbox is an address that stops receiving mail after a set period, usually minutes or hours, while the address on an Amazon account must still receive a sign-in code or a password reset months later. An account created with one works at first: verification arrives, the account opens, and the first order confirms. The failure comes later, when the inbox has closed and a password reset, a sign-in code or a refund notice has nowhere to go. The account is not deleted. It is unreachable through its own recovery route. A permanent forwarding alias works whether or not the block exists, and a short-lived inbox fails the account later even if it passes signup today. Shared domains used by many alias holders are the easiest to list; detection and rejection are covered in [Can Websites Tell You Are Using an Email Alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-websites-tell-you-are-using-an-email-alias).

<Callout type="warning" title="A deleted alias stops forwarding at once">
An alias deleted after the account is opened stops forwarding at once, so a password reset or a sign-in code sent to it never arrives. The alias must stay live until every order closes and the account no longer needs it.
</Callout>

## Plus addressing in Gmail

Gmail plus addressing is the free option many shoppers reach for first. A plus sign and a tag are added to the username, so name+amazon@gmail.com delivers to the same inbox as name@gmail.com, with no setup needed. Google's support page describes the mechanism: add a plus sign and any word before the @ sign, and messages to the variation all arrive in the current inbox, where filters can route them. That description is on [Google's support page for creating variations of an email address](https://support.google.com/a/users/answer/9282734?hl=en).

Plus addressing exposes the base address in every tagged variant. The base address sits in plain sight inside the tagged address, and anyone who sees it can strip the tag and reach the base address. The tagged address keeps working as long as the Gmail account does, so it meets the Amazon permanence requirement. A plus address cannot be switched off on its own, while a real forwarding alias can. The full comparison is set out in [Email Plus Addressing vs Aliases](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/email-plus-addressing-vs-aliases). For Amazon, a plus address is a workable middle step: it satisfies the one-email rule and keeps receiving mail, but it does not hide the real address.

## Accounts used for selling

Selling on Amazon follows a different rule from buying. A buyer account needs one address. A seller account needs its own unique address, different from the address on every other seller account the seller holds. Empire Flippers states it directly: for every Seller Central account opened, it must have a unique email attached. That statement is in the [Empire Flippers guide to creating an Amazon seller account](https://empireflippers.com/first-amazon-seller-account/).

The reason is Amazon's multiple-account policy. Amazon's Seller Code of Conduct starts from one Seller Central account per region, with additional accounts only where the seller has a legitimate business need and all accounts are in good standing. Amazon's examples are separate businesses for multiple brands, manufacturing for two distinct companies, and participation in a program that requires separate accounts. A second brand name alone does not establish a separate business. The current position, reviewed against Amazon's US Seller Central guidance on 16 October 2026, is set out in the [Hopted FAQ on multiple Amazon seller accounts](https://www.hopted.com/blog/faq-multiple-amazon-seller-accounts).

Each seller account must be associated with a unique email address, a bank account and a credit card, as stated in the [SellerApp guide to multiple Amazon seller accounts](https://www.sellerapp.com/blog/multiple-amazon-seller-accounts/). SellerApp also states that creating multiple accounts with the same address, or using a false identity for a second account, can result in the suspension or termination of all accounts. The Hopted FAQ adds that policy issues in one account may affect all related accounts.

An alias satisfies the unique-email requirement, but it cannot separate the other signals Amazon uses to connect accounts. GridInbox lists the signals as email address, browser fingerprint, IP address, payment method, phone number and business registration details, attributed to Amazon's 2023 Brand Protection Report, as set out in the [GridInbox guide to managing multiple store emails](https://www.gridinbox.com/blog-amazon-seller-email). Amazon does not publish its detection method, so that list is reported rather than confirmed. Opening a second account to escape a suspension or work around a restriction is a direct violation, and a new account opened after a suspension can result in the suspension or termination of all connected accounts.

| Address type | Keeps receiving mail over time | Conceals the real inbox address | Counts as a separate Amazon identity |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Gmail plus addressing | Yes | No | Yes |
| Managed forwarding alias | Yes, while it stays active | Yes | Yes |
| Short-lived inbox | No | Yes | Yes, until it expires |

## AliasFleet on Amazon

AliasFleet cannot change Amazon's rules. It cannot merge two Amazon accounts, free an address held by another account, or recover an account whose alias has been deleted. A deleted alias stops forwarding at once, so a reset or code sent to it never arrives. The service also cannot make a second seller account legitimate: the business need and good standing requirements are Amazon's, and the bank account, phone number and business identity behind each seller account stay separate regardless of the email address used.

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) supplies managed, persistent email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox, one alias per website as the core model. The mechanism, a forwarding rule, a reply route that sends from the alias, and a pause switch for each alias, is set out in [How Email Aliases Actually Work](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work). For Amazon, the setup is one alias for the buyer account. It sits on a managed subdomain or a custom domain, and it is created before the account is opened or moved to it through Login and security. The alias stays active while the account is live. It is paused or deleted only after the Amazon account email has changed, or when the account itself is no longer used. The free tier covers 10 active forwarding aliases, 3 managed subdomains, 1 verified destination inbox and 100 MB of monthly forwarding.

What the alias does is narrower: Amazon holds the alias rather than the real inbox address, and mail for one account can be paused without touching the others. The steps follow from the Amazon rules. One alias serves each account, and the alias stays live until every order closes. If the alias is ever deleted, the Amazon address is changed first.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Aliases</category><category>Amazon</category><category>Online Shopping</category><category>Privacy</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>An Email Alias Works for Spotify When It Stays Active</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-spotify</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-spotify</guid>
      <description>An email alias works for Spotify when it stays live and forwards reliably. Spotify resets passwords by email only, so a dead alias strands the account.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[An email alias works as the address on a Spotify account when it stays live and forwards mail. For an account created with an email address, Spotify sends the password reset by email only, and Spotify states that access to the registered email address is required to open the reset link. The alias therefore has to outlast the account, not just the sign-up.

## Sign-up

An email address comes first at Spotify sign-up. The [sign-up page](https://www.spotify.com/signup) puts the email field at the top, offers Google and Apple as alternatives, and shows no phone field on the email path. A password, a display name and a date of birth complete the account.

Third-party guides report that music starts playing before any confirmation mail arrives. That would let an address with an hour of life carry the sign-up and then lapse. The claim is reported, not confirmed: no Spotify page read for this article gives the order of events at sign-up.

Netflix rests on a different rule. The [Netflix alias piece](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-netflix) turns on a per-profile requirement dated 15 June 2026, and Spotify has nothing comparable. Spotify's sign-up and change-email pages describe one email address per account, and what matters is whether that address still takes mail when it is next needed, months or years later.

## Password reset and recovery

Spotify's [password reset page](https://support.spotify.com/vn-en/article/reset-password/) sets out three steps: open the password reset page, type in the email address linked to the account, and follow the instructions in the reset email. No other channel exists. There is no SMS code, no backup code, and no support form that resets a password without the email.

The same page puts the condition plainly:

> "You need access to the email address associated with your Spotify account to open the password reset link we email you."

Losing access leaves two options on the page: win back the old email address, or open a new Spotify account and start fresh. What becomes of the contents of an account that cannot be recovered is not stated.

A reset link addressed to an inbox that no longer takes mail never arrives. The account stays shut behind a forgotten password, and the documented answer is to recover the old address or start again. No documented support route restores access without the email address. The AliasFleet guide on [using an email alias for account recovery](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery) gives the general rule behind this: an address only guards an account while it stays in service at least as long as the account. The recovery route runs entirely by email.

Closing the account is no shortcut. Spotify's [account-closure page](https://support.spotify.com/us/article/how-can-i-close-my-spotify-account/?ref=related) says the account can be reactivated from an emailed link inside 7 days, and the same email address can open a new account 14 days after the date of closing. A closed account tied to a dead address cannot be reactivated, because the reactivation link goes to that address.

Steam is the nearest parallel. The [Steam alias piece](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-steam) records Steam Guard codes, password resets and trade confirmations all going to the contact address for the account's lifetime. The pattern matches: a single address carries every security message, and the account is only as recoverable as that address.

## Email verification

Spotify sometimes asks the holder to confirm the email address on the account. The [verification page](https://support.spotify.com/us/article/verify-email-address/) states: "For security, we sometimes ask you to verify your email address. Tap SEND EMAIL when the app asks you to verify, and we'll send a verification link to the email address registered to your Spotify account." What prompts the request is not stated. What to do with an old or lost address is stated: tap Edit email address to update it.

A verification request is a second point at which a dead address fails. The request goes to the address on file, and an address that has stopped taking mail cannot respond. What follows an unverified account is not stated.

## The September 2026 login change

From 1 September 2026 the registered email address carries more weight. Spotify's page on [changing how you log into Spotify](https://support.spotify.com/ca-en/article/changing-how-you-log-into-spotify/) states: "After September 1, 2026, you'll be able to log into Spotify with your email address, not your username." Accounts already signed in with an email address, or with Facebook, Google or Apple, need no action. The warning covers everyone else: "If you don't have the right email address or another login method on your account, you won't be able to log in."

The change takes away the last login route that did not rely on the email address. A username login could carry on after the email address died. An email login cannot. The page tells holders to check the address on the account page before the deadline, under Edit personal info, and save the change.

## Changing the email address

The address on a Spotify account can be changed while the account is still open. Spotify's [change-email page](https://support.spotify.com/id-en/article/change-email-address/?ref=related) lists the steps as opening Edit personal info, entering the new email address under Email, confirming the password, and clicking Save profile. In the app the route runs through the profile picture, Settings and privacy, Account, then the email field.

The current password has to be confirmed, so the change must be made while the account is still open, not after a lockout. The new address must not already belong to another Spotify account. An alias due to be paused or deleted should be replaced first, while the password still works, with the new address tested before the old alias is touched. The AliasFleet guide on [what happens to aliases when a service is cancelled](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-happens-to-your-aliases-if-you-cancel-your-alias-service) recommends the same order.

## Phone sign-up

Spotify's [phone login page](https://support.spotify.com/in-en/article/phone-number-login-help/) says signing up with a phone number means logging in with a code sent by text, with no password to remember. The same page gives the limit: "You can't use your phone number to log into the desktop app." The desktop app needs an email address added on the account page and a password created from it.

Phone sign-up swaps one dependence for another. The account runs on mobile with no email address, and the desktop app then demands one anyway. Once an email address is added, it becomes the recovery route, and the permanence rule applies to it as well.

## Address types

Three kinds of address exist, and only the first two pass the Spotify test.

| Address type | Receives mail long term | Hides the real inbox address | Survives a password reset |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Managed forwarding alias | Yes, while active | Yes | Yes |
| Plus addressing on a real inbox | Yes | No | Yes |
| Short-lived inbox | No | Yes | No, once it expires |

A short-lived inbox stops taking mail after a set period. That design fails the Spotify test, because the address must take a password reset link whenever the holder asks for one, which can be years after sign-up. The AliasFleet guide on [when a service will not accept an alias email](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/when-a-service-wont-accept-your-alias-email) records the wider pattern: whether a site accepts an address at sign-up turns on the domain's reputation, not on the fact that it is an alias, and a listed domain can stop working years after first acceptance.

Plus addressing passes the delivery test and fails the privacy test. A tagged address delivers into the same inbox as the base address and keeps working for years, yet the real address is visible inside it. The AliasFleet guide on [how to set up an email alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-set-up-an-email-alias) sets out the comparison. The managed alias is the only row that passes both tests: it forwards for years and keeps the real address out of Spotify's files.

Checking the address on [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) shows whether it has appeared in a breach. The service lists 1,052 pwned websites and 17,858,376,246 pwned addresses as of 13 November 2026. An alias used only for Spotify means a breach at Spotify exposes that alias and nothing else. The [guide on checking whether an email was leaked](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked) sets out the check and the response.

## AliasFleet and Spotify

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides managed forwarding aliases: one forwarding address per site, each delivered to a verified destination inbox, each managed on its own. A Spotify account can carry an AliasFleet alias as its registered email address. The alias takes the verification email, the password reset link and any other account mail, and forwards them to the destination inbox. It is a permanent forwarding address under the holder's control.

The free tier covers 10 active aliases, and the [pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing) lists the full tiers. The [guide on what an email alias is](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-is-an-email-alias) explains the mechanism: an alias is a mail-routing rule, not a mailbox, and deleting it removes the rule. The [guide on receiving two-factor codes at an email alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-receive-two-factor-authentication-codes-at-an-email-alias) covers the related case of codes sent to an alias, which arrive like any other message while the alias is active.

AliasFleet does not alter Spotify's rules: the password reset still runs by email only, and the September 2026 login change still applies. If the alias is paused or deleted, Spotify mail stops arriving, and recovery then depends on regaining the old address or opening a new account.

## Unconfirmed points

Three questions have no public answer yet. Spotify has not said whether alias addresses are accepted or blocked at sign-up, so acceptance of a particular alias domain is undocumented. Spotify has not said how long a password reset link lasts, so no figure is given here. Spotify has not said what happens to the contents of an account that cannot be recovered, beyond the instruction to start a new account.

The first gap is the one a reader can act on. A refusal at sign-up, if one happens, is a property of the domain rather than the alias, and the fallback order in the AliasFleet guide on when a service will not accept an alias email applies: another domain from the same provider, a provider subdomain, a different provider, or an alias on a domain the holder owns. The test before trusting any of them stays the same: a verification or reset message is requested and its arrival confirmed.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Aliases</category><category>Spotify</category><category>Account Recovery</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Chainstack Breach Exposes Emails and Password Hashes</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/chainstack-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/chainstack-data-breach</guid>
      <description>Chainstack disclosed a breach that reached production through a test Grafana instance with default credentials, exposing customer emails and password hashes.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[On 3 November 2026, Chainstack disclosed that an attacker had reached a customer account database inside its infrastructure. The company provides blockchain infrastructure. The database held organisation names, account holder names, member email addresses and password hashes. Entry came through a test Grafana instance whose default administrator credentials were still in place. From there the attacker moved out of a development environment and into parts of production over three days, before Chainstack detected the intrusion and contained it on 31 October. Full technical details followed in the company's [incident report](https://chainstack.com/security-incident-nov-2026/) on 10 November, updated again on 11 November.

## Timeline of the intrusion

![Chainstack's incident report notice, created 3 November 2026 and updated 11 November 2026](/blog/chainstack-data-breach/notice.png)

Chainstack dates the intrusion from 26 October to 31 October 2026, and finalised the investigation on 2 November.

| Date | Event |
| --- | --- |
| 26 October 2026 | The attacker entered through the test Grafana instance in a development environment |
| 29 October 2026 | The attacker reached production |
| 31 October 2026 | Chainstack detected the intrusion and contained it |

The first access came on 26 October, in a development environment. The way in was a test Grafana instance, set up in a development Kubernetes cluster during July 2026, exposed to the internet, still running its default administrator credentials, and guarded by nothing else: no single sign-on, no basic authentication. At 19:26 UTC the attacker started reaching internal services through Grafana's data-source proxy, with no destination allowlist in place and no network policy to limit where Grafana could connect.

By 21:01 that evening the attacker had got as far as an internal MCP tool server. The server gives AI agents access to Kubernetes operations, asks for no authentication, and runs under a service account bound to cluster-admin. Over the following ninety minutes the attacker probed an internal workflow engine for write access, set up administrator users in the development identity provider, and swapped a development web application's JavaScript. On 27 October the same technique hit the staging web application and the development Grafana. The injected loader pointed at a second-stage script hosted on silverbullet.icu, which Chainstack did not retrieve, so what it did is unknown.

By 29 October, development cloud credentials and an API key for the internal BI tool were already being used from an attacker address. Between 17:03 and 17:12 the attacker changed a workflow in the workflow-automation platform, editing its database directly so it ran shell commands, then fired it with a valid webhook token and restored the original. The run produced a machine identity for the infrastructure access gateway. At 17:49 that identity pulled up a production Kubernetes cluster's secrets and read several one at a time. That was the move into production.

The heaviest activity came on 31 October. Between 01:40 and 08:31 UTC the attacker pulled secrets in bulk from the production secrets manager. New keys appeared, together with a Kubernetes service account carrying a long-lived token, short-lived pods ran in production, and a relay was installed as a static pod. One of the secrets read was the private key belonging to a VPN peer on the database network. A client using that key connected to the database network from 03:39. Two clients now presented the same peer identity, the tunnel endpoint flapped, and a database replication pipeline went down. The failure is what started the investigation. From about 07:30 the attacker connected to a production database as an administrative user, working from pods it had created, and pulled query results out through pod command output in base64 chunks. Between 10:39 and 10:43 the attacker queried PostgreSQL's pg_shadow view on one instance, the view holding role password hashes. Chainstack spotted the intrusion and cut the access paths the same day. The last observed use of a copied credential came at 06:28 on 2 November.

## Records the attacker reached

The attacker reached a database of customer account information, and the incident report lists what may have been exposed: organisation names, account holder names, member email addresses for organisations on Chainstack, and password hashes. The company puts it as "may have been exposed", not as a confirmed copy, and the notice does not say which password-hash algorithm was used.

The attacker also got to the systems that hold node credentials. Chainstack states it has no evidence the credentials were read, but it treats them as exposed anyway and asks customers to rotate them.

The exposure has two limits. Customer-facing services kept working normally through the whole incident, and customer nodes, the console and the API were left untouched. Chainstack also states it keeps no payment method details such as full card numbers or security codes, so none of those were exposed.

An email address with a password hash is the pair that feeds credential stuffing: where the same password was reused elsewhere, the hash gives an attacker a starting point. The organisation name and account holder name supply the detail that makes a phishing message look genuine, and that combination keeps its value after the incident ends.

## The Grafana entry point

The entry point was a test dashboard, not a software vulnerability. No software vulnerability was needed, and Chainstack states it found no evidence that one was exploited. Default credentials, exposed administrative functionality, missing authentication, over-broad permissions and long-lived credentials formed the chain, and in three days it took an attacker from a test dashboard to production databases.

The pivot was Grafana's data-source proxy. The proxy lets Grafana pull data from configured sources. An administrator can aim a data source at any URL, and the proxy forwards the request and hands back the response. With no destination allowlist and no network policy to limit where Grafana could connect, the proxy opened a way into the cluster network.

The MCP tool server was the next link: it gives AI agents access to operations, asked for no authentication, and ran under a service account bound to cluster-admin. The third link was the route from development to production. Machine credentials taken in development also worked in production. The automation platform let shell commands run with a machine identity mounted into the same pod. The remediation programme aims for development to have no path to production, and detection came from a side effect: the compromised VPN key, used from two endpoints at once, broke a database replication pipeline, and that failure started the investigation.

## The ARTEX campaign

Chainstack places the incident inside a broader AI-powered attack campaign reported in late October. The company assesses with high confidence that the attacker used ARTEX, an open-source framework that orchestrates LLM agents to automate intrusions. The markers line up: the attacker's resources carried artx and artex prefixes, and the attacker tunnelled through chisel, which reporting on ARTEX also describes.

Attribution stops at the tooling. Chainstack notes that public reporting ties ARTEX to several unrelated groups, so the framework gives no name to whoever was behind this intrusion, and none of its indicators appear in the actor-specific indicators CrowdStrike published for Vapor Panda or Microsoft for Storm-0940 and Storm-3358. The company therefore attributes the tooling, not the actor.

In [The Hacker News](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/chainstack-reports-production-systems.html)'s assessment, the incident shares overlaps with a campaign by a China-linked cluster targeting high-value firms with ARTEX. That is the researchers' assessment, not Chainstack's, and this article reports it as such.

WorkOS, an API platform, disclosed a security incident involving the same framework, according to The Hacker News. It was discovered on 30 October 2026 and stayed within its GTM systems, leaving production systems and customer platform data unaffected. A separate incident came from Chainalysis on 30 October 2026. Chainalysis is a blockchain analysis firm, a different company from Chainstack, and it took its Reactor and Data Solutions products offline as of 2 November. AliasFleet covered that [Chainalysis breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/chainalysis-data-breach) in a separate article, and the [DIVD breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/divd-data-breach), which involved the same ARTEX framework, in an earlier one. The tooling is shared across the three incidents. The companies and the incidents are different, and this article keeps them separate.

## Customer measures

Chainstack is emailing every customer, and asks each of them to take four steps. The same sequence appears in the [guide to what to do when an email is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach), for any breach: find what leaked, fix reused passwords, expect phishing, then contain the next one.

The first step is a password change, on Chainstack and anywhere else the same password was reused. Changing the password alone does not finish the job: sessions, tokens and recovery settings can survive a reset. The [guide on changing passwords after a breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/does-changing-your-password-stop-hackers) sets out what else has to happen.

The second step is to rotate the node credentials, which can now be done through self-service rotation in the console, with current endpoints working until the rotation is complete. Third comes regenerating platform API keys, for anyone who uses the platform API. Fourth is the phishing watch. Chainstack states it will never ask for passwords, tokens or keys.

The phishing watch matters because of what leaked. A message that quotes an organisation name, an account holder name and the timing of Chainstack's real notice will look genuine, and the words on the page will not give the forgery away. The check that still works is in the [guide on how phishing uses a leaked email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email): verify through a channel the sender does not control, by opening the app or typing the address directly, and never click a link in a breach email.

On its own side, Chainstack cut off the attacker's network sources, disabled the compromised identities and deleted their keys, and took out the attacker-created Kubernetes identities, pods and relay. Long-lived tokens were revoked, access to Kubernetes API endpoints was restricted, and the affected development cluster was shut down. Exposed credentials were rotated, cluster certificate authorities and join tokens were renewed, and customer login sessions were invalidated.

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Open items in the investigation

Several items stay open in the public record. No victim count has been disclosed, which leaves the scale of the exposure unknown. The password-hash algorithm is unstated, so the notice gives no way to judge the practical risk of the hashes. Whether the customer account database was copied out or only accessed is unconfirmed, and the company has not said whether it reported the incident to a regulator. The second-stage script the injected JavaScript loader pointed at was never retrieved, so what it did is unknown. Chainstack calls the incident report page the single source of truth.

[Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) is the quickest public check for whether an address turns up in known breach data. A Chainstack customer who finds an address in the file should go through the company's four steps in order, starting with the password change and the node credential rotation.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>Blockchain</category><category>Email Privacy</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Use One Alias per Broadband Provider to Protect Your Email</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-broadband</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-broadband</guid>
      <description>Broadband providers issue email addresses tied to the service. One alias per provider keeps billing and engineer visits working when the provider changes.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Broadband is the only signup where the provider hands over an email address as part of the service, and that address is where bills, engineer visit confirmations and account recovery messages go. A change of provider leaves it dead, chargeable, or deleted. [Ofcom](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/phones-and-broadband/switching-provider/email-address) states that it does not regulate email services directly, so no regulator guarantees the address survives a switch. One alias per provider is the protection: the ISP address is never used as an identity, and the alias stays active for the life of the contract.

## The ISP email address

Before free webmail became normal, every broadband package came with an email address. [MoneySavingExpert](https://www.moneysavingexpert.com/team-blog/2021/11/is-your-broadband-email-address-costing-you-p100s-yr-/) notes BT and Virgin Media still issue addresses to existing customers. Many households made the provider address their main address for banking, shopping and subscriptions. The address cost nothing at signup and nothing in the form said it belonged to the provider, so the habit stuck. Both of the largest UK providers have since stopped issuing them. [Choose](https://www.choose.co.uk/broadband/guide/email-address-when-switching-broadband-provider/) reports BT stopped on 26 October 2022, and [The Register](https://www.theregister.com/networks/2026/09/09/virgin-media-offloads-email-services-to-third-party-provider/5295230) reports Virgin Media stopped in 2022.

## The address after a switch

The rules after a switch vary by provider, and the table gives each provider's own published position where one exists, with a reported position where it does not.

| Provider | Address | After leaving |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| BT | @btinternet.com, @btopenworld.com, @talk21.com | Free Basic webmail-only, or Premium at £7.50 a month; closed accounts deleted after 60 days |
| Virgin Media | @virginmedia.com, @ntlworld.com, @blueyonder.co.uk, @virgin.net | Moving to Junara; deleted permanently after 165 days of no action |
| Sky | @sky.com | Free, with a login at least every six months |
| TalkTalk | @talktalk.net and legacy domains | Mail Plus at £5 a month or £50 a year |
| Plusnet | @username.plus.com | Closed on cancellation, with no webmail-only service |
| Xfinity | @comcast.net | Kept only with a login in the 90 days before disconnection, then every nine months |
| AT&T | @att.net, @sbcglobal.net | Reported as kept indefinitely with no action, while the account is in good standing |
| Spectrum | @charter.net, @rr.com, @twc.com | Reported as ending after cancellation, with about 60 days to back up messages |

Of all the providers, BT publishes the most detailed position. [BT Help](https://www.bt.com/help/email/what-happens-to-my-email-address-when-my-bt-broadband-service-stops) states that a customer ending broadband can keep the address on the free Basic webmail-only service, pay £7.50 a month for Premium email, attach it to a friend or family member's BT broadband account, or close it. After closing, 60 days remain to upgrade to Premium. Once those 60 days pass, every address on the BT ID is deleted and the personal data is unrecoverable. With no choice made, BT moves the account to Basic email.

Virgin Media's position changed in September 2026. The [Virgin Media O2 newsroom](https://news.virginmediao2.co.uk/helping-customers-understand-upcoming-changes-to-their-virgin-media-email-services/) announced on 9 September 2026 that Junara, a provider owned by Atmail, takes over management of the email service. Customers have at least 45 days from their first communication to choose: move to Junara, download their data, or close the account. A 120-day recovery window follows that choice period, and an account with no action after 165 days is permanently deleted. Current customers get the first 12 months free, subject to a 99p transfer fee, while former customers pay a standard Junara plan.

Sky keeps the address free, subject to a login at least every six months. [broadband.co.uk](https://www.broadband.co.uk/broadband/help/keeping-email-address-when-changing-broadband-providers) reports a Sky Yahoo Mail address stays accessible after leaving, as long as it is logged into at least every six months. An account left unlogged is deleted and cannot be reactivated. TalkTalk charges for the same privilege: the same source puts Mail Plus at £5 a month or £50 a year, and reports unpaid accounts closed, with data deleted from 31 October 2025. Plusnet offers nothing: cancelling the account closes access to email.

US providers follow the same pattern. [Compare Internet](https://www.compareinternet.com/blog/keep-isp-email-address-after-switching-providers/) reports Xfinity keeps a @comcast.net address only when the holder signs in in the 90 days before disconnection and at least once every nine months after. No new Comcast.net accounts have been created since June 2024, the same source adds. The same source reports AT&T @att.net addresses kept indefinitely while the account stays in good standing, Spectrum addresses ending after cancellation with about 60 days to export messages, and Optimum @optonline.net addresses closing at cancellation. All of these US positions are reported, not provider-confirmed.

## The cost of keeping an ISP address

Keeping a provider address after leaving is either free with conditions or paid, and the paid options add up over a year. BT Premium at £7.50 a month comes to £90 a year; TalkTalk Mail Plus at £5 a month comes to £60 a year. MoneySavingExpert reports seven million people are out of contract on broadband. Many of them pay £100s a year in missed cheaper deals because they stay with a provider mainly to keep an email address. The same source warns that anyone who wants to keep an address must tell the provider before leaving; otherwise the provider may delete the account and the inbox.

## The broadband signup form

The signup form asks for a contact email address before the service starts. That address becomes the account address for billing, engineer visits and recovery. The provider sends the installation date, the router delivery and the first bill to it, and a password reset goes to it when the account holder is locked out. Nothing in the form marks the address as temporary or secondary. The provider treats it as the account holder's identity for the whole contract.

One alias per provider runs the signup differently. The alias is created before the order is placed and entered in the contact email field, and it forwards to the household's real inbox. Provider mail lands in the real inbox and replies return from the alias, so the provider never sees the real address. Because the alias carries the provider's name, a leak traces back to that one provider. It stays active for the whole contract: billing and engineer visits depend on it. When the contract ends, the old alias closes and a new one is created for the new provider, while the real inbox never changes.

<Callout type="warning" title="The alias must stay active for the life of the contract">
The alias carries billing, engineer visit confirmations and account recovery messages for the whole contract. Closing it early stops those messages from arriving and removes the recovery path for the broadband account.
</Callout>

No provider-published policy was found that says BT, Sky, Virgin Media, TalkTalk or Plusnet block alias domains at signup, or that they accept them. A missing published block is not a guarantee. A signup that rejects the alias needs a fallback ready before the order is placed: a second alias on a different domain, not the real inbox address. Ofcom recommends a free webmail account separate from the provider instead of paying to keep a provider address. An alias gives the same separation, with the provider confined to one address.

## Switching provider after signup

In the UK, the new provider now handles the switch under [Ofcom's One Touch Switch process](https://www.comparethemarket.com/broadband/content/one-touch-switch/). The customer contacts only the new provider, which manages the switch. Ofcom announced the process in September 2021, and it slipped from April 2023 to September 2024. Compare the Market reports 1.6 million people switched in its first year. The switch covers the line, not the email address. The old provider's email policy applies separately, and the new provider takes no responsibility for the old mailbox. [Ofcom's announcement](https://www.wired-gov.net/wg/news.nsf/articles/Simpler+broadband+switching+in+as+little+as+a+day+28092021130500?open) states switching could take as little as one day where technically possible. Its research found 41% of people who decide against switching are put off by the hassle of contacting more than one provider.

The email work of a switch sits apart from the line work. The [AliasFleet guide to switching email providers](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-switch-email-providers) covers moving a mailbox between providers. It recommends a month of overlap with both accounts open, while old mail is copied and new mail is forwarded. A broadband alias removes most of that work before it starts. The old alias closes with the old contract and the new alias opens with the new contract, while banking, subscriptions and services were never given either provider's address. The overlap still matters for an old provider address, if one was ever used: mail sent to a deleted ISP address bounces.

## Second factor and recovery

Second-factor protection on an ISP mailbox is uneven. The recovery path is often the ISP address itself. BT community reports from July 2026 state that BT has made two-step verification mandatory on MyBT accounts. Codes go to a mobile or an email address. The same [BT Community thread](https://community.bt.com/t5/General-email-queries/Is-two-step-authentication-now-mandatory-No-option-to-switch-it/td-p/2459753/page/2) reports that BT webmail asks for a code inconsistently across devices, and that email apps do not ask for the second factor at all. These are customer reports, not a BT policy statement, and no official BT page stating the webmail position was found.

The broadband account's recovery address needs the same separation as its contact address. When the recovery email is the ISP address, losing the ISP address also loses the recovery path. A locked broadband account cannot be recovered without it. On any account that matters, the recovery address is a provider-independent address, one that survives a switch. The broadband alias itself is not a recovery address. It forwards to the real inbox, and recovery messages arrive in the real inbox. The mobile-carrier signup guide covers the same separation for phone accounts: see [how to protect email when signing up for a mobile carrier](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-a-mobile-carrier).

## AliasFleet and broadband signup

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides one alias per service. A broadband signup takes one alias named for the provider. The alias forwards to the household's real inbox and replies go back from the alias, so the provider never sees the real address. A single alias covers the whole contract. Billing, engineer visits and recovery messages all arrive on the same alias, which is paused or closed only when the contract ends. The free tier covers 10 active aliases, 1 verified destination inbox, 3 managed subdomains and 100 MB of monthly forwarding. [Pro, at $12 a month](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), adds unlimited aliases and 3 custom domains.

AliasFleet does not move old mail out of an ISP mailbox. It does not keep a deleted ISP address alive either. That migration is a separate job, covered by the guide to switching email providers. An alias also does not protect the broadband account itself. The account password and second factor still need to be set on the provider account.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Broadband</category><category>ISP Email</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Protect Your Email When Signing Up for Pet Sitting</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-pet-sitting</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-pet-sitting</guid>
      <description>A pet sitting account holds your home address, payment details and pet routine, and hands them to a stranger. One alias per platform keeps it contained.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Email protection at pet sitting signup means one managed alias for each platform, not the main personal address. Signup collects the owner's name, email address, postal address, phone number, date of birth, pet information and payment card details, and the platform then passes booking information to a sitter the owner has never met. Care takes place at the owner's home, with the sitter visiting, or at the sitter's home, with the pet staying there, and the owner is usually away throughout. A separate alias for each platform confines that platform's booking mail to one address, identifies the source of any leak from its list, and keeps the main inbox address out of the platform's records.

## Data collected at signup

Account information under [Rover's privacy statement](https://www.rover.com/ca-en/terms/privacy/03-27-2025/), last updated 27 March 2025, runs to name, email address, postal address, phone number, date of birth, pet information, availability and any other account-related information the user chooses to provide. Payment and tax information covers the amount and type of services bought, the date and time of each transaction and payment card information. Card transactions go through third-party payment processors. In the United States and Canada, the third-party background check provider collects a sitter's social security or social insurance number; in the United Kingdom, Switzerland and the European Economic Area, the identity verification provider collects a photo and an image of a passport, government identity card or driver's licence.

[TrustedHousesitters' privacy policy](https://www.trustedhousesitters.com/privacy-policy/), last updated 10 August 2026, describes the same pattern. Personal data is collected when a person creates an account, completes a sitter profile or posts an owner listing. Technical and usage data, including IP address, browser type, location and device information, is collected automatically. Personal data also arrives from third parties, including the provider that conducts background checks.

On both platforms the email address is the account: login, booking channel, receipt route and password reset route in one. Everything the platform knows about the owner, the home and the pet hangs on that address.

## What the sitter receives

Booking information goes from Rover to the sitter. Its privacy statement states that Rover shares information about a booking with the applicable pet service provider when the owner makes or accepts a booking. [Rover's help centre](https://support-uk.rover.com/hc/en-gb/articles/360000998683-What-information-does-Rover-share) states that Rover numbers are used before and after a service so the owner's actual phone number stays private, and that a sitter's address appears only when the service takes place at the sitter's home. The phone number is masked; the home address, the dates of the sit and the pet routine are not, because the sitter needs them to work.

At the point of handover, TrustedHousesitters works the same way. Its privacy policy states that certain personal data may be shared with other users of the platform as part of the normal operation of the service. Its [help centre](https://support.trustedhousesitters.com/hc/en-gb/articles/360001883538-Are-my-contact-details-shared-with-other-members) states that contact details are not shared with other members unless the owner requests it, and that members can communicate through the platform without exchanging phone numbers. Members describing the process on the company's community forum report that the owner Welcome Guide, shared with the confirmed sitter, contains the owner's full name, full address and telephone number. That point comes from users, not from the policy itself.

A shopping account hands an address to a warehouse. A pet sitting account hands a home address, the dates the owner is away and the pet routine to a stranger who then holds the keys. The guide on [how to protect your email when booking vet care](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-booking-vet-care) deals with a different record, the pet medical record held by a clinic. Pet sitting covers the home and the absence.

## Background checks and identity verification

Both large platforms screen sitters. The screening has stated limits. [Rover's background checks page](https://www.rover.com/background-checks/) states that every sitter profile is reviewed and that every new sitter and dog walker undergoes an enhanced background check through a third-party service. The enhanced check comprises a search of the US Department of Justice National Sex Offender Public Website, a search of a national criminal database for disqualifying criminal offences, and a search of county criminal court records drawn from the person's address history. Sitters who joined before January 2022 and have not upgraded may still hold the basic check, which covers only the sex offender registry and the national criminal database.

The same page states the limits plainly: information reported for a background check can be limited by various laws and reporting systems, each check runs on information submitted by the applicant, and criminal records are not always comprehensive. Rover states that a criminal background check is only one consideration when hiring a pet care provider, and recommends Meet and Greets and verified reviews alongside it. Identity verification is separate: [Rover's ID verification page](https://www.rover.com/id-verified/) states that every sitter and dog walker joining its European community undergoes identity verification through Onfido, using a timestamped selfie matched against the photo on the sitter's passport or other identity document. From 2026, new sitters in eligible locations in the North American community undergo identity verification too.

A background check and an identity check vet the person, not the address. Neither protects the owner's email address: the platform still holds it, booking details still reach the sitter through it, and a breach of the platform's records still exposes it. Screening establishes who the sitter is and places no limit on what happens to the owner's address after signup.

## Recorded exposures in the pet sector

This research found no breach of Rover or TrustedHousesitters customer email lists, and this article claims none. Pet owner data has been exposed in the wider pet sector, and the data types involved match what a pet sitting account holds.

On 5 August 2026, [Edinburgh Live reported](https://www.edinburghlive.co.uk/news/edinburgh-news/edinburgh-dog-cat-home-customers-34410839) that Edinburgh Dog and Cat Home had warned supporters that an unauthorised third party had accessed a third-party system it uses and copied database backups. The home had been notified on Monday 3 August of a cyber security incident at Beacon, a third-party CRM provider. Name, email address, postal address, telephone number, records of interactions with the home, pet's name and past gifts were potentially accessed and downloaded. The home reported the incident to the Information Commissioner's Office and stated there was no evidence at that stage that the information had been misused. Payment details were not held in that system.

An earlier case shows the same data reaching the wrong owner through a configuration failure, not an attack. In March 2021, [Computing reported](https://www.computing.co.uk/news/4029169/petlog-accused-mishandling-details-customers-pets) that a database migration at Petlog, the UK microchip database managed by the Kennel Club, left owners seeing other people's details, including an address and phone number. The company said no pet details had vanished and that they had been safely migrated.

In both cases the exposed data was the ordinary account record: name, email address, postal address, phone number and pet name. No targeted attack on the pet owner was needed; the record itself was the target, and the email address was part of it.

## Phishing aimed at pet owners

A pet sitting account also attracts phishing, because messages around a booking are expected and trusted. [Rover's account security help page](https://support.rover.com/hc/en-us/articles/206241876-How-can-I-keep-my-Rover-account-secure) states that phishing messages usually request personal information such as full name, email address, phone number, password and financial information. Rover states that its support team never asks for a username or password, and that official Rover emails end in @e.rover.com or @rover.com. Any other address in the From line is likely not from Rover. The same page describes the overpayment scam: a person is sent a cheque for more than the amount owed and asked to reimburse the difference, then the cheque bounces and the money sent is kept.

Pet details make a phishing message more convincing: a sender who knows the pet name, the breed, the dates of a sit and the amount charged can write a message that reads as if it comes from the platform or the sitter. A leak of the booking record supplies all of those details. An alias does not stop phishing on its own, and it does not verify a sender. It makes the phishing visible: a message about a pet sitting booking that arrives on the pet sitting alias is in the right place, while a message about a booking that arrives on an address the platform never had is plainly wrong.

## One alias per pet sitting platform

The setup is one managed alias per platform: a separate forwarding address for Rover, another for TrustedHousesitters, another for any local sitting service, with no other service using any of them. Booking confirmations, receipts, messages from the sitter and reminders for one platform all arrive on that platform's alias. The alias is created before signup, labelled with the platform name, and stays active while the account exists and any booking, payment, claim or review is still open.

The arrangement confines a leak to one platform: the exposed address belongs to that platform only and cannot sign in to other accounts. It also identifies the source of unwanted mail, because marketing mail or spam arriving on the alias given to one platform points to that platform with no investigation needed. And the alias can be paused or replaced once the platform is no longer used or its mail turns unwanted, without changing the main inbox address.

The same pattern appears in other guides. The guide on [how to protect your email when setting up smart home devices](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-setting-up-smart-home-devices) applies one alias per device brand, because the address is the key to cameras inside the home. The guide on [a separate email for health and fitness apps](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-health-and-fitness-apps) applies one alias per app, because the address is the field that joins health data to a person. Pet sitting follows the same logic with a different stake: the address is tied to a home, an absence and a stranger with the keys. The alias must stay active while the account is live, because booking confirmations, receipts and messages about the sit arrive on it, so closing it after the first booking can block messages the owner still needs. A change of platform is a planned move: the new platform gets a new alias, and the old alias stays active until no booking, payment or claim is outstanding.

<Callout type="warning" title="Closing the alias before the booking closes">
The alias stays active while any booking, payment, claim or review is still open. Booking confirmations, receipts and messages about the sit arrive on that alias, and closing it early blocks messages the owner still needs.
</Callout>

Two other measures sit alongside the alias: a unique password on each pet sitting account stops a leak at one platform from opening the others, and two-factor authentication stops a password alone from opening an account. The alias controls the handover of the address; it does not replace either measure. The owner should also check the address on [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) after signup, to see whether it has appeared in a known breach.

## AliasFleet for pet sitting accounts

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides managed email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox. Each pet sitting platform gets a separate alias, and every alias forwards to the same destination inbox, so booking mail from all platforms arrives in one place while each platform holds a different address. Replies travel back through the alias, so the destination address stays out of the platform's records. The free tier includes 10 active aliases, 1 verified destination inbox, 3 managed subdomains and 100 MB of monthly forwarding, according to the [AliasFleet pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing). AliasFleet does not control the security of the pet sitting platforms, and an alias does not replace two-factor authentication or a unique password on those accounts.

## Limits of an alias for pet sitting

An alias does not make the pet sitting platform secure, and it does not stop a platform from being breached. A breach of the platform's records exposes the name, home address, phone number and pet details alongside the alias, whatever address the owner gave. An alias does not hide the pet name, the home address or the dates of the sit from the platform or the sitter, because both need those details to arrange care. Nor does it stop the platform sharing the address with the suppliers who need it, including payment processors, background check providers and identity verification services. Rover's privacy statement lists third-party data sources and service providers among the parties it shares information with. TrustedHousesitters' privacy policy lists service providers including payment processing, sitter verification, banking, advertising, fraud prevention, web hosting and analytics.

An alias also leaves the banking rule unchanged. A bank account keeps a permanent real address used only for financial accounts, because recovery, statements and fraud alerts depend on it. The pet sitting alias covers the platform signup and its booking mail, never the bank account identity.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Pet Sitting</category><category>Email Aliases</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TSMC Confirms Employee Data Leak From Cloud Vendor</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/tsmc-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/tsmc-data-breach</guid>
      <description>TSMC confirmed on 12 November that employee data was posted online without authorisation, after sellers offered a claimed 46,000 records for 3 bitcoin.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Data belonging to some current and former employees of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company appeared on an external website without authorisation, the company confirmed on 12 November 2026. Forum sellers had put the material up for sale, describing it as 46,000 employee records and asking 3 bitcoin. According to TSMC, the records match data held by a cloud service provider. The company reported no sign of compromise in its own systems, and said neither production nor customer data was affected.

TSMC lodged the confirmation with the [US Securities and Exchange Commission](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1046179/000104617926000800/a20261112statementregardin.htm) as a Form 6-K, signed by chief financial officer Wendell Huang. TSMC is the biggest contract chipmaker in the world. The filing is short. It confirms that the exposure happened and that the data sat outside TSMC's own systems. It gives no scale, names no vendor, and says nothing about how the records left the provider.

## How the leak surfaced

Listings for the dataset appeared on DarkForums and BreachForums, two underground forums. The sellers put the size at about 46,000 TSMC employee records totalling 6.9 GB, and asked 3 bitcoin for the set. [ETHNews, reporting Taiwan's Central News Agency](https://ethnews.com/tsmc-employee-data-leak-raises-fresh-supplier-security-concerns/) carried the claim, and so did [Crypto Briefing](https://www.tradingview.com/news/cryptobriefing:d4e317cfb094b:0-tsmc-confirms-employee-data-leak-as-hackers-seek-3-btc-for-the-records/). At the price on the day of the listing, 3 bitcoin came to about $220,000, or about NT$7.4 million by local media calculation. The sellers threatened to publish the full set within a week if no buyer came forward.

The sellers backed the listing with a sample. A file named "tsmc.txt" held 499 records, each with 19 fields. That sample is all anyone outside the sellers has seen of the claimed dataset, so reporting on the contents depends on it alone. TSMC's reply came the same day, 12 November, in the statement filed to the SEC.

## Data reported in the sample

The sample's contents, as reported, run wide. Reporting on the sample, including [FinanceFeeds](https://financefeeds.com/tsm-stock-tsmc-employee-data-leak-3-bitcoin/), describes 19 fields per record: email addresses, national ID numbers, bank details, emergency contacts, home addresses, phone numbers, names, nationalities, dates of birth and job titles. [WCCFTech](https://wccftech.com/taiwan-chip-giant-tsmc-acknowledges-hack-of-reportedly-49000-employee-files-occurred-but-says-leaked-data-matches-that-stored-with-external-cloud-provider/), which also published TSMC's full statement, gives the same list and adds that bank account numbers, emergency contact details and home addresses together hand phishers and impersonators useful material.

TSMC itemised nothing in its statement. The list itself comes from reporting on the sellers' sample, not from the company. Its statement confirms that employee data was posted without authorisation and stops there, leaving the contents undescribed. The 46,000 figure belongs to the sellers, not to the company, and no one has verified whether every claimed record is genuine or how complete the set is. What the sample does establish is narrow: 499 records exist in the form the sellers describe. Nothing in it speaks to the other 45,500.

An email address alone invites spam. Combined with a name, a role, a home address, a national ID number and bank details, it lets a phisher write a message that quotes the recipient's own file back to them. The employer, the job title and the personal details all check out, which is what makes the usual signs of a fake message fail.

## What TSMC confirmed and what the sellers claim

The two versions of events differ on scope, not on the fact of the exposure. The full statement, as published by WCCFTech, reads:

> "TSMC has found that some of our current and former employee data was made available on an external website without authorization. Currently, we have found no evidence that TSMC's systems have been compromised. This information has been verified to match data stored in the system services of a cloud service provider, but is unrelated to the company's operations or customer-related data. We have been informing impacted personnel and are providing them with necessary support. TSMC has engaged with both the cloud service vendor, the relevant investigating authorities, and a third-party cybersecurity agency to jointly ascertain the facts and take necessary actions. We remain firmly committed to protecting employee privacy and safeguarding data security."

What the statement pins down is a short list. Employee data from current and former staff was posted on an external website without authorisation, and the data matches records in a cloud provider's systems. TSMC's own systems show no evidence of compromise. The company is also contacting the people affected, and is working with the vendor, the investigating authorities and a third-party cybersecurity firm.

Everything else comes from the sellers and stays unconfirmed. The claimed size is about 46,000 records and 6.9 GB. The price is 3 bitcoin, the deadline a week, and the field list is the one set out above. TSMC's statement contains none of those figures. It names no cloud provider, explains nothing about how the records left the provider's systems, and leaves the access method undisclosed. Beyond "some" current and former employees, the company has given no victim count.

The headline on the WCCFTech report gives a larger record figure than the report's own body, and larger than every other outlet's figure for the claim. This article sticks to 46,000, and treats it as the sellers' claim in every mention.

## Supplier origin

TSMC's own network was not where the data came from, on the company's account: the records matched data stored in a cloud service provider's systems, which puts the entry point at a supplier. That shape recurred through 2026: the headline names one company, and another company's systems were entered. Crypto Briefing draws the parallel with June 2023, when LockBit's ransomware group listed TSMC as a victim and demanded $70 million, after breaching hardware supplier Kinmax, reaching the chipmaker through a partner once again.

The same shape showed up in AliasFleet's October coverage from Japan. Customer data at Daiwa Securities and at Citizen Watch came out through Scala Communications, a vendor both companies shared, and Sompo Japan reported a breach through that same vendor days later. The firm holding the data was not the firm whose name sat on the customer relationship in any of the three cases. TSMC's case repeats that shape on a bigger scale, and it moves the risk: hardening a company's own network does not stop a vendor it pays from exposing its employees' personal data. Those employees never chose the vendor. They had no way to check its controls either.

## What TSMC staff were told to do

Notification from TSMC itself is the starting point. The company says it is informing impacted personnel and giving them necessary support. A current or former employee should look for that notice first, not for a message found elsewhere. Mail that claims to come from TSMC about the incident needs care: the reported sample hands attackers the details for a convincing fake notice. The order of operations is set out in full in the [guide on what to do when an email is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach).

Passwords come first in the response. A TSMC work password used anywhere else should be changed, with the email account at the head of the queue, since every password reset runs through it, and the bank next. The sample lists no passwords, yet the addresses in it are enough to try against passwords from older breaches. That is the live risk from reused passwords, even with no password field in this dump. A password manager speeds the rotation up; the change itself is what matters.

Phishing after this leak needs a different check. The sender now holds the name, the company and the timing of the genuine warning notice, which lets a forgery copy the company's real template, as the [guide on how phishing uses a leaked email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email) explains. What still separates a real message from a fake one is the channel, not the content. Links in a breach email should stay unclicked, however genuine they look. The company's site or app should be opened directly and the message checked there; a message that does not appear there did not come from the company.

If bank details were in the data, the response escalates past passwords. The bank's fraud team is the first call, ahead of any guide. It should be asked about monitoring and replacement of the affected account details. In Taiwan, the Joint Credit Information Center offers access to personal credit reports, the local way to check whether an exposed national ID number has been used. The breach notice should be kept somewhere safe, noting the dates, the company name and what was taken, in case a fraudulent account has to be disputed later.

## The address problem

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## What is still unconfirmed

How serious this turns out to be depends on answers the investigation has not given yet. Scale comes first: are the claimed 46,000 records genuine, and how many current and former employees are actually affected? TSMC has put no number on it, and the sellers' count is unverified, so the vendor question comes next: which cloud provider held the records, and by what mechanism did they leave its systems? Then the deadline: do the sellers publish the full dataset when a week passes with no buyer? Publication would take the data out of a sale listing and into general circulation. Its phishing use would then widen well beyond the sample.

Regulators form a fourth unanswered question. Whether authorities in Taiwan or elsewhere look into the vendor's security controls is something to watch, Crypto Briefing notes. Taiwan's data protection rules cover the employee data at the centre of the incident, and nothing has been said in public about the vendor's obligations under them.

The gap between the two accounts is the limit on this piece. TSMC confirmed an exposure that came from a vendor. The sellers supplied the scale, the size in gigabytes, the field list and the deadline. Those numbers are claims from the sellers or from reporting on their sample, and they stay claims until the company or the investigation confirms a count and a list of data types. The one number that rests on something seen is the 499-record sample. No confirmed misuse of the data has been reported.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Phishing</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ezTravel Breach Exposes 690,000 Customers&apos; Email Data</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/eztravel-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/eztravel-data-breach</guid>
      <description>The ezTravel data breach may have exposed names, email addresses, phone numbers and booking details of more than 690,000 members.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The ezTravel data breach is the unauthorised access to booking information of more than 690,000 members of ezTravel, a Taiwanese online travel agency, disclosed by the company on 9 November 2026. The data that may have been exposed includes names, email addresses, phone numbers and purchase or order details from past bookings. Credit card numbers, card security codes, account passwords, passport numbers and national identification numbers were not involved, and payment processing was not affected. As of the end of 2025, the ezTravel app had been downloaded more than 4 million times and more than 70 percent of bookings were made through the app, according to [Taiwan News](https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/6474147), citing the Commercial Times.

## Detection and disclosure

ezTravel detected unusual external network activity targeting its membership system on Saturday 7 November 2026 and blocked the suspicious traffic, according to the company's statement as reported by [Focus Taiwan](https://focustaiwan.tw/society/202611090021). The company released its statement on Monday 9 November, and the [Taipei Times](https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/11/10/2003867478) reported the same sequence of detection on Saturday and disclosure on Monday. The affected count of more than 690,000 was set after cross-checking records and removing duplicates, according to [BreachNews](https://breachnews.com/breaches/eztravel-member-center-breach-690000-customers/), so the figure counts people rather than bookings or records. The activity targeted the membership system, the part of the platform that holds customer records, and payment processing was not affected.

## Data exposed and data not exposed

The exposed data may include four fields: names, email addresses, phone numbers and purchase or order details from past bookings. ezTravel used the word "may" because the preliminary investigation had not established the full extent of what was taken, and the company described the information as improperly accessed rather than confirming exfiltration of every record. Names, email addresses, phone numbers and real order details are the material used for impersonation scams, and ezTravel warned customers about that risk.

| Data type | Status in the breach |
| :--- | :--- |
| Names | May have been exposed |
| Email addresses | May have been exposed |
| Phone numbers | May have been exposed |
| Purchase and order details | May have been exposed |
| Credit card numbers | Not involved |
| Card security codes | Not involved |
| Account login passwords | Not involved |
| Passport numbers | Not involved |
| National identification numbers | Not involved |

## Investigation and official reporting

ezTravel apologised for the concern caused to consumers and pledged to safeguard customers' personal information, according to Focus Taiwan. The company hired an independent cybersecurity team to investigate the incident and conduct a digital forensic analysis, and it reported the incident to the relevant government agencies and police under Taiwan's personal data protection laws. The company did not name a threat group, describe an attack vector, or say how the attackers first reached the membership system. No attribution has been published. No confirmed misuse of the exposed data and no financial losses have been reported in the company's initial statement.

## Notification and scam warnings

ezTravel notified affected customers by text message and email. The company warned that scammers might impersonate customer service or bank representatives to obtain credit card details or verification codes, or trick customers into using ATMs or clicking suspicious links, according to [EconoTimes](https://econotimes.com/ezTravel-Says-Data-Breach-Affected-More-Than-690-000-Members-1773799). The warning named specific tricks: fake customer service calls, bank staff impersonation, requests for verification codes, and ATM operations to cancel instalment payments. The company said it would never ask customers to disclose account passwords or verification codes, or to use ATMs to cancel instalment payments. BreachNews reported that official notifications about this incident do not include website links, according to local reporting of the company's guidance, so a message about this breach that contains a link is not an official notification. Customers with questions can call ezTravel's service line at 412-8001, adding 02 from a mobile phone, or Taiwan's 165 anti-fraud hotline.

## Steps for affected members

Unexpected calls, texts or emails about ezTravel bookings should be treated with suspicion, even when the sender knows a real order detail. Card numbers and one-time verification codes should never be shared over those channels. The steps to take after an address appears in a breach are set out in [what to do when your email is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach). The exposed order details give phishing messages real material to work with: a message can name a real destination, a real travel date or a real booking reference. Those details do not show the message is genuine. The mechanics of that kind of attack are covered in [how phishing uses a leaked email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email).

<Callout type="warning" title="ezTravel will never ask for these">
ezTravel said it will never ask customers to disclose account passwords or verification codes, or to use ATMs to cancel instalment payments. A call, text or email that asks for any of those is not from ezTravel.
</Callout>

Customers who want to know whether their address appears in known breaches can check with the method in [which website leaked my email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/which-website-leaked-my-email). Changing the ezTravel account password is a reasonable precaution even though passwords were not exposed, because the same password may be reused elsewhere, and customers who reused their ezTravel password on other services should change it on those services too. The question of whether a new email address is needed after a breach is answered in [should you change your email after a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-change-email-after-data-breach).

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## The wider pattern in Taiwan

Taiwan's Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA) said on Wednesday 11 November 2026 that recent attacks on more than 10 businesses and platforms affected more than 1 million personal records, including names, phone numbers, email addresses and order details, according to [Focus Taiwan](https://focustaiwan.tw/sci-tech/202611110020). Ministry officials said preliminary investigations linked nearly half of the attacks to AI, and some attack traffic appeared to originate from Hong Kong. The wave began around mid-September, with the first cases reported in South Korea, and it was still ongoing when MODA spoke on 11 November. MODA declined to name the affected businesses. The companies named here come from their own disclosures, not from MODA: e-commerce service provider 91APP said up to 4.8 million consumers could have been affected, and ezTravel reported more than 690,000 affected members. MODA did not confirm whether either company was included in its tally of more than 1 million records, so the ezTravel figure should not be counted as part of that total.

## What remains unknown

The investigation is still preliminary. The attack vector is undisclosed, no threat group has been named, and no attribution has been published. It is not known whether the data was exfiltrated or only accessed, or which records were confirmed exposed rather than suspected. No confirmed misuse of the exposed data has been reported, and no financial losses have been linked to the breach. No standalone English incident page from ezTravel was found, and the company has not said when the forensic investigation will conclude or whether a final report will be published. Further detail from ezTravel or MODA would change the picture.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Taiwan</category><category>Phishing</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Fullerton Health breach may have exposed workers&apos; data</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/fullerton-health-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/fullerton-health-data-breach</guid>
      <description>Fullerton Health confirmed unauthorised access to its Migrant Worker Primary Care Plan server; names, FIN numbers and emails may have been affected.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Unauthorised access to a server supporting Fullerton Health's Migrant Worker Primary Care Plan (PCP) programme in Singapore may have exposed the personal data of migrant workers, the healthcare provider confirmed. Discovery came on 31 October 2026, and the notice went up on the company's website on Monday 9 November 2026. Six categories of data may have been affected: full names, Foreign Identification Numbers (FIN), dates of birth, mobile phone numbers, email addresses and residential addresses. The company said no health or medical records and no personal financial information were involved. No victim count was given, so the scale of the incident is still unknown.

![Fullerton Health's 9 November 2026 notice about the data-security incident affecting the Migrant Worker Primary Care Plan portal](/blog/fullerton-health-data-breach/notice.png)

## Chronology of the incident

On 31 October 2026, Fullerton Health became aware of the incident and activated its incident response protocols. Precautionary measures were implemented across the company's network to secure its systems while the investigation continued. Nine days passed before the notice appeared on the company's website, on Monday 9 November 2026. [CNA](https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/fullerton-health-migrant-worker-care-plan-cybersecurity-incident-6541451), [The Straits Times](https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/fullerton-health-server-hit-by-cyberattack-personal-data-of-migrant-workers-affected?ref=more-on-this-topic) and the [Malay Mail](https://www.malaymail.com/news/singapore/2026/11/11/singapore-migrant-workers-id-numbers-home-addresses-at-risk-after-fullerton-health-cyber-breach/242839) reported it the same week.

How the server was accessed has not been disclosed. No attack vector has been reported, no attacker has been named, and no motive has been stated. Neither has the company reported any confirmed external outflow of the data, nor any confirmed misuse of it. The notice says the data "may have been affected". Unauthorised access to the server is confirmed, while exfiltration of a defined set of records is not.

Services stayed up throughout. Fullerton Health said all its managed care services, healthcare services and facilities remained operational. It also said it is cooperating fully with the relevant authorities, and that investigations remain ongoing, with further updates to come as more verified information becomes available.

## Data that may have been affected

Six categories of personal data may have been affected, according to the notice: full names, Foreign Identification Numbers, dates of birth, mobile phone numbers, email addresses and residential addresses. The same six categories appear in the reporting of all three outlets, and the company drew a clear line around what was not involved. The affected data contains no health or medical information, and no personal financial information.

A FIN number is a government-issued identifier for foreign residents in Singapore. It cannot be changed the way a password can. Combined with a full name, date of birth, mobile number, email address and home address, it gives an attacker enough material to build a convincing identity for phishing and fraud attempts. No single field opens an account on its own. Together, the fields let an attacker impersonate a worker to a bank, an employer, a government service or the worker themselves. A leaked address becomes the starting point for that kind of attack, because password resets and official notices flow through the inbox, as [How an email address leads to identity theft](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-leads-to-identity-theft) explains.

The email address carries a second risk. An attacker reaches the worker through that address, and the worker's own accounts use it for recovery too. A phishing email sent to an address the worker gave to a healthcare programme, naming the worker and referencing the PCP programme, is far more convincing than a generic scam message. The pattern is described in [How phishing uses a leaked email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email): the leaked details supply the personalisation, and the personalisation supplies the trust.

## Migrant Worker Primary Care Plan

Eligible migrant workers in Singapore receive affordable primary healthcare through the PCP programme. The Ministry of Manpower (MOM) administers it, and employers must buy PCP coverage for certain work permit and S Pass holders, including workers in the construction, marine shipyard and process sectors. Because that coverage is mandatory, the affected population could be large even though no victim count has been given. The programme covers a defined and sizeable workforce, and the server held the personal details of workers enrolled through it.

Some of the people affected may need more help understanding how they have been affected and what precautionary steps they can take. The company acknowledged this. Guidance will form part of the notification process, the company said. It is taking steps to notify affected migrant workers, tell them about the incident, and point them to where they can seek further assistance. Some of those affected may face language barriers, limited familiarity with Singapore's data protection process, and dependence on employers for information about a programme their employer bought on their behalf.

## Company response and regulatory action

The Personal Data Protection Commission was notified, a police report was lodged, and the Ministry of Manpower was contacted. CNA received confirmation from the PDPC that it is aware of the incident and is investigating, and a PDPC spokesperson confirmed the same to The Straits Times. The company said it is giving the relevant authorities its full cooperation.

The incident also appears limited to a specific standalone system supporting the PCP programme, the company said. That is the company's own assessment, qualified in the notice itself with the words "appears" and "at this time". According to the company, there is no evidence at this time that systems supporting other programmes, projects, clients or patients have been affected. What the ongoing investigation finds will decide whether that assessment holds. Further updates will follow from the company as more verified information becomes available.

In its statement, Fullerton Health said: "Protecting personal information is one of Fullerton Health's highest priorities and we deeply value the trust that our stakeholders have placed in us. We sincerely regret any concern or uncertainty this incident may have caused."

## Precautionary measures for affected workers

Affected migrant workers are being notified directly by Fullerton Health, with guidance on precautionary measures included in that notification. A notification's guidance should be read first by any worker who receives one, because it will reflect what the company knows about which records were on the affected server.

The standard steps for a breach of this kind are straightforward, beyond the company guidance. Any email, text message or call that references the PCP programme, a FIN number or Fullerton Health details should be treated with caution. It should be verified through a channel the worker already trusts, rather than through a link or number in the message itself. The signs to look for are covered in [How to check if an email is phishing](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-an-email-is-phishing): a sender address that does not match the organisation it claims to be from, pressure to act quickly, and requests for passwords or payment details.

A check of whether their email address appears in a known breach is also worth doing. That check is run by [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com), which explains what each result means. The incident has not been reported as listed in Have I Been Pwned yet, so a clean result would not prove an address was unaffected, because listing depends on the data being verified and loaded. A reused password should be changed on each account, starting with email, for workers who reuse the same password across accounts. A leaked email address combined with a reused password is the combination that opens accounts. Those steps are walked through in order in [What to do when your email is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach).

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Related Singapore disclosures

Several other Singapore breaches were reported in the same fortnight, and the Fullerton Health incident follows them. Telco M1 disclosed a breach on 30 October 2026. Telehealth provider Doctor Anywhere reported a leak of users' personal data, with clinical records not affected according to forensic specialists. Singapore Airlines said data relating to booking records was accessed in a breach involving software provider Amadeus. SPH Media said its systems were hit by cyberattacks, and food solutions provider SATS disclosed that Tappee, a school meal ordering application, had been affected by a cyber incident.

No reported evidence links these incidents to each other. Two of those incidents have coverage on this blog: the [M1 data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/m1-data-breach) and the [SPH Media data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/sph-media-data-breach). The Amadeus incident behind the Singapore Airlines disclosure is covered in the [Amadeus airlines data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/amadeus-airlines-data-breach) article.

## State of the investigation

The investigation is ongoing, and the facts that would settle the scale of the incident have not been disclosed. How many workers were affected, how the server was accessed, whether the data left the company's systems, and whether any of the data has been misused: none of this has been stated by the company. More detail may come from the PDPC investigation, and further updates will follow from the company as more verified information becomes available. Until then, what is verified is the discovery date, the notice date, the six categories of data that may have been affected, the absence of health and financial data, and the regulatory notifications the company has made. A victim count is the next update worth watching for. It would turn an incident of unknown scale into a measured one. Any statement from the Ministry of Manpower is also awaited. The ministry administers the programme and has been contacted by both CNA and The Straits Times for more information.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breaches</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Singapore</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email for a Period Tracking App</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-a-period-tracking-app</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-a-period-tracking-app</guid>
      <description>A period tracking app holds reproductive health data outside HIPAA protection. One alias per tracker keeps the account apart from the banking and work address.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A period tracking app keeps reproductive health data in an account that falls outside the main United States health privacy law, and named apps have passed that data to analytics and advertising firms. One managed alias per app, kept live while the app remains in use, keeps the account apart from the address used for banking and work.

## What a period tracking app records

Cycle dates, symptoms, sexual activity, birth control and pregnancy status are the health detail a tracker records, next to an email address, a name, device identifiers and an IP address. The app turns that detail into predictions of the next period and the fertile window. Mozilla examined 25 reproductive health apps and wearable devices in 2022 and recorded the same combination, with email addresses, device IDs and advertising IDs held next to cycle length, date of last period, sexual activity and pregnancy due date. [The Mozilla Foundation review](https://foundation.mozilla.org/en/blog/in-post-roe-v-wade-era-mozilla-labels-18-of-25-popular-period-and-pregnancy-tracking-tech-with-privacy-not-included-warning/) carries the full findings.

On its own a cycle date reads as a calendar entry. Joined to an email address, a name and a device identifier, the same date becomes a record that identifies a person and states facts about that person's reproductive health. [The companion guide on separate addresses for health and fitness apps](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-health-and-fitness-apps) covers the wider category.

## HIPAA and personal health apps

Covered entities under HIPAA are health plans, most health care providers and health care clearinghouses, plus their business associates. A tracker downloaded from an app store for personal use is generally none of those. HHS puts the position in plain terms in its guidance on personal phones: "The HIPAA Rules generally do not protect the privacy or security of your health information when it is accessed through or stored on your personal cell phones or tablets." The same guidance leaves unprotected data downloaded or entered into mobile apps for personal use, unless the app comes from a covered entity or its business associate. [The HHS guidance](https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/cell-phone-hipaa/index.html) carries the full statement.

Information collected by a device or app may be viewed by other entities, used to send specific ads, or sold to a data broker, HHS adds. The FTC Act and the FTC Health Breach Notification Rule cover the gap instead. A final rule effective 29 July 2024 extended the Rule to developers of health apps and counts an unauthorised disclosure as a breach of security. [The Federal Register](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-05-30/html/2024-10855.htm) carries the amendment text.

## Documented sharing of health data

The record rests on three enforcement cases, each turning on the same pattern: health data reached analytics and advertising firms despite privacy promises.

On 17 September 2020 Glow settled with the California Attorney General, agreeing to pay a $250,000 civil penalty over alleged failures to protect users' personal and health information. Information was shared without authorisation through a partner-connect feature, and a password-change flaw allowed anyone to reset a user's password. [Wyrick Robbins' account](https://practicalprivacy.wyrick.com/blog/the-california-attorney-generals-settlement-with-glow-a-wake-up-call-for-consumer-health-app-developers) describes the case.

On 13 January 2021 the FTC announced a settlement with Flo Health, whose period and fertility tracking app was used by more than 100 million consumers. The complaint alleged that Flo promised users their health data would stay private, then sent health data from millions of users, including whether a user was pregnant, to five outside firms as "app events": Facebook's analytics division, Google's analytics division, Google's Fabric service, AppsFlyer and Flurry. The practice ended only after a February 2019 news article exposed it and hundreds of users complained. Under the settlement Flo must obtain user consent before sharing health information and undergo an independent privacy review. [The FTC press release](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2021/01/developer-popular-womens-fertility-tracking-app-settles-ftc-allegations-it-misled-consumers-about) gives the full account.

The same pattern appeared at Premom two years later. On 17 May 2023 the FTC charged Easy Healthcare, the operator of Premom, with passing sensitive health data to AppsFlyer and Google through software development kits, and precise geolocation to two China-based analytics firms, Umeng and Jiguang. A $100,000 civil penalty, a permanent bar on sharing health data for advertising, and a further $100,000 to Connecticut, the District of Columbia and Oregon were in the proposed order. It was the FTC's second enforcement action under the Health Breach Notification Rule. [The FTC press release](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/05/ovulation-tracking-app-premom-will-be-barred-sharing-health-data-advertising-under-proposed-ftc) has the details.

Mozilla's review of the category, published 17 August 2022, found the problem went beyond the three named apps. Of the 25 apps and devices reviewed, 18 received a Privacy Not Included warning, and eight failed to meet Mozilla's Minimum Security Standards. A class action, Frasco v. Flo Health, was filed in 2021, and a settlement of nearly $60 million was reported in September 2025. Flo denies liability and settled during the jury trial, so no verdict exists on its conduct; a jury did find Meta liable for violating the California Invasion of Privacy Act. [Ifrah Law's account of the reported settlement](https://www.ifrahlaw.com/crime-in-the-suites/personal-information-flo-wing-out-of-control/) describes it.

## Law enforcement access after Dobbs

Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization was decided by the US Supreme Court on 24 June 2022, overturning Roe v. Wade. Almost eight weeks later Mozilla published its review, raising the concern that app data could be used by authorities to determine whether users were pregnant or seeking abortion services.

Access in law is narrower than the concern. A legal analysis published by the Cincinnati Bar Association notes that no reported cases existed of law enforcement requesting period app data in an abortion prosecution, and that a request to a third party company needs only a subpoena, while a request to the individual directly needs a warrant. [The Cincinnati Bar Association article](https://www.cincybar.org/About-Us/News/CBA-Blog/CBA-Blog-View/ArticleId/27879/Personal-Data-Tracking-in-a-Post-Roe-World) carries the analysis.

An alias leaves that position untouched. A subpoena served on the app company reaches the account record, and the alias forms part of that record. Only the identifier changes: the company holds the alias rather than the address used for banking and work, so the account cannot be linked to those accounts by email alone. What an alias provides is isolation of one channel; it is not a barrier to legal process.

## The email address in a tracking account

The signup address also becomes the channel for the marketing mail that follows. When a tracker shares data with an analytics or advertising partner, mail arriving later on that address cannot be traced to its source unless the address belonged to one app only. A distinct alias per app makes the source visible in the address itself, the same attribution mechanism described in [the guide to one alias per website](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/different-email-for-every-website). [The guide on protecting email when booking medical care](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-booking-medical-care) sets out the same separation method for a different channel.

At signup the email address becomes two things at once: the contact and recovery route for the account, and the key the app company and its analytics partners use to join the account to other records. One address shared across a tracker, a bank and a workplace account means a breach at any one of them hands the same identifier to whoever holds the file.

## One alias per tracking app

One alias goes to each tracker, created before signup and labelled with the app name. Mail on that alias belongs to that app alone, and any marketing mail arriving on it names its source. Closure of the alias comes only after the account itself has been closed or moved, once the app is no longer used.

<Callout type="warning" title="Keep the alias live while the app is in use">
While the app holds health history, its alias stays live. Closing the alias first breaks password resets and account recovery, so closure comes only after the account itself is closed.
</Callout>

Recovery through an alias works only while the alias stays in service and forwards to a controlled inbox, as set out in [the guide on using an alias for account recovery](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery).

A short-lived address does not fit an account holding health history, which needs an address that lasts as long as the account. A managed alias is a persistent forwarding address, not a throwaway inbox, as [the guide on whether aliases are safe](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe) states.

A check on [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) identifies which address was exposed when an alias appears in breach data. [The guide on checking whether an email was leaked](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked) walks through reading that result, and [the guide on finding every account linked to an email address](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-find-every-account-linked-to-your-email) lists the accounts tied to the main address before any change is made.

## App choice and data exposure

The choice of app determines what data the app collects and where that data goes, while the address determines only the channel for account mail. Flo released Anonymous Mode on 14 September 2022, a setting under which users access the app without a name, email address or technical identifiers being associated with their health data. Cloudflare's Oblivious HTTP system sits behind the setting. Flo's own announcement states the trade-off: once Anonymous Mode is activated, data cannot be recovered if the device is lost, changed or stolen. [Flo's announcement](https://flo.health/newsroom/flo-anonymous-mode-now-live) is the source.

Some apps keep data on the device rather than in a company cloud. Euki stores data locally on the user's device and was the only app to earn Mozilla's "Best Of" place in the 2022 review. With no server copy to breach, share or hand over, at the cost of sync and recovery if the device is lost. [The FTC's consumer guidance on apps and tracking](https://consumer.ftc.gov/articles/how-protect-your-privacy-apps) recommends reviewing app permissions and opting out of personalised ads.

Which third parties receive data, and what the company does on a legal request, is stated in the privacy policy before signup. The cases above show a policy can promise privacy and still be followed by sharing, so the policy is read alongside the enforcement record. No claim is made here about the current practice of any named app.

## Limits of an email alias

Nothing beyond the email channel is contained by an alias. Health data collection continues, the alias encrypts nothing, sharing under the app's policy continues, and an address already stored in a system is not removed. The company still holds the name, the cycle data and the usage history, and the account is not anonymous.

The address already given away is not fixed by the alias, and acceptance is not guaranteed: no verified count of alias acceptance at these apps was found.

## AliasFleet and period tracking accounts

Managed email aliases from [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) forward to a verified destination inbox. A distinct alias is created for each tracker and given at signup. Account mail for that app arrives through the alias, and replies route back through it, so the destination address stays out of the app's records. The alias can be paused or closed when the app is no longer used, without changing the destination inbox. [How email aliases actually work](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work) describes the mechanism: the alias is a forwarding address under the user's control, not a separate inbox.

10 active aliases, 1 verified destination inbox, 3 managed subdomains and 100 MB of monthly forwarding bandwidth are covered by the free tier, per the [pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing). AliasFleet holds no health data and makes the account no more anonymous. A permanent real address used only for financial accounts stays with the bank account, and a tracker keeps its own alias.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Health Apps</category><category>Email Aliases</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Signing Up for Therapy</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-therapy</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-therapy</guid>
      <description>A therapy account holds session notes, intake answers and payment details. One alias per therapy platform keeps that mail in its own stream.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Protection for an email address at therapy signup takes the form of one alias per therapy platform, with the address on the clinical record left permanent. Session notes, intake answers and payment details sit behind the signup address, which ties those records to one named person. The Federal Trade Commission ordered BetterHelp to pay $7.8 million after it passed email addresses and health questionnaire answers to advertising platforms, and Cerebral reported 3,179,835 people affected when tracking pixels sent similar information to the same kind of recipient.

## What a therapy account contains

The address supplied at signup acts as the identifier for the whole therapy record. Account confirmation, session reminders, messages from the therapist, billing receipts and password resets all run through it. The record behind it is a clinical record, and the address connects that record to one named person.

At signup the form takes a name, an email address, a date of birth and payment details, and the intake questionnaire asks about mental health history, current symptoms, medication and past treatment. In the BetterHelp case the Federal Trade Commission recorded that the company asked whether users had experienced depression or suicidal thoughts and whether they were taking any medications, together with the name, email address and birth date. Each session adds to the record: session notes, messages with the therapist, diagnosis information and the treatment plan. Therapy is an ongoing relationship rather than a single booking, so the record keeps growing for months or years, unlike the one-off booking covered in [how to protect your email when booking medical care](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-booking-medical-care).

## Email addresses and health information

An email address on its own is ordinary contact detail. Once it is joined to a therapy platform name, a session time and an intake answer, it becomes an identifier tied to mental health care. The HHS bulletin on tracking technologies states that individually identifiable health information collected on a regulated entity's website or mobile app generally is protected health information, and it lists an email address among the information that counts. A breach of a therapy platform therefore exposes an address already joined to a health fact.

[Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) counts 1,051 pwned websites and 17,858,196,501 pwned addresses. The method for checking whether an address has appeared in a known breach is set out in [how to check if your email was leaked](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked).

## The Cerebral pixel disclosure

Cerebral, a telehealth platform providing online therapy and medication management, reported to the HHS Office for Civil Rights breach portal that 3,179,835 people had their information exposed by tracking pixels from Google, Meta (Facebook) and TikTok, which had run on its platforms from 12 October 2019. On 3 January 2023 Cerebral determined that it had disclosed information that may be regulated as protected health information under HIPAA to third-party platforms and some subcontractors without HIPAA-required assurances. The figures are reported in the [Fierce Healthcare account of the Cerebral disclosure](https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/digital-health/cerebral-hipaa-violation-shared-data-millions-users-tech-giants) and the [TechTarget account](https://www.techtarget.com/healthtechsecurity/news/366594426/Cerebral-Notifies-31M-Users-of-Healthcare-Data-Breach-Stemming-From-Pixel-Use).

The disclosed data included an account holder's name, phone number, email address, date of birth, IP address and client ID number, assessment responses for anyone who completed the mental health self-assessment, and appointment dates, treatment and insurance information for subscribers. Cerebral stated that no Social Security numbers, credit card information or bank account information were disclosed.

Cerebral's own notice was not directly readable during research for this article, as its PDF returned an error when fetched. The figures in this section therefore come from the HHS portal reporting and the two independent reports quoted above.

## The BetterHelp order

The enforcement action concerns BetterHelp. On 2 March 2023 the Federal Trade Commission announced a proposed order banning BetterHelp from sharing consumers' health data, including sensitive information about mental health challenges, for advertising, and requiring the company to pay $7.8 million to consumers. The order was reported as finalised in July 2023.

According to the [FTC press release](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/03/ftc-ban-betterhelp-revealing-consumers-data-including-sensitive-mental-health-information-facebook), BetterHelp revealed consumers' email addresses, IP addresses and health questionnaire information to Facebook, Snapchat, Criteo and Pinterest for advertising, after promising to keep such data private. The address itself was the mechanism. BetterHelp used consumers' email addresses and the fact that they had previously been in therapy to instruct Facebook to identify similar consumers and target them with advertisements.

The complaint states that between 2017 and 2018 BetterHelp uploaded lists of over 7 million visitors' and users' email addresses to Facebook, which matched over 4 million of them to Facebook user accounts. In January 2019 the company disclosed IP addresses and email addresses of approximately 5.6 million visitors to Snapchat. The full terms are set out in the [FTC consent order](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/202_3169-betterhelp-consent.pdf).

The $7.8 million funds partial refunds to consumers who signed up for and paid for BetterHelp's services between 1 August 2017 and 31 December 2020. The order also bans BetterHelp from disclosing health information for advertising. BetterHelp settled without admitting wrongdoing and stated that the practices were industry-standard and had stopped in 2020. In each of the two cases the address gave the advertising platform a match key to an account it already held, and the health information arrived attached to it.

## How the address leaves the therapy platform

The address given at signup does not stay inside the therapy platform by default: it moves under the platform's privacy policy, which differs between the health care side and the consumer side of the same company. The current [Talkspace privacy policy](https://www.talkspace.com/public/privacy-policy), last updated 17 July 2025, states that an email address is collected when an account is created. Talkspace may also disclose personal data to service providers for advertising, marketing and analytics. Disclosure to business partners covers personalised advertising, including advertising technology vendors and social media platforms. Its US state privacy notice states that once a person becomes a patient and uses the portal, Talkspace does not engage in sales, sharing or targeted advertising.

BetterHelp's own [Notice of Privacy Practices](https://www.betterhelp.com/npp/) draws a similar line. Protected health information is collected at signup and payment, according to the notice, and written authorisation is required before use or disclosure of PHI for marketing or sale of PHI. The notice applies to the provider group delivering therapy, while a separate privacy policy covers the subscription offering.

On 1 December 2022 the HHS Office for Civil Rights issued a bulletin stating that regulated entities must not use tracking technologies in ways that result in impermissible disclosures of protected health information, and that disclosures of PHI to tracking technology vendors for marketing purposes, without HIPAA-compliant authorisations, are impermissible disclosures. The [TechTarget account of the bulletin](https://www.techtarget.com/healthtechsecurity/news/366594539/OCR-Outlines-Proper-Use-of-Tracking-Tech-to-Maintain-HIPAA-Compliance) records that the bulletin followed reports of patient data reaching Facebook through tracking technology on hospital websites and inside password-protected patient portals.

## A separate alias for each platform

Each therapy platform receives a distinct alias, created in advance and labelled with the platform name. The [guide to setting up an email alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-set-up-an-email-alias) and the explanation of [what an email alias is](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-is-an-email-alias) describe the setup. Session reminders, billing mail and follow-up mail for that platform arrive through the alias and forward to the real inbox, so nothing about the care itself changes. When marketing mail starts on the same alias, the source is visible in the address itself. When the care relationship ends, the alias can be closed without touching mail from any other platform.

The therapy case adds duration. Session reminders, billing mail and clinical messages keep arriving for as long as care continues, so the alias has to stay alive for months or years. The same preparation applies to [protecting an email address when signing up for an online pharmacy](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-an-online-pharmacy), where the address links to prescription records. The wider enforcement record for health apps is set out in [whether to use a separate email for health and fitness apps](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-health-and-fitness-apps).

## The alias during care

The alias stays alive for the life of the care relationship. Session reminders, billing mail and messages from the therapist may still arrive on it months after signup, and a missed session reminder or a missed billing message is a care problem, not only an inbox problem. The alias therefore stays in place until the care relationship ends and the account is closed properly.

<Callout type="important" title="The alias stays live during care">
The alias is the account address, not anonymity from the therapist. The therapist still knows who the patient is, because the patient gives a name, a date of birth and payment details at signup, and the clinical record holds those details whatever address was used. The clinical record keeps its own permanent address for the medical record, account recovery, identity checks and clinical communication, and the alias must never replace that address.
</Callout>

In this arrangement the alias keeps the address out of the advertising and analytics systems around the therapy platform, and keeps the therapy mail stream separate from the address used for banking, work and personal mail. The recovery position is set out in [whether an email alias can be used for account recovery](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery).

## Forged mail after a therapy data exposure

A therapy data exposure can be followed by forged mail, because the disclosure leaves the address and the platform name known. The forged message knows the platform name, the timing of the real notice and the kind of mail the person expects, so reading the message does not expose the forgery. The mechanism is set out in [how phishing uses a leaked email](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email): after a leak, the mail stops guessing, and the To line becomes the test. A message claiming to be from the therapy platform, arriving on the alias given to that platform, is plausible. The same message arriving on any other alias is forged by definition, because the therapy platform never held that address.

The check that exposes most forgeries is set out in [how to check if an email is phishing](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-an-email-is-phishing): a character-by-character reading of the sender domain, hovering over every link to see where it really points, and questioning the ask. The order of operations after a breach is set out in [what to do when your email is in a data breach](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach).

## What an alias does not do

An alias does not stop a therapy platform collecting health data. The platform still receives the intake answers, session notes and payment details entered at signup and during care. It does not make the person anonymous to the platform, it does not remove data already shared or sold, and it does not encrypt the mail. An alias controls the handover of the address, nothing else. The mechanism is described in [how email aliases actually work](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work): the alias is a forwarding address under the person's control, not a separate inbox, and replies route back through the alias so the destination address stays out of the platform's records.

No verified count of therapy platforms that reject alias addresses at signup was found for this article. Some platforms may refuse an alias domain. The gap is stated here rather than filled with a guess. An alias also does not replace checking what was already exposed. An address used for therapy signups for years stays in past mail, and a breach check establishes what already happened before the alias system limits what happens next.

## AliasFleet in therapy signup

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox. A distinct alias is created for each therapy platform, labelled with the platform name and given at signup, and session reminders, billing mail and follow-up mail arrive through it, with replies routing back through it. The alias can be paused or closed when the care relationship ends, without changing the destination inbox address. The free tier includes 10 active aliases, 1 verified destination inbox and 3 managed subdomains. Monthly forwarding bandwidth is 100 MB, as listed on the [AliasFleet pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing). AliasFleet does not hold the clinical record, and it does not replace the therapy platform: the permanent address on the clinical record stays in place, and the alias covers signup, session and billing mail only.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email privacy</category><category>Therapy</category><category>Email aliases</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Is Mailfence Safe? Its Encryption Is Opt-In, Not Default</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-mailfence-safe</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-mailfence-safe</guid>
      <description>Mailfence promises no one can read mail, not even Mailfence. The claim holds only for mail encrypted with OpenPGP, switched on message by message.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Mailfence is a Belgian email service run by ContactOffice Group SA, and the safety question has two answers. OpenPGP-encrypted mail cannot be read by Mailfence, because the browser does the encryption and the decryption, and the private key is stored on Mailfence servers encrypted with the account holder passphrase, with Mailfence holding no root key. Mail that goes out without that step remains readable on Mailfence servers in Belgium, where a valid Belgian court order can force its disclosure. The record shows this happening: 21 requests arrived in the second half of 2025, and 9 were complied with.

## The claim and the default state

The [private email page](https://mailfence.com/en/private-email.jsp) says that no one can read encrypted emails, not even Mailfence, because the browser encrypts each message and only the intended recipient decrypts it. The wording is accurate, and one word sets its boundary: encrypted. It describes mail that has been encrypted, and it covers nothing else in the account.

Nothing encrypts by default. A new account sends ordinary mail until the holder configures OpenPGP, creates or imports a key pair, and then picks the encrypted option message by message. The two choices appear side by side at send time in webmail, encrypted or in the clear. A [critique of the claim](https://kaifisahil.substack.com/p/dissecting-mailfences-security-claims) puts it plainly: the promise is technically correct, and it depends on a manual setup that, the critique claims without a source, most account holders never finish. The percentage in that critique comes with no source. The setup mechanism itself is confirmed by Mailfence documentation.

## OpenPGP encryption

OpenPGP is the encryption standard behind the claim. It is defined in [RFC 4880](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4880) of November 2007, which specifies public-key and symmetric cryptography for confidentiality, key management, authentication and digital signatures. The service includes a built-in keystore, so generating and managing keys needs no third-party add-on. A key pair can be created inside Mailfence or imported from another tool. Several key pairs can be held at once, and a message can carry a signature so the recipient can verify where it came from.

The browser is where key generation happens. The private key is encrypted locally with the account holder passphrase before it crosses the network, according to an [independent review](https://www.email-tools.me/posts/mailfence-review/). Mailfence states that the stored private key is encrypted with the account holder passphrase using AES-256. The unencrypted private key never appears on Mailfence servers, and Mailfence holds no root key. Under that design, the provider cannot quietly read encrypted mail, and the keys also stay portable, so keys and messages can be exported and used with any OpenPGP tool. In its [comparison with Tuta](https://blog.mailfence.com/tuta-vs-mailfence/), Mailfence notes that OpenPGP mail can be exchanged with any OpenPGP user. Tuta uses a proprietary format and does not support OpenPGP, so encrypted mail cannot leave the Tuta system.

OpenPGP on Mailfence has the same limits as OpenPGP anywhere, because both sides must use it for a message to be end-to-end encrypted. A message from Mailfence to a Gmail address travels under TLS, but the recipient holds no PGP key, so it is not end-to-end encrypted. The private key is protected by a passphrase. If the passphrase and the key backup are both lost, the encrypted mail cannot be recovered, by the account holder or by Mailfence. Client-side keys remove the provider's ability to read the mail, and with it the provider's ability to rescue it.

## Unencrypted mail

Without OpenPGP, a message travels under TLS and has no further protection once it arrives. The [secure email page](https://mailfence.com/en/secure-email.jsp) states that all connections use TLS encryption, with Perfect Forward Secrecy on HTTPS connections and HSTS on all web pages. Inbound mail is validated with SPF and DKIM. This is baseline practice across the industry, not a feature particular to Mailfence.

Once a message reaches Mailfence servers, TLS stops applying. The body is then stored in a form Mailfence can read. The Mailfence [security analysis](https://kb.mailfence.com/kb/mailfence-security-analysis/) describes the split directly. Bodies and attachments encrypted end to end are encrypted in storage with OpenPGP, and the web server does not know them. Sent and draft items are the exception. Message headers in storage are not encrypted at all. Subject lines, sender and recipient addresses, and timestamps sit unencrypted even for mail that is otherwise protected. The analysis also lists the standard limits of browser-based encryption, including false code served in a man-in-the-middle attack and access to the account holder computer.

| Property | OpenPGP-encrypted mail | Mail sent without encryption |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Message body readable by Mailfence | No | Yes |
| Subject, sender, recipient and timestamps readable | Yes | Yes |
| Protection in transit | TLS plus OpenPGP | TLS only |
| Body readable by Mailfence after disclosure | No, stays encrypted | Yes |

## Data collection

A long list of items appears in the Mailfence [privacy policy](https://mailfence.com/en/privacy.jsp): IP addresses, message-IDs, sender and recipient addresses, subjects, browser versions, countries and timestamps. Automatic anti-spam, anti-virus and anti-abuse checks run over incoming and outgoing messages. Some card details remain stored after credit card payments. Registration asks for an external email address, used for the activation code and for contact if the account cannot be accessed.

The same policy sets out what does not happen to that data. Mailfence does not sell, trade or transfer personally identifiable information to outside parties, except when forced by Belgian law. It does not use Google Analytics trackers. Messages, calendar entries, contacts and documents feed a search index, but the policy states that no information from that index is used to compile profiles of users. Technical and organisational measures behind that position are listed on the [GDPR page](https://smtp.mailfence.com/en/gdpr.jsp).

The policy also states retention periods. Backups of deleted messages and documents are kept for 45 days, then permanently deleted. After an account is closed, all data is permanently deleted 30 days after the legal expiration date. Belgian law sets that date at 365 days after account closing. The policy was last updated on 21 December 2021, more than four years before November 2026, and may not reflect current practice in full.

## Belgian jurisdiction and the transparency report

ContactOffice Group SA launched Mailfence in November 2013. The company has run hosted collaboration software since 1999, according to [CyberInsider](https://cyberinsider.com/email/reviews/mailfence/). Mailfence is provided by the Belgian company ContactOffice Group SA and falls under Belgian law. Mailfence states that Belgium has no equivalent to the US National Security Letter or gag order, so the company cannot be forced to act without being allowed to disclose it. The company also states that it does not disclose information directly to law enforcement agencies outside Belgium.

Belgian courts can compel disclosure, and Mailfence complies when they do. The [transparency report](https://blog.mailfence.com/transparency-report-and-warrant-canary/) gives the numbers. From 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2025, Mailfence received requests for user identification in 21 cases and complied in 9, under valid Belgian court orders. From the launch of Mailfence to 30 June 2025, it received 228 such requests and complied in 105 cases. Only legally binding requests from Belgian courts are counted. Unofficial requests are always rejected and not counted.

<Callout type="info" title="Reporting lag">
The transparency page was last updated in January 2026, with the next update due in July 2026. As read in November 2026, it still shows the July to December 2025 period. The figures describe the past, not the present.
</Callout>

The same page carries a warrant canary. It states that Mailfence has never received US National Security Letters or FISA court orders, and has never placed backdoors in hardware or software.

The sources do not settle whether Belgium imposes a data-retention obligation on email providers. One review states that there is none. CyberInsider reports that the 2016 retention law was declared unconstitutional on 22 April 2021. The privacy policy lists the metadata collected without citing a retention law as the reason, so retention-law logging remains unverified. Belgium is also a member of the Fourteen Eyes alliance, which CyberInsider notes as a drawback.

## Password-encrypted messages

A second encrypted option exists for recipients who do not use PGP. The sender and recipient agree a password, which encrypts the message, and the recipient follows a link to decrypt it on Mailfence servers. The decryption takes place on Mailfence servers, not in the recipient browser. Mailfence therefore has the technical ability to decrypt these messages. The protection is not end-to-end encryption in the sense that OpenPGP is, and that follows from Mailfence's own wording. The Substack critique makes this point.

## Pricing and plans

The free plan provides 500 MB of email storage and 500 MB of document storage, according to the Mailfence [comparison of free providers](https://blog.mailfence.com/best-free-email-providers/). IMAP and POP access come with paid plans only. Paid plans start at 2.50 EUR per month. The free plan is thin for a primary mailbox, because 500 MB of storage fills quickly and, without IMAP, the account must be used in webmail or the mobile app.

The [FAQ](https://imap.mailfence.com/en/faq.jsp) states that 15 percent of Ultra plan revenues go to the Electronic Frontier Foundation and European Digital Rights. Subscriptions are not refunded, because the free plan allows testing before upgrading. Payment options are credit card, Bitcoin, Litecoin, PayPal and wire transfer, and a free account is suspended after 7 months of inactivity and deleted 5 months later. The pricing figures in this section come from the Mailfence blog, because the pricing page returned 404.

The code is not open source. CyberInsider lists closed code as a drawback, because the encryption implementation cannot be inspected by the public. Mailfence states that its code is open to audits by recognised security experts, but no audit report was found or verified.

## Mailfence and Posteo

[Is Posteo Safe?](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-posteo-safe) is the closest published comparison on this site. It covers a German service with the same opt-in encryption shape and a different data model. Posteo collects no personal data at signup and logs no IP addresses, while Mailfence collects IP addresses, subjects and timestamps, and both services still differ sharply in what they record despite both offering OpenPGP.

## AliasFleet and the Mailfence inbox

AliasFleet provides managed, persistent forwarding addresses, and a Mailfence account can sit behind them as the destination inbox. Mail sent to an alias forwards to the Mailfence address, and replies travel back through the alias. Websites never receive the Mailfence address itself. The free plan from [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) includes 10 active aliases. The alias layer changes what is exposed, not what Mailfence can read. Mail forwarded to Mailfence is still mail held by Mailfence, and the encryption split described above still applies to it. An alias keeps the Mailfence address out of circulation. It also lets the account holder cut off a single alias when a service leaks it, as described in [How Email Aliases Actually Work](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work). Banking follows the same separation: a bank account uses a permanent real address kept only for financial accounts, as described in [Should You Use a Separate Email for Banking](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-banking).

## Summary of the findings

The OpenPGP implementation is real, standards-based, client-side and portable. The transparency report runs on a six-month cycle, and its figures show real compliance with Belgian court orders. Encryption has to be switched on, per message, by an account holder who has set up keys. The other party has to use PGP as well. Until both steps happen, the mail is TLS mail on Belgian servers, with headers stored unencrypted and metadata collected under a privacy policy last updated on 21 December 2021. The wider question of provider access is covered in [Can My Email Provider Read My Emails](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-my-email-provider-read-my-emails), and the check for an address already in a breach is covered in [How to Check If Your Email Was Leaked](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked).]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Secure Email</category><category>Mailfence</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Is Runbox Safe? Norwegian Privacy, Readable Mail</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-runbox-safe</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-runbox-safe</guid>
      <description>Runbox is a Norwegian email service in operation since 2000. Its protection rests on Norwegian law and GDPR, not on end-to-end encryption by default.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Runbox is a paid email service run by Runbox Solutions AS from Oslo, Norway. The service has operated since 2000, keeps mail on servers the company owns in Oslo, and bases its protection on Norwegian law and the [GDPR](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32016R0679) rather than on encryption of stored mail. Connections to Runbox use TLS with Perfect Forward Secrecy, stored data carries full-disk encryption, and no end-to-end encryption applies by default, so the operator can read stored mail.

The two sides of the service sit far apart. Sign-in controls are thorough, the bar for disclosure is high, and the published request figures are small. Stored mail is readable by the operator at the same time, no published date exists for account-level encryption, and no published independent security audit was found. Strong sign-in controls and a high disclosure bar stand beside readable stored mail, no published audit, and no encryption date.

## Company background

An independent review dates the start of Runbox to August 2000, when the service offered 100 MB of storage without charge. [Runbox](https://runbox.com/) gives its own operating history as more than 25 years and counts 26 years on its comparison page. The company is independent and employee owned, with no venture capital. Its homepage gives the scale as over 1 million accounts served and customers in over 170 countries, both figures being the company's own claims.

Mail sits on servers Runbox owns inside a maximum security data centre in Oslo. The data centre was originally constructed for the Norwegian Government Computer Centre. The centre runs on 100 percent renewable energy, mainly Norwegian hydropower, and describes its operations as carbon negative through double offsetting. Ethical Consumer has named Runbox a Best Buy in each year since 2020.

## Norwegian law and jurisdiction

Norway belongs to the European Economic Area, and the GDPR applies there through the Norwegian Personal Data Act. Enforcement belongs to the Norwegian Data Protection Authority, [Datatilsynet](https://www.datatilsynet.no/), which began work on 1 January 1980 and ranks among the oldest data protection agencies in the world. [Runbox records](https://runbox.com/about/norwegian-privacy/) that it collects only the data needed to run the service, that Norwegian law does not ordinarily require it to retain traffic logs, and that it deletes user data on request.

Disclosure turns on a court order. Runbox [requires a Norwegian court order](https://runbox.com/blog/2026/03/why-we-require-a-norwegian-court-order-to-disclose-user-data/) under the Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act before it gives information to the Norwegian police, and it applies the same test to requests from foreign authorities. A foreign request ordinarily passes through diplomatic channels and the Ministry of Justice before it reaches a Norwegian court. Runbox records that a subpoena, a warrant, or a request from a government or foreign agency does not suffice on its own. The same pages record that the company complies with legally valid requests where Norwegian law or its Terms of Service have clearly been broken, so the court order rule sets a high bar rather than a refusal to cooperate in all cases.

## The United States CLOUD Act

The United States CLOUD Act of 2018 allows United States authorities to compel a United States company, or a company using infrastructure under United States control, to hand over user data wherever the data is stored. Runbox records that [the Act does not apply](https://runbox.com/blog/2026/04/runbox-vs-the-cloud-act-your-data-stays-safe-in-norway/) to the service, because the company is Norwegian, owns its servers in Oslo, and uses no infrastructure under United States control. Its business pages add that GDPR Article 48 restricts transfers of personal data to authorities outside the European Union. The position rests on server ownership and location, and it is the company's legal position, not a point settled by a court.

Norway belongs to the Nine Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangement, a point an independent review raises when it weighs Norway against Switzerland as a location for email. Runbox does not discuss the point on its own pages.

## Mail protection in transit and at rest

Every connection to Runbox servers carries TLS with Perfect Forward Secrecy, and the servers carry full-disk encryption at rest. Full-disk encryption guards against a drive that is physically taken. It leaves stored mail readable by the operator, because the operator holds the keys. Runbox states the position plainly on its [comparison page](https://runbox.com/features/runbox-compared/): account-level and end-to-end encryption are not offered by default yet, and platform upgrades are under way to prepare for them. No date is given for that work.

<Callout type="info" title="Published evidence gap">
No published independent security audit of Runbox was found while this article was prepared, and no ISO 27001 certificate appeared on the company's primary pages. The absence of a published audit is a gap in public evidence, not a record of a failed audit.
</Callout>

Users can add end-to-end encryption themselves. PGP works in webmail through the [Mailvelope](https://www.mailvelope.com/) browser extension, and S/MIME works through mail clients, with OpenPGP built into Thunderbird and native S/MIME support in Apple Mail. Runbox notes in [its September comparison](https://runbox.com/blog/2026/09/how-runbox-compares-to-proton-tuta-fastmail-posteo-and-mailbox/) that end-to-end encryption holds in full only between users of the same system, and a message sent to a Gmail or Outlook address carries no end-to-end encryption unless keys have been exchanged. The comparison places Runbox beside Fastmail in the group without account-level encryption by default, while Proton and Tuta encrypt by default. Mail is therefore guarded in transit and at rest against outsiders, while the operator and a lawful order can still reach it.

## Login and session protection

Two-factor authentication rests on TOTP codes from an authenticator app, with six-digit codes that change every 30 seconds. App passwords allow Outlook, Apple Mail, or Thunderbird to connect without the main account password. Trusted browsers, an unlock code held as a backup for two-factor authentication, per-protocol service toggles, IP-based access control, and active session monitoring complete the set, and session monitoring allows access to be inspected and revoked at any time.

Every provider in the comparison group offers some form of two-factor authentication, so it does not distinguish Runbox. The combination of app passwords, trusted browsers, an unlock code, and per-protocol toggles is the thorough part of the Runbox set. On IP addresses, an independent review lists the removal of IP addresses from outgoing messages as a benefit. Runbox does not state that on its own pages, so the claim belongs to the review and not to Runbox.

## Advertising, tracking and server logs

Subscriptions fund the service in full. Runbox shows no advertisements, uses no third-party tracking tools and no web beacons, and records that it uses neither Google Analytics nor any other third-party tracking. Mail passes through scanning for virus and spam protection only, and the company records that it [never scans messages for advertising](https://runbox.com/blog/2025/01/protecting-your-privacy-the-runbox-commitment/), data mining, or sharing with third parties. [The privacy policy](https://runbox.com/about/privacy-policy/) records that the hosting provider and the ISP keep no logs of traffic to or from the Runbox servers.

Server logs for email delivery are kept for 10 days, and server logs for use of the web interface are kept for 1 month. The logs stay on the servers that run the service and go to no other company. The privacy policy records that incoming and outgoing mail may pass through automatic scanning for virus and spam protection, and that mail contents are indexed automatically to provide search. The policy page itself carries a 2018 date, while the [privacy pages](https://runbox.com/why-runbox/privacy-protection/) around it were updated during 2026.

Email content is kept for up to 6 months after a paid account closes and up to 1 month after a trial account closes, with immediate deletion available on request to support. Account information is kept for up to 5 years after closure, as Norwegian bookkeeping law requires. Backups of account content sit on separate secure servers for up to 6 months, even after the content has gone from main storage.

## Disclosure requests and the transparency record

Runbox publishes a [Transparency Report](https://runbox.com/why-runbox/privacy-protection/transparency-report/) with figures for requests for disclosure of individual customer data received directly from authorities and others. The page stood up to date as of 9 September 2026 when this article was prepared. The figures are small.

| Year | Norwegian requests | Foreign requests | Outcome |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2026 | 0 | 1 | 1 complied with |
| 2025 | 1 | 3 | Norwegian request complied with; 1 foreign complied with, 2 rejected |
| 2024 | 2 | 4 | Both Norwegian complied with; 1 foreign complied with, 3 rejected |

Few requests reach Runbox, and a share of the foreign requests are turned down, which supports the court order claim. The company still complies when the legal standard is met, including with the single foreign request in 2026, which matches its own statement that it is not a safe haven for criminal activity.

## Plans and prices

Runbox has no free tier. A 30-day free trial comes with every plan, and a 60-day money-back guarantee applies to paid subscriptions. Six plans are listed by [an independent review](https://cyberinsider.com/email/reviews/runbox/), because the official pricing page did not render content when checked for this article: Micro with 2 GB of mail storage at $19.95 per year, Mini with 10 GB at $34.95, Medium with 25 GB at $49.95, Max with 50 GB at $79.95, Max 100 with 100 GB at $119.95, and Max 250 with 250 GB at $179.95. [Three-year plans](https://runbox.com/blog/2025/10/we-are-celebrating-25-years-with-new-3-year-sub-account-plans/) are available at a discount, including for sub-accounts since October 2025.

Every plan includes 100 aliases on Runbox domains, unlimited aliases on the user's own domain, and unlimited plus-addressing, according to the [Runbox help pages](https://help.runbox.com/features-and-quotas/). All plans include calendar and contacts over CalDAV and CardDAV, file storage, and standard IMAP, POP, and SMTP access. The Runbox 7 webmail is open source and available on GitHub, while the rest of the service is not. Payment takes cards, PayPal, wire transfer, cryptocurrencies, and cash, according to the [Runbox help pages](https://help.runbox.com/runbox-7-payment-methods/). Runbox [describes the model](https://runbox.com/blog/2025/03/decentralized-email-for-maximum-privacy-and-security/) as email only, with no ads and no data mining, funded by subscriptions.

## AliasFleet and Runbox

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe) provides managed, persistent email aliases that forward to a destination inbox. Runbox serves as that destination inbox: forwarded mail arrives at the Runbox address, while the Runbox address itself is never given to websites or services. A leak or a spam run against one alias stays with that alias, and the Runbox address stays unexposed. Two-factor authentication codes can be [received at an alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-receive-two-factor-authentication-codes-at-an-email-alias), so sign-in and recovery mail can also stay behind aliases. AliasFleet does not encrypt mail and does not replace the destination inbox; the Runbox account still holds the mail, and the limits set out above still apply to it. The separation between the address given out and the address that holds the mail is the point of pairing aliases with a provider such as Runbox. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) checks whether an address has already appeared in a breach.

## Runbox beside other providers

The same trust series covers [Posteo](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-posteo-safe), [GMX](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-gmx-mail-safe), and [iCloud](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-icloud-mail-safe), and Runbox differs from each in the same way: jurisdiction, rather than encryption, is the selling point. Posteo is a German provider with optional encrypted mailbox storage, and the Posteo piece turns on that option. GMX is a free ad-supported German service, and the GMX piece turns on the advertising model. iCloud Mail is tied to Apple accounts and Apple infrastructure, and the iCloud piece turns on that integration. Runbox is the provider in the series whose case rests on Norwegian law, a published transparency record, and a long operating history, with readable stored mail as the stated cost. Proton and Tuta encrypt by default. Those properties fit a reader who wants a stable paid inbox under strong privacy law and accepts the encryption limit. [The Have I Been Pwned safety piece](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-have-i-been-pwned-safe) covers the breach-checking service named above in more detail.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Safety</category><category>Runbox</category><category>Privacy</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Can You Use an Email Alias for Steam? Yes, With One Catch</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-steam</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-steam</guid>
      <description>Steam accepts an email alias as the contact address on an account, and the sign-up form asks for an email address, a country and a CAPTCHA before verification.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[An email alias for Steam is a forwarding address used as the contact address on a Steam account. Steam accepts such an address at sign-up: the form asks for an email address, a country of residence and a CAPTCHA, then sends a verification email, and no phone number is required. The address then carries Steam Guard codes, password resets and trade confirmations for the life of the account.

Valve publishes no rule on alias addresses specifically. The sign-up page states that some email providers just do not work with Steam, and it recommends a different address when the verification email never arrives. Acceptance therefore turns on the provider and the domain behind the address, not on the address being an alias.

## Account creation

Account creation starts at the [Steam sign-up page](https://store.steampowered.com/join/), where the form asks for the email address twice, the country of residence, a CAPTCHA, and confirmation that the user is 13 or older and accepts the [Steam Subscriber Agreement](https://store.steampowered.com/subscriber_agreement/) and the Valve Privacy Policy. A verification email follows, and the account name and password are chosen once the address is confirmed. Secria confirmed the same five fields, the email address entered twice, the country, the CAPTCHA and the age and terms confirmation, in its 5 November 2026 check, with no phone number field anywhere in the process, as reported by [Secria](https://secria.me/blog/create-steam-account-without-phone-number/). The account name is the sign-in name, separate from the email address and the community profile name.

The Steam Subscriber Agreement bars users under 13 and states that the account is strictly personal: it may not be sold, charged for, or transferred, and an account Valve notices has been sold will be permanently locked. The same email address can be used on more than one Steam account. [ExpertBeacon](https://expertbeacon.com/can-i-delete-my-steam-account-and-make-a-new-one-with-the-same-email/) reports that Steam Support states there is no limit to the number of Steam accounts that can use one email address. Games stay with the account that bought them, and deleting an account is permanent, with a 30-day window in which the owner can cancel the deletion request.

## Domain reputation and alias acceptance

Steam checks that the address can receive its verification email, and it does not ask whether the address forwards to another inbox. A managed alias on a reputable domain therefore behaves like any other address at sign-up. The distinction that matters is between a managed alias and a short-lived address. TempMailBest, a provider of short-lived addresses, reports that some Steam beta sign-up forms reject known short-lived domains, and that its first domain may be blocked while an alternative domain works, as described in its [guide to Steam beta access](https://www.tempmailbest.com/blog/temp-mail-steam-beta-access). TempMailBest addresses expire after 10 minutes, which makes them unsuitable for any account that needs mail later.

Third-party guides report that less common or newly created domains may be flagged, and that some email providers have blocked mail from Steam intermittently, according to [Games Learning Society](https://www.gameslearningsociety.org/wiki/why-wont-steam-accept-my-email/). The general pattern of services rejecting alias domains is covered in the AliasFleet guide on [when a service will not accept an alias email](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/when-a-service-wont-accept-your-alias-email): the domain's reputation decides, not the fact that the address is an alias. No verified user report was found of a named alias provider being accepted or rejected by Steam itself. Steam sends more than the one verification email: purchase receipts, security notifications, trade confirmations and password resets all go to the contact address over the life of the account, and an address that worked for sign-up and then stopped receiving mail leaves the account cut off from all of them.

## Steam Guard and the contact email

Steam Guard is Valve's second layer of account security. It requires a code at sign-in from an unrecognised device, sent to the contact email address or generated by the [Steam Guard Mobile Authenticator](https://help.steampowered.com/en/faqs/view/7EFD-3CAE-64D3-1C31) in the Steam Mobile App. Valve's [Steam Guard FAQ](https://help.steampowered.com/en/faqs/view/06B0-26E6-2CF8-254C) states that Steam Guard is enabled by default on an account if the email is verified and Steam has been restarted twice on the computer since verification. The authenticator generates a code that changes every 30 seconds and can only be used once, and Valve describes the phone-based authenticator as the best level of Steam account security.

The email address matters because email Steam Guard is only as safe as the inbox behind it. Valve states the consequence directly:

> If your verified email account is stolen or compromised, a user can enter your account freely provided they know your account name. Knowing your Steam account password would not be required as this can be reset with access to your email account.

Valve's [Account Security Recommendations](https://help.steampowered.com/en/faqs/view/6639-EB3C-EC79-FF60) add that the Steam account password and the contact email password should be different, and that hijackers often target email accounts to reach other accounts, including Steam. An alias does not weaken this chain, provided the alias forwards reliably and the destination inbox is itself protected with a strong password and two-factor authentication. Two-factor codes at an alias are covered in the AliasFleet guide on [receiving two-factor authentication codes at an email alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-receive-two-factor-authentication-codes-at-an-email-alias).

A check of the address on [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) shows whether it has appeared in a breach. The service lists 1,051 pwned websites and 17,858,196,501 pwned addresses, as shown on the Have I Been Pwned homepage on 11 November 2026. An alias limits the damage of a breach to the one service that received that alias, because the address is not shared with other accounts.

## Trading and the Community Market

Trading and the Steam Community Market are tied to Steam Guard, not to the email address itself. Accounts without the Mobile Authenticator enabled for at least seven days have items held by Steam for up to 15 days when they leave the account, and email-only accounts cannot trade from a newly confirmed device for seven days. Accounts with Steam Guard turned off cannot trade or use the Market at all, as reported by [UrbanWired](https://urbanwired.com/steam-guard-mobile-authenticator-vs-email-codes/) from Valve's trading-restriction pages.

Changing the contact email is reported to trigger the same kind of restriction. [Games Learning Society](https://www.gameslearningsociety.org/wiki/why-does-steam-guard-take-15-days/) lists changing the email address among the security changes that can trigger the 15-day hold. This is a third-party report, and the Valve pages checked for this article do not state the hold length for an email change directly.

## Account recovery

Steam Support's page on [recovering a stolen or hijacked account](https://help.steampowered.com/en/faqs/view/0A94-F308-34A5-1988) states that recovery is possible even if someone has changed the account's email address, password and phone number. The same page asks the account holder to provide any possible email addresses used on the account, and the support form asks for the first email used on the account. A working alias helps recovery, because the alias is the address Steam has on file and the destination inbox is where the recovery mail arrives. A dead alias does the opposite: the recovery mail goes to an address that no longer forwards, and the account holder must prove ownership another way, for example with details of a payment method used on the account. The general case is covered in the AliasFleet guide on [using an email alias for account recovery](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery).

<Callout type="warning" title="A paused or deleted alias stops Steam mail at once">
Steam Guard codes and password resets sent to a paused or deleted alias never arrive. The address on the Steam account must be changed before the alias that holds it is paused or deleted.
</Callout>

## Changing the contact email

The contact email on an existing account can be changed from Account Details in the Steam client or on the website, under Contact Info, by selecting "Change my email address". The change requires verification through a code sent to the current inbox or through the mobile authenticator, as described by [Recharge](https://www.recharge.com/en/us/steam/infos/how-to-change-steam-email). If the old inbox is no longer accessible, Steam offers an option for that case, and Steam Support then asks for proof of ownership, such as past purchase methods, old CD keys, or a linked phone number. The same route moves an existing Steam account from a personal address to an alias, or from one alias to another.

## Scale of the platform

Valve's last official figure is 132 million monthly active users, reported in 2021. Analyst estimates for 2025 are higher: GameDiscoverCo estimated roughly 198 million monthly active users in the second half of 2025, extrapolated from Valve's EU Digital Services Act disclosure of 31.1 million monthly active users in the EU, as reported by [TheGamer](https://www.thegamer.com/steam-more-monthly-active-users-playstation/). The 198 million figure is an estimate, not a Valve announcement.

## AliasFleet and Steam

AliasFleet provides managed email aliases that forward mail to a permanent destination inbox. A Steam account can use an AliasFleet alias as its contact address, and the alias receives the verification email, the Steam Guard codes and the purchase receipts, which are then forwarded to the destination inbox. The alias is a permanent forwarding address under the user's control, so it keeps receiving mail for as long as the account needs it. AliasFleet does not change Steam's rules: the account remains subject to the Steam Subscriber Agreement, Steam Guard still applies, and trading restrictions after an email change still apply. If the alias is paused or deleted, Steam mail stops arriving, and account recovery then depends on the other proof Steam Support accepts. The forwarding mechanism is described in the AliasFleet guides on [what an email alias is](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-is-an-email-alias) and [how email aliases actually work](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work), and the guide on [using an email alias for Netflix](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-netflix) covers the equivalent question for a streaming account. The [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com/) free tier includes 10 aliases.

Steam accepts an alias address, and the acceptance question is settled at the domain level. The ongoing condition is delivery: the alias must receive Steam Guard codes and recovery mail for the life of the account, and the destination inbox must stay protected. An alias that stops forwarding removes the recovery route with it.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Aliases</category><category>Steam</category><category>Gaming</category><category>Account Security</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Signing Up for a DNA Test</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-a-dna-test</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-a-dna-test</guid>
      <description>A DNA test signup ties one email address to genetic data that cannot be changed. One permanent alias per service keeps that address out of every breach file.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A DNA test signup is protected by one permanent email alias, used for that DNA service only and kept live for as long as the account exists. The alias keeps the real address out of breach files and other services, while results, relative matching, recovery and deletion requests continue to arrive at it. The alias does not hide identity from the DNA company, which still holds the sample, the name and the genetic data. Genetic data cannot be changed after a breach as a password can be changed or a payment card cancelled, so the address attached to it carries more weight than the address on most accounts.

## The 23andMe record

In early October 2023, 23andMe disclosed a breach that the company first described as limited and attributed to credential stuffing, and confirmed the full scope that December. About 14,000 accounts were directly compromised through credential stuffing, and attackers used the DNA Relatives feature to reach profile information for about 5.5 million people, plus Family Tree information for about 1.4 million more. The total was 6.9 million affected people, roughly half of the company's then 14 million customers, according to [TechCrunch](https://techcrunch.com/2023/12/04/23andme-confirms-hackers-stole-ancestry-data-on-6-9-million-users/). The exposed data included names, birth years, relationship labels, the share of DNA held with relatives, ancestry reports and self-reported locations.

On 23 March 2025, 23andMe filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, putting its assets, including the genetic database and the laboratory biobank, up for sale. TTAM Research Institute, a nonprofit founded by co-founder Anne Wojcicki, acquired substantially all of the assets for $305 million and completed the purchase on 14 July 2025, as recorded on [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/23andMe). At a House hearing on 10 June 2025, the interim chief executive said about 1.9 million of roughly 15 million customers had asked for their data to be deleted since the filing, as reported by [Test Your Genome](https://www.testyourgenome.com/blog/dna-company-sold-what-happens-to-your-data.html). That figure is not confirmed from a primary transcript.

On 19 October 2026, California Attorney General Rob Bonta announced a $6 million settlement with Chrome Holding Co., formerly 23andMe, pending court approval. The settlement resolves allegations over the 2023 breach and the state's objection to the sale of Californians' genetic information and samples in bankruptcy without affirmative consent. The breach affected nearly 7 million customers in the United States, including more than 855,000 Californians, according to the [California Department of Justice](https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-secures-6-million-settlement-23andme-litigation).

## The signup address

The address on a DNA test account carries more functions than the address on most accounts: results, relative-matching alerts, password resets and deletion confirmations all arrive there. The California Attorney General's deletion instructions end with a confirmation email that the customer must follow, so a customer who cannot receive mail at the signup address cannot complete the deletion request.

The same address carries account recovery: an alias deleted while the account is live strands it, because mail sent to it bounces and never arrives. The AliasFleet article on [using an email alias for account recovery](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery) states the rule plainly: a recovery address works only while it stays live and forwards to a controlled inbox. The rule applies to any account, and with more force to a DNA test account, because the data cannot be re-created by signing up again.

Two-factor codes sent to the alias arrive like any other message but expire within minutes, so an authenticator app or a passkey serves as the main second factor, with codes by email as a fallback, as the AliasFleet article on [two-factor codes at an email alias](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-receive-two-factor-authentication-codes-at-an-email-alias) explains.

## Genetic information and the law

The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, usually called GINA, is the main federal law governing the use of genetic information in the United States. Title I bars health insurers from using genetic information in underwriting. Title II bars employers with 15 or more employees from using it in employment decisions. The [EEOC summary](https://www.eeoc.gov/genetic-information-discrimination) states the rule plainly: an employer may never use genetic information to make an employment decision.

GINA does not apply to life insurance, disability insurance or long-term care insurance. A result showing a known pathogenic variant in BRCA1 or an APOE risk variant could legally factor into a life, disability or long-term care insurance application in most US states, according to the [Guide to Genetics](https://www.guidetogenetics.com/genetic-data-and-insurance-gina-explained/).

Law enforcement is a separate matter. 23andMe states that it does not voluntarily share DNA with police and releases data only under valid legal process. Its Transparency Report, last updated 30 April 2026, records 13 data requests received in the United States since 2015, covering 17 user accounts, with data produced for 0 accounts. The company states it will not voluntarily release data to law enforcement, insurance companies or public databases, as shown on the [23andMe Trust Center](https://www.23andMe.com/en-gb/transparency-report/). Its support pages add that the company does not sell genetic information without explicit consent and shares with law enforcement only under a valid court order, subpoena or search warrant, as set out in [23andMe Support](https://support.23andme.org/hc/en-001/articles/42964802438551-Will-the-Information-I-Provide-be-Shared-With-Third-Parties).

MyHeritage states it has never sold or licensed genetic data or health data and will never do so without explicit consent. It will never provide personal data to insurance companies or employers under any circumstances, and it prohibits law enforcement use of its DNA services, according to its [privacy policy](https://www.myheritage.de/FP/Company/popup-privacy-policy.php?dispLang=EN). FamilyTreeDNA and GEDmatch have allowed law-enforcement matching under opt-in settings. The 2018 identification of the Golden State Killer suspect came after investigators uploaded a crime-scene DNA profile to GEDmatch, where a relative of the suspect had uploaded their own DNA, as set out by [GenomeTesting.org](https://www.genometesting.org/blog/police-and-genetic-genealogy-databases-explained.html).

## Privacy policies across services

Nine topics decide what happens to the data: sample storage, deletion exceptions, research consent, partner sharing, law enforcement, de-identification, mergers and bankruptcy, data location and breach notification, according to [Test Your Genome](https://www.testyourgenome.com/blog/dna-company-privacy-policy-clauses.html).

Research consent should be a separate, optional consent, not a condition of receiving results, as [Test Your Genome](https://www.testyourgenome.com/blog/dna-company-privacy-policy-clauses.html) advises. Withdrawal usually works going forward only. Ancestry states it will not be able to remove de-identified genetic information from active or completed research projects, and 23andMe states research already performed or published before withdrawal will not be reversed or withdrawn.

Deletion has exceptions. Clinical laboratories can have legal retention duties, and Ancestry states it will delete genetic information from its systems within 30 days, with backup copies taking longer to clear.

The merger and bankruptcy clause differs between services. Ancestry's statement says data may be shared with an acquirer and the promises in the privacy statement will continue to apply. 23andMe's current statement goes further for genetic data: it will not sell or transfer genetic data in connection with any merger, acquisition or bankruptcy unless the buyer meets set conditions and agrees to adopt the statement. The sale completed on 14 July 2025 despite the clause, after the court approved the transfer over the state's objection. A buyer that inherits a policy can change it later, and a bankruptcy court can approve a transfer over a state's objection, as the California settlement record shows. An alias does not protect genetic data held by the testing company itself: the 23andMe record shows a breach and a sale happening to the same company within two years.

<Callout type="important" title="The alias is the account address, not anonymity">
An email alias does not hide identity from the DNA company. The company still holds the sample, the name, the payment details and the genetic data. The alias limits exposure across services and after breaches. It does not limit what the provider itself knows. A genome remains distinctive even without a name attached: a 2013 study in Science showed surnames could be inferred from some research participants' genomes using public genealogy databases, as reported by [Test Your Genome](https://www.testyourgenome.com/blog/dna-company-privacy-policy-clauses.html).
</Callout>

## The alias setup

One permanent alias per service. The alias is created before signup and used only for that DNA service. One alias per site contains a breach to that site, names the leaker when spam arrives on it, and keeps the real address out of breach files entirely. The AliasFleet article on [a different email address for every website](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/different-email-for-every-website) sets out the arithmetic: Have I Been Pwned now tracks 1,051 breached sites and more than 17.8 billion exposed addresses, and a reused address stitches accounts together across every future leak.

The alias stays live permanently. A DNA test account differs from a free trial or a newsletter signup. The alias is the account address, and the account needs it for years: results, relative matches, recovery and deletion confirmations. The full address is recorded in a password manager next to the password, so it is at hand when a recovery form asks for it.

Ordinary account protection surrounds the signup. A unique password from a password manager matters here more than usual, because the 23andMe breach began with credential stuffing: attackers fed username and password combinations stolen from other breaches into 23andMe's login page. Checking the old address on [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) before signup shows whether it is already circulating, and the AliasFleet guide to [checking whether an email was leaked](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked) explains how to read each result.

The alias domain is checked against rejection. Some websites can tell an address is an alias, usually from its domain, and a small number reject alias domains. Detection is not rejection, and plain aliases on clean domains pass more often than random strings on shared domains, as the AliasFleet article on [whether websites can tell an alias is in use](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-websites-tell-you-are-using-an-email-alias) explains. No DNA service publishes a policy on alias-domain acceptance, and no public test of alias signups at 23andMe, Ancestry or MyHeritage was found, so no claim is made here about any specific service blocking or accepting aliases. If a DNA service rejects an alias domain, an alias on a custom domain or a dedicated real address for that one service is the fallback. No live signup test was run for this piece: that would require creating an account with a real DNA service.

## AliasFleet and DNA test signups

AliasFleet is an email alias service that supplies one forwarding address per site, with mail forwarded to a destination inbox and replies sent from the alias. The mechanism is set out in the AliasFleet article on [how email aliases actually work](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work): a forwarding rule, a reply mechanism and a kill switch. The free tier covers 10 active aliases. AliasFleet does not hold genetic data, does not run DNA tests, and cannot change a testing company's privacy policy or its law-enforcement record.

## Summary of the setup

A DNA test signup uses one permanent alias per service, created before signup and kept live for as long as the account exists, because results, relative matching, recovery and deletion confirmations all depend on it. The account uses a unique password with an authenticator app or passkey as the main second factor. The alias limits exposure across services and after breaches. It does not hide identity from the DNA company or change the service's privacy policy.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>DNA Testing</category><category>Email Aliases</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Signing Up for a Carrier</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-a-mobile-carrier</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-a-mobile-carrier</guid>
      <description>A mobile carrier account guards the phone number itself. A dedicated alias, app-based second factor and the carrier number lock keep that account isolated.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A US mobile carrier account controls a phone number, and the number is the recovery path for email, banking and social accounts. The email address on the account is protected with one dedicated alias that stays active permanently, an app-based second factor instead of SMS codes, and the carrier number lock switched on at signup.

## The carrier account and the phone number

A SIM swap moves the number onto a SIM card controlled by an attacker, and a port-out moves it to a different carrier under the attacker's control. The [Federal Communications Commission](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-398483A1.txt) defines a SIM swap as a bad actor convincing a carrier to transfer a victim's service to a phone in the attacker's possession. Once the number moves, calls and texts go to the attacker, including SMS verification codes for email, banking and social accounts.

The [FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center](https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2024_IC3Report.pdf) recorded 982 SIM swap complaints and $25,983,946 in reported losses in the United States in 2024. An earlier FBI announcement, [public service announcement I-020822-PSA](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/fbi-warns-of-criminals-escalating-sim-swap-attacks-to-steal-millions/), recorded 1,611 SIM swapping complaints in 2021 with adjusted losses of more than $68 million. Both sets of figures count only complaints made to the FBI, so the real total is higher.

## SIM swap and port-out rules

The [Federal Communications Commission](https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-23-95A1.txt) adopted rules on SIM swap and port-out fraud on 15 November 2023, in Report and Order FCC 23-95. The rules require wireless providers to adopt secure methods of authenticating a customer before redirecting a phone number, to notify customers immediately whenever a SIM change or port-out request is made, and to offer customers the option to lock their accounts against SIM changes and number ports. The rules apply to wireless providers including resellers, for prepaid and postpaid customers. Carriers may not rely on readily available biographical information or account information as the secure method of authentication, so a date of birth or a billing address is not treated as a secret. The account PIN, the number lock and the second factor carry the weight instead of the personal details given at signup.

Secondary reports disagree on the compliance timing of individual provisions, so this article states the adoption date and the requirements without claiming a compliance date for every provision. The FCC's December 2023 enforcement advisory described the changes as not yet in effect, while later summaries give 8 January 2024 as the effective date, with some information-collection provisions held back pending Office of Management and Budget review.

## The email address on the account

The email address given at carrier signup is a dedicated alias used for the carrier and for nothing else. One dedicated alias per carrier keeps the account isolated, so a breach at a shop, a forum or a streaming service cannot expose the address that recovers the carrier account. The pattern is the same one described in [a separate email for every website](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/different-email-for-every-website), applied to the account where it matters most. The same permanence rule applies to [account recovery](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery): an alias used for recovery must still work when recovery is needed, years after signup.

<Callout type="warning" title="The alias must stay active permanently">
A carrier account needs its email address for recovery for as long as the number exists. An alias that is deleted or allowed to lapse removes the recovery path for the number, so the carrier alias is kept alive for the life of the account.
</Callout>

The primary inbox behind the alias needs the same attention, because if it is protected only by SMS codes sent to the carrier number, a SIM swap breaks both at once. An address can be checked for past breaches at [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) before it is given to the carrier.

## Number locks

Each major US carrier offers a free number lock, and the lock is switched on at signup. The names differ by carrier, but the function is the same: the lock blocks SIM changes and number transfers until the account holder switches it off. The locks are opt-in and must be switched on, so they only help when the account holder turns them on.

| Carrier | Lock | Where it is switched on |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| T-Mobile | SIM Protection and Port Out Protection | T-Life app: Manage tab, gear icon, Security, SIM Protection; T-Mobile.com: Profile, Security, SIM Protection |
| Verizon | SIM Protection and Number Lock | My Verizon app or website, under Security settings |
| AT&T | Wireless Account Lock | AT&T app only; standalone tablet or hotspot locks are managed by contacting AT&T |

T-Mobile offers two features. [SIM Protection](https://www.t-mobile.com/support/plans-features/help-with-t-mobile-account-fraud) is a free feature for T-Mobile postpaid customers that prevents bad actors from moving a number to another device. [Account Takeover Protection](https://www.t-mobile.com/support/plans-features/account-takeover-protection/) blocks unauthorised users from transferring lines to another wireless carrier, and it must be added to each line individually. Only the Primary Account Holder can remove SIM Protection. T-Mobile also requires an account PIN of 6 to 15 non-sequential numbers, which cannot be a date of birth or a Social Security number.

Verizon splits the protection into two toggles. [Number Lock](https://www.verizon.com/support/port-out-faqs/) is free and prevents a mobile number from being moved to another carrier, and a locked number cannot generate a Number Transfer PIN. Verizon states plainly that Number Lock does not prevent SIM card changes or equipment changes, so SIM Protection is needed as well. A Number Transfer PIN expires after 7 days.

AT&T combines the protection into one switch: [Wireless Account Lock](https://www.att.com/support/article/wireless/000102016/) is a free security feature. When the lock is switched on or off, AT&T sends a confirmation email to the account email address and a text message to the wireless device. Account holders outside the United States need their own carrier's equivalent lock, and carrier app menu paths change often, so the locations above are taken from the carriers' own support pages as opened on 2026-11-11.

A number lock depends on carrier staff following the verification procedure when an attacker calls or visits a store. In August 2019, attackers took control of Twitter chief executive [Jack Dorsey's account](https://www.securityweek.com/sim-swapping-blamed-hacking-twitter-ceos-account/) after tricking his mobile provider into handing over his number, an incident Twitter attributed to a security oversight by the mobile provider. The lock reduces the risk and does not remove it, which is why the second factor must not depend on SMS.

## The second factor

The second factor on the carrier account is app-based, never SMS-only. The [Federal Trade Commission](https://consumer.ftc.gov/consumer-alerts/2019/10/sim-swap-scams-how-protect-yourself) states that text message verification may not stop a SIM card swap, and recommends an authentication app or a security key for accounts with sensitive personal or financial information. The [FTC's two-factor authentication guidance](https://consumer.ftc.gov/articles/use-two-factor-authentication-protect-your-accounts) adds that an authenticator app is safer than a text message code because the passcode it generates is not susceptible to a SIM card swap attack, and that a security key is the strongest method.

An authenticator app generates codes on the device from a shared secret, so no code travels over the phone network and no number is involved. A SIM swap gives the attacker the number, but the app codes are generated on the owner's device and the attacker does not have them. [NIST SP 800-63B-4](https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html) requires applications at Authentication Assurance Level 2 to offer a phishing-resistant authentication option. Some carrier steps still use SMS: [AT&T sends a one-time code by SMS](https://www.att.com/support/article/wireless/000102016/) to validate switching Wireless Account Lock on or off, so where SMS is the only option for a particular step, the number lock and the account PIN carry the protection instead. The same rule applies to the email account behind the alias: [two-factor authentication codes can be received at an email alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-receive-two-factor-authentication-codes-at-an-email-alias), but the codes are only as safe as the inbox they land in.

## Alias rejection at signup

Some websites reject alias domains at signup, usually through a blocklist of domains associated with alias services or short-lived inboxes. [AliasFleet's own article on alias detection](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-websites-tell-you-are-using-an-email-alias) states that some websites can detect an alias, usually from its domain, but that detection is not rejection, and that many detected aliases are accepted. No carrier-published policy was found stating that T-Mobile, Verizon or AT&T block alias domains at signup, and this article does not claim that any named carrier does so. If a carrier signup rejects the alias, the fallback is a permanent address on a domain the account holder controls, or a mainstream provider address kept only for the carrier account. The question of whether aliases are safe in general is covered in [the AliasFleet guide on alias safety](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe).

## Recovery planning

Recovery planning is done at signup, while the account holder still controls the number and the inbox. The same pattern for another high-value account is described in [the password-manager signup guide](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-a-password-manager).

If a SIM swap happens, the [FTC](https://consumer.ftc.gov/consumer-alerts/2019/10/sim-swap-scams-how-protect-yourself) advises contacting the cellular service provider immediately to take back control of the phone number, then changing account passwords, checking bank and card accounts for unauthorised charges, and going to [IdentityTheft.gov](https://identitytheft.gov) if Social Security, card or bank account numbers may have been stolen. The email account is secured first, because it is the route to every other account. The warning signs named by the FTC are a phone that suddenly stops working, or an unexpected notification that the SIM card has been activated on a new device.

## AliasFleet and the carrier account

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides managed forwarding aliases, with one dedicated alias per service, forwarding to a verified destination inbox. A carrier alias forwards carrier mail to the primary inbox, and it can be paused or disabled if it starts receiving spam, without changing the primary inbox address. The free plan includes 10 active aliases, as listed on the [pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing).

AliasFleet does not stop a SIM swap. The number lock, the account PIN and the app-based second factor do that work, and they belong to the carrier. What AliasFleet does is keep the carrier account isolated from every other signup, so a breach elsewhere does not hand an attacker the address that recovers the number.

## Measures at signup

At signup, one dedicated alias is created for the carrier account and used nowhere else, and it stays active for the life of the account. An app-based second factor, never SMS-only, protects both the primary inbox behind the alias and the carrier account itself. The carrier number lock is switched on at signup, in the carrier app or account settings, and an account PIN is set that is not a date of birth, a Social Security number or any other readily available personal detail. Backup or recovery codes for the email and carrier accounts are saved in a password manager or on paper in a safe place, with the authenticator app backed up or enrolled on a second device.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Mobile Carriers</category><category>SIM Swap</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Is Posteo Safe? No Personal Data, but Encryption Is Opt-In</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-posteo-safe</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-posteo-safe</guid>
      <description>Posteo is a €1-a-month German email service built on data minimisation: no personal data at signup, no IP logs, and optional encryption, with clear limits.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Posteo is a German email service that charges €1 per month for a mailbox built on data minimisation. Signup needs a username, a password and a choice of domain only, with no personal data collected and no IP addresses logged. End-to-end encryption is opt-in, not automatic, and Posteo does not support custom domains. The account includes 4 GB of storage and three aliases, with no free tier and no advertising.

## Background and pricing

Posteo e.K. is based in Berlin and was founded in 2009, with servers in data centres in Frankfurt, Germany. The company is financed entirely by its users, with no investors and no advertising, and the [feature list](https://posteo.de/en/site/featurelist) states that the price has been stable at €1 per month since 2009. An account can be cancelled at any time, with remaining credit refunded. Posteo reported more than half a million accounts in 2025, a figure given in its [transparency report](https://posteo.de/en/site/transparency_report).

The account is a standard mailbox with webmail and support for IMAP, POP3, CalDAV and CardDAV, so it works with external mail clients. The [feature list](https://posteo.de/en/site/featurelist) lists 4 GB of storage, expandable to 75 GB at €0.25 per GB per month, three aliases expandable to 25 at €0.10 per alias per month, and three calendars. An S/MIME certificate for signing and encrypting mail costs €3.65 per year. Storage was doubled from 2 GB to 4 GB on 4 February 2026 at no extra cost, according to the [Posteo blog](https://posteo.de/en/blog/2).

The account costs €1 per month, paid in advance from a prepaid credit balance, with no contract and a 14-day notice period. The included items are 4 GB of storage, three aliases, three calendars, an address book, notes, spam and virus protection, and free support by email. Extra calendars cost €0.10 per month each. There is no free tier and no free trial.

## Signup and data minimisation

Posteo collects no personal data at signup. The feature list states registration without personal data, no IP logging on the website or the email account, IP stripping from outgoing mail, and no connection of payment data to email accounts. An account is created with a username and a password only, with no name, address, phone number or recovery email required. Independent testing by [email-tools.me](https://www.email-tools.me/posts/posteo-review/) found the same result: the signup form asked for a username, a password and a choice of domain, and nothing else.

Payment is handled separately from the account. Posteo accepts bank transfer, PayPal, credit card and cash sent by post. [CyberInsider](https://cyberinsider.com/email/reviews/posteo/) reports that Posteo manually separates payment information from the account record, and [ProPrivacy](https://proprivacy.com/email/review/posteo) notes the cash-by-post option and a 14-day money-back guarantee.

## Encryption and crypto mail storage

Transport encryption is automatic. The [encryption page](https://posteo.de/en/site/encryption) states that all access to Posteo is encrypted, with TLS 1.2 to 1.3 and Perfect Forward Secrecy, HSTS and DANE/TLSA, and that mail sent to other providers travels over an encrypted connection when the other server supports it. Posteo reports an A+ mark on the Qualys SSL Labs test as of July 2026. All server hard disks are fully encrypted with dm-crypt/LUKS, and internal connections are encrypted with SSH and TLS.

<Callout type="important" title="Opt-in encryption">
Mail is stored readable on Posteo servers unless crypto mail storage or end-to-end encryption is switched on. A new account has neither feature active by default.
</Callout>

End-to-end encryption is opt-in. The encryption page states that individual emails can be given end-to-end encryption with S/MIME or OpenPGP, that both communication partners need to use the encryption, and that message metadata such as subject, recipient, sender and time stamp remain unencrypted. In February 2026 Posteo released its own S/MIME add-on for webmail, described in the [Posteo blog](https://posteo.de/en/blog/new-posteo-smime-add-on-available-now), which had two security audits by independent experts at Cure53 and keeps private keys on the user device. Posteo also offers inbound encryption, which encrypts newly arriving mail with S/MIME or OpenPGP when the sender has not already done so.

Crypto mail storage is a separate optional feature. When it is activated, Posteo encrypts all saved emails, including content, attachments and metadata, using RSA asymmetric encryption, AES with HMAC for symmetric encryption and authentication, and bcrypt hashing, with the key protected by the account password. The [encryption page](https://posteo.de/en/site/encryption) states that the feature passed an external audit by Cure53 and that Posteo cannot deactivate the encryption once it is switched on. Calendar and address book data can be encrypted separately with AES, also protected by the account password. Without crypto mail storage or end-to-end encryption, mail is stored readable on Posteo servers, as it is with most conventional providers.

## Transport security and account protection

Posteo holds certification for secure email transport from the BSI, the German Federal Office for Information Security, under technical guideline TR-03108 version 2 (2025), according to Posteo. A comparison by [EuropeanStack](https://www.europeanstack.io/en/compare/gmx_mail-vs-posteo) gives the certificate number as BSI-K-TR-0745-2025, though that number was not found on the Posteo pages read for this article. Posteo implemented DANE/TLSA in May 2014 and states on its encryption page that it was the first provider to do so.

Two-factor authentication is available using TOTP, with a one-time password that changes every 30 seconds, and the feature list also lists app passwords and passkeys, with up to five of each. An additional account protection setting blocks access by external programs using the main Posteo password, so only app passwords work. The encryption page notes that passwords are stored as salted hashes and that Posteo does not know the account password.

The [PrivacyPick review](https://privacypick.com/email/posteo/) states that the audit trail has not been refreshed since 2017, and a full independent audit of the current Posteo codebase was not found in this research. The Cure53 audits cited in this article are feature-specific: crypto mail storage and the S/MIME add-on.

## Transparency report and authority requests

Posteo published a transparency report in May 2014, becoming the first German telecommunications provider to do so, and has published one annually since. The [transparency report](https://posteo.de/en/site/transparency_report) covers all authority requests received up to the end of December 2025. Posteo operates under German law, and the German Telecommunications Act has applied to email services since 1 December 2021, after a period from June 2019 to November 2021 when an EU court ruling had removed that obligation.

| Request type in 2025 | Count |
| :--- | :--- |
| Requests for user information | 72 |
| Mailbox seizures | 4 |
| Surveillance orders for a specified period | 2 |
| Unclear requests | 7 |
| Total requests | 85 |

In 2025 Posteo received 85 requests: 79 from German authorities and 6 from foreign authorities. Posteo lawyers checked the formal correctness of the requests and found 27 of the 72 user information requests formally incorrect. The releases in 2025 were 0 for user information, 0 for traffic data, and content data from 2 mailboxes, both under formally correct judicial rulings. None of the four seizure orders was carried out: three of the mailboxes did not exist and crypto mail storage was activated for one of them. With no personal data or traffic data held, mailbox content is the only data that can be handed over under a court order, and only from mailboxes that exist and are not protected by crypto mail storage.

No public breach of Posteo itself was found in the research for this article. That is absence of a public record, not proof that no breach has happened. An address can be checked on [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/). The companion trust pieces on [GMX Mail](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-gmx-mail-safe), [AOL Mail](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-aol-mail-safe) and [mail.com](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-mail-com-safe) cover large free providers whose safety turns on the security stack rather than on data minimisation.

## Custom domain availability

Posteo does not support custom domains. The [PrivacyPick review](https://privacypick.com/email/posteo/) states that the only choice is between Posteo domains, and [EuropeanStack](https://www.europeanstack.io/en/compare/posteo-vs-swissnode) describes the refusal as deliberate, to avoid the identity records that domain ownership would require. That reason comes from independent reviews rather than from a Posteo page read for this article. A business or a person who needs an address on a domain they own cannot use Posteo for it, and the address cannot be moved to another provider if Posteo is left. Posteo also has no free tier, and no recovery route that works without the account password when crypto mail storage is active, since Posteo cannot read the encrypted data to restore it.

## AliasFleet and Posteo

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) creates managed, persistent email aliases that forward to a mailbox, so the mailbox address is not shared with websites or services. A Posteo mailbox works as the destination for those aliases, and the Posteo address stays private while each website or service gets its own alias. If one alias starts receiving spam or appears in a breach, that alias can be paused or closed without touching the Posteo account or any other alias. The same pattern is described in the companion trust pieces on [Gmail](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-gmail-safe) and [Outlook](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-outlook-safe), and in the guide to [whether email aliases are safe](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe).

Posteo already offers three aliases inside one account, but those are tied to the Posteo account and to Posteo domains, while AliasFleet aliases sit in front of the mailbox and can be managed independently of it. The [AliasFleet documentation](https://aliasfleet.com/docs) explains how aliases forward and how replies are routed, and pricing is on the [AliasFleet pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing).

Posteo holds no personal data, no IP addresses and no payment data connected to the account. Mail in an unprotected mailbox can be obtained under a court order, and Posteo does not support custom domains.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Secure Email</category><category>Posteo</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Nitori Reports Up to 37.62 Million Records May Have Leaked</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/nitori-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/nitori-data-breach</guid>
      <description>Nitori said up to 37.62 million customer records may have leaked after unauthorised access found on 6 November 2026. Passwords and card data were not included.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A data breach at Nitori Holdings, Japan's largest home retailer, may have leaked up to 37.62 million customer records. The disclosure came on 9 November 2026. Unauthorised access to a Nitori system was confirmed on 6 November, and outside specialists placed the intrusion in mid-to-late October. Email addresses, names, home addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth and member numbers fall within the data in scope. Login passwords and card data were not compromised. The total counts records, not confirmed unique people, and the company has not confirmed that any data was actually taken.

## Disclosure

Nitori Holdings [published its notice](https://www.nitorihd.co.jp/news/items/2b702dbe4d438f7fef74945d68e5bd27_3.pdf) on 9 November 2026. [Kyodo News](https://english.kyodonews.net/articles/-/90746) reported it in a daily digest. [The Straits Times](https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/japanese-home-retailer-nitori-says-up-to-38m-customer-records-may-have-leaked) carried the same report. Nitori said a system it manages had been accessed without authorisation, confirmed on 6 November. Access was blocked, and outside specialists were brought in to investigate. Log analysis since then showed that a third party may have reached the system before 6 November, at some point in mid-to-late October. Nitori said the vulnerable point has been fixed, monitoring has been strengthened, and blocking of the attackers continues. What the weakness was, and how the attackers got in, has not been stated, and no start date more precise than mid-to-late October has been given. The incident has been [reported to Japan's Personal Information Protection Commission](https://japancyberwatch.com/articles/nitori-data-breach-37-million-2026), and Nitori is consulting the police and other relevant organisations. Affected customers will be contacted by email or post. Nitori also warned that the 37.62 million figure may change as log analysis and data matching continue.

The same day brought a second Japanese breach announcement. The Straits Times reported that Sega said on 9 November that about 2.2 million customer email addresses leaked after Arara, a contractor used to send newsletters, was compromised. The incidents are separate, but 9 November produced two email-address exposures in Japan.

## Data in scope

The scope reaches beyond registered members. It covers individual members, people who bought from the Nitori group without an account, corporate members, and orders placed through Nitori Net and Nitori's official shops on online malls. The data items differ by customer type:

| Customer group | Data that may have leaked |
| --- | --- |
| Individual members and purchasers | Member number, name (including the reading in kana), email address, home address, phone number, date of birth, gender |
| Corporate members | Member number, company name, department, representative's name, company address and phone number, contact person's name, email address and phone number |
| Orders | Orders placed through Nitori Net and Nitori's official shops on online malls |

Login passwords and credit card information were not included, so no Nitori account can be opened with a password from this incident and no card can be charged with details from it. The remaining data still supports impersonation. A message that names the customer, gives a real home address and phone number and refers to an order history is more convincing than a generic phishing message.

Up to 37.62 million is a record count, not a headcount. A single person can appear several times, as a member, as a one-time buyer and as an online-mall customer, and corporate contacts and orders are counted in the same total. Nitori has not stated how many unique individuals the records represent, or how the total divides between members, purchasers, corporate members and mall orders. [TipRanks](https://www.tipranks.com/news/company-announcements/nitori-reports-potential-exposure-of-37-62-million-customer-records) described the announcement in the same terms: up to 37.62 million records affected, covering names, contact details, addresses, birth dates, genders and order data, with passwords and credit card information excluded. [Japan Cyber Watch](https://japancyberwatch.com/articles/nitori-data-breach-37-million-2026), which tracks Japanese breaches, ranks it as the fourth-largest breach disclosed in Japan in 2026.

## Customer groups in scope

A person who bought furniture once and supplied a delivery address may appear in the data without ever creating an account, and may not think of themselves as a Nitori customer at all. A customer who ordered from a Nitori shop on an online mall dealt with the mall rather than with Nitori's own site, yet the order data is in scope. Nitori has not named the malls, and has not said what the order data contains beyond the order itself, for example delivery addresses or items purchased.

Corporate membership adds a business angle. The records hold the company representative and the named contact person, with company and personal contact details. Those details support targeted invoice fraud and payment-change scams as well as ordinary consumer phishing, so the exposure touches the named contact people at companies holding Nitori corporate accounts, not only individual shoppers.

## Response from Nitori

So far the response consists of the disclosure, the regulator report, police consultation and a customer warning. Nitori says the vulnerable point has been fixed and monitoring strengthened, and that blocking of the attackers continues. No technical detail has been published about the weakness, the affected system or the attack method, and nothing has been said about whether ransomware or extortion was involved. Japan Cyber Watch reported that, as of 9 November, it had not seen Nitori on leak sites tracked by ransomware.live, a negative observation from one tracker rather than a company statement.

The warning to customers is the most concrete part of the response. Customers were told to watch for messages pretending to come from Nitori, delivery companies or online malls, and Nitori said it will never ask for passwords, card numbers or PINs by email or phone. Affected customers will be contacted by email or post. A genuine Nitori message and an impersonation travel by the same channels, so the message itself cannot confirm its sender. The check is the route taken: Nitori's official site or a known contact route, rather than a link or a number inside the message.

## Protective steps for customers

The measures below follow from what leaked and what did not. They also follow Nitori's own warning and published guidance on breach response.

First, any message about a Nitori delivery, refund or order problem should be treated as unverified until it has been checked on Nitori's official site. Links in order-related emails or texts should not be followed, and a number supplied in such a message should not be called. [Phishing built on leaked email addresses](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email) works because the message already knows the recipient's details. Familiarity is not evidence that a message is genuine.

Second, the email address used with Nitori can be checked against [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com), which lists breaches by email address and shows which incidents exposed it. The Nitori incident may not appear there yet, since the data has not been confirmed as taken, but the check covers the other breaches that may have exposed the same address. A fuller guide to the steps after a breach notice is in [what to do when your email is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach).

Third, password reuse remains the main account risk. No Nitori passwords leaked, but attackers try passwords from other leaks against the same brand after a breach announcement. [How credential stuffing works](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-credential-stuffing-works) explains the mechanism. Anyone who reused a Nitori password on another site should change it there, and turn on two-factor authentication on the Nitori account and on the email account itself where it is available.

Fourth, corporate customers should brief the named contact person on the account. Invoice fraud and payment-change requests that name the company, the representative and the contact person will look routine, so payment details should be verified through a known channel, not through contact details supplied in the message asking for the change.

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Unanswered questions

Much is still unknown. The attack route and the vulnerable point have not been disclosed. The start of the access, and the reason it went unnoticed until 6 November, have not been explained. The number of people behind the 37.62 million records, and the split between members, purchasers, corporate members and mall orders, has not been stated. The online malls involved have not been named, and the contents of the order data beyond the order itself have not been described. Whether the data left Nitori's systems, rather than only being possibly accessed, has not been confirmed. No confirmed misuse or fraud has been reported so far.

A follow-up disclosure is the next source of answers. Until then, the confirmed position is the one set out on 9 November: up to 37.62 million records may have leaked, the data is contact and order information rather than passwords or card details, and the company's response centres on a warning about phishing built on the exposed details.

Nitori's disclosure also continues a run of Japanese retail breaches covered on this blog. [Bookoff](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/bookoff-data-breach) disclosed in October that up to about 6.43 million member-number records may have been obtained, and the [MUJI](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/muji-data-breach) breach was reported in the same autumn run of Japanese retail disclosures.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Japan</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SPH Media cyberattacks exposed 9 per cent of its database</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/sph-media-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/sph-media-data-breach</guid>
      <description>SPH Media disclosed cyberattacks on five of its systems on 10 November 2026. Email addresses made up most of the data exposed in 9 per cent of its database.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[SPH Media, the Singapore media group behind The Straits Times, said on 10 November 2026 that cyberattacks had hit five of its systems, with email addresses making up most of the data exposed in 9 per cent of its database, alongside some names, mailing addresses and phone numbers. No payment card details, financial or banking information, or customer account access was compromised, and the company's news websites and subscription services were unaffected. SPH Media said the attacks are believed to be a concerted effort by the same threat actor, who has not been identified, and no attack vector has been disclosed by the company so far. The first incident was detected on 4 November 2026 and the most recent on 8 November 2026, two days before the disclosure.

## Chronology of the attacks

The first incident was detected on 4 November 2026 and the most recent on 8 November 2026, with disclosure following on 10 November, two days after the latest detection. In [its own statement](https://www.sph.com.sg/media-centre/media-releases/media-statement-sph-cybersecurity-incident/), SPH Media described the attacks on the five systems as believed to be a concerted effort carried out by the same threat actor, who has not been identified, and no attack vector has been disclosed by the company so far. The five systems fell into two groups, one holding some personal data and the other holding systems that stored no personal data. The data exposure came from the systems in the first group, while SPH Media reported unauthorised access to the systems in the second group with no data exposure attached. The statement did not specify the extent of exposure from the second group, a gap [Channel News Asia](https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/sph-media-cyberattack-data-breach-6538681) also noted. No source has reported the exposed data published or sold anywhere, no source has reported misuse of it, and SPH Media has not stated whether the data has been misused, so no misuse has been reported either way.

## Exposed personal data

Email addresses dominated the exposed data, with some names, mailing addresses and phone numbers appearing alongside them, and SPH Media put the total at 9 per cent of its database, a figure [The Straits Times](https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/sph-media-hit-by-cyberattacks-no-payment-card-details-or-financial-information-compromised?ref=top-stories) also reported. No absolute victim count was disclosed, since SPH Media gave only the proportion affected with no total size for the database, so no headcount can be worked out from the published information and this article gives none. The 9 per cent figure is the only measure of scale available. The Straits Times reported that some email addresses belonging to employees and corporate customers were compromised, while the SPH Media statement itself says nothing about employees or corporate customers, so the two sources differ on this point. An exposed email address on its own gives an attacker no account access, but it does give an attacker a working address to aim phishing at, and that risk grows when real names and addresses travel with it, since real details make fake messages harder to spot. The guide on [how phishing uses a leaked email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email) describes how a leaked address is used in phishing attempts.

## Data not exposed

SPH Media stated that no payment card details or financial or banking information was compromised. Customer account access was not compromised either, and The Straits Times reported that subscribers' access to their accounts was not affected. The company's news websites and subscription services were unaffected. The guide on [email breaches and password breaches](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/email-breach-and-password-breach) explains why an exposed address and an exposed password are different problems with different fixes.

## Suspected AI involvement

SPH Media said it suspects the intrusions could be AI-enabled attacks, a suspicion that rests on preliminary investigations, and The Straits Times reported both the suspicion and its preliminary basis. Channel News Asia reported that SPH Media is unable to confirm whether the attacks are AI-enabled while investigations are ongoing, so the AI element stays a suspicion, not an established fact. The company put the cause down to a combination of factors, including software bugs and system configuration, with no further detail published, and a company spokesman gave that description to The Straits Times. No specific software or system has been named, and the company said it has applied bug fixes to its information technology systems, updated the system configurations and perimeter defences to block further probing and exploitation attempts, and heightened monitoring.

SPH Media said it is enhancing its defences to better detect AI-aided attacks, with safeguards to identify vulnerabilities earlier and remediate them swiftly forming part of that work. The company said it will continue to keep a close watch on its systems, since cyberattacks can happen at any time and at any frequency. Whether the AI suspicion is confirmed or dropped will depend on the investigation. No evidence for the AI-enabled suspicion has been published.

## SPH Media response

SPH Media said it moved at once to secure the affected systems once the incidents were discovered, and engaged external cybersecurity experts to investigate and contain the breaches. The company is working closely with the relevant authorities, and third-party specialists are involved as well. A company spokesman said SPH Media takes the security and confidentiality of customers' information very seriously. SPH Media said it informed all impacted parties about the incident and advised them about the precautions they should take, with its advisory posted on the company's website main page. The company advised customers to remain vigilant, as set out in the advisory below. The Straits Times reported that employees and corporate customers were among those advised, and they were told to exercise caution and stay vigilant against suspicious and unsolicited messages.

<Callout type="warning" title="SPH Media's advice to customers">
SPH Media advised customers to remain vigilant and exercise caution for suspicious and unsolicited emails, messages and calls, particularly ones requesting personal information, passwords or payments, and to avoid clicking on suspicious links or attachments.
</Callout>

## Reports to regulators

SPH Media reported the incident to the [Personal Data Protection Commission](https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/) (PDPC), the [Cyber Security Agency of Singapore](https://www.csa.gov.sg/) (CSA) and the [Infocomm Media Development Authority](https://www.imda.gov.sg/) (IMDA). A police report was filed as well. The three agencies issued a joint statement on 10 November 2026 in response to queries, saying they are aware of the incident, and IMDA and PDPC are investigating the incident while CSA monitors developments closely. The agencies said they have asked SPH Media to contain the impact and identify the root cause of the incident, and their joint statement added that organisations should implement measures to protect their systems against data breaches. Members of the public should remain vigilant to potential phishing attempts and scams, the statement added.

## Singapore context

Channel News Asia reported that the incident follows other reported Singapore breaches, including telco M1 and telehealth provider Doctor Anywhere on 6 November. The [M1 breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/m1-data-breach) exposed customers' personal information, including names, NRIC or FIN numbers, dates of birth, mobile numbers, email addresses and residential addresses. AliasFleet covered it on 7 November 2026. Doctor Anywhere reported a leak of users' personal data. Clinical records were not affected, according to cybersecurity and forensic specialist Ensign InfoSecurity. Channel News Asia also reported that data relating to around 46,000 Singapore Airlines booking records was accessed in a breach involving software provider Amadeus, which affected at least eight airlines.

## Precautions for affected readers

People whose email address was in the exposed portion of the database can check whether the address appears in a known breach. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) lists breaches by email address. Passwords reused across services should be changed, starting with the accounts that matter most: email, banking and any account that holds payment details. A password that appears only on one service cannot be reused by an attacker elsewhere, which is the point of using a different password per service. The guide on [whether changing a password stops hackers](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/does-changing-your-password-stop-hackers) covers when a password change helps and when it does not. Two-factor authentication should be turned on wherever it is offered, since it blocks logins that rely on a stolen password alone.

Unexpected emails, messages and calls should be treated as suspicious, particularly ones that request personal information, passwords or payments. SPH Media's own advice is to avoid clicking on suspicious links or attachments, and the company advised customers to remain vigilant against suspicious and unsolicited messages. A message that names the recipient correctly and refers to a real SPH Media subscription is not proof that it comes from SPH Media, because the exposed data included the names and email addresses needed to write such a message. The guide on [how to check if an email is phishing](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-an-email-is-phishing) sets out the checks that catch most of these messages.

An email address given to SPH Media is the same address that will now receive any phishing built on this breach, so a person who used one address for every service cannot tell which service leaked it when a phishing message arrives. A person who used a separate alias per service can trace a phishing message back to the service whose address it was sent to, and can stop that alias without touching any other service. [Email aliases are a managed, persistent identity per service](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe), not a short-lived inbox, and the alias keeps working until the owner pauses or deletes it. SPH Media advised impacted parties to stay vigilant against suspicious emails, messages and calls, and a phishing message sent to a service-specific alias identifies the service behind the leak.

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Ongoing investigation

The investigation is ongoing, and SPH Media has not named the threat actor behind the attacks, disclosed an attack vector, or said whether the exposed data has been misused. The AI-enabled suspicion is preliminary and unconfirmed, and no evidence for it has been published. The regulators have asked SPH Media to contain the impact and identify the root cause, and their investigations continue alongside the company's own work with external experts. Two questions stay open: whether the exposed data appears outside SPH Media's systems, and whether the investigation confirms the AI-enabled suspicion. SPH Media said it will continue to keep a close watch on its systems.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Singapore</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SEGA confirms 2.2 million emails leaked in Arara breach</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/arara-message-data-breach-followup</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/arara-message-data-breach-followup</guid>
      <description>SEGA confirmed on 9 November that 2,196,044 newsletter email addresses leaked through Arara Message, as the platform total rose to 81.3 million addresses.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[SEGA confirmed on 9 November 2026 that unauthorised access to Arara Message, the email delivery service run by its contractor Arara, exposed 2,196,044 email addresses from SEGA and SEGA Fave newsletters. Arara's third incident report of 6 November 2026 put the platform-wide total at 81,329,467 deduplicated email addresses across up to about 380 client companies. SEGA's figure forms part of that platform total. Arara Message stored the mailing lists of many client companies on shared infrastructure, so the SEGA count does not add to the total. The service has been shut down since 31 October 2026, and Arara has announced no restart date.

## The SEGA disclosure

SEGA's [notice of 9 November 2026](https://www.sega.co.jp/release/261109_1.html) covers email addresses used to send newsletters about SEGA and SEGA Fave products and services. Of the 2,196,044 addresses, 92,273 records also held information related to newsletter distribution. SEGA states that the contents of that additional information are still being checked with Arara. The count is of email address records. One person can hold several addresses, so the figure is not a count of individuals.

The notice also sets out what the SEGA records did not contain. Names, dates of birth, gender, postal addresses, telephone numbers, credit card details and login passwords were absent, and addresses registered with SEGA Account fall outside the breach because that service uses a different delivery system. SEGA states that no misuse of the exposed information had been confirmed as of 9 November 2026. [Cyber Insider](https://cyberinsider.com/sega-data-breach-2-2-million-email-addresses/) and [GameSpark](https://en.gamespark.jp/article/2026/11/09/2112.html) both reported the disclosure on 9 November 2026, with the same count and the same exclusions.

## The affected mailings

Eleven newsletters are covered by the leak. SEGA's notice lists each one, sent between 2 July and 28 October 2026, with its sending date.

| Date sent | Mailing |
| :--- | :--- |
| 2 July 2026 | CHUNITHM Mate launch notice |
| 6 July 2026 | SEGA Lucky Kuji Online release information |
| 13 July 2026 | SEGA Lucky Kuji Online release information |
| 23 July 2026 | Ongeki Re:Fresh Act.2 launch notice |
| 4 September 2026 | SEGA Lucky Kuji release information |
| 7 September 2026 | SEGA Lucky Kuji Online release information |
| 17 September 2026 | Tokyo Game Show 2026 exhibition information |
| 17 September 2026 | maimai DX MAGiCAL launch notice |
| 18 September 2026 | Tokyo Game Show 2026 exhibition information |
| 21 October 2026 | SEGA Lucky Kuji Online release information |
| 28 October 2026 | SEGA Lucky Kuji Online release information |

Arcade game releases, Lucky Kuji lottery products and the Tokyo Game Show 2026 presence are the subjects of the mailings. SEGA will contact affected customers individually when the details of the exposed information are confirmed, according to the notice.

## Disclosure chronology

SEGA first raised the question before Arara had confirmed any leak. On 29 October 2026, during checks on its security environment, SEGA asked Arara to verify the safety of the newsletter distribution. Arara replied that no information leak had been confirmed. Arara disclosed the unauthorised access publicly on 1 November 2026. SEGA asked for another check. On 3 November 2026, Arara notified SEGA by email that addresses used for its mailings had leaked externally. Checks continued between 5 and 8 November 2026. During that period SEGA received a formal report from Arara. SEGA published its notice on 9 November.

Newsletters sent through Arara remain suspended while SEGA verifies the exposed information and completes safety checks. The company plans to file a joint report with Arara to Japan's Personal Information Protection Commission, and it states that it will update its notice if new facts that should be made public come to light.

## The Arara platform total

SEGA is one client company in a much larger platform incident. Arara's [third report of 6 November 2026](https://www.arara.com/news/info/20261106_arara), issued through its parent Paycloud Holdings, put the platform-wide total at 81,329,467 deduplicated email addresses. The figure counts email addresses, not people. Arara states that the count is still being examined, and the incident affected 97 servers and up to about 380 client companies. The same figures appear in Paycloud's [third-report filing](https://contents.xj-storage.jp/xcontents/AS71226/0d5f3847/6172/4bcc/bfab/73896dab795d/20261106211906670s.pdf) of 6 November 2026.

The third report splits the total into three parts. Unauthorised access via the Arara Message service accounts for 78,102,937 addresses, while the shared environment first disclosed on 29 October accounts for 2,842,400. A cloud environment identified in the third report, accessed between 28 and 31 October 2026, accounts for 3,249,492. The shared-environment figure was revised down from 3,386,187 in the second report. Added together, the three parts exceed the deduplicated total, because the total removes overlap between the three categories, so the parts cannot simply be added together.

Arara also splits the total by the data attached to each address. Its third report lists 34,285,087 addresses in the email-only category. A further 47,044,380 addresses carry additional attributes, as reported by [Newsflayer](https://newsflayer.com/2026/11/06/arara-message-data-breach/). The attributes vary by client company. Names, gender, dates of birth, telephone numbers, membership numbers and addresses can all appear. Arara states that the service holds no credit card numbers. Other clients have published their own counts inside the same platform total. The Bic Camera group reported about 14.9 million records, Asoview 15,821,184 member records, and Workman up to about 1,450,000 email addresses. [TSN Media](https://tsnmedia.org/arara-message-data-breach/) lists these client disclosures alongside the SEGA and third-report figures.

The earlier AliasFleet article on this incident, [Arara Message breach leaks about 77 million emails](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/arara-message-data-breach), covered the second report of 2 November 2026. The third report raised the total from about 77 million to 81,329,467 and added the newly identified cloud environment.

## Phishing emails from the service

The incident also involved phishing emails sent through the service. Arara reported that up to about 7.13 million emails impersonating credit-card companies were sent from news@arara.com between 28 and 30 October 2026. Subject lines asked recipients to confirm card usage or review billing statements. The messages went to addresses the attacker brought in from outside, not to the client companies' mailing lists. The 7.13 million figure is therefore a count of emails sent, and it is not part of the 81,329,467 leaked addresses.

These phishing emails are the only confirmed abuse of the incident so far. They came from the service's own sending address, news@arara.com, an address recipients had reason to associate with legitimate mail from the platform. Arara advises anyone who received such an email to delete it without opening its links. Anyone who entered card details through one of the messages should contact their card issuer straight away. The guide on [how to check if an email is phishing](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-an-email-is-phishing) covers the checks that apply to messages of this kind.

SEGA's notice carries the same warning in its own terms. It states that SEGA and SEGA Fave never ask for passwords or credit card information by email, and recipients should not open links or attachments in unexpected emails or reply to them.

## The separate SEGA Fave incident

SEGA's notice draws a line between the Arara breach and a separate intrusion in SEGA Fave's arcade infrastructure. The arcade intrusion forced SEGA Fave to suspend its ALL.Net and Aime network services on 1 November 2026. According to SEGA, no personal information was compromised in the arcade server intrusion. The two incidents are separate matters, and SEGA Lucky Kuji Online remains under maintenance as part of safety checks for the arcade intrusion rather than the Arara breach. Neither the victim counts nor the attacks should be combined.

## Measures for affected recipients

SEGA advises recipients of the affected newsletters to treat unexpected emails claiming to come from SEGA, SEGA Fave or Arara with care. Links and attachments in unexpected emails should not be opened. Such emails should not be answered. Messages that ask for passwords or credit card information should be deleted. The company states that it never asks for either by email. The same advice applies to messages claiming to come from Arara, which states that it never asks for passwords or card details by email.

Arara's advice covers the phishing messages directly.

<Callout type="warning" title="Delete the card-company emails from news@arara.com">
An email from news@arara.com sent between 28 and 30 October 2026 with a subject about confirming card usage or a billing statement should be deleted without opening its links. Anyone who entered card details should contact their card issuer straight away.
</Callout>

Recipients can check whether their address appears in known breaches through [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com), which records breaches by email address. The guide on [what to do when your email is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach) covers the steps after a confirmed exposure. The guide on [how phishing uses your leaked email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email) explains how a leaked address and a brand name combine into a convincing phishing message.

The SEGA records contained no passwords, so there is no SEGA password to reset. Anyone who used the same password for another account registered with the leaked address should change the password on that account.

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## AliasFleet and newsletter signups

A newsletter signup hands an email address to a company. The company may hand it on to a delivery provider such as Arara. The subscriber has no way to see that chain. The leak shows what follows when the provider is compromised: the address reaches attackers together with the name of the brand the recipient trusts. AliasFleet provides a separate email alias for each website or service. A newsletter signup then uses an address that belongs only to that service. If that alias appears in a breach, the leak is traceable to the service it was given to, as explained in the guide on [which website leaked my email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/which-website-leaked-my-email), and the alias can be paused or deleted without changing the address used anywhere else. AliasFleet does not prevent a delivery provider from being breached. It does not remove an address from a list that has already leaked.

## Unresolved points

Arara stopped the Arara Message service on 31 October 2026. No restart date has been announced. Resumption depends on identifying the intrusion route, changing credentials, and confirming system safety through an external specialist. Client companies have been asked to reset administrative passwords and API keys. Arara reported the incident to Japan's Personal Information Protection Commission, the police and JIPDEC on 29 October 2026, while the entry point of the intrusion has not been confirmed by Arara or SEGA. No CVE has been named in any primary notice. A [thecybersecguru](https://thecybersecguru.com/news/sega-arara-data-breach-php2shell-analysis/) analysis has linked the intrusion to PHP2Shell vulnerabilities disclosed on 21 October, but that attribution is unconfirmed and neither company has endorsed it, so it is stated here only as an unconfirmed third-party claim. The final platform total is also still open. Arara states that the count is still being examined and that further reports will follow. Until those reports appear, the 81,329,467 figure is the latest confirmed total, dated 6 November 2026. SEGA's 2,196,044 is the latest confirmed client count within it.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data breaches</category><category>Email privacy</category><category>Phishing</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Can Someone Hack Your Email With Your Birth Date?</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-someone-hack-my-email-with-my-date-of-birth</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-someone-hack-my-email-with-my-date-of-birth</guid>
      <description>A birth date alone cannot open an email account. It matters because providers use it in account recovery, and attackers pair it with a name and an address.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A date of birth is a verification detail used in email account recovery, not a credential that opens an inbox. Sign-in still requires the password, plus a second factor where one is set. A birth date alone therefore opens nothing. Its value to an attacker comes from combination. Paired with a name and an email address, it can support a recovery claim and make a phishing message or a phone call more convincing. This article sets out where providers use a birth date as proof, how attackers obtain one, and the measures that stop it being useful.

## What a birth date does and does not do

A birth date is not a secret in the way a password is a secret. People share it on social media, on forms and with services that ask for it at sign-up. It is also short. Only 366 days exist in a year, and the year narrows further once an attacker knows roughly how old a person is. On its own, it is a weak piece of information.

Sign-in is unaffected by it. The sign-in page asks for the password, and it asks for a second factor too when two-factor authentication is turned on. Knowing a birth date changes none of that. The [guide on hacking an email account without a password](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-someone-hack-my-email-without-my-password) sets out the methods that do work, such as stolen passwords and session theft. A birth date is not among them.

Recovery is where a birth date has force. Recovery exists for people who have lost both the password and the second factor, so it has to rely on details the owner can supply from memory. A birth date is one of those details. It is also a detail an attacker can often find. The gap between what recovery accepts and what an attacker can find is the whole problem.

| Use of a date of birth | Result |
| :--- | :--- |
| Sign-in | Nothing changes. A password and a second factor are still required at sign-in, and knowing a birth date changes neither of those two requirements. |
| Account recovery | It counts as one verification detail among several. |
| Phishing | It lends a message or a call credibility. |
| Password reset at a bank | Regulators state it is not valid proof on its own for a password reset. |

<Callout type="info" title="A birth date cannot be changed">
A password can be reset after a breach. A birth date stays valid for life, and it stays useful to an attacker for as long as any service accepts it as a verification detail.
</Callout>

## How a birth date reaches attackers

Breaches are the largest source. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) lists dates of birth among the exposed data in many large breaches, and the scale is large. The Facebook data set dated August 2019 covers 509,458,528 accounts, as HIBP lists, summarised by serus.ai. Names, phone numbers, email addresses, dates of birth, locations, employers, genders and relationship statuses are listed as exposed. The [Facebook breach summary](https://www.serus.ai/data-breaches/facebook/) records that the data was added to the HIBP database on 4 April 2021 and that no passwords are in the data. The absence of passwords does not make the set harmless. Each email address in it sits beside the name and birth date that recovery checks ask for.

The Luxottica leak is another case at the same scale. HIBP lists, as summarised by serus.ai, 77,093,812 accounts. Names, emails, phone numbers, addresses, dates of birth and genders are listed. The [Luxottica breach summary](https://www.serus.ai/data-breaches/luxottica/) notes that the data was taken in March 2021 and leaked in 2023. Because a birth date cannot be changed, the exposure does not fade with time.

Public posts are the second source. People post birthday messages, photos of celebrations and age milestones, and friends and family add to that. A birth date found in a breach can also be checked against a public post, which confirms it. Data brokers are the third source. They collect public records and sell them, and a name plus a rough location is often enough to pull a full birth date from a broker listing. The [guide on how email leads to identity theft](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-leads-to-identity-theft) explains how these pieces join up: one leaked detail leads to another, and the email address is the thread that ties them together.

The [guide on checking whether an email address was leaked](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked) explains how to find out if an address appears in a known breach. That check covers the address, not the birth date directly. The two travel together in the same breach records, so a leaked address is a fair warning that the birth date went with it.

## Account recovery at the main providers

Microsoft is the clearest example. Its recovery form uses a birth date as a verification credential. The [guidance notes for the Microsoft account recovery form](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/accounts-billing/manage/guidance-notes-for-the-microsoft-account-recovery-form) list Birthdate as a field on the form. They tell the user to enter the date of birth in USA format, MM/DD/YYYY. The same page states that the more information a person provides, the better the chances of validating ownership of the account. The form also asks for the full name, the country or region where the account was created, previous passwords and other details. A birth date is one item in that set. It is not the whole test.

Google takes a similar approach with questions rather than a single field. Its [tips to complete account recovery steps](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/7299973?hl=en) tell users to answer as many questions as possible and to take a best guess rather than skipping a question. The page also states that Google never asks for a password or a verification code over email, phone call or message, and that passwords and codes should only be entered at accounts.google.com. Google's own page does not list a date of birth among the questions, so this article does not claim that Google asks for one. What the page does show is that recovery is a test of how many correct details a person can supply.

Apple's current recovery page lists no birth date among its recovery factors. Its [support page for a forgotten Apple Account password](https://support.apple.com/en-hk/102656) lists trusted phone numbers, codes from a recovery contact, the account email address, a credit card CVV, and a recovery key or security keys. A birth date is not listed among them.

The pattern across the three providers is consistent. A birth date is useful to a provider only when nothing stronger is available. Where a stronger factor exists, the provider uses that instead. No provider publishes how much weight a birth date carries in a recovery decision, so this article cannot say how far a birth date alone gets an attacker in a real recovery attempt.

## The view of banks and regulators

Banks treat a date of birth with more caution than email providers do. Regulators have said so in plain terms. The European Banking Authority answered a question about whether a payer's date of birth and place of birth can count as a knowledge element for strong customer authentication under PSD2. Its [final answer in Q and A 2021_5821](https://eba.europa.eu/single-rule-book-qa/qna/view/publicId/2021_5821), published on 30 July 2021, states that date and place of birth cannot constitute a knowledge element under PSD2 and the Delegated Regulation, since these may be accessible by third parties other than the payment service user or the payment service provider. The reasoning is direct: knowledge has to be something only the user knows, and a birth date is not that.

The same reasoning applies beyond banking. A birth date describes a person. It does not belong to them as a secret. Identity documents carry it, records carry it, and data that has already leaked carries it. A system that accepts it as proof is therefore accepting a detail an attacker can obtain through ordinary research. The EBA answer concerns payment authentication, not email recovery, and it should not be read as a rule for email recovery. The logic is the same logic, and email providers are moving the same way.

## Phishing and impersonation

A birth date makes phishing more convincing, and that is where it does the most damage in practice. A phishing message that opens with a name and a correct birth date looks like it comes from a company that knows the recipient. A phone call that quotes a birth date sounds like a support agent who has already verified the caller. The birth date is not the attack. The attack is the message or the call, and the birth date is what makes the target trust it.

The mechanism is simple: a company that holds a birth date is expected to know it. A message that includes it therefore passes a quick check in the reader's mind, and the reader then follows the link or answers the questions that follow. The [guide on how phishing uses a leaked email](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email) sets out how a leaked address is used to target a person. A birth date adds one more correct detail to that targeting. The [guide on checking whether an email is phishing](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-an-email-is-phishing) gives the checks that still work when a message looks right. The checks that still work are the sender address, the link destination, and whether the message asks for a password or a code.

Impersonation at a help desk is another use. A caller who gives the correct name, email address and birth date can sound like the account owner, and a support agent who relies on those three details may accept the claim. This is the same weakness as in the recovery form, applied over the phone. The defence is the same in both cases: a second factor that cannot be recited from a breach record.

## Birth dates as passwords and PINs

Some people use their birth date as a password or a PIN, and that is a separate problem from recovery. A birth date used as a PIN is easy to guess once the birth date is known, and the research on this is old and clear. Bonneau, Preibusch and Anderson studied customer-chosen banking PINs and found that guessing PINs based on the victim's birthday lets a competent thief gain use of a stolen bank card once for every 11 to 18 stolen wallets. The finding is reported in [Bruce Schneier's write-up of the research](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/02/1234_and_birthd.html/). The research dates from 2012, so it should not be read as a current rate. The mechanism has not changed: a PIN built from a birth date falls as soon as the birth date is known.

The same warning applies to passwords. A password that contains a birth date, or that is a birth date with a few extra characters, is weak against anyone who knows the date. [Credential stuffing](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-credential-stuffing-works) is the attack that turns a weak password into a taken account: a password exposed in one breach is tried against other services, and a birth-date password is also easy to guess directly. A birth date should never appear in a password or a PIN, in any form.

A spam email on its own does not give an attacker access either, and the [guide on whether opening a spam email can hack an account](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-opening-a-spam-email-hack-you) explains why. The risk in both cases is what the person does next: clicking a link, entering a password, or giving details to a caller.

## Protection measures

The strongest protection is a second factor that does not depend on personal details. An authenticator app generates a code on a device the owner holds. A passkey proves possession of the device itself. Google states that [passkeys provide the strongest protection against phishing](https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/14124480?hl=en). A passkey cannot be shared, copied, written down, or given away by mistake. It also bypasses the second step where two-step verification is set, because it already proves possession of the device.

The UK National Cyber Security Centre recommends [setting up 2-Step Verification on important accounts](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/setting-2-step-verification-2sv), starting with email, because criminals with access to an inbox can use it to reset passwords on other accounts. The same guidance is repeated in the NCSC advice on [securing user accounts](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/using-online-services-safely/securing-your-users-accounts), which states that turning on two-step verification instantly makes it much harder for an attacker to access an account, even if they know the password. The [guide to setting up two-factor authentication on Gmail](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-set-up-two-factor-authentication-on-gmail) gives the steps for the most widely used email service.

Security questions should be removed where the service allows it. NIST's digital identity guidelines, SP 800-63B-4, prohibit password hints and knowledge-based questions as authenticators, and the [full text of SP 800-63B-4](https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63b-4) is published by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology. Where a service still forces a security question, the answer should not be a real personal detail. A random string stored in a password manager works as an answer, because the question is then answered by something the attacker cannot look up.

CISA's advice on [safeguarding personal data](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/safeguarding-your-data) covers the same ground from the data side: use strong passwords, keep software updated, and limit the personal information shared online. Every detail posted is a detail an attacker no longer has to steal.

## AliasFleet and email aliases

A separate alias for each site reduces what a birth date can be combined with. One email address used everywhere means a breach at any one service exposes the identifier every other service uses, and the birth date from that breach pairs with it. A different alias per site breaks that pairing. A leaked address is used nowhere else. [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides managed aliases that forward to one inbox. Each alias can be paused or removed on its own if it starts receiving spam or appears in a breach.

An alias does not stop a birth date from being used in recovery at a provider that asks for it. That is a limit worth stating plainly. The alias changes the address an attacker holds, not the birth date the provider asks for. The protection comes from the combination: the alias breaks the link between services, and two-factor authentication or a passkey stops the recovery attempt from succeeding. The [guide on using an email alias for account recovery](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery) explains how recovery works when the address on the account is an alias, including which services accept one. [Pricing](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing) sets out the plans, including the free tier of 10 aliases.

## After a birth date is exposed

A birth date cannot be changed. The response is to make it useless, not to hide it. The check is whether the email address appears in a known breach, using Have I Been Pwned. The next step is to turn on app-based two-factor authentication or a passkey on the email account, and the same step is repeated on every account using the address. Then any password or PIN that contains the birth date is changed. Security questions that use personal details are removed too.

If identity theft has already happened, the US Federal Trade Commission runs [IdentityTheft.gov](https://identitytheft.gov), which produces an Identity Theft Report and a personal recovery plan. A credit freeze at the main bureaus stops new accounts being opened in the person's name. A name, an email address and a birth date are the standard starting set for opening an account, which is why a freeze matters. The [guide on whether a home address can be found from an email address](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-someone-find-my-home-address-from-my-email-address) covers a related exposure. The same breach records that carry a birth date often carry an address too. The same protections apply.

A birth date alone opens nothing. A birth date combined with a name and an email address is a verification credential that attackers can use. The fix is not to keep the birth date secret, because that is no longer possible for most people. The fix is to make the birth date worthless as proof, with a second factor the attacker does not hold and an address that does not link every account together.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Security</category><category>Account Recovery</category><category>Identity Theft</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Can You Use an Email Alias for Netflix?</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-netflix</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-netflix</guid>
      <description>An email alias works for Netflix when the address is permanent and forwards reliably. Netflix now requires one unique email for each adult profile.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[An email alias for Netflix is a forwarding address that receives mail for one profile and passes it to a real inbox. It works when the address is permanent. Netflix began requiring a separate email address for each adult profile on 15 June 2026. A household needs one alias per profile. The address must stay active for the life of the profile, because Netflix sends sign-in codes, password resets and two-factor codes to it.

A Netflix spokesperson confirmed the change to Ars Technica. The spokesperson said: "This sign-in update is a permanent change that started rolling out on June 15, 2026," as reported by [The Sun](https://www.the-sun.com/tech/16607066/netflix-streaming-account-sharing-pop-up/). Eleven outlets reported the confirmation, including [TechSpot](https://www.techspot.com/community/topics/netflix-now-wants-every-profile-to-have-its-own-email-address-annoying-users.297949/). The Ars Technica original was not read directly. No Ars Technica URL was returned by search, and none was guessed. The rollout is phased. Not every subscriber has seen the prompt yet.

## The June 2026 change

Before June 2026, one Netflix account held up to five profiles under a single email address and a single password, as described by [The Week](https://www.theweek.in/news/entertainment/2026/06/29/netflix-account-sharing-policy-update.html). That structure ended in stages. The new rule assigns a distinct email address to each adult profile, and each profile signs in with its own credentials, as reported by [tbreak](https://tbreak.com/netflix-unique-email-profile-requirement/). Children's profiles are exempt. [Galaxus](https://www.galaxus.ch/en/page/no-more-anonymous-profiles-netflix-introduces-mandatory-email-addresses-for-shared-accounts-43119) reports the exemption, and [Dim Sum Daily](https://www.dimsumdaily.hk/netflix-requires-email-for-each-profile-from-15th-june/) records the same start date of 15 June 2026.

The rollout is phased. [Eastern Herald](https://easternherald.com/2026/06/29/netflix-email-per-profile-account-sharing-login-requirement/) reports that the update reached subscribers over time rather than all at once, and that the child exemption applied from the start. Not every account has seen the prompt yet. The prompt appears when a profile is selected in the app or on the website, and [Men's Journal](https://www.mensjournal.com/entertainment/netflix-quietly-makes-frustrating-change-for-those-sharing-accounts) quotes its wording as follows: "Personalised new ways to enjoy Netflix are coming. Add an email address to your profile for easier sign-in access, to recover your account, get personalised suggestions and more." The wording varies between reports.

No standalone Netflix policy page states the rule. [Cord Cutters News](https://cord-cutters.gadgethacks.com/news/netflix-profile-email-requirement-turns-shared-accounts-into-individual-logins/) notes that the Help Center describes a profile email as a setting for secondary adult profiles, without publishing a broad rule that every profile must hold a separate address. The mandate rests on two sources. One is the spokesperson confirmation. The other is the prompt subscribers see in the app. The change follows the password-sharing crackdown Netflix began in May 2023, which [The Economic Times](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/new-updates/netflix-makes-major-change-to-shared-accounts-heres-all-you-need-to-know/articleshow/132048794.cms) describes as the latest step in the reshaping of account-sharing rules. [TechFyle](https://techfyle.com/netflix-unique-email-per-profile-requirement-permanent-2026/) places the crackdown start in May 2023 and records 50 million paying subscribers added within 18 months. No price change has been announced. The household rule did not change either: an account may not be shared outside a Netflix Household, defined by Netflix as devices connected to the internet at the main place where the account holder watches Netflix.

## Use of the profile email

A profile email is part of the sign-in system. Netflix Help Center states that members who add an email address to a secondary profile can use that email to sign in. After an email is added to a secondary profile, Netflix sends a 6-digit code to that address, and the code must be entered before sign-in, according to Ars Technica and Netflix Help Center as reported by [The Gray Vine](https://thegrayvine.com/threads/netflix-now-wants-an-email-for-every-profile-heres-how-to-comply-without-falling-for-a-scam.76288/). The address then carries password resets. A profile owner with a linked email resets the profile password and receives two-factor codes without involving the primary account holder. Sign-in on new devices, display settings and two-factor authentication are managed separately for each profile. Recovery through an alias is covered in [Can You Use an Email Alias for Account Recovery](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery), and two-factor codes at an alias are covered in [Can You Receive Two-Factor Authentication Codes at an Email Alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-receive-two-factor-authentication-codes-at-an-email-alias).

Billing stays with the primary account email. Billing notices and payment matters go to that address, not to a profile email. A profile alias handles sign-in codes, password resets and two-factor codes for one profile only, and nothing else. Netflix's privacy policy states that email addresses may be shared with marketing and advertising partners, and adding an email can trigger promotional messages that the recipient can unsubscribe from, as reported by [gHacks](https://www.ghacks.net/2026/06/29/netflix-requires-unique-email-addresses-for-each-profile-adding-login-steps-to-shared-accounts/). An alias limits that exposure. Netflix holds the alias rather than the real inbox address, and promotional mail arrives at the alias where it can be filtered or stopped.

## One address for each profile

One alias for a whole account does not meet the rule. Three adult profiles need three distinct addresses, one attached to each profile. Netflix treats each address as a separate sign-in identity, and two profiles cannot share one address. Five adult profiles need five aliases. The same count applies when one person keeps several profiles for organising viewing, one for documentaries and one for films, because Netflix applies the rule to the profile rather than to the person behind it. A separate alias for each service also keeps a leak in one place from reaching the rest. That principle is set out in [Different Email for Every Website](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/different-email-for-every-website) and in [How Email Aliases Actually Work](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work). The safety of the model in general is covered in [Are Email Aliases Safe](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe).

| Address type | Receives mail long term | Hides the real inbox address | Separate sign-in identity |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Gmail plus addressing | Yes | No | Yes |
| Managed forwarding alias | Yes, while active | Yes | Yes |
| Short-lived inbox | No | Yes | Yes, until it expires |

## Permanence of the address

A short-lived inbox gives out an address that stops receiving mail after a set period. That design fails the Netflix test. The address on a profile must receive a sign-in code months after it was added, and it must receive a password reset link whenever the profile owner needs one. An expired address does neither. Cord Cutters News advises against addresses that may be lost later, because account recovery and profile communications may depend on that address. The profile keeps working only while the address keeps receiving mail. Once the address stops working, the sign-in code route closes, and the password reset route closes with it. Netflix has not stated what recovery path exists for a profile whose email address has expired. No documented fallback exists.

Control matters as much as permanence. An address on a service that deletes inactive inboxes carries the same risk, as does an address tied to an account that gets closed. The test is simple. The address must still receive mail a year from now, and the profile owner must still be able to open the inbox it forwards to. A disabled alias stops forwarding mail. Spam sent to a disabled alias never reaches the inbox, and that is the purpose of the kill switch. The same property strands a Netflix profile. A disabled alias stops receiving sign-in codes, password reset links and two-factor codes, and the profile sits behind an address that no longer delivers mail. Disabling an alias stops its forwarding by design. An alias used for Netflix should be disabled only after the profile email has changed to a different address, or when the profile itself is no longer used. Both questions have separate guides. Whether a site can detect an alias is covered in [Can Websites Tell You Are Using an Email Alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-websites-tell-you-are-using-an-email-alias), and whether a second address is needed at all is covered in [Do You Need a Second Email Address](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/do-you-need-a-second-email-address).

## Plus addressing

Plus addressing is the free option Gmail provides. A plus sign and a tag are added to the username, so an address such as name+netflix@gmail.com delivers to the same inbox as name@gmail.com. No setup is needed. [AIEmaily](https://aiemaily.com/blog/gmail-plus-addressing) describes the mechanism: Gmail delivers mail sent to a tagged address to the normal inbox, and the tag stays visible in the To header. [EmailAlias.io](https://emailalias.io/blog/gmail-aliases/) adds that Gmail has supported the behaviour for well over a decade, and that tagged variants can be created on the fly without limit. [BounceCheck](https://bouncecheck.email/blog/plus-addressing-email) notes that Gmail has supported plus addressing since 2008, and that tagged addresses are receive-only. The tag does not hide the real address. The base username sits in plain sight inside every tagged variant, and anyone who sees the tagged address can strip the tag and reach the base address. Replies go out from the primary address instead. The comparison with a forwarding alias is set out in [Email Plus Addressing vs Aliases](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/email-plus-addressing-vs-aliases), and the limits of Gmail's built-in approach are set out in [Gmail Plus Addressing Limitations](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/gmail-plus-addressing-limitations). Some signup forms reject the plus sign outright. That rejection is a property of the form, not of Gmail. Netflix is not reported to reject plus addresses.

## Email aliases for Netflix

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides managed forwarding aliases. Each alias is a separate address that forwards mail to a verified destination inbox, and each alias can be paused or disabled on its own without affecting the others. The free plan covers a household. The free plan includes 10 active forwarding aliases, 3 auto-provisioned personal subdomains, 1 verified destination inbox and 100 MB of monthly forwarding bandwidth, as listed on the AliasFleet homepage. Five adult profiles fit inside it. Aliases persist until the account holder disables them, and mail sent to an alias keeps arriving at the destination inbox for as long as the alias stays active. AliasFleet is not a short-lived inbox service. It does not change the Netflix rule, and it does not remove the limit above: a disabled alias stops forwarding Netflix codes for the profile it belongs to.

## What Netflix has not confirmed

The rule itself is confirmed. The details around it are still settling. The spokesperson confirmation, the rollout date of 15 June 2026, the exemption for children's profiles and the 6-digit verification code are reported by multiple outlets and traced to Ars Technica and Netflix Help Center. Three questions have no public answer yet. Netflix has not stated the enforcement timeline for profiles without an email, the recovery path for a profile whose email address has stopped working, or whether any class of email address is rejected. No public evidence shows Netflix rejecting alias domains, and no test of alias domains against Netflix sign-up was found. Acceptance of a particular alias provider remains untested.

<Callout type="warning" title="Correction">
A claim circulated in June 2026 that Netflix would require multi-factor authentication for all subscribers from 7 July. That claim is false for regular subscribers. Ars Technica clarified that the multi-factor requirement applies only to business partner accounts, not to home subscriptions. The false claim still circulates alongside the real rule.
</Callout>]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Aliases</category><category>Netflix</category><category>Privacy</category><category>Streaming</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email for a Home Security System</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-a-home-security-system</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-a-home-security-system</guid>
      <description>A monitored alarm account holds the home address and emergency contacts. A dedicated alias, a unique password and two-factor authentication keep it separate.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Protecting email for a home security system means giving the monitored alarm account a dedicated alias, a unique password, two-factor authentication, and a tested recovery route. The account holds the home address, the armed state of the system, camera and sensor status, and emergency contacts. A breach of the provider or a leak elsewhere can therefore expose the household, its address and its alarm state, not just an inbox.

## The April 2026 ADT breach

In April 2026, attackers accessed ADT systems and took customer data. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) counted about 5.5 million unique email addresses in the leaked dataset. ADT confirmed that limited customer and prospective customer data was accessed, without confirming a total number, while the attackers claimed more than 10 million records, a figure that ADT did not confirm.

ADT stated that no payment information was accessed. It also stated that customer security systems were not affected or compromised. The confirmed scope still mattered: names, phone numbers, emails, and addresses were accessed. Dates of birth and the last four digits of Social Security numbers or Tax IDs appeared in a small percentage of cases.

A caller who knows the name, the phone number, and the home address, and who knows the household uses ADT, sounds legitimate. ADT warned customers to stay alert for phishing emails, phone calls, and text messages from people claiming to represent ADT. The [aftermath coverage](https://www.nestorderly.com/adt-breach-aftermath-scam-warnings-october-2026) and the [class action summary](https://openclassactions.com/lawsuits/data-breaches/adt-data-breach-class-action-lawsuit.php) both record the same confirmed scope. A dedicated alias limits exposure to one address used for one service, and a later leak then points to that provider alone. The guide to [checking if an email was leaked](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked) explains how to read the results of such a check.

## Contents of the alarm account

A monitored alarm account differs from a smart speaker account. The provider holds the monitoring address. It holds emergency contact names and phone numbers. It also holds the live state of sensors and cameras. [ADT help on alerts](https://help.adt.com/article/adt-Smart-Home-Security-Alerts-and-Notifications) describes alerts for burglar, fire, and emergency alarms, for sensors and devices in trouble, and for arm and disarm events, including who armed or disarmed the system.

The same address receives the alerts themselves. ADT enrols customers automatically in four system-generated alerts on the default email address. The All Alarms alert requires at least one notification method at all times. An old inbox that is no longer checked receives alerts that nobody reads, and the alarm keeps sounding while the warning sits unseen.

The address also carries account information such as permits, billing, and updates. It carries alerts about alarms, troubled devices, camera activity, and custom events such as a door opening. [ADT help on changing the notification email](https://help.adt.com/article/adt-Smart-Home-Security-Changing-Your-Email-Address-for-Notifications) lists those uses directly. The signup email is the address the alarm system talks to, every day, for as long as the system is installed.

<Callout type="warning" title="Warning">
Alerts, login codes, and password resets all go to the address on the account. A missed alarm alert is the direct result.
</Callout>

## Credential stuffing and Ring

The risk sits in reuse, not in the alarm hardware. An email address used at signup often appears on other accounts. One of those accounts leaks. Passwords exposed in that breach are then tried against other services. That method is credential stuffing. The guide to [how credential stuffing works](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-credential-stuffing-works) explains the mechanism in full.

Ring is an example: in December 2019, attackers reached Ring cameras through credential stuffing and spoke to people through the cameras in their homes. Ring stated that the attackers gained access through credential stuffing. It also stated that no unauthorised access to Ring systems or networks was detected during the attacks on individual customer accounts.

Ring then made two-factor authentication mandatory for all accounts on 18 February 2020. Ring President Leila Rouhi said the second layer of verification became mandatory for all users when they log in. Users receive a one-time six-digit code via the email address listed on the account or by text message each time they log in. [BleepingComputer reported the announcement](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ring-forces-2fa-on-all-users-to-secure-cameras-from-hackers/) with that date and that code method.

The email address can also lead back to the home. An address that appears in breach data alongside a name can be connected to a home address through data broker records and other public sources. The guide to [whether someone can find a home address from an email address](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-someone-find-my-home-address-from-my-email-address) covers that chain. For an alarm account, the connection runs the other way too. Anyone inside the account already has the home address and the alarm state, because both sit in the account record itself.

## A dedicated alias

The setup that fits an alarm account is one dedicated email alias, used for the alarm system and nothing else. The alias forwards to a real inbox that is checked daily. Every alert, every login code, and every password reset for the alarm account arrives at that one address. Mail for no other service arrives there.

Separation also identifies the source of a problem. If the alias starts receiving spam or appears in a breach, the source is the alarm provider or its supply chain. The alias can then be replaced without touching any other account. That is the same separation used for other signups. The guide to [protecting email when setting up smart home devices](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-setting-up-smart-home-devices) covers device ecosystems and gadgets rather than a monitored account. This article covers the monitored alarm account, a different account with different stakes. The same principle applies when [signing up for a password manager](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-a-password-manager) or [signing up for a VPN](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-a-vpn): one alias per service, so a leak in one place stays in one place.

One rule for the alarm alias does not apply to aliases for shops or trials. The alarm alias stays live permanently. A shop alias can be paused or deleted when it starts collecting spam. An alarm alias cannot be paused. Pausing it means missing an alarm alert when it matters most. Deleting it means losing the account. The alias is created once, at signup, and kept.

## Passwords and two-factor authentication

The alarm account needs a password that is used nowhere else. The [FTC guidance on home security cameras](https://consumer.ftc.gov/articles/how-secure-your-home-security-cameras) advises choosing a strong password that would be hard for a stranger to guess. It advises against using a password that has been used before for another website or account. The same guidance advises looking for two-factor authentication for the cloud account, which requires something in addition to a password, like a verification code sent by email or generated from an authenticator app.

Two-factor authentication is now standard on the main alarm providers. On two of them, it is not optional. Ring made it mandatory for all accounts in February 2020. SimpliSafe requires 2-Step Verification on every account. [SimpliSafe support](https://support.simplisafe.com/articles/account-billing/2step-verification-for-simplisafe-accounts) states that it is a required element for a SimpliSafe account and is enabled when the account is first set up. It also states that it cannot be turned off.

The email address matters here because the second factor often travels by email. Ring sends its six-digit code to the email address on the account. SimpliSafe sends a device verification email to the account address on any new login, and the user clicks the Verify Device button in it. That happens on any new login, or on a login renewal after about 30 days. If the address on the account is an inbox that is not checked, the login cannot be completed. The guide to [receiving two-factor authentication codes at an email alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-receive-two-factor-authentication-codes-at-an-email-alias) explains how forwarded codes work in practice.

Where the alarm provider offers an authenticator app or a security key as the second factor, that option is stronger than a code by email or text. A code sent by email depends on the email account itself. [CISA cyber guidance](https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-guidance-small-businesses) states that any form of MFA is better than no MFA. It states that any form of MFA, like SMS text messages or authenticator codes, will raise the cost of attack and will reduce risk.

## Recovery and household access

The recovery path is tested at setup. A password reset for the alarm account goes to the address on the account. If that address is an old inbox, a work inbox from a former job, or an alias that was later deleted, the reset never arrives. The account then cannot be recovered without the provider's help. The guide to [using an email alias for account recovery](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery) covers the general case. The alarm account has a sharper version of the same problem, because a missed reset can lock the household out of its own alarm.

The account holder signs out of the alarm app and requests a password reset. The reset email should arrive at the alias and forward to the inbox that is checked daily, with no delay beyond normal delivery. The account holder then signs back in and confirms that the login verification code arrives too. That test takes a few minutes. It proves the whole chain: the alias forwards, the inbox receives, and the account can be recovered.

Household access belongs in the provider's own sharing feature, not in a shared login. SimpliSafe requires 2-Step Verification on the account email and offers multi-factor authentication through registered phone numbers, as described on [SimpliSafe account security help](https://support.simplisafe.com/en_GB/articles/app-support/securing-your-simplisafe-account). Ring requires the six-digit code for every user on an account, including shared users. One login shared between household members means one password and one email address protecting the whole house, with no separate access for anyone else. It also means no way to remove one person's access without changing the login for everyone.

## Changing the account email

Changing the account email later is possible, but the route differs by provider. It is not always self-service. Getting the address right at signup avoids that work entirely.

| Provider | Account email change | Notification email change |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| ADT | Contact support through chat for account and marketing email | Change in the ADT+ app or the plus.adt.com portal, under My Profile |
| SimpliSafe | Change only through the SimpliSafe Online Account in a web browser, not in the mobile app | No separate notification email; verification goes to the account email |

ADT help on changing the notification email gives the ADT routes. [SimpliSafe help on updating an email address](https://support.simplisafe.com/en_GB/articles/account-billing/how-to-update-your-email-address-for-your-simplisafe-account) gives the SimpliSafe route. Other providers differ, and each provider's own help pages give its route.

## AliasFleet and the alarm account

AliasFleet provides managed email aliases that forward to a real inbox. An alias created for the alarm system forwards alarm alerts, login codes, and password resets to the inbox the account holder checks daily. The real address is never given to the alarm provider. The alias is a permanent forwarding address, not a short-lived inbox, and it stays active for as long as the alarm system is installed.

AliasFleet does not provide the alarm system, the monitoring, or the two-factor authentication on the alarm account. Those remain the provider's responsibility. The alias only protects the email address used at signup. [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) lists the plans and the free tier on its homepage.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Home Security</category><category>Email Aliases</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Signing Up for Ride-Hailing</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-ride-hailing-apps</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-ride-hailing-apps</guid>
      <description>Ride-hailing accounts hold payment details, trip history and location. One alias per ride app keeps receipts contained and the account recoverable.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A ride-hailing account is a payment account with a location history. Signup asks for a name, email address, phone number and payment method, and the app records every pickup, drop-off, date, time, distance and fare. It receives the receipts, trip confirmations, password resets and change notices. The practical protection is one alias per ride app, tied to a personal inbox, with no work or university address used at signup.

## Data collected by ride-hailing apps

[Uber's privacy overview](https://www.uber.com/global/en/privacy/overview/) lists account information (name, email, phone number, payment method, profile picture) and trip information (payment details, amount charged, date and time, requested pickup and drop-off addresses, distance travelled). Location data is collected from ride request until completion, and while the app runs in the foreground. Precise location data from a driver's device during a trip is linked to the rider's account, even when the rider has not enabled precise location collection.

[Lyft's privacy policy](https://www.lyft.com/privacy) describes the same categories: account creation collects name, email address, phone number, birth date and payment information, and ride information includes date, time, destination, distance, route and payment. Lyft retains transactional information such as rides and payments for at least seven years, for accounting and tax purposes.

| Data | Examples |
| :--- | :--- |
| Account details | Name, email, phone number, payment method |
| Trip details | Date and time, pickup and drop-off addresses, distance, fare |
| Location | From ride request until completion |

The email address is the account key: the app uses it for receipts and trip summaries, account change confirmations, and password reset links. A rider who loses access to that address loses the main route back into the account, and the choice of address at signup carries more weight than it appears to carry at the time.

## Ride-hailing breaches

Ride-hailing email addresses have already been exposed at scale by two of the largest apps in the sector. The email address was among the first fields taken in both cases, because it sits in the account record next to the name and phone number. The trip data taken in the Careem case is the second risk: a ride account holds a record of where the account holder travels and when. An address exposed in either breach can be used for phishing mail naming the app, the city and the trip.

### Uber breach of 2016

In October 2016, two people outside Uber accessed user data stored on a third-party cloud service the company used, including the names, email addresses and mobile phone numbers of 57 million riders and drivers in total, including around 600,000 drivers in the United States whose licence numbers were also taken. Uber did not disclose the incident until November 2017, more than a year later, and paid the two people $100,000 in exchange for assurances that the data had been deleted.

Uber's chief executive at the time, Dara Khosrowshahi, stated in the disclosure that there was no indication trip location history, credit card numbers, bank account numbers or dates of birth had been downloaded. The disclosure is covered in detail by [eWeek](https://www.eweek.com/security/uber-admits-it-hid-massive-data-breach-of-57m-users-and-drivers/) and by [The Hacker News](https://www.thehackernews.com/2017/11/uber-hack-data-breach.html?m=1).

In September 2018, Uber agreed to pay $148 million to settle with the attorneys general of all 50 US states and the District of Columbia, the largest multi-state data breach settlement at the time. The settlement is described by the [Jeffer Mangels Butler and Mitchell cybersecurity team](https://cybersecurity.jmbm.com/2018/10/01/lessons-from-the-record-setting-uber-data-breach-settlement/) and by the [Business Times](https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/companies-markets/transport-logistics/uber-pays-us148m-over-data-breach-latest-image-boosting-move). The UK Information Commissioner's Office fined Uber £385,000 and the Dutch Data Protection Authority fined it €600,000, as reported by [National Technology News](https://nationaltechnology.co.uk/Uber_Fined_%C2%A3900k_Over_Data_Breach.php).

### Careem breach of 2018

Careem, the ride-hailing service operating across the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia including Pakistan, disclosed a breach on 23 April 2018. Careem became aware on 14 January 2018 that criminals had gained access to its systems and took the names, email addresses, phone numbers and trip data of 14 million customers and 558,000 drivers. Careem stated that passwords and credit card details were held on a separate third-party server and were not taken. The disclosure is reported by [Dawn](https://www.dawn.com/news/1403401/careem-users-personal-data-compromised-in-massive-data-breach) and by [Gulf News](https://www.gulfnews.com/technology/over-14m-careem-customers-data-stolen-by-cybercriminals-1.2210200).

## Signup address risks

Most riders sign up with the address already used everywhere else, which creates three problems, the first being correlation: the same address on a ride app, a bank account, a shopping account and a social account lets any one breach connect the accounts together, and a list of addresses from a ride app breach is also a list of people who use that app in the cities where it operates. [A separate address for every service](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/different-email-for-every-website) breaks that link, because each service holds a different address.

The second problem is the work address. A work or university address belongs to the employer or the institution, not to the account holder. It is deactivated when employment ends or the course finishes, and later mail to it goes nowhere. A ride account registered to that address then has no working recovery address. Password resets, account change confirmations and support replies all fail, leaving the rider to prove ownership through support with a phone number and a payment method as the only remaining links. The same reasoning applies to banking and other long-lived accounts, so the [question of whether a second email address is needed](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/do-you-need-a-second-email-address) is best answered before signup, not after a lockout.

The third problem is volume. Ride apps send a receipt for every trip, plus promotions and service updates. On a main personal address that mail mixes with everything else, and a compromised address means the spam and phishing that follows a breach lands in the inbox that matters most. A dedicated address keeps that mail in one place, where it can be filtered, muted or cut off.

<Callout type="warning" title="Work address on a ride account">
A ride account on a work address should be moved to a personal address or a dedicated alias while the work address still works, because recovery then depends on the phone number and the support process.
</Callout>

## One alias per ride app

The setup is one alias for each ride app, each forwarding to the same personal inbox: Uber gets one alias, Lyft gets another, Careem gets a third. The addresses differ, the inbox is the same, and the rider reads all of the mail in one place.

If Uber is breached, the exposed address is the Uber alias, which no other service holds, so it reveals nothing about the rider's other accounts. The alias can be paused or replaced, and the Uber account can be moved to a fresh alias. The recovery path stays open as long as the alias forwards to an inbox the rider controls.

Receipts and trip confirmations arrive at the ride alias, and a filter there sorts them into a folder or labels them without any rule touching the main inbox. If one app starts sending unwanted mail, that alias can be paused while the others keep working. The guide to [what to do when an alias starts getting spam](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-an-alias-starts-getting-spam) covers the steps for an alias that starts attracting spam.

Email two-factor codes also work through an alias, forwarding to the destination inbox like any other message. The guide to [receiving two-factor codes at an email alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-receive-two-factor-authentication-codes-at-an-email-alias) covers the timing and the cases where an app insists on SMS. An alias does not replace a password or a second factor; it limits what a breach exposes. [Credential stuffing](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-credential-stuffing-works) still works when a password is reused across services, whatever address is on the account, so a unique password for the ride account matters as much as the address does.

Some apps reject alias addresses at signup, usually targeting the domain rather than the alias itself. The [guide to services that refuse alias addresses](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/when-a-service-wont-accept-your-alias-email) explains the common causes and the workarounds. When an app refuses the alias, the fallback is a dedicated personal address used only for that app, kept separate from the main address.

## Changing the address on an existing account

A rider who already signed up with a personal or work address can change it in the app's account settings without creating a new account, and the app verifies the new address before the change takes effect.

Uber's help pages describe the process: the rider opens the app menu, taps Settings, taps the bar showing name, phone number and email, chooses the information to change, makes the change and saves. Uber sends a confirmation code to the new email address for entry in the app. A notification email goes to the old address, as described on [Uber's help page for updating a phone number or email](https://help.uber.com/en/riders/article/i-cant-update-my-phone-number-or-email?nodeId=3670ef6e-8bd7-4738-80f4-4980f16272b9).

The order of steps matters. The new alias is created and tested before the change, with a test message confirming the forwarding works, so the verification code arrives somewhere the rider can read it. Only then is the address on the ride account changed, with the old address left in place until the new address is confirmed, because the confirmation code goes to the new address and the notification goes to the old one.

## Account recovery and two-factor codes

The email address on a ride account is also the recovery address: a forgotten password is reset through a link sent to that address, and a changed phone number is confirmed through a code sent to it. A rider who can no longer read mail at that address has lost the simplest recovery route. The account then depends on support verification.

The [guide to email aliases and account recovery](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery) covers the general rules. The alias must forward to an inbox the account holder controls, and the destination inbox must stay accessible. The alias is only as reliable as the inbox behind it, so a destination inbox with its own two-factor authentication and a recovery method is part of the setup.

A rider who suspects the address on a ride account has appeared in a breach can check it against [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com), which lists the Uber 2016 breach. A match does not mean the ride account was taken over, but it does mean the address is in circulation, and it is a reason to change the password and move the account to a fresh alias. The guide to [email breaches and password breaches](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/email-breach-and-password-breach) covers the difference between the two.

## Aliases from AliasFleet

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides managed, persistent email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox. A rider creates one alias per ride app, for example one for Uber and one for Careem, each forwarding receipts, trip confirmations and password resets to the same inbox. An alias that starts receiving spam can be paused without affecting the others, and a breached alias can be replaced while the account moves to a fresh address. AliasFleet does not store the rider's password, does not replace two-factor authentication, and does not prevent a ride app itself from being breached. It keeps the address on each account separate. A breach of one app does not expose the address used for the others. [Pricing](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing) starts with a free tier of 10 active aliases.

## Limits of the approach

An alias is not a complete protection for a ride account. The app still holds the phone number, the payment details, the location history and the trip record, and none of that changes when the email address changes. A breach of the app exposes the trip data regardless of which address is on the account, as the Careem case showed. The alias limits the exposure of the email address itself and keeps the rider's accounts from being linked through a single shared address. It does not stop the app collecting the data, or phishing mail that uses details from a breach. The remaining controls are a unique password, two-factor authentication where the app offers it, and a check of known breaches. The guide to [whether email aliases are safe](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe) covers what aliases do and do not protect against.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Ride-Hailing</category><category>Email Aliases</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Maru-Jan breach exposed 1.85 million emails, passwords</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/signaltalk-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/signaltalk-data-breach</guid>
      <description>SignalTalk confirmed that a Maru-Jan breach exposed the email addresses and passwords of all 1,855,578 members, downloaded by 4 November 2026.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The SignalTalk data breach is the unauthorised download of the email addresses and passwords of all 1,855,578 members of Maru-Jan, the online mahjong service operated by SignalTalk Inc. SignalTalk disclosed the breach on 7 November 2026, three days after the download, and resumed the service the same day. The leaked items were email addresses and passwords only. Credit card numbers were not part of the leak, because SignalTalk does not hold them.

Two documents carry the disclosure. The first is the [company notice published on 7 November 2026](https://prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/000000136.000009867.html), timed 16:30 JST. The second is the [member-facing explanation on the Maru-Jan site](https://www.maru-jan.com/2026information.html), updated at 16:37 the same day. Japanese trade press [reported the announcement the same day](https://www.4gamer.net/games/015/G001524/20261107002/index_2.html), [Toyo Keizai republished the release in full](https://toyokeizai.net/ud/pressrelease/6aeee252126217ada1000004), and the company notice is the primary source for every fact in this article.

## Download, disclosure and resumption

SignalTalk said data including member information was downloaded externally by around 15:00 on Wednesday 4 November 2026, after unauthorised access that abused a function of the company's management system. The notice names no vulnerability, product or attacker. It also says nothing about how the access was first detected, and it gives no date for the first discovery. Three days passed between the download and the disclosure on 7 November, so the notice leaves members unable to tell how long an attacker held the data before the warning arrived.

After the discovery, the company put the service into emergency maintenance, suspending game logins and the web member page while the work went on. The service resumed at 16:00 on Saturday 7 November 2026, the same day SignalTalk disclosed the breach. SignalTalk apologised for the wait during maintenance and for the leak.

SignalTalk said the intrusion route has been identified, and countermeasures have been applied to the part of the system that was abused. The work continues past resumption. The company listed continuing checks of servers, the management system and business PCs, stronger monitoring for unauthorised access, a review of information management, and continued investigation of weaknesses beyond the one already found. Further findings and progress are to be reported on the official site.

## Records in the leaked set

The scope is the whole membership. SignalTalk put the number at 1,855,578 members, and the notice states the scope as every member of the service. An email address was affected where a member had registered one. Email addresses and passwords are the confirmed leaked items, and the notice itemises nothing else.

How the passwords were stored is not stated. SignalTalk did not say whether they were plaintext, hashed, salted or stretched, and no secondary source read for this article adds that detail. The distinction matters, because plaintext passwords can be used at once while properly hashed passwords take far more work to crack. Members cannot assume the safer case, since the notice does not state it. The company's own instruction points the same way: every member was asked to change the password, which is the instruction for passwords treated as usable.

Credit card numbers were not part of the leak. SignalTalk does not hold them. That single fact removes payment card numbers from the exposed data entirely, because a company cannot leak card numbers it never collected. No other data types appear in the company's list. Names, addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth and payment data are not mentioned, and this article does not claim they leaked or that they did not. The notice is silent on those items, and silence in a first disclosure is not evidence either way.

Misuse is unconfirmed in either direction. The notice says neither that the leaked data has been used, published or sold, nor that it has not. It also contains no statement about a report to Japan's Personal Information Protection Commission or to police.

## Response and compensation

Members were told to change the Maru-Jan password to one not used on any other service, and to change the same password on any other service where it had been reused. They were also told to beware of suspicious mail impersonating Maru-Jan. Old passwords still work for login, the company noted, and members were asked not to keep using them. Password changes are made from [the official Maru-Jan member page](https://www.maru-jan.com/sys/member/service.php?mode=change), and the company warned members against reaching that page through links in mail.

Takafumi Kaya, SignalTalk's president and Maru-Jan development lead, signed the apology in the notice. Kaya said the company had emailed members about security measures shortly before the incident, telling them the service was safe to use. That message asked for trust, he said, and the breach broke it.

As an apology, each member was offered 3,000 points, worth 3,000 yen. The points are claimed from the points claim page on the Maru-Jan site, and the claim deadline is 24:00 on Friday 20 November 2026. The offer is compensation for the incident, not a security measure. Claiming it does not change the password advice.

Taken together, the response had four parts: fix the abused system, resume the service, tell members what to change, and offer compensation.

## Credential stuffing risk

Every member is in the leaked list, not only active players. The list is the full membership record, so it holds the addresses and passwords of people who may not have opened the service recently as well as regular players.

An email address on its own is mainly a phishing risk, and a password on its own is a risk only to the account it belongs to. Together the two are a different problem. The address identifies the person, and the password can be tried against other services where the same combination was reused. That practice is called credential stuffing. It works because password reuse is common. With 1,855,578 matching pairs, an attacker can test them against mail providers, shopping sites, banks and social networks, and each reused password that matches opens another account.

The phishing risk follows directly from the leak. SignalTalk warned that mail impersonating Maru-Jan may arrive at the leaked addresses. A message naming the service, referring to the breach and linking to a fake password change page is easy to build from the public facts, and the leaked addresses give the sender a real audience. The company's advice covers this: members should not follow links in mail claiming to be from Maru-Jan, and password changes should be made from the official site. The wider pattern is set out in [how phishing uses a leaked email address](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email).

## Member password changes and inbox checks

The company's instructions set the order of action. The Maru-Jan password comes first: a new password, not used on any other service, set from the official member page. The same password should then be changed on every other service where it was used, starting with the email account itself, because that account is the recovery route for most other accounts.

Members can also check whether the Maru-Jan email address appears in other known breaches. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) lists breaches by email address and shows which incidents exposed a given address, so a member can see every breach tied to that address. At the time of writing, no Have I Been Pwned listing for this breach existed. That is expected three days after disclosure, so members should check again once the breach is added.

The inbox needs watching for mail impersonating Maru-Jan. Any message about the breach, the password change or the 3,000 points that asks the reader to click a link should be treated as suspicious, and the action should be done from the official site instead. The points claim deadline of 20 November 2026 is a detail a forged message can copy. Urgency in a message is not evidence that the message is genuine.

<Callout type="warning" title="Do not use links in breach mail">
SignalTalk warned members to beware of suspicious mail impersonating Maru-Jan. Password changes should be made from the official Maru-Jan site, reached directly, not through a link in mail claiming to be from the service.
</Callout>

Two limits apply to the advice. A new Maru-Jan password protects the Maru-Jan account, but it does nothing about copies of the old password already held by the attacker. The reused copies elsewhere must also change, for that reason. The company has not said how the passwords were stored, so no member can judge from the notice how quickly the passwords can be used. The general steps for a breached address are set out in [what to do when an email is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach), and the password question is covered in [does changing your password stop hackers](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/does-changing-your-password-stop-hackers).

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## AliasFleet and breached email addresses

AliasFleet provides a separate email alias for each website a user signs up to. One address is used in one place. If an address used only for Maru-Jan appeared in a later breach, the source of the leak would be identifiable from the address itself. That alias could then be paused or replaced, without changing the address used anywhere else. AliasFleet does not prevent a breach at a service. It does not protect a password reused across services either. What it does is limit the spread of a leaked address, because the address is not the same address the user gives to other sites. The password advice in this article still applies in full to AliasFleet users.

## Other Japanese member-system breaches

The Maru-Jan breach is the latest in a run of Japanese member-system breaches disclosed in October and November 2026. Lawson disclosed unauthorised access to its Lawson ID and app reservation systems affecting about 2,155,000 member IDs, as covered in [the Lawson data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/lawson-data-breach). Bookoff Group Holdings disclosed unauthorised access to a subsidiary member-management system covering up to about 6.43 million member records, as covered in [the Bookoff data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/bookoff-data-breach). Daiichi Kosho disclosed a contractor terminal malware infection with up to 8.72 million customer records possibly affected, as covered in [the Daiichi Kosho data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/daiichi-kosho-data-breach). Each incident differs in vector, scope and data. This article does not claim a common cause.

## Remaining questions

SignalTalk has promised further updates on its official site as the investigation continues. Three questions remain open: the password storage format, whether any misuse has been confirmed, and whether a regulator report was made.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Japan</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Can Email Aliases Receive Attachments? Yes, Mostly</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-email-aliases-receive-attachments</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-email-aliases-receive-attachments</guid>
      <description>An email alias is a forwarding address, so attachments travel with the message. Managed aliases forward files within limits; short-lived inboxes strip them.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[An [email alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-is-an-email-alias) passes mail sent to it on to a real inbox. Files travel inside the message, so a managed alias delivers attachments as well as text. Limits still apply. Managed services forward files up to a published size, and short-lived inboxes remove them before the message is shown. The type of alias and the limits along the route decide whether a file arrives.

## How an attachment reaches an alias

The MIME standard defines how a file travels inside an email. [RFC 2045](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2045/history/) was published on 1 November 1996 and sets out the format of internet message bodies, including multipart messages that hold a file next to the text. Binary data is encoded, usually in base64, so it can move inside a text message, and that encoding adds about a third to the file's size while it travels. The attachment is one part of the message, so it reaches the inbox when the message does.

An alias service takes the message in and sends the whole thing on to the destination inbox, parts intact. The guide to [how email aliases actually work](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work) explains that mechanism, and the comparison of [email forwarding and aliases](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/email-forwarding-vs-aliases) explains how forwarding differs from a separate mailbox. A file that is inside the message when it reaches the alias is still inside it when it reaches the destination, unless a limit or a filter takes it out along the way.

## Maximum message sizes

Every managed alias service publishes a maximum message size, and the cap covers the whole message, attachments included. The published figures:

| Service | Maximum message size | Attachment handling |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| SimpleLogin | 25 MB | Forwarded with the message |
| addy.io | 25 MB, including attachments | Forwarded with the message, counts towards bandwidth |
| Firefox Relay | 10 MB | Forwarded with the message; 150 KB before March 2022 |
| Apple Hide My Email | No published limit | Mail forwarded to the personal inbox |

SimpleLogin puts its current limit at 25 MB in its [FAQ](https://simplelogin.io/faq/) and suggests a file upload service with a link for anything larger. addy.io says in its [FAQ](https://addy.io/faq/) that forwarded mail and replies can carry attachments, that attachments count towards bandwidth, and that the maximum email size is 25 MB including attachments.

Relay's limit has changed once already. When Mozilla announced Relay Premium in November 2021, free Relay aliases came with attachments of up to 150 KB. Tickets and receipts ran over that limit, users reported it, and Mozilla raised it. A March 2022 announcement said the limit had gone up to 10 MB, so emails with or without attachments would reach the inbox. The two announcements sit on the Mozilla press blog, the [2021 announcement](https://blog.mozilla.org/press/2021/11/introducing-firefox-relay-premium-allowing-more-aliases-to-protect-your-identity-from-spammers/) and the [2022 announcement](https://blog.mozilla.org/press/2022/03/latest-firefox-relay-includes-bigger-attachment-size-and-filters-for-promotional-emails/), and Mozilla's support pages confirm 10 MB as the current limit. The 150 KB figure belongs to 2021, not to the service today.

Hide My Email has no published size figure. Apple's support page says mail sent to a Hide My Email address is forwarded to the personal email account, and gives no attachment size for the feature. The Apple support page for [Hide My Email](https://support.apple.com/guide/icloud/what-you-can-do-with-icloud-and-hide-my-email-mme38e1602db/1.0/icloud/1.0) describes how the forwarding works.

A second limit waits at the destination inbox. For personal accounts Gmail caps messages at 25 MB, and a message over that cap has its attachment taken out and replaced with a Google Drive link. Google's support page on [sending attachments in Gmail](https://support.google.com/mail/answer/6584) gives the 25 MB figure for personal accounts and notes that work and school accounts have limits set by the administrator. A message inside the alias service limit can still fail at an inbox with a lower one. Encoding narrows the margin further: a file of about 18 MB on disk is already close to a 25 MB encoded message. The lowest limit in the chain is the one that decides.

## Short-lived inboxes

Short-lived inboxes strip files, which is where the question matters most. Tmailor says on its own site that it takes the email in, then removes attached files and embedded images before storing the message, keeping only the text and a cleaned-up HTML version of the body. Nothing tells the sender the file was removed. What the reader sees is the subject, the sender and the body, with no file list, no download button and no note that something was taken out. Tmailor's article on [attachments in short-lived inboxes](https://tmailor.com/blog/en/article/40945-can-temp-mail-receive-attachments.html) covers the handling in full.

TempMailRoom gives the same result in its FAQ: file attachments are dropped and never stored, and emails larger than 1 MB in total are discarded entirely. Its inboxes last 10 minutes, and messages are permanently deleted when they expire. Both the attachment rule and the 1 MB limit come from the TempMailRoom [FAQ](https://www.tempmailroom.com/faq). TempMailFast says attachments are not supported, while download links in the message body work normally, since a link is part of the text the inbox shows. Its [article](https://tempmailfa.st/articles/secure-file-sharing-guide/) advises using an address under the reader's own control when the file only arrives as an attachment.

Temp-Mail.org is a reported exception, not a confirmed one. Tmailor's comparison table, checked against providers' official pages on 19 and 20 October 2026, says Temp-Mail.org accepts attachments and that its terms list downloading the message source including attachments. The claim comes from Tmailor's own comparison, not from Temp-Mail.org's own page, so it stands here as Tmailor's finding rather than a direct fact. Whether an inbox keeps attachments varies by provider, and the provider's own documentation is the place to check before relying on it for a file.

## Embedded images and undocumented behaviour

A picture pasted into the body of an email is not an attachment. Mozilla's support pages for Firefox Relay say only attachments are supported, and an image pasted into the body rather than attached is not forwarded. The same split applies elsewhere: a file sent as its own MIME part goes through, while content embedded in the HTML body may be treated differently.

<Callout type="caution" title="Oversized messages: no documented outcome">
No provider page checked for this article says what happens to a message over the size limit. SimpleLogin gives only the 25 MB limit, addy.io gives only the 25 MB limit, and Firefox Relay gives only the 10 MB limit. None of the three says whether an oversized message bounces back to the sender, is dropped without notice, or arrives without its attachment. No failure mode is claimed here that the providers do not document.
</Callout>

## Files that need a lasting address

Anything expected to arrive as a file needs a lasting alias or a real inbox, never a short-lived inbox. Receipts, tickets, statements and contracts are the usual cases. A booking confirmation carries its PDF ticket as an attachment, and it has to reach the inbox intact, which is why the guide to [using email aliases for travel bookings](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-use-email-aliases-for-travel-bookings) uses a lasting alias. A shopping receipt is the same case. A statement or a contract may be needed months later, after a short-lived inbox has expired and its messages have been deleted.

Codes and links sit on the other side of the line. A two-factor code is text, and it reaches an alias as described in the article on [receiving two-factor codes at an email alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-receive-two-factor-authentication-codes-at-an-email-alias). A confirmation link is text in the message body. The file is what decides: text and links pass through any inbox, while a file needs an address that forwards attachments.

Caution still applies to any file that does arrive. A file from an unknown sender can carry malware, and the article on [opening email attachments safely](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-it-safe-to-open-email-attachments) covers the checks to run before opening one. An alias only delivers the file; it does not make it safe. A missing file was removed by a limit or a filter. A file that arrived from an unknown sender still needs checking before it is opened.

## AliasFleet and attachments

AliasFleet is a managed alias service. Mail sent to an AliasFleet alias is forwarded to the verified destination inbox with its attachments included as part of the message. That rests on the published full-message forwarding description and the bandwidth limit. No test attachment was sent through the live app for this article, so the claim is given on that basis rather than as a tested result.

The free tier gives 10 active aliases and 100 MB of monthly forwarding bandwidth, and attachments count towards that bandwidth because they are part of the forwarded message. The Pro tier gives 1 GB of monthly forwarding bandwidth, as listed on the [pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing). The [pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing) lists the free tier as 10 active aliases, 1 verified destination inbox, 3 managed subdomains, 100 MB monthly forwarding bandwidth and two-way reply routing. AliasFleet is described in full on the [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) homepage and in the article on [what AliasFleet is](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-is-aliasfleet).

There is no separate per-attachment limit on top of the bandwidth allowance. A message inside the monthly bandwidth is forwarded with its attachments, and a message over the destination inbox's own limit is subject to that inbox's rules, as with any forwarded mail. Replies can go out from the alias, so a conversation that starts with an attached file can continue without exposing the real address. An alias that starts receiving spam can be disabled in one click, as described in the guide on [what to do when an alias starts getting spam](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-an-alias-starts-getting-spam).]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Aliases</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Attachments</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Gnosis Pay breach exposed card numbers and wallet addresses</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/gnosis-pay-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/gnosis-pay-data-breach</guid>
      <description>Gnosis Pay disclosed a 6 November breach of its legacy card system. Notifications listed full card numbers, CVVs, home addresses and linked wallet addresses.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[On 6 November 2026, Gnosis Pay disclosed a breach of the legacy system behind its branded Visa debit cards. Monitoring had picked up unauthorised access three days earlier, on 3 November, and containment began within two hours. The company said customer funds were not affected. No victim count was given. The public statement named no data categories, saying only that certain customer information had been exposed. What was taken appears in the individual notices sent to affected customers, reviewed by [Cointelegraph](https://www.tradingview.com/news/cointelegraph:56c73480e094b:0-gnosis-pay-breach-exposes-card-details-personal-data-and-crypto-wallet-information/) and reported by [CoinDesk](https://www.coindesk.com/business/2026/11/07/gnosis-pay-breach-exposes-card-numbers-home-addresses-and-linked-crypto-wallets): full payment card numbers, expiry dates, CVV codes, names, home addresses, linked cryptocurrency wallet addresses, email addresses, phone numbers and nationalities, with IBAN and BIC banking details in some cases.

## What the company disclosed

The cards are Visa debit cards sold under the Gnosis Pay name. They let customers spend stablecoins from self-custodial wallets. CoinDesk reported that the company was unveiled in 2023. The cards are issued by Monavate, an e-money firm authorised by the UK Financial Conduct Authority, according to the [formal notice](https://help.gnosispay.com/articles/1452055581-formal-notice-closure-of-the-gnosis-pay-web-app-and-card-21-september-2026) Gnosis Pay issued to cardholders on 21 September 2026.

The access hit the system that powers the branded cards, the company's consumer business line. Detection came on 3 November 2026. The security team moved at once, and containment began within two hours. Gnosis Pay said the affected security credentials were replaced and the vulnerability addressed, and the [full statement is on the company's own blog](https://gnosispay.com/blog/data-breach-legacy-system-gnosis-pay-branded-cards). [Decrypt](https://decrypt.co/382718/crypto-card-provider-gnosis-pay-hackers-customer-data) covered the breach on 6 November 2026, the day Gnosis Pay disclosed it. Nothing outside the consumer system was affected.

The 20 December 2026 retirement was set before the breach. A notice issued on 21 September 2026 ended branded card services at 23:59 UTC that day. The enterprise platform, which powers white-label card programmes for other businesses, was not affected, and Gnosis Pay said it told its partners about the breach. It is also communicating with the applicable data protection authorities and with its card issuer. The authorities were not named. Monitoring of card activity and wallets was increased, to catch fraud or attempts to reach user funds. Specialist monitoring was arranged for any sign that the stolen information is misused.

## Data in the breach notifications

The disclosure gave no list of data. It said only that the breach "resulted in the exposure of certain customer information". Cointelegraph and CoinDesk reported the categories from the breach notices sent to affected customers. The list describes what the reviewed notices contained. No claim follows that every affected customer lost every field.

The notices reviewed by Cointelegraph listed full payment card numbers, expiry dates and CVV codes. They also listed customer names, home addresses and the cryptocurrency wallet addresses linked to each account. Email addresses, phone numbers and nationalities appeared too. Some notices added banking details such as IBAN and BIC information. CoinDesk reported the same categories from the notices it saw.

No victim count has been disclosed. Cointelegraph cited third-party tracking data that put Gnosis Pay at roughly 2,400 daily active cardholders, processing about $263,200 over the previous 24 hours. The figure measures the platform's active user base, not the number of victims. CoinDesk cited Paymentscan data for annualised payments volume of around $67.6 million. Neither number says how many accounts the breach reached.

## Wallet addresses and identity

Wallet addresses are public by design. A block explorer shows the balance and transaction history of any wallet address. The address on its own carries no name. Pair it with a name, a home address, an email address and a phone number, and the missing piece is supplied. That pairing stays valid for as long as the wallet is in use. Attackers could use the stolen data to connect users' real-world identities with their crypto holdings, and CoinDesk reported that the breach raises the risk of targeted scams on that basis.

The email addresses in the notices reviewed by Cointelegraph carry the same risk in a different form. They sit alongside names, home addresses and card numbers. An attacker with those contact details and personal facts can make a fraudulent message look real. Gnosis Pay warned customers to expect phishing attempts. The checks that apply when a message arrives carrying real personal details are covered in guidance on [how to check if an email is phishing](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-an-email-is-phishing).

## The cardholder notice

One November notice has been made public. Its recipient, Lefteris Karapetsas, shared it on X. Karapetsas is the founder of Rotki, a crypto portfolio tracker. The notice listed his name, full home address, card number and every wallet address linked to his account, according to CoinDesk. His reply read:

> "You had already lost me as a user but you could have at least protected my data."

Cointelegraph reviewed one notification that confirmed the customer's card was cancelled on 3 November. No suspicious transactions or movement of funds were detected in that case. The confirmation covers one customer only. Gnosis Pay has not said that every affected card was cancelled on the same day.

Every affected customer was emailed on 6 November, Gnosis Pay said, with exactly what information was taken from their account. That email is the authoritative record. A customer who received no such email has no confirmation from the company that their account was affected. A breach lookup service such as [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) lets anyone check whether their address appears in a known breach.

## What Gnosis Pay told customers

All online card payments now need 3D Secure verification until the consumer system retires on 20 December 2026, and fraud monitoring was increased too. A leaked card number belongs to a card that stops working after 20 December, so that part of the exposure ends on a fixed date. Gnosis Chain is a public blockchain, so transactions linked to a wallet address remain visible on it.

Support for refunds, disputes and chargebacks ends at 23:59 UTC on 12 June 2028, according to the [formal notice](https://help.gnosispay.com/articles/1452055581-formal-notice-closure-of-the-gnosis-pay-web-app-and-card-21-september-2026) Gnosis Pay issued to cardholders on 21 September 2026. The cards stop working long before that date. The notice sets no deadline for withdrawing self-custodied funds, so any message tying a transfer to the 20 December shutdown is false. The breach was confirmed by the company in its own post on X on 6 November:

> "We had a data breach affecting the system powering Gnosis Pay-branded cards (our B2C business line) that resulted in the exposure of certain customer information. Everyone affected was sent an email today with full information. We deeply regret that this happened."

## Measures for affected cardholders

Customers were told to check the email Gnosis Pay sent them, which lists exactly what was taken from their account. If the card number was listed, the card should be frozen from the app. Any unexpected email, text, call or letter about Gnosis Pay, a partner app or their card should be treated as suspicious, even if it includes real details or a real purchase, and its links should not be clicked. Customers were told to go to the official Gnosis Pay web app or their partner app directly.

Neither Gnosis Pay nor its partner apps will ask for a seed phrase, private keys, a PIN or a full card number, the company said. Re-verification of identity by email or text will not be requested. Customers will never be asked to move funds by email, text or phone. Account changes are only ever made inside the official Gnosis Pay web app or a partner app. Customers were advised to be careful who they share their address or details of their crypto holdings with, online and offline.

A separate risk faces cardholders who reused the exposed email address and password combination elsewhere. The breach notices reviewed by Cointelegraph listed email addresses. Credential stuffing works on reused credentials: stolen login pairs are tried against other services. That mechanism is described in [how credential stuffing works](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-credential-stuffing-works). Changing a password on one service does not protect the others that share it, as [does changing your password stop hackers](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/does-changing-your-password-stop-hackers) explains.

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Second incident in 2026

Gnosis Pay had a security incident earlier in 2026 too. In June, attackers exploited a flaw in wallet software modules used by Gnosis Pay accounts and extracted about $1.5 million. Gnosis covered those losses and restored customer funds, according to CoinDesk. The June incident took funds, while the November incident exposed information. The company has not stated that the two incidents share a cause.

The June incident took money from customer accounts, and Gnosis covered the losses and restored the funds, while the November incident exposed personal information, which a refund cannot reverse. A card number can be cancelled, and the card retires on 20 December 2026. The company has not said how long the stolen records will circulate.

## Open questions

Three facts remain undisclosed. The number of affected customers is one. The intrusion start is another: 3 November is only the date of detection. Whether the stolen data has been used in scams is the third. Specialist monitoring for signs of misuse was arranged by the company, which did not immediately respond to Cointelegraph's request for comment.

No technical root cause was published either. The company said it addressed the vulnerability. The disclosure does not say what the vulnerability was or how the attacker got in. The attack vector is undisclosed, and no attribution has been reported. Until Gnosis Pay publishes more, the public record is the detection date, the notification list, and the measures the company has put in place before the system retires on 20 December.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>Crypto</category><category>Email Privacy</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Booking Vet Care</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-booking-vet-care</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-booking-vet-care</guid>
      <description>Vet booking portals collect an owner email address with the pet medical record. One alias per vet keeps reminders separate and limits a leak.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Booking vet care online usually needs an email address. It sits on the same client record as the pet name, species, breed, medical history, microchip number and insurance details. One alias per vet or pet service keeps its messages apart. A leak at one service then stays contained to that alias. The alias must stay active for as long as the pet is under care, so appointment and results messages continue to arrive.

## What vet booking collects

Booking software collects more than a contact address. [Porter Veterinary Center](https://www.portervet.com/privacy-policy) lists email address and physical address among its contact identifiers, and microchip number, vaccination history and prior medical records among the pet information it holds. [Home Vets London](https://www.homevetslondon.com/privacy-policy/) lists name, email address and telephone number, plus pet health information including medical records. The owner address and the pet medical record are therefore collected together and stored together.

The minimum for a booking is smaller. [Vev](https://vev.co/online-appointment-scheduler/mobile-veterinarian) says a pet owner booking from a clinic online page has to enter a name and an email address, and can leave phone number and address blank. [Reservio](https://www.reservio.com/veterinary-software) says a reservation needs an email address, or a sign-in with Google, Apple or Facebook. Vev follows a booking with three emails: a confirmation, a reminder ahead of the appointment, and a thank-you afterwards. Reservio sends a confirmation email. It carries the booking details and a link to change or cancel the booking. [Setmore](https://www.setmore.com/industries/veterinary) and [Bookafy](https://bookafy.com/veterinary/) both describe automatic text or email reminders for every visit.

## Where the address travels

Once given, the address moves beyond the clinic. [Vetstoria](https://www.vetstoria.com/privacy-policy/) is the booking platform many clinics use. PetDesk Brand Holdings, which owns Vetstoria, says in its privacy policy that it processes customer data for the clinic, including email addresses, appointment data and pet information such as vaccines, insurance, microchip number and medical history. The same policy says personal data goes to service providers and to marketing and advertising partners.

[Village Vets](https://www.Villagevets.ie/privacy-policy) says pet information sits on the client record and counts in law as information about the owner. The group passes information to its practice management system provider, to the suppliers that send email, text and WhatsApp messages, to its online booking provider, to laboratories and referral practices, to microchip database operators, and to the pet insurer when the owner has asked it to handle a claim. [Prairie Pet Mobile Vet](https://www.prairiepetmobilevet.com/privacy-policy) and [Vet in a Van](https://www.vetinavan.com.au/privacy-policy/) describe the same pattern.

## Recorded exposures

Exposures of vet and pet insurance data, with owner email addresses attached, have already happened. On 10 December 2025, [TechCrunch](https://techcrunch.com/2025/12/10/petco-takes-down-vetco-website-after-exposing-customers-personal-information/) reported that Petco had taken part of its Vetco Clinics website offline after a security lapse exposed customer records to the open web. Records could be downloaded by anyone, with no login, and they included names, home address, email address and phone number, visit summaries, medical histories and prescription records, and pet names, species, breed, age, microchip number and medical vitals. The cause was an insecure direct object reference in the PDF generation page on the petpass.com portal, where customer numbers ran in sequence. Google had indexed at least one record dated mid-2020. Petco did not confirm how many customers were affected, and TechCrunch estimated the total ran into the millions from sequential customer numbers checked at intervals. TechCrunch counted the incident as Petco's third data breach in 2025.

In October 2025, [Website Planet](https://www.websiteplanet.com/news/rainwalk-pet-insurance-breach-report/) reported that researcher Jeremiah Fowler had found a database with no encryption and no password, holding 85,361 files totalling 158 GB. The files included pet insurance claims, veterinary bills and customer communications, with names, physical and email addresses, phone numbers and partial credit card numbers, and pet names, medical histories and microchip numbers. The database appeared to belong to Rainwalk Technology of South Carolina. Fowler sent a responsible disclosure notice and got no reply. Access stayed open for nearly a month. Fowler stated that it is not known whether Rainwalk or a third-party contractor owned the database, or whether anyone else accessed it.

A third exposure, reported in November 2023, involved pet medical records. [Website Planet](https://www.websiteplanet.com/news/wala-breach-report/) reported that Fowler found a cloud database with no password, holding 56,624 documents totalling 25 GB and apparently belonging to the Worldwide Australian Labradoodle Association. The documents included pet medical reports, DNA tests and pedigree history, and owner names, addresses, phone numbers and email addresses.

A configuration error alone published an address. [The Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons](https://www.rcvs.org.uk/about-us/news-and-views/news/data-display-issue-on-rcvs-find-a-vet-service) stated that between 29 July and 25 August 2026, some alternate phone numbers and individual email addresses appeared on about 789 of over 4,500 practice listings on its Find a Vet service. Of those, 124 appeared to have personal domains such as hotmail.com and gmail.com. The college called it an internal data configuration issue, not a cybersecurity issue.

| Date | Incident | Scale | Source |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 10 December 2025 | Vetco Clinics, Petco | Not confirmed by Petco; TechCrunch estimated millions | TechCrunch |
| October 2025 | Rainwalk pet insurance | 85,361 files, 158 GB | Website Planet |
| November 2023 | Worldwide Australian Labradoodle Association | 56,624 documents, 25 GB | Website Planet |
| 29 July to 25 August 2026 | Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, Find a Vet | About 789 listings; 124 personal-domain addresses | Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons |

## Reminders and marketing

Two kinds of email come from a vet clinic. Messages about an appointment already booked, or about an episode of care the pet is receiving, are service messages under the Village Vets policy. They cover test results, discharge instructions, an invoice or receipt, and a safety recall. The clinic keeps sending them for as long as the person is a client, whatever the marketing preferences say. Health reminders work differently. A reminder that a booster, a worming or flea treatment, a repeat prescription or a dental check is due counts as direct marketing in law, because it invites the owner to book and pay for a service.

[Remindlo](https://www.remindlo.co.uk/blog/best-veterinary-reminder-software-uk) draws the same line between pre-visit reminders for appointments already booked and reactivation reminders, sent when a booster or health check is due but nothing is in the diary. Village Vets keeps client contact records for 7 years after the last transaction, and clinical records for 7 years from the last treatment. Retention periods differ by country and practice. Those figures describe one practice group, not a universal rule.

## Phishing and scam messages

Pet details make a phishing message more convincing. A sender who knows the pet, the treatment and the amount can look genuine. The Rainwalk report stated that criminals could in theory send fraudulent invoices modelled after real ones, using dates, amounts and claim numbers known only to the care provider, the insurer and the owner. The WALA report described microchip renewal scams, in which owners get emails claiming a pet microchip registration is expiring and urging payment of a fraudulent renewal fee. Microchips do not expire, according to the report.

Even a message that names the pet, the clinic and a real claim number needs checking through the official channel. A leaked record can supply all three details. Links in an unexpected vet or insurer message should not be clicked. An alias helps here. A phishing message sent to the vet alias is visible as a vet message. The alias does not stop phishing on its own, and it does not verify a sender.

## One alias per vet or service

[One alias per vet or pet service](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-booking-medical-care) is the setup. A separate forwarding address goes to each vet clinic, each pet insurer, each microchip registry and each pet pharmacy or pet supply service. The confirmation, the reminder, the lab result and the invoice for that service all arrive on that one alias, and no other service uses it. Spam on the vet alias points to the service it came through. The vet alias belongs on the booking form, on the insurer claim form, and on the microchip registration, and the same alias stays with the same service across visits.

## Keeping the alias alive during care

While the pet is under care, the alias stays alive. Vet records are tied to the pet identity, so appointment messages, lab results, recall reminders and insurance correspondence still need to arrive. Closing the alias after the first visit can block a lab result, a recall reminder for a booster, or a claim decision. A change of vet is a planned move. The new vet gets a new alias, the old vet is told the pet has moved, and the old alias stays active until the old clinic confirms that no record, result or invoice is outstanding.

## Microchip registration and insurance claims

The microchip registry is a separate place where the owner address is stored. [The British Small Animal Veterinary Association](https://www.bsava.com/resources/veterinary-resources/microchipping-advice/microchipping-registration/) states that once a microchip has been implanted, the details must be recorded on a Defra approved database. Welsh and Scottish legislation also require the keeper email address where the keeper has one. The owner should check which database holds the pet record. The vet clinic and the microchip database can hold different addresses. [Pet Database](https://www.petdatabase.com/privacy) states that it collects contact details including address, telephone number and email address, and shares data with pet insurance partners and with regulators and public bodies. The Rainwalk claim file contained the claim number, the account holder name, the pet name, the monetary amount, and the veterinary bill.

Pet insurance is a large market. The North American Pet Health Insurance Association estimated 7.03 million pets were insured in North America at the end of 2024, up 12.2 percent from 6.25 million in 2023, with nearly 5.2 billion US dollars in gross written premiums. That figure comes from the Rainwalk report, which cites the association, and was not read directly from the association itself.

## What an alias does not cover

An alias does not make the vet clinic secure, and it does not stop a clinic or a platform from being breached. A portal flaw exposed the full record, medical history and owner address included, whatever address the owner gave. An alias does not hide the pet name, the treatment or the cost from the clinic. The clinic needs those details to provide care. An alias does not stop the clinic from sharing the address with the suppliers who need it. It does not verify a sender. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) lets the owner check whether an email address appears in a known data breach.

## AliasFleet for vet bookings

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com/) provides email aliases that forward mail to a verified destination inbox. A separate alias goes to each vet clinic, insurer, microchip registry or pet service, and each alias forwards to the same destination inbox. The owner can pause or close an alias when a service no longer needs it. The free tier includes 10 active aliases, 1 verified destination inbox, 3 managed subdomains and 100 MB monthly forwarding, according to [AliasFleet pricing](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing). AliasFleet does not make the vet clinic secure, and it does not verify the sender of a message.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Vet Care</category><category>Email Aliases</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Signing Up for a Pharmacy</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-an-online-pharmacy</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-an-online-pharmacy</guid>
      <description>A pharmacy account links an email address to prescriptions and insurance. One alias per pharmacy keeps that mail contained and names the source of any leak.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[An online pharmacy account links an email address to prescription records, refill history and insurance details. The address given at signup receives order updates, refill reminders and marketing mail, and the privacy policy decides if it is shared with advertising networks or third parties. Protection rests on three measures: verification that the pharmacy is licensed and legitimate, a dedicated email alias for each pharmacy, and keeping that alias active for as long as prescriptions are live.

## What a pharmacy account holds

A pharmacy account holds the customer's name, address, date of birth and payment details, and the prescription record: which medicines were ordered, in what dose, on what date, and which doctor prescribed them. The account also holds insurance details, because the pharmacy bills the insurer before sending the medicine. The email address given at signup is the address used for order confirmation, delivery updates, refill reminders and password resets, so it sits at the centre of that record.

## Verification of a legitimate online pharmacy

Email protection starts before signup, with a check that the pharmacy is legitimate. The [FDA guidance on buying medicines safely](https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/how-buy-medicines-safely-online-pharmacy) lists the signs of a safe online pharmacy: it always requires a doctor's prescription, provides a physical address and telephone number in the United States, has a licensed pharmacist on staff to answer questions, and is licensed with a state board of pharmacy. The FDA states that the pharmacy's licence can be checked in the state board of pharmacy licence database through the BeSafeRx website, and that an online pharmacy not listed there should not be used. The same guidance warns that unsafe online pharmacies may not provide clear written protections of personal and financial information, and may sell that information to other websites.

The National Association of Boards of Pharmacy runs a second check through the [NABP Safe Pharmacy site](https://safe.pharmacy/), which offers a Safe Site Search Tool that checks whether a website is verified or listed as not recommended. NABP has found more than 40,000 websites that fail to comply with its patient safety and pharmacy practice standards or with applicable laws. A [Drug Topics article on the NABP initiative](https://www.drugtopics.com/view/protecting-patients-online-and-at-home-how-nabps-safe-pharmacy-initiative-helps-patients-safely-buy-prescriptions-online) states that 95% of the illegal online pharmacies reviewed did not require a valid prescription for prescription-only medicine.

## How an email address moves beyond the pharmacy

Whether a pharmacy shares the email address given at signup with other companies depends on the privacy policy that applies to the account, and the policies differ between pharmacies and between the retail side and the health care side of the same company.

CVS states the position in its California notice. The notice, last updated on 30 July 2026, says CVS sells or shares identifiers, including name, postal and email address and phone number, for marketing and advertising purposes to third-party advertising networks and social media platforms. Commercial information, such as items purchased or considered, and internet activity are also sold or shared. The [CVS California notice](https://www.cvs.com/retail/help/ca_notice_collection) sets out the categories in a table and offers an opt-out from the sale or sharing of personal information. The [CVS store privacy policy](https://www.cvs.com/help/privacy_policy.jsp) and the [CVS Health privacy policy](https://www.cvshealth.com/privacy-policy.html) state the same terms in longer form.

Walgreens states a different position. Its [privacy policy](https://www.walgreens.com/topic/help/generalhelp/privacyandsecurity.jsp?foot=security), last updated on 1 January 2026, states that Walgreens may use third-party advertising networks to serve advertisements, and that the cookies received with those advertisements may be used to collect and build behavioural profiles for targeted advertising. The same policy states that information submitted for a prescription order is subject to HIPAA rather than to the consumer privacy policy.

## The GoodRx enforcement action

The Federal Trade Commission's enforcement action against GoodRx documents pharmacy related email sharing. GoodRx is a telehealth and prescription drug discount provider, not a pharmacy, and its users look up drug prices and use coupons to buy medication. The [FTC enforcement action](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/02/ftc-enforcement-action-bar-goodrx-sharing-consumers-sensitive-health-info-advertising), announced on 1 February 2023, states that GoodRx shared sensitive personal health information, including users' prescription medications and health conditions, with Facebook, Google, Criteo, Branch and Twilio since at least 2017, contrary to its privacy promises. In August 2019, GoodRx uploaded the email addresses, phone numbers and mobile advertising IDs of users who had purchased particular medications, such as those for heart disease and blood pressure, to Facebook to target them with health related advertisements. The order imposed a $1.5 million civil penalty and a permanent ban on sharing user health data for advertising.

The [Legal 500 analysis of the settlement](https://www.legal500.com/intelligence/united-states/technology/federal-trade-commission's-goodrx-settlement-not-just-a-%2415-million-penalty) notes that the order also requires GoodRx to obtain affirmative express consent before sharing health information with third parties for other purposes and to direct third parties to delete the data that was shared. A [HIPAA Journal report](https://www.hipaajournal.com/goodrx-25-million-settlement-tracking-technology-lawsuit/) published on 29 October 2026 states that a revised $32 million settlement has received preliminary court approval to resolve class action litigation against GoodRx and Criteo over website tracking tools that disclosed user information to third parties without consent between 2017 and 2020. Class members must object or opt out by 29 December 2026, and the final fairness hearing is scheduled for 11 February 2027. The settlement is preliminary approval only.

## Pharmacy breaches in 2025 and 2026

Pharmacy data also leaves through breaches, and the breaches of 2025 and 2026 show the pharmacy website is often the point of failure. [Ridgeway Pharmacy](https://www.hipaajournal.com/ridgeway-pharmacy-data-breach/), a mail-order and community pharmacy in Victor, Montana, found on 21 August 2026 that personal information had been exposed through its third-party designed website. The exposure affected 258,920 customers, and the data potentially compromised included prescription information, health information and insurance information, with payment card information for a subset.

An employee at Freedom Fertility Pharmacy, operated by Lynnfield Drug, Inc., mistakenly emailed customer names, email addresses and diagnosis or condition information to an unauthorised recipient in September 2026. The [Freedom Fertility breach report](https://databreachrights.com/freedom-fertility-pharmacy-data-breach/) states that the notification filed with Massachusetts regulators in October 2026 reports 15 Massachusetts residents affected, with no nationwide total disclosed. The incident was an employee error, not a hack, and shows an address can be exposed by a mistyped address as well as by an intrusion.

McKesson, a drug distributor, confirmed an August 2026 cyberattack and stated in a 21 September update that confirmed data theft was limited to certain third-party applications serving a subset of its Oncology and Multispecialty customers. The [McKesson update](https://www.medicaldaily.com/mckesson-data-breach-oncology-multispecialty-patient-notifications-478987) states that the data likely taken included names, email addresses, patient IDs and dates of birth. The extortion group ShinyHunters claimed about 284 million rows of raw patient data, and [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) counted 6.4 million unique email addresses in data the group published. McKesson has confirmed neither figure.

[Boudreaux's Specialty Compounding Pharmacy](https://www.claimdepot.com/data-breach/boudreauxs-specialty-compounding-pharmacy), a locally owned pharmacy in Shreveport, Louisiana, experienced a network disruption on or around 25 January 2025. The breach was disclosed to the US Department of Health and Human Services on 10 April 2025 and affected 6,270 people. The exposed data included prescription information, health insurance information, email addresses and Social Security numbers.

## A separate alias for each pharmacy

The email address given at signup decides how much of the customer's mail the pharmacy can connect to one identity. A single address used for every pharmacy, every shop and every service means a leak or a sale at any one of them exposes the same address everywhere else. A dedicated alias for each pharmacy breaks that connection. The alias forwards to the customer's real inbox, so refill reminders and order updates arrive as normal while marketing mail from that pharmacy stays separate. If spam arrives on the pharmacy alias from a company the customer never dealt with, the alias names the source: the address was shared or leaked by that pharmacy.

The alias has to stay alive while prescriptions are active, and must never be allowed to expire or be closed while refills, recall notices or insurance messages may still arrive. Refill reminders, recall notices, delivery updates and insurance messages may still arrive on it months after signup, and a missed refill reminder or a missed recall notice is a health problem, not only an inbox problem. The alias therefore stays in place until the prescriptions end and the account is closed properly.

<Callout type="warning" title="Keep the alias active while prescriptions are live">
A pharmacy alias must never be allowed to expire or be closed while refills, recall notices or insurance messages may still arrive.
</Callout>

An alias protects the email address, not the prescription record: if the pharmacy's own systems are breached, the prescription information, insurance details and health information in those systems are exposed whatever address was used at signup. The alias limits the damage to the inbox: it stops the exposed address from being the same address used for banking, work and every other service, and it identifies which pharmacy the address came from. An alias also does not make an unlicensed pharmacy safe: a rogue online pharmacy that sells counterfeit medicine is a safety problem first, and the FDA verification checks come before any decision about which email address to use.

Patients also hold rights under HIPAA. The [HHS guidance on rights under HIPAA](https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-individuals/guidance-materials-for-consumers/index.html) states that pharmacies are covered entities, and that patients have the right to ask for restrictions on how health information is used or disclosed and to decide on permission before it is used or shared for certain purposes such as marketing. The email address used for a retail account may fall under a separate consumer privacy policy, so the HIPAA rights and the policy opt-out have to be used together.

## AliasFleet for pharmacy accounts

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com/) provides email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox. Each alias is a separate address that can be paused or closed on its own without affecting the others. A dedicated alias can be created for each pharmacy, so refill and marketing mail from that pharmacy arrives on its own address and the customer's real email address is not given to the pharmacy. The free tier includes 10 active aliases, 1 verified destination inbox, 3 managed subdomains and 100 MB of monthly forwarding bandwidth, as listed on the [AliasFleet pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing). AliasFleet does not hold prescription records and does not verify pharmacies, and the alias still has to stay active while prescriptions are live.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Pharmacy</category><category>Health Data</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Is It Safe to Check Email on Someone Else&apos;s Phone?</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-it-safe-to-check-email-on-someone-elses-phone</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-it-safe-to-check-email-on-someone-elses-phone</guid>
      <description>A borrowed phone is safe for email when the session is contained and removed afterwards. The risk is a leftover login or a saved password.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Checking email on someone else's phone is a borrowed-device session, and it is safe when that session is contained and removed afterwards. The phone itself is not the risk. The risk is the session left behind: a signed-in browser tab, a saved password, or notification previews that keep showing new mail after the phone is handed back. A private browsing window, a declined save-password prompt, and a full sign-out before the phone changes hands contain that risk.

## Saved sessions on a borrowed phone

A phone is a personal device in a way a [shared computer](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-it-safe-to-check-email-on-a-public-computer) is not. The owner stays signed in to everything, so a guest who borrows the phone adds a second set of sessions to a device that already holds the owner's.

The owner's mail app is already signed in. Opening the Gmail app or the Outlook app on a borrowed phone opens the owner's inbox, not a blank login screen, so a guest who uses those apps reads the owner's mail by accident. The browser is usually signed in to the owner's account too, and opening Gmail in Chrome on an Android phone can drop the guest straight into the owner's inbox. Google states that Chrome does not automatically sign the user in to a Google Account in [Incognito mode](https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/95464?hl=en-GB), which is the reason the private window matters here.

## What a guest sign-in leaves behind

A login on a borrowed phone leaves more behind than most people expect. The session itself is the main item. A signed-in browser tab stays signed in until the user signs out or the cookie expires, and a signed-in mail app stays signed in until the account is removed from the device.

The saved-password prompt is the second item. Google Password Manager offers to save passwords by default, and Google states that the offer can be turned off in settings. The relevant page is the [Google Chrome Help page on passwords and passkeys](https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/6197437?hl=en&co=GENIE.Platform%3DAndroid). If the guest taps Save, the password is stored on the owner's phone, in the owner's account, and the guest's inbox stays one tap away afterwards.

Notifications are the third item. New mail keeps arriving after the guest hands the phone back, and if the phone shows notification previews on the lock screen, the sender name and the first lines of each new message appear on the screen for anyone nearby. Apple documents this in its [iPhone notification settings guide](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/change-notification-settings-iph7c3d96bab/18.0/ios/18.0). Android documents the same control in its [guide to controlling notifications](https://support.google.com/android/answer/9079661?hl=en), which includes an option to hide sensitive content on the lock screen.

## Session containment

The routine that contains a guest session has five steps, and the order matters. The private window comes first, because it prevents most of the other problems from arising at all.

1. First, the guest opens a private browsing window. In Chrome, that is Incognito mode. In Safari, it is Private Browsing, which Apple documents in its [guide to browsing privately on iPhone](https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/browse-the-web-privately-iphb01fc3c85/16.0/ios/16.0). Google states that after an Incognito session ends, Chrome does not retain site data or a record of the sites visited.
2. Second, the guest signs in to webmail in that private window, not in the owner's mail app. The provider's website is the route. The Gmail app and the Outlook app belong to the owner's account, so neither is opened.
3. Third, the guest declines the save-password prompt. When the browser asks whether to save the password, the answer is Never or Not now, with the exact wording depending on the browser and version. A saved password can be checked and removed later at [Google Password Manager](https://passwords.google.com), but declining at the time leaves nothing to clean up.
4. Fourth, the guest reads the mail and does nothing else. No attachments are downloaded unless necessary, no account settings are changed, and the account is not added to the phone.
5. Fifth, the guest signs out fully and closes the private window. Every private tab is closed, not just the mail tab. Google states that the Incognito session ends when all Incognito windows are closed, and the site data is removed at that point.

## Gmail and Outlook sign-out

Gmail and Outlook handle sign-out differently on a phone, and the difference matters for a guest.

Gmail has no sign-out button in its app. Google states this plainly in its [Gmail sign-out help page](https://support.google.com/mail/answer/8154?hl=en-GB&ref_topic=2467017&co=GENIE.Platform%3DAndroid). On a phone or tablet, the only way to sign out of the Gmail app is to remove the Google Account from the device, which also signs the user out of all other Google apps on the device. A guest must never do this on someone else's phone, because it removes the owner's account, not the guest's.

Outlook on the web does have a sign-out. Microsoft states that to sign out of Outlook.com, the user selects their account picture or initials at the top corner of the inbox and then selects Sign out, in its [Outlook.com sign-out page](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/accounts-billing/manage/sign-out-of-hotmail-or-outlook-com). The same page states that it is no longer possible to sign out of the Outlook app or be prompted for a password to sign in. A guest who opens the Outlook app on a borrowed phone is therefore in the owner's mailbox, with no sign-out inside the app to fix that. The web version is the safe route, and the sign-in page for it is documented in Microsoft's [guide to signing in to Outlook on the web](https://support.microsoft.com/en-gb/outlook/how-to-sign-in-to-outlook-on-the-web).

## Notification previews

The notification problem runs in both directions. A guest who signs in on a borrowed phone leaves a notification trail, and an owner who lends a phone exposes their own previews to the guest.

On iPhone, the control is Show Previews under Settings, Notifications, with three choices: Always, When Unlocked, and Never. When Unlocked hides the message text until Face ID, Touch ID, or the passcode unlocks the phone. The setting can be changed for one app at a time, so the Mail app can be set to Never while other apps keep their previews.

On Android, the control is under Settings, Notifications, Notifications on lock screen. The options include showing no notifications on the lock screen, showing all notifications, and hiding sensitive content. The exact labels vary by phone maker, and Google notes that settings can vary by phone.

Neither setting deletes anything. Hiding a preview only changes what the lock screen shows. The messages are still in the app, and on Android the notification history still records them. The setting is a screen control, not a security control, and it does not cover a phone with no lock screen, since the lock state of any given borrowed phone is unknown.

## Forgotten sign-out

A forgotten sign-out on a borrowed phone can be fixed from another device. The fix has three parts.

First, the account security page lists the devices with account access. Google documents this in its [page on devices with account access](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/3067630?hl=en). The borrowed device is selected and signed out. Google states that to ensure no account access remains from a device, the user must sign out of all sessions on that device individually, because a device can show more than one session.

Second, the password is changed. Google states that changing or resetting a password signs the user out everywhere, except for devices used to verify identity, some devices with third-party app access, and some home devices. The full list of exceptions is on Google's [change or reset your password page](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/41078?hl=en). A password change after a forgotten sign-out is worth doing even when the remote sign-out looks complete, because sessions can linger and the password change ends them. The new password should be unique to that account, and a check at [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) shows whether the address has appeared in a known breach.

Third, [two-step verification](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-secure-your-email-account) is turned on. Google documents the setup in its [2-Step Verification help page](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/185839?hl=en). Two-step verification adds a second step at sign-in, so a password alone is not enough to open the account from the borrowed phone.

Microsoft accounts have the same kind of remote fix. Microsoft's [sign out everywhere page](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/accounts-billing/manage/how-to-sign-out-of-your-microsoft-account-everywhere) states that signing out everywhere signs the user out of browsers, apps, and trusted devices within 24 hours, except for an Xbox console. The sign-out is not instant, and the account stays reachable from the borrowed phone until it takes effect.

## Email aliases and borrowed devices

Email aliases do not fix a borrowed device. An alias is a forwarding address that receives mail for one service and forwards it to a real inbox. The exposure on a borrowed phone is the session on that phone, not the address used to sign in. Signing in with an alias instead of a real address leaves the same session, the same saved-password prompt, and the same notification trail behind.

What an alias does do is limit what a session exposes. If the guest's mail is sorted by alias, with one alias per service, then a session left open on a borrowed phone exposes only the mail that arrived on that alias, not the whole inbox. It reduces the damage of a forgotten sign-out. It does not prevent one.

AliasFleet provides managed email aliases with one alias per service, forwarding to a single real inbox, and a one-click control to disable an alias that starts receiving unwanted mail. The free tier includes 10 active aliases, 1 verified destination inbox, 3 managed subdomains, and 100 MB of monthly forwarding bandwidth, as listed on the [AliasFleet pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing). An alias that was exposed on a borrowed phone can be disabled from the AliasFleet dashboard, which stops mail to that address without touching the real inbox. The session on the borrowed phone still has to be signed out by hand.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Account Security</category><category>Mobile</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SM Entertainment breach leaks staff ID and bank data</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/sm-entertainment-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/sm-entertainment-data-breach</guid>
      <description>SM Entertainment confirmed on 8 November 2026 that an attacker accessed its business systems and leaked staff identity and bank data across three companies.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[On 8 November 2026, SM Entertainment disclosed a data breach in which an external attacker entered its business systems around 4 November and removed stored document files. The files held employee identity and bank data, including resident registration numbers, bank account numbers, mobile phone numbers and addresses. Three companies in the group were affected: SM Entertainment, DearU and Dream Maker Entertainment. No victim count has been disclosed.

SM Entertainment is one of South Korea's largest entertainment agencies. SM said the leaked material covers members and partners of the group, and the exact scope and the people affected are still being assessed. Notifications go out individually, by email or SMS, as the company confirms what was taken from each person.

## Leaked data

The notice lists employee identity and financial data. Its items are mobile phone numbers, addresses, bank account numbers, resident registration numbers, affiliations, and some information recorded in contracts. Which items leaked varies from person to person, because the attacker took stored document files rather than a single structured database table.

A resident registration number is South Korea's national identity number. It is used across government services, banking and employment. Unlike a password, it cannot be changed. A bank account number on its own does not empty an account, but paired with a name, address and phone number it gives a caller enough detail to impersonate the account holder. SM told affected people to watch for voice phishing and smishing from callers impersonating company officials. No disclosed leaked-item list mentions passwords, and no disclosure states whether passwords were affected.

The three companies disclosed different item lists, and the fuller list in the table comes from a summary of the three companies' disclosures. The DearU list comes from a secondary summary and is labelled as such.

| Company | Leaked items as disclosed |
| --- | --- |
| SM Entertainment | Names, mobile phone numbers, addresses, bank account numbers, resident registration numbers, department, position and title, some contract information |
| DearU | Names and English names, gender, date of birth, employee number, internal ID, email address, mobile phone number, department, position, title, rank, job duties, hire date |
| Dream Maker Entertainment | Same items as SM Entertainment, as reported in the summary of the three companies' disclosures |

<Callout type="info" title="Note">
Email addresses appear only in the DearU row. The claim comes from a summary of the three companies' disclosures, not from SM's own notice, and DearU's own notice was not read directly for this article.
</Callout>

Email addresses appear in only one row of the table. A [summary of the three companies' disclosures](https://finance.biggo.com/news/a9150680-b6e7-4813-8090-5eaf5655f8c4) reports that DearU's leaked employee database contained email addresses, with the caveat that the items actually leaked vary by individual. DearU's own notice was not read directly for this article, so the email claim is stated here as a secondary summary and kept separate from SM's own list. SM's own listed items do not include email addresses. The distinction matters: SM warned of voice phishing and smishing, and DearU employees' work addresses are in the leaked list, while the parent company's list is an identity and banking problem first.

## The three companies

The breach reached beyond the parent company. DearU, the information technology affiliate behind Bubble, the fan communication app, confirmed a similar leak of personal data. Dream Maker Entertainment, the group's concert planning affiliate, confirmed a breach of the same type around 4 November. The disclosures describe the three leaks as part of the same incident, with the same intrusion reaching all three companies through the business systems they share. [StarNews Korea](https://www.starnewskorea.com/en/star/2026/11/08/2026110817260689757) reported that SM is identifying the exact individuals and items involved and notifying them individually.

SM stated that fan information was not leaked. The leaked DearU material is employee data from the affiliate's business systems, not fan data from the Bubble platform, and fans of SM artists are not named as affected people in any disclosure so far.

## Notice and chronology

SM posted a notice on its website on 8 November 2026. It said recent internal security monitoring had confirmed that an external attacker gained unauthorised access to its business systems, including its electronic approval system, and sent stored document files outside the company. [Seoul Economic Daily](https://en.sedaily.com/culture/2026/11/08/sm-entertainment-says-employee-id-and-bank-data-leaked-in) reported the notice the same day. [Maeil Business News](https://www.mk.co.kr/en/society/12201769) and [Chosun Biz](https://biz.chosun.com/en/en-society/2026/11/08/XF4UESERQBB7TP5DZTIUTKGW5Y/) carried the same wording from the notice, and [Edaily](https://en.edaily.co.kr/news/eda202611085329/) reported the same dates and the same apology.

SM put the leak at around 4 November 2026. The company said it is investigating the exact circumstances with the relevant authorities, and it apologised for the concern the incident caused. [SBS](https://news.sbs.co.kr/english/article.do?news_id=N1008836201) reported at 20:13 KST on 8 November that SM described the leaked information as details of SM members and partners and said the exact scope was still being assessed.

## Actions after discovery

SM said that as soon as it became aware of the incident, it blocked the IP addresses and access routes used in the attack and replaced the unauthorised access keys, and that the steps shut off further attacks and data leaks. Maeil Business News reported the same steps on 8 November. The company said it plans further measures: a detailed investigation in cooperation with government authorities and outside specialist agencies, and a review of its security systems.

SM also said no cases of secondary damage from misuse of the leaked data have been confirmed so far. That statement covers the period up to the disclosure on 8 November. [isec.news](https://www.isec.news/2026/11/08/sm-entertainment-cyberattack-employee-partner-data/) summarised the same position: no secondary misuse confirmed, and the scope still being determined.

SM warned affected people to be cautious about voice phishing and smishing that impersonate company officials, a warning that matters because the leaked names, phone numbers and employer details give callers material to quote. Individual notifications are going out by email and SMS.

## Regulatory reports

SM reported the incident to the Korea Internet and Security Agency (KISA) and the Personal Information Protection Commission (PIPC), South Korea's privacy regulator. SBS reported both reports on 8 November. The PIPC is the authority that investigates personal data breaches in South Korea and can order corrective measures, [under the Personal Information Protection Act](https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b2eddef3-ace1-45ca-b3c4-c8af58163fe8).

## Sector context

HYBE, South Korea's largest music agency, disclosed a separate corporate leak on 2 November 2026. HYBE said attackers accessed its internal systems in two windows, 12 to 13 September and 3 to 5 October, through a document preview solution provided by an outside vendor and linked to its electronic approval system, and also through its expense processing system. The leaked items included names, resident registration numbers, passport numbers, bank account numbers, card numbers, mobile phone numbers, dates of birth and employee numbers. [K-VIBE (Yonhap) reported the HYBE disclosure on 2 November](https://korean-vibe.com/article/1065602401931689).

The HYBE incident is not the SM incident: the dates, the entry points and the item lists differ, and no source links the two attacks. The parallel is limited to the sector and the system type. Both agencies held employee identity documents in business systems built around electronic approval, and both disclosed the leak days or weeks after the intrusion. SM has disclosed no attack vector. The HYBE vendor entry point belongs to HYBE, not to SM.

## Measures for affected employees

The measures below cover the bank account, the resident registration number, phishing and email.

The first measure concerns the bank. Affected employees can contact their bank's fraud team, ask what extra checks can be placed on the account, and watch statements for transactions they did not make. The [breach-response order of operations](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach) covers the sequence: find what leaked, fix reused passwords, expect phishing, then contain the next one.

The second measure concerns the resident registration number, which cannot be changed once it has leaked. The response is monitoring rather than replacement. Affected employees can watch for accounts opened in their name and for official mail about services they did not request.

The third measure concerns phishing. SM's own warning is the starting point: voice phishing and smishing impersonating company officials. A call or text that quotes the employee's name, employer and phone number is not verified by those details. Those details are the leaked data. Affected employees can reach the company through its published contact channels rather than through a number or link in a message about the breach. The [guide to post-breach phishing](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email) describes how a leaked address and a leaked name turn a generic lure into a message that reads as if it came from the employer.

The fourth measure concerns email. It applies to DearU employees whose email addresses are in the leaked database. The risk is phishing that quotes the breach back at them. Affected employees can check whether their address appears in known breaches on [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) over the coming weeks, and change the password on any account that shares a password with the affected work account. The [guide to checking a leaked email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked) explains how to read each breach result and what to do for each one. The question of [whether to change an email address after a breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-change-email-after-data-breach) is answered in the negative for most cases. The old address stays in the stolen copy. The work is containing the damage rather than moving the address.

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Open questions

The investigation is still open. SM said it is working with the relevant authorities and outside specialist agencies to identify the exact cause, and the scope of the leak is still being determined. The questions the investigation still owes are the number of people affected, the full list of documents removed, the entry point the attacker used, and whether the data was published or sold after it left the company.

No attribution has been made to any group. No ransomware or extortion demand has been reported in any disclosure so far. A follow-up article is warranted when SM publishes a victim count, names the entry point, or reports a finding from the PIPC investigation.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>South Korea</category><category>Email Privacy</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Arara leaked 77 million emails in a week of major breaches</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/this-week-in-email-privacy-2026-11-09</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/this-week-in-email-privacy-2026-11-09</guid>
      <description>Arara Message, MUJI, Harvard, NTT Docomo, Gnosis Pay, SM Entertainment and Gmail Send As: the email privacy stories of 3 to 9 November 2026.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The email privacy roundup for 3 to 9 November 2026 covers seven stories. Paycloud Holdings disclosed that about 77 million email addresses were taken, or may have been taken, from Arara Message. Ryohin Keikaku extended the MUJI disclosure to card numbers in about 1.09 million records. Have I Been Pwned listed a Harvard dataset. NTT Docomo, Gnosis Pay and SM Entertainment each reported a breach, and Google set January 2027 as the end of Gmail Send As for third-party email addresses.

## Arara Message breach

On 2 November 2026, Paycloud Holdings reported unauthorised access to Arara Message. About 77 million email addresses were taken, or may have been taken, from 97 dedicated servers. Up to about 380 client companies were affected. Between 28 and 30 October 2026, up to about 7.13 million messages impersonating credit card companies were sent through the service. The full account is in [Arara Message data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/arara-message-data-breach).

## MUJI second report

Ryohin Keikaku issued a second MUJI report on 4 November 2026. It added card numbers in about 1.09 million MUJI Card records to the disclosure. Up to about 27.26 million app records, including email addresses, had already been covered. The figures are worded as information that may have leaked. No leak to the dark web and no misuse had been confirmed when the second report appeared. The full account is in [MUJI data breach second report](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/muji-data-breach-second-report).

## Harvard listing

Have I Been Pwned added the Harvard dataset on 3 November 2026. It holds 850,537 email addresses, with a breach date of November 2025. Harvard found the intrusion on 18 November 2025, after a phone-based phishing attack. People were notified by email on 22 November 2025. The full account is in [Harvard data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/harvard-data-breach).

## NTT Docomo breach

NTT Docomo confirmed unauthorised access to Docomo Online Shop and My docomo. Up to 300,000 customer records leaked, including email addresses and bank details. The full account is in [NTT Docomo data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/ntt-docomo-data-breach).

## Gnosis Pay breach

Gnosis Pay disclosed the breach on 6 November 2026. The legacy system behind its branded Visa debit cards was affected. Unauthorised access was detected on 3 November, and containment began within two hours. Customer notices reviewed by Cointelegraph listed full card numbers, expiry dates, CVV codes, names, home addresses, linked wallet addresses, email addresses and phone numbers. No victim count was given. Customer funds were not affected. The full account is in [Gnosis Pay data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/gnosis-pay-data-breach).

## SM Entertainment breach

SM Entertainment disclosed the breach on 8 November 2026. An external attacker had entered its business systems around 4 November and removed stored document files. The files held employee identity and bank data, including resident registration numbers, bank account numbers, mobile phone numbers and addresses. Three companies were affected: SM Entertainment, DearU and Dream Maker Entertainment. No victim count was disclosed. The full account is in [SM Entertainment data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/sm-entertainment-data-breach).

## Gmail Send As change

Google's Gmail Help page states that Gmail no longer supports Send As for third-party email addresses from January 2027. The change applies on the web and in the Gmail mobile apps. Gmailify and POP fetching of third-party accounts end at the same time. Send As for Gmail and Google Workspace addresses is not affected. People who set up Gmail Send As manually to send from an alias address are affected by the change. The source is [Learn about changes to third-party email account support in Gmail](https://support.google.com/mail/answer/17101213).

## Further stories published this week

The week also brought breach articles on [Suntory](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/suntory-data-breach), affecting around 100,000 people and disclosed on 2 November 2026; [M1](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/m1-data-breach), covering customer names, NRIC numbers and email addresses; [DigiCert](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/digicert-data-breach), covering archived customer records; [Iris Plaza](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/iris-plaza-data-breach), covering up to 7.7 million records; [Mirae Asset Securities](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/mirae-asset-securities-data-breach), covering about 3,800 accounts and data of 35,255 staff; [Who Gives A Crap](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/who-gives-a-crap-data-breach), a marketing vendor incident that exposed names, emails and phone numbers; and [Nojima](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/nojima-data-breach) and [iStyle Cosme](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/istyle-cosme-data-breach), both published on 3 November 2026. The guide on [how to check if an email was leaked](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked) covers checking whether an address appears in a breach, and the guide on [what to do when an email is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach) covers the response.

AliasFleet provides email aliases that forward mail to a verified destination inbox. Two-way reply and Quick Send do not use Gmail Send As.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breaches</category><category>Privacy</category><category>Email Aliases</category><category>Weekly Roundup</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>One Alias Per Smart Home Brand Keeps a Leak in One Account</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-setting-up-smart-home-devices</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-setting-up-smart-home-devices</guid>
      <description>Smart home setup hands your email address to the camera maker. One managed alias per device brand keeps a leak in one account instead of all of them.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Protecting an email address during smart home setup means giving each device brand its own managed alias instead of the main personal address, with a unique password and two-factor authentication on every account. The address entered at setup becomes the login, the password reset route and the channel for security alerts for every device on the account. Ring and Wyze have each had incidents in which account data, including email addresses, was exposed, and Eufy uploaded face thumbnails to cloud servers without the owner having a cloud storage account. In the Ring and Wyze cases the email address was the key to cameras inside the home.

## The email address at setup

A smart home device cannot be set up without an account, and the account cannot be created without an email address. [Google states](https://support.google.com/googlehome/answer/10503498?hl=en&ref_topic=16061887) that a Google Account is needed to create a Nest app account, and that Nest cameras and doorbells need an account for setup, notifications and video footage. [Wyze states](https://support.wyze.com/hc/en-us/articles/360032757851-Wyze-App-Account-Password) that a Wyze account controls Wyze devices. The address is therefore the account itself, and it stays attached to every device and every alert.

The same address is often also the login for banking, shopping, work and social accounts, so a leak at one smart home company hands attackers an address known to be real and active. A password reused across accounts turns a single leak into access to several accounts at once.

## Ring credential leak, 2019

In December 2019, login credentials for 3,672 Ring camera owners were found posted on a text storage site. The data held login emails, passwords, time zones and camera names such as "bedroom" or "front door". [Bitdefender reported](https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/hotforsecurity/ring-cam-credentials-leaked-web-nows-good-time-change-password) that BuzzFeed News verified the leak with four of the people affected. With the login email and password, an intruder could reach the home address, phone number and payment card details on the account, live footage from all cameras on the account, and 30 to 60 days of video history. [Security Magazine reported the same figures](https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/91469-amazon-ring-leaks-thousands-of-customer-data).

Ring denied that its own systems had been breached and said the credentials were harvested from other breaches. Security researchers cited by BuzzFeed said the standardised format of the data suggested a company database. The origin was never settled in public. None of the affected owners had two-factor authentication enabled. A second list of around 1,562 Ring credentials was reported on the same day, according to [Gizmodo](https://gizmodo.com/ring-sure-does-have-a-lot-of-password-leaks-that-are-en-1840541202).

## Ring and the Federal Trade Commission, 2023

In May 2023, the [Federal Trade Commission charged Ring](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/05/ftc-says-ring-employees-illegally-surveilled-customers-failed-stop-hackers-taking-control-users) with compromising customer privacy by allowing any employee or contractor to access customer videos, and with failing to put basic protections in place against credential stuffing and brute force attacks. The complaint states that any employee or contractor, including hundreds of Ukraine-based contractors, could access customer videos. One employee viewed thousands of recordings belonging to female users over several months before another employee discovered the misconduct.

The FTC complaint also states that Ring experienced multiple credential stuffing attacks in 2017 and 2018 and did not add multi-factor authentication until 2019. Hackers accessed stored videos, live streams and account profiles of about 55,000 US customers between January 2019 and March 2020, and used the two-way talk feature to harass people, including children. Ring agreed to pay $5.8 million in consumer refunds and to run a data security programme for 20 years, while denying that it violated the law. [TechCrunch covered the settlement](https://techcrunch.com/2023/05/31/amazon-ring-ftc-settlement-lax-security/) and noted that Ring made two-factor authentication mandatory in February 2020 and added end-to-end encryption in 2021.

## Wyze database exposure, 2019

In December 2019, Wyze confirmed that an unsecured database had exposed user data from 4 December to 26 December. The database was a copy of production data made for measuring business metrics, and an employee removed the security protocols on 4 December by mistake. [BleepingComputer reported](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/wyze-exposes-user-data-via-unsecured-elasticsearch-cluster/) that it held customer emails, camera nicknames, Wi-Fi network names, Wyze device information, Alexa tokens for about 24,000 users, and body metrics for 140 beta testers. Twelve Security, the firm that found the exposure, put the number of affected customers at about 2.4 million. Wyze did not confirm that number.

Wyze said the database held no passwords or financial information, forced all users to log back in and refreshed API tokens. [Threatpost reported the same sequence](https://threatpost.com/iot-company-wyze-leaks-emails-device-data-of-2-4m/151451/) and noted that Wyze warned customers to watch for phishing using the exposed email addresses. [Digital Trends reported](https://www.digitaltrends.com/home/wyze-customers-hit-by-online-data-leak-company-confirms/) that a second unprotected database was found during the audit that followed.

## Wyze web view incident, 2023

In September 2023, an engineer fixing a bug on the Wyze web viewing portal selected the wrong caching setting. For about 40 minutes, up to 2,300 users who logged in could have seen cameras belonging to 10 affected users. Wyze disclosed the incident in [its own forum advisory](https://forums.wyze.com/t/wyze-web-view-service-advisory-9-8-2023/275448/1), took the portal down, notified the 10 users and hired an external security firm for penetration testing.

## Eufy thumbnail uploads, 2022

In November 2022, security researcher Paul Moore found that his Eufy Doorbell Dual was uploading thumbnail images of faces to cloud servers even though he had no Eufy cloud storage account. [Gizmodo reported](https://gizmodo.com/eufy-security-cameras-unencrypted-footage-cloud-scandal-1849833489) that the uploaded clips were not encrypted and could be played in a desktop media player. [AppleInsider reported](https://appleinsider.com/articles/22/11/29/eufy-cameras-upload-content-to-the-cloud-without-owners-knowledge) that the Eufy website could still show an uploaded image after Moore turned off the HomeBase.

Eufy replied that thumbnails were briefly hosted on AWS to send push notifications with thumbnail images, and that the app had failed to disclose this. Eufy stated that the thumbnails were encrypted on its servers and deleted automatically, while Moore demonstrated unencrypted playback of uploaded clips. In a statement quoted by [Security Systems News](https://www.securitysystemsnews.com/article/eufy-responds-to-allegations-of-insecure-cameras-violation-of-privacy-laws), Eufy called the lack of communication an oversight, apologised, and said it would revise the notification wording. Eufy also said it had closed the route that allowed camera streams to be played in a third-party player without authentication. No account credentials leaked in the Eufy case. Data left the home when the owner had chosen local storage, and the thumbnails were tied to the Eufy account. [MacRumors reported](https://www.macrumors.com/2023/01/31/anker-eufy-camera-security/) in January 2023 that Anker said every Eufy camera was being updated to use WebRTC, which is encrypted by default, and that it was bringing in third-party security companies to audit Eufy products.

## Incident summary

| Brand | Date | Data exposed or affected |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Ring | December 2019 | Login emails and passwords for 3,672 owners, with camera names and time zones |
| Ring | May 2023 | About 55,000 US customers had accounts compromised, per the FTC complaint |
| Wyze | December 2019 | Customer emails, camera nicknames, Wi-Fi names and device data for about 2.4 million customers, per Twelve Security |
| Wyze | September 2023 | Up to 2,300 users could have seen cameras belonging to 10 affected users |
| Eufy | November 2022 | Face thumbnails uploaded to cloud servers without a cloud storage account |

## One alias per device brand

The response is to give each device brand its own address: one alias for Ring, one for Wyze, one for Google Nest, one for Eufy, and so on. If one brand leaks, the exposed address belongs to that brand only and cannot be used to sign in to the other brands. The alias must stay active for the life of the devices, because password resets, security alerts and firmware notices all go to it. An address that stops working locks the owner out, so the alias must be managed and persistent.

A separate alias also shows the source of spam. If phishing mail arrives on the Ring alias, the sender got that address from Ring or from a leak of Ring data, and the alias can be paused or replaced without touching any other account. That only works if the alias is used for one brand and nothing else.

<Callout type="warning" title="Warning">
An alias that stops working locks the account owner out of password resets and security alerts. The alias stays active for the life of the devices, and the recovery address on the account stays current.
</Callout>

## Two-factor authentication and recovery

An alias limits the damage from a leak. It does not stop someone who already has the password from signing in. Two-factor authentication stops a password alone from opening an account.

Ring supports two-step verification through a six-digit code sent by text message or generated by an authenticator app, managed in Control Centre, and [Ring documents the setup](https://ring.com/au/en/support/articles/2mmqs/setting-up-two-step-verification-for-Ring). Wyze now has two-factor authentication enabled by default, with email, SMS and authenticator app codes as the available methods, according to [Wyze support](https://support.wyze.com/hc/en-us/articles/360024402052-Two-Factor-Authentication). The same page warns that losing access to the phone number used for two-factor authentication may mean a new account is needed. Google Nest accounts use the Google Account's own two-step verification.

Recovery details carry the same weight as the password, and the recovery email is a different address from the one being protected. A password manager holds a unique password for each brand, and the backup codes from two-factor setup are stored somewhere other than the phone. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) can check whether an address has already appeared in a breach.

## AliasFleet and smart home accounts

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com/) provides managed email aliases that forward to a real inbox. One alias per device brand gives each smart home account its own address, and the alias can be paused or replaced if it starts receiving spam or appears in a breach. The free tier includes 10 active aliases, 1 verified destination inbox, 3 managed subdomains and 100 MB of monthly forwarding. [Pro plans](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing) add unlimited aliases and custom domains. AliasFleet does not control the security of the smart home brands, and an alias does not replace two-factor authentication or a unique password on those accounts.

## Account setup sequence

The setup sequence for a new device runs in the same order for each brand. A managed alias is created for the brand before the account is opened. The account is registered with that alias and a unique password stored in a password manager. Two-factor authentication is turned on and the backup codes are stored away from the phone. The recovery email and phone number are checked and kept current. The alias stays active for the life of the devices, and the address is checked on Have I Been Pwned after setup.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Smart Home</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Guides</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email for Cloud Storage Signups</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-cloud-storage</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-cloud-storage</guid>
      <description>Cloud storage holds backups, photos and documents for years. Use one alias per provider as the signup address, kept alive for the life of the account.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Email protection for cloud storage signups is the practice of registering a cloud storage account with a dedicated email alias instead of a personal inbox address. The alias serves as the signup address for sign-in, password resets, security alerts and storage warnings, and it stays active for as long as the files remain in the account. One alias is used per provider, so a leak at one provider exposes only that provider's address, while the destination inbox behind every alias stays under the holder's control.

Cloud storage accounts hold backups, photographs and documents for years, and the signup address is the route back into the account for the whole of that time. The address is also recorded in the provider's customer records, so a breach at the provider can expose it alongside the account.

## The signup address and the account

A cloud storage account is a long-term registration, and the signup address carries four functions through the life of the account. The provider sends sign-in codes when a new device connects, password reset links when the password is forgotten, security alerts when account activity looks unusual, and storage warnings when the quota runs low. Each message goes to the signup address alone, so an address that stops working cuts every route back into the account at once.

A single address used at Google Drive, Dropbox, OneDrive and iCloud ties four accounts to one identifier, so one leak hands attackers the address for all four. A separate alias per provider keeps the exposure inside one account, and the [guide to a different email for every website](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/different-email-for-every-website) covers the same principle for websites in general.

## Free storage tiers

The free tiers of the main providers are small, and the signup address is tied to the whole account. Every Google Account includes up to 15 GB of storage shared across Google Drive, Gmail and Google Photos, according to the [Google One plans page](https://one.google.com/plans). Apple gives 5 GB of free iCloud storage on first sign-in to an iPhone, iPad or Mac with an Apple Account, shared with backups, mail and photographs, according to the [Apple iCloud page](https://www.apple.com/icloud/). Microsoft sells storage through Microsoft 365: the Personal plan includes 1 TB of OneDrive storage at $9.99 per month or $99.99 per year, according to the [Microsoft 365 plans page](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/buy/compare-all-microsoft-365-products).

## The Dropbox Sign breach of 2024

In April 2024 an attacker reached the production environment of Dropbox Sign, the Dropbox document signing service. Dropbox became aware of the unauthorised access on 24 April 2024 and disclosed it on 1 May 2024. The attacker accessed data on all Dropbox Sign users, including email addresses and usernames, and for some users phone numbers, hashed passwords, API keys, OAuth tokens and multi-factor authentication details. People who only received or signed a document through Dropbox Sign, without creating an account, also had their names and email addresses exposed. The incident was reported by [CybersecurityDive](https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/dropbox-sign-cyberattack/714999/) and by [Dark Reading](https://www.darkreading.com/application-security/dropbox-breach-exposes-customer-credentials-authentication-data). Dropbox reset passwords, logged users out of connected devices and rotated API keys and OAuth tokens.

## Loss of access to the signup address

Each provider handles loss of access to the signup email differently. Dropbox states the position plainly: if the holder cannot access the email address on the account and has no logged-in device and no verified recovery email, Dropbox cannot change the email address on the account, and the holder may not be able to reset the password or log in. The full policy is on the [Dropbox lost-email-access help page](https://help.dropbox.com/account-access/lost-email-access?fallback=true). Changing the email on a Dropbox account sends a verification email to the new address, and the change completes only when it is confirmed, according to the [Dropbox change-email help page](https://help.dropbox.com/account-settings/change-email).

Google requires recovery information to be set in advance, and recovery information cannot be added while locked out or during account recovery. Google advises a recovery email address that is used regularly and differs from the sign-in address, and after a change to recovery information Google may send codes to the previous information for 7 days, according to the [Google recovery options page](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/183723). Google also limits email changes: a Gmail address can be changed to another Gmail address, but after the change the holder cannot create a new Google Account email ending in gmail.com for the next 12 months, and cannot delete the new email address, according to the [Google change-email page](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/19870?hl=en-GB&co=GENIE.Platform%3DDesktop).

Microsoft runs recovery through a form, reviewed within 24 hours and submittable up to two times per day. If two-step verification is on and no alternate verification method can be accessed, Microsoft support agents cannot send password reset links or change account details, according to the [Microsoft account recovery form help page](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/account-billing/help-with-the-microsoft-account-recovery-form-b19c02d1-a782-dee6-93c3-dc8113b20c42). Apple applies a waiting period when a password cannot be reset through a trusted device or another recovery factor, and Apple states the process can take several days or more, according to the [Apple forgot-password support page](https://support.apple.com/en-hk/102656).

## Recovery options at signup

Each provider offers a recovery email, a recovery phone number, or both, and the options are set at signup, while access is certain. Google offers a recovery email, a recovery phone number and recovery contacts; Microsoft offers alternate verification methods and the recovery form; Apple offers a trusted phone number, a recovery contact and a recovery key; Dropbox offers a recovery email. The options must be added before a lockout, because none of them can be added during one. Two-step sign-in is turned on at the same time, with backup codes stored in a password manager.

| Provider | Recovery route | Stated limit |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Google | Recovery email, phone number, contacts | Nothing can be added during a lockout; codes may go to previous information for 7 days after a change |
| Microsoft | Recovery form, alternate verification methods | Form reviewed within 24 hours; two submissions per day; no manual override with two-step verification on |
| Apple | Trusted phone number, recovery contact, recovery key | Recovery can take several days or more |
| Dropbox | Recovery email | No email change without the address, a logged-in device, or a verified recovery email |

## Aliases per storage provider

One dedicated alias is created for each cloud storage provider and used as the signup address. The alias forwards mail to a destination inbox the holder controls and checks regularly, and the provider never sees the real inbox address. A second email address can serve the same purpose if it is a real, maintained inbox, and the [guide on whether a second email address is needed](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/do-you-need-a-second-email-address) covers that choice. The alias route has one advantage over a second inbox: each alias can be paused or removed on its own when a provider starts sending spam or suffers a breach.

Apple offers a similar built-in option for its own users. Hide My Email generates unique, random email addresses that forward to a personal inbox, so the real address stays private at signup. Hide My Email covers Apple users only; a general alias service covers any provider. [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides aliases as managed, persistent identities, with one alias per service and forwarding to a chosen inbox, and AliasFleet is not a disposable email service.

<Callout type="warning" title="The alias outlives the signup">
A short-lived address that stops forwarding leaves the account without a working route for resets or security codes. The alias stays active for the life of the account, and any change of address happens inside the provider account before the old alias is removed.
</Callout>

## Alias lifetime and account inactivity

An alias protects the account only while it stays live, and three things can end it: the alias service closes, the destination inbox closes, or the provider deletes an inactive account. Google reserves the right to delete an inactive Google Account and its activity and data if the holder is inactive across Google for at least two years, according to the [Google inactive account page](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/3036546). Deletion affects all products tied to the account, including Drive, so two years of inactivity can remove the files as well as the account.

The alias itself needs the same attention. If the alias service account lapses or the destination inbox closes, mail to the alias stops, and the [guide to using an email alias for account recovery](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery) states the rule: recovery through an alias works only while the alias stays live and forwards to a controlled inbox. Before any alias is deleted, the protected account is updated to a new address first, not afterwards. A short-lived address must never be used for an account holding files, because the provider sends security codes and reset links to that address and will not change the address on the account without proof of access to it.

## Post-signup checks

Four checks close the loop after signup. The verification email arrives at the destination inbox through the alias, the storage quota and uploaded files are checked, and the recovery email and phone number are confirmed as recorded. The signup address is checked against known breaches using [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com), with the [guide to checking if an email was leaked](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked) covering what to do with the result.

## Signup mistakes

Three mistakes recur. The first is signing up with a work email address, which belongs to the employer, and leaving the job can remove access to it. Dropbox states that an account registered to a former workplace email may no longer receive its security codes, and the holder has to contact the former employer for help. The second is signing up with a short-lived address, which may pass verification and then stop, leaving the account with no working route for resets or alerts. The [guide to protecting email for free trials](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-free-trials) covers short-lived signups where the account holds nothing of value; cloud storage is the opposite case, because the account holds files. The third is reusing the same address across providers, which gives one leak or one compromised inbox the reset route for every account.

## AliasFleet and cloud storage signups

AliasFleet supplies managed, persistent identities, one alias per online account, with mail forwarded to a destination inbox and replies sent from the alias. For a cloud storage signup, the holder creates one alias for the provider, uses it as the signup address, and keeps it active while the files stay in the account. The free tier includes 10 active aliases, 1 verified destination inbox, 3 managed subdomains, 100 MB monthly forwarding and two-way reply routing, according to the [AliasFleet pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing). AliasFleet does not store or back up the files, and does not replace the provider's recovery options. The recovery email and second factor still have to be set inside the provider account.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Cloud Storage</category><category>Email Aliases</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Is AOL Mail Safe After the 2014 Data Breach?</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-aol-mail-safe</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-aol-mail-safe</guid>
      <description>AOL Mail uses TLS and offers 2-step verification, but the 2014 breach, mail scanning for ads and a 2026 change of owner leave an old AOL address exposed.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[AOL Mail is a webmail service operated by AOL, which Bending Spoons bought from Yahoo in January 2026. The service uses TLS transport encryption and offers 2-step verification, so an account with a unique password and 2-step verification is reasonably protected against takeover. The address is the weaker part of the picture: an AOL address created years ago has been in breach files since a 2014 incident affecting about 2.4 million people, and mail content was scanned for advertising under the Yahoo-era privacy policy.

## Ownership and operation

AOL Mail still operates as a standard webmail service in 2026. A guide to mail clients for AOL lists the published settings as imap.aol.com on port 993 with SSL for incoming mail and smtp.aol.com on port 465 with SSL for outgoing mail. No announcement ending IMAP access had been found as of November 2026. The service is [free with advertising, with paid add-ons that remove ads](https://faraday.email/blog/is-aol-mail-still-around-2026). The settings are set out in [aiemaily's guide to mail clients for AOL Mail](https://aiemaily.com/blog/best-email-client-for-aol-mail).

Yahoo agreed in October 2025 to sell AOL to [Bending Spoons](https://techcrunch.com/2026/07/05/what-is-bending-spoons-everything-to-know-about-aols-acquirer/), the Milan-based company behind Evernote, Meetup and WeTransfer. [The deal closed on 2 January 2026 for $1.454 billion](https://www.techspot.com/news/110076-italian-software-company-bending-spoons-new-owner-aol.html), and Bending Spoons co-founder Luca Ferrari estimated that AOL remains among the world's top ten email providers, with roughly 8 million daily visitors.

## The 2014 data breach

In April 2014 AOL noticed a large increase in spam sent from spoofed AOL addresses. Its investigation found unauthorised access to AOL's network and systems, and [on 28 April 2014 the company published a security update](https://www.darkreading.com/cyberattacks-data-breaches/aol-subscriber-data-stolen-you-ve-got-pwned) confirming that information on a significant number of user accounts had been accessed. The exposed data included email addresses, postal addresses, address book contact information, encrypted passwords and encrypted answers to security questions, plus certain employee information.

AOL stated that there was no indication the encryption on the passwords or the security question answers had been broken, and no indication that encrypted financial information had been accessed. The company [urged all users to change their passwords and their security questions](https://www.scworld.com/brief/after-investigating-mail-incident-aol-confirms-breach) as a precaution. Spammers had used the stolen contact information to send spoofed mail appearing to come from roughly 2% of AOL email accounts. At the time AOL had [about 24 million email accounts and 2.5 million paid users](https://www.crn.com/news/security/300072671/aol-breach-could-bolster-phishers-exposes-email-spoofing-web-threats), according to financial filings cited by CRN. Breach records put the number of affected individuals at [about 2.4 million](https://www.twingate.com/blog/tips/aol-data-breach); AOL itself never published a final count, so the 2.4 million figure comes from breach records rather than from the company. AOL [tightened its DMARC policy](https://www.crn.com/news/security/300072671/aol-breach-could-bolster-phishers-exposes-email-spoofing-web-threats) after the breach so that bulk AOL mail is rejected if it does not come from an AOL server.

## Earlier incidents

In 2006 AOL Research released a dataset of about 20 million search queries from more than 650,000 users for research purposes. The data was meant to be anonymised, but personally identifiable information was present in many queries, and the New York Times identified an individual from the released data by matching queries against phone book listings. The release led to [resignations, sackings and a class action lawsuit settled in 2013](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AOL_search_data_leak), but copies of the dataset had already spread widely. [Mailbird's guide to the Bending Spoons acquisition](https://www.getmailbird.com/bending-spoons-aol-acquisition-email-privacy-guide/) lists the release among the earlier incidents in AOL's history.

An earlier incident dates to 2003. In May of that year Jason Smathers, a software engineer at AOL, took a list of 92 million screen names and email addresses from AOL systems and sold it to a spammer. Federal prosecutors charged Smathers in June 2004, and [in August 2005 he was sentenced to 15 months in prison](https://www.theregister.com/security/2005/08/18/aol-techie-jailed-for-selling-email-database-to-spammers/1115755) after pleading guilty. The list was used to send large volumes of spam to AOL members.

## AOL account security

AOL Mail connects over TLS. Webmail runs over HTTPS, and the published IMAP and SMTP settings both require SSL, so mail is encrypted between the device and AOL's servers. That is transport encryption, not end-to-end encryption: AOL publishes no end-to-end encryption for AOL Mail, so mail is readable on AOL's servers and by anyone with lawful access to them.

Two-step verification is the main control available on the account. AOL's Account Security page offers 2-step verification by phone number, with the code sent by text message or by call, and [by authenticator app](https://www.authenticator.sh/2fa/aol). The authenticator-app option appears only on accounts with at least two recovery methods, a recovery phone number and a recovery email address, and AOL states the option is not yet available for all accounts. Third-party mail apps cannot ask for a code, so once 2-step verification is on, they need an app password generated on the Account Security page instead of the normal password.

AOL's Account Security page also shows recent account activity. [Passkey support for AOL Mail is not verified in any source found](https://login.com/guides/aol-mail/), according to login.com's guide, which checked AOL's official help pages. The phone method works on every account, the authenticator method works on accounts that meet the recovery requirements, and both are stronger than a password alone.

## Mail scanning and advertising

In April 2018 Oath, then the Verizon-owned parent of AOL and Yahoo, [published a unified privacy policy](https://www.ghacks.net/2018/04/16/oaths-privacy-policy-is-a-privacy-nightmare/) that stated Oath "analyzes and stores all communications content, including email content from incoming and outgoing mail". The policy also covered attachments and user content around interactions with financial institutions. The stated purpose was to deliver targeted advertising based on interests identified in the scans.

[The Wall Street Journal reported that Oath scanned over 200 million inboxes](https://www.techradar.com/news/report-yahoo-and-aol-will-scan-your-emails-and-sell-the-data-to-advertisers) and pitched advertisers on the ability to draw information from Yahoo Mail inboxes. Oath said the scanning applied to commercial mail from retailers and mass senders, and that users could opt out of interest-based advertising. The same reporting noted that Gmail stopped scanning mail for ad targeting in 2017, and that Microsoft Outlook states it does not use email content for ad targeting.

[Yahoo's own privacy policy, last updated in April 2022](https://lookingforwhitman.org/tutorials/legal.yahoo.com/us/en/yahoo/privacy/index.html), still states that Yahoo analyses and stores all communications content, including email content from incoming and outgoing mail, to deliver, personalise and develop features, content, advertising and services. Whether that policy still governs AOL Mail after the January 2026 sale is not confirmed in any public source found. No source found states whether AOL Mail scanning for advertising continues under Bending Spoons, so the current position is an open question rather than a confirmed fact.

## The inherited address

An address created in the 1990s or 2000s has been handed out to banks, shops, forums and mailing lists for decades, and the 2014 breach put many of those addresses, with postal addresses and contact lists, into criminal hands. A reader can check whether an address appears in known breaches through [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/), which aggregates breached records and offers notifications when an address appears in a future breach. The AliasFleet [guide to checking whether an email was leaked](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked) explains how to read each breach the check names and what to do for each one.

Password reuse makes the exposure worse. If the same password that protected an AOL account in 2014 was also used on other sites, the encrypted password taken in the breach could be cracked offline and tried elsewhere. AOL's advice at the time was to change the password everywhere it had been reused, not only at AOL. The same logic applies now: an old address with an old password is a credential that has been exposed more than once.

| Aspect | Account | Address |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Protection | Unique password and 2-step verification | A separate alias for each site, forwarding to AOL |
| Main risk | Takeover if the password is reused or 2-step verification is off | Presence in breach files since 2014 |
| Limit | Mail is readable on AOL servers; no end-to-end encryption is published | Aliases do not remove the address from breach files |

## AliasFleet and an old AOL address

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) is not a replacement for AOL Mail. The setup it is built for keeps AOL as the destination inbox and puts aliases in front of it. Each site gets its own alias address, and mail sent to that alias forwards to the AOL inbox. The AOL address itself is never handed out to a new site, so it stops spreading further. If one alias starts receiving spam, that alias can be paused or deleted without touching the inbox or any other alias. AliasFleet lists its current plans on its [pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), and the [docs](https://aliasfleet.com/docs) explain how aliases and forwarding work.

<Callout type="info" title="Note">
The AOL address stays the destination inbox. Aliases sit in front of it, so a new site never receives the AOL address itself, and a leak of one alias exposes only that alias.
</Callout>

What AliasFleet does not do is also part of the picture. It does not encrypt mail end to end, it does not change AOL's mail scanning policy, and it does not remove an address from breach files. The AOL address still needs a unique password and 2-step verification turned on. The alias layer limits how far a new leak can travel; it does not repair the leaks that already happened.

The [Gmail](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-gmail-safe), [Outlook](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-outlook-safe), [Yahoo](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-yahoo-mail-safe), [Zoho](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-zoho-mail-safe) and [GMX](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-gmx-mail-safe) pieces in the same series each reach a similar split between account security and address safety. AOL is the oldest inbox in the set, and the address has been in circulation for decades.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Safety</category><category>AOL Mail</category><category>Privacy</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Is Mail.com Safe as a Main Email Address?</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-mail-com-safe</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-mail-com-safe</guid>
      <description>Mail.com is a free email service with 100+ vanity domains, but the domain names reveal identity and idle accounts are deleted after six months.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Mail.com is a free email service operated by 1&1 Mail & Media Inc., a subsidiary of the German internet group United Internet. It provides SSL/TLS transport encryption, spam filtering, virus scanning and two-factor authentication, and it offers a choice of more than 100 domain names. Mail is not end-to-end encrypted, and free accounts are marked for deletion after six months without a login.

## History and ownership

Mail.com began in 1995 as Vanity Mail Services. United Internet bought the email service in September 2010 and runs it on the GMX platform, and the operating company is 1&1 Mail & Media Inc., based in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, with the parent group in Montabaur, Germany. That history is recorded on [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mail.com), which lists the service as launched in 1995 with United Internet as the parent.

## Free plan

The free account includes 65 GB of email storage, 2 GB of cloud storage, attachments up to 30 MB and up to 10 alias addresses under one login, with a choice of more than 100 domains, according to [mail.com's own mail page](https://www.mail.com/mail/?kid=kid). Some older reviews cite more than 200 domains, including the [TechRadar review](https://www.techradar.com/reviews/mailcom-review), which also puts Premium at $9.99 for three months or $29.99 a year, with ads removed and attachments raised to 100 MB.

Apps are available for Android and iOS, and the [Android app](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details/mail_com_Secure_Email_Cloud?id=com.mail.mobile.android.mail&hl=en_IN) lists TLS and SSL encryption, PIN and fingerprint lock, and the same choice of domains. [Canary Mail](https://canarymail.io/blog/mail-com-alternatives), which checked the providers' own sites on 13 October 2026, states that IMAP, POP and forwarding are Premium-only on mail.com, so a free account works only in mail.com's own website and apps.

## Security

Mail.com's [security page](https://www.mail.com/security/) describes the setup in plain terms. Mail is transferred using SSL or its successor TLS. Virus protection and spam protection are switched on by default. Two-factor authentication uses a six-digit code from an authenticator app on the phone, entered alongside the password at login. Data is stored on mail.com servers in the United States, in a data centre in Kansas according to TechRadar.

One point is unresolved. Mail.com's own security page describes two-factor authentication without saying which plan it needs, while [JoinDeleteMe](https://joindeleteme.com/is-site-safe/is-mail-com-safe/) describes it as a Premium feature. Signup also asks for a personal phone number, and phone verification is required before two-factor authentication can be switched on, according to Wikipedia.

## Vanity domains

The domains are the product: Mail.com offers domains for professions such as doctor.com, lawyer.com, engineer.com and consultant.com, for places such as usa.com and london.com, and for interests and beliefs, including fan domains. Wikipedia describes them as brand-neutral domains covering geographical locations, professions, beliefs and interests.

An address at doctor.com states a profession to every recipient, every website and every data broker that sees it. An address at a fan domain states a taste, and an address at a place domain states a location. A plain address at gmail.com or outlook.com states nothing about the person behind it, and the [Gmail](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-gmail-safe) and [Outlook](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-outlook-safe) pieces cover those services on their own terms.

The same address is reused across dozens of accounts, so the address that appears on a CV, a shopping account and a forum login ties those together, and a vanity domain adds a label to that tie. A labelled address is also easy to guess and easy to target: a sender who wants to phish doctors can write to addresses at doctor.com and already holds one fact about the target. The domain choice is free, and the label travels with every message the account sends.

## Encryption

Mail.com encrypts mail in transit and stores it on its own servers. It offers no end-to-end encryption and no PGP option. Canary Mail states this directly after checking the providers' own sites, and [Clean.email](https://clean.email/blog/email-providers/is-mail-com-legitimate) agrees, noting that mail is stored server-side with no end-to-end encryption by default. Mail.com's own security page lists only SSL/TLS, which is consistent with that: transport encryption protects mail on the wire, not from the provider.

Mail.com can read stored mail and hand it over under a lawful request, and JoinDeleteMe notes that the free plan shows ads targeted using user data, with an ad-free experience reserved for Premium. ToS;DR, the project that rates terms of service, has not graded mail.com, but notes as potential concerns that it keeps logs for an undefined period and uses third-party cookies for advertising.

That position matches Gmail, Outlook and Yahoo, which also encrypt mail in transit without end-to-end encryption. The difference is with the sister service: the companion piece on [GMX Mail](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-gmx-mail-safe) covers the service from the same company that offers optional PGP encryption and free IMAP, where mail.com offers neither on the free plan.

There is no widely reported mail.com data breach. Canary Mail says it found no credible reports of one, and JoinDeleteMe says the same. That finding rests on the sources checked, and an address can be checked against [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) before it is trusted with important accounts.

## Inactivity deletion

The free account rule is stated on mail.com's own blog: free accounts are considered inactive after six months of no login activity and are marked for deletion. When an account is deleted, all information in it, including emails and cloud files, is deleted from mail.com servers. The post is at [mail.com's blog](https://www.mail.com/blog/posts/inactive-email-accounts/71/).

<Callout type="warning" title="Six months without a login">
A free mail.com account with no login for six months is marked for deletion, with mail and cloud files deleted and the address blocked from re-registration for one year. Accounts that depend on the address for password resets lose that route.
</Callout>

A deleted address is blocked from re-registration for one year, and after that year it becomes available to anyone. Anyone who used the mail.com address as the login or recovery address for other accounts loses the password reset route for those accounts, and if someone else registers the old address later, password resets for those accounts go to a stranger. Mail.com's own blog makes exactly this point about recovery addresses, and the same post states the countermeasure: log in regularly, or do not use the address for anything that matters.

Six months is short compared with the competition. Yahoo deletes mailbox contents after 12 months without a sign-in, and Google may delete the account and its data after 24 months. The [Yahoo](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-yahoo-mail-safe) and [Zoho](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-zoho-mail-safe) pieces cover those services.

| Provider | Inactivity period | Result |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Mail.com | 6 months | Account marked for deletion; mail and cloud files deleted |
| Yahoo | 12 months | Mailbox contents deleted |
| Google | 24 months | Google may delete the account and its data after 24 months |

## Account blocking

The official [GMX support page](https://support.gmx.com/security/why-account-blocked.html), written for mail.com accounts, states that using a VPN during registration can lead to a block immediately after registering, because certain VPN configurations are prohibited. It also states that new accounts cannot be created from certain IP address ranges because of high spam activity, and that new mail.com addresses are not available in all countries. The same page defines "irregular activity" as the security department detecting spam or phishing mail sent from an account, sometimes because the account was hacked.

User reports match that description. Mail.com holds 2.2 out of 5 from 4,620 reviews on [Trustpilot](https://ie.trustpilot.com/review/www.mail.com), and the recent reviews are dominated by reports of sudden lockouts, repeated forced password resets for supposed irregular activity, and slow or absent support. These are user reports, not verified facts about the service, and the volume and consistency of the complaint is the reason they are recorded here.

Telephone support is reserved for Premium customers, according to TechRadar, and free users are left with self-help articles and a contact form. A [guide to locked mail.com accounts](https://gethuman.com/customer-service/Mail-com/how/How-Do-I-Get-Back-My-Locked-Mail-com-Account/fBR) notes that free users who get no response are sometimes told to try the Premium phone line anyway. A separate [login troubleshooting guide](https://www.justfixemail.com/guides/mail-com-login-sending-problems.php) adds a practical detail: mail.com needs IMAP/POP switched on in settings before any third-party app can connect, and guessing the password repeatedly can trigger a temporary lock.

Deleting an account is straightforward but final. The [deletion guide](https://www.serus.ai/opt-out-guides/delete-mail-com-account/) records the steps: Account, then Delete Account, then password confirmation. All mail is deleted with the account, and the address is blocked for one year.

## Aliases and mail.com

Mail.com itself offers up to 10 alias addresses inside one account, but those aliases share the same vanity domain and the same account, so they do not fix the identity problem or the deletion risk. The arrangement that addresses both is to put forwarding aliases in front of mail.com and never hand out the mail.com address.

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides managed forwarding aliases: a separate alias for each site, with forwarding to the mail.com inbox, and the ability to pause or close one alias if it starts receiving spam or appears in a breach, without touching the others. The mail.com address stays private, so the vanity domain never appears on a signup form, and the six-month deletion rule stops being a threat to logins because no account depends on the mail.com address directly. AliasFleet does not provide the inbox itself, and it does not change mail.com's encryption, advertising or deletion rules. Pricing is on the [pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), and setup is covered in the [docs](https://aliasfleet.com/docs).

Mail.com provides a free inbox with standard transport security, a vanity domain that states something about its owner, no end-to-end encryption, and a six-month deletion rule for idle free accounts. Behind forwarding aliases, the address stays private and the deletion rule stops threatening logins; handed out directly, the address carries the identity with it.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Security</category><category>Mail.com</category><category>Privacy</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Mirae Asset Securities confirms breach of 3,800 accounts</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/mirae-asset-securities-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/mirae-asset-securities-data-breach</guid>
      <description>Mirae Asset Securities disclosed on 7 November 2026 that unauthorised access on 4-5 November exposed about 3,800 account numbers and data of 35,255 staff.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Mirae Asset Securities, South Korea's largest brokerage, disclosed on 7 November 2026 that unauthorised external access on 4 and 5 November exposed account numbers belonging to about 3,800 customers and personal information belonging to 35,255 current and former employees, retirees and outsourced staff. The company reported the incidents to the Financial Services Commission, the Financial Supervisory Service and the Personal Information Protection Commission, and said no financial damage had been confirmed at the time of disclosure.

## What the breach exposed

The two populations had different data exposed. For customers, the exposed item was one item only: the account number of an account opened with the firm. [Yonhap News Agency](https://m-en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20261107000400315) reported the leakage of "some 3,800 customer account numbers", and [Aju Press](https://www.ajupress.com/view/20261107081270741) confirmed that account-holder names and other sensitive information were not leaked. Account-holder names, passwords and balance details were not exposed.

For employees, the exposure was wider but uneven. Names and employee ID numbers were exposed for most of the 35,255 current and former employees, retirees and outsourced staff, while email addresses, mobile phone numbers and encrypted passwords were exposed for some of them only. [MK](https://www.mk.co.kr/en/stock/12201388) reported that split, and [SBS News](https://news.sbs.co.kr/english/article.do?news_id=N1008835291) reported the same. The exact number of employees whose email addresses were exposed is not public. Resident registration numbers, passport numbers, driver's licence numbers and foreign resident registration numbers were not exposed.

| Population | Number affected | Data exposed | Data not exposed |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Customers | About 3,800 | Account numbers of accounts opened with the firm | Account-holder names, passwords, balance details |
| Employees, retirees and outsourced staff | 35,255 | Names and employee ID numbers for most; email addresses, mobile phone numbers and encrypted passwords for some | Resident registration numbers, passport numbers, driver's licence numbers, foreign resident registration numbers |

Headline totals of about 39,000 add the two figures together, about 3,800 plus 35,255. The company did not state a combined total.

## Unauthorised access

On 4 November 2026, abnormal external access targeted the mobile web phone-authentication login service, and the customer account numbers were exposed. On 5 November, the internal groupware system, mi-global, was attacked, and the employee information was exposed. [Seoul Economic Daily](https://en.sedaily.com/technology/2026/11/07/mirae-asset-securities-hit-by-hacking-some-client-and-staff) and [The Korea Times](https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/business/companies/20261107/leak-exposes-personal-info-of-39000-mirae-asset-securities-customers-employees) reported both dates and both systems.

The company said it detected signs of abnormal access from external IP addresses, blocked the affected access routes and activated its emergency response system. The mobile web login service was suspended at once and its external connection cut while the company checks for vulnerabilities. The company described the incident as data viewed from outside without proper authorisation. It said there was no malware infection and no service disruption, and that major systems and services, including the company website, were operating normally.

The attack method has not been disclosed. No attacker or group has claimed responsibility in the reporting so far, and whether the data was copied out or only viewed is not stated. The company said it is examining the cause of the incident and the circumstances of the leak in detail.

## How the company responded

Mirae Asset Securities reported the incident to the Financial Services Commission, the Financial Supervisory Service and the Personal Information Protection Commission. Co-CEOs Kim Mi-seop and Heo Seon-ho apologised in a notice posted on the company website. The notice said the company deeply apologised for failing to fulfil its responsibility to protect customers' personal and credit information, and that it was examining the cause and the leak in detail to prepare measures to prevent a recurrence.

The company warned customers to be cautious of phishing and smishing attempts through phone calls, text messages or emails impersonating the company. Its notice advised customers not to click links in messages or share passwords, one-time passwords or SMS authentication codes, even if the other party knows their account number. A temporary consultation centre operated from 10:00 to 17:00 on 7 November for affected customers. The company also told affected customers that they could seek compensation through a damages claim or apply for dispute mediation through the Personal Information Dispute Mediation Committee.

## What affected customers should do

The company advised customers to change their cyber ID password by going directly to the official homepage rather than through a link in a message, and to check recent orders, transactions and transfers in the MAPS app for anything they do not recognise. Anyone who finds an unfamiliar transaction, or who shared a password or authentication code with a caller claiming to be from the firm, should report it to the customer centre at 1588-6800.

The company warned that the leaked account numbers could be used in impersonation attempts. A caller or message that quotes a real account number can sound legitimate while asking for a password, a one-time password or an SMS authentication code. Customers were told to treat any contact that asks for those as impersonation, whatever account details it quotes. The [guide on what to do when an email address is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach) covers the same sequence in general terms: confirm the exposure, change the password, and watch for impersonation mail that uses the leaked details.

Staff were advised to be careful with contacts impersonating the company or a colleague, and not to open suspicious links or attachments or install programs on instruction from such a message. The [guide on how to check whether an email is phishing](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-an-email-is-phishing) sets out the checks that apply to those messages.

Some staff email addresses are in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Financial sector context

Mirae Asset Securities is the fourth Mirae Asset Group affiliate targeted since 26 October, according to Aju Press. Mirae Asset Life confirmed a customer information leak on 26 October, Mirae Asset Management was hit by external intrusion attempts on 28 October, and Energy Infrastructure Asset Management was targeted on 2 November. No source has linked the four incidents beyond their timing, and the Energy Infrastructure incident was described as intrusion attempts rather than a confirmed leak.

The Korea Times, citing the Financial Services Commission, reported that more than 470,000 personal data records had been leaked from 37 companies in 40 incidents since 30 September, with the amount of funds stolen estimated at 1 billion won, about US$745,000. The companies include four commercial banks, five financial investment firms, three insurance firms and five savings banks. Other securities firms hit in the same wave include Daishin Securities and Hanyang Securities, as reported in the [Daishin Securities data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/daishin-securities-data-breach) article.

## What the investigation still needs

The investigation is still open. The company is checking the vulnerabilities in the affected systems, analysing the cause and the circumstances of the leak, and preparing measures to prevent a recurrence. The regulator reports were filed, affected customers and staff were notified, and the temporary consultation centre ran for one day, on 7 November. The attack method, whether the data was copied out or only viewed, how many of the 35,255 employees had email addresses exposed, and whether the four Mirae Asset Group incidents share a cause remain unstated in the reporting. The company said it would announce further findings and protective measures as the investigation confirms them. No Have I Been Pwned listing for this breach exists at the time of writing.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data breaches</category><category>South Korea</category><category>Email security</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Who Gives A Crap breach may have exposed customer data</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/who-gives-a-crap-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/who-gives-a-crap-data-breach</guid>
      <description>Who Gives A Crap told customers on 7 November 2026 that a marketing vendor incident may have exposed names, emails and phone numbers.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The Who Gives A Crap data breach is a vendor incident in which customer names, email addresses, phone numbers, postal addresses and total spending may have been viewed. The Australian toilet-paper company told customers on 7 November 2026 that an unauthorised party accessed the data through a third-party marketing software provider based in the United States. The access began on 30 October, was detected on 31 October and was secured on 1 November. Customers in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States may have been affected, and no victim count has been published.

The disclosure was made by customer notice on Saturday 7 November 2026, and [ua.news, citing ABC News Australia, reported it the same day](https://ua.news/en/dovkolo-svitu/who-gives-a-crap-povidomila-pro-dostup-do-danikh-kliientiv-abc-news-australia). Who Gives A Crap sells toilet paper by subscription in several markets. The incident involved a marketing software provider holding a copy of the customer list, not the company's own storefront.

## Access through the marketing provider

The unauthorised access ran through a marketing software provider used by Who Gives A Crap. The provider is based in the United States. The company has not named it. According to the company statement carried by ABC News, the access began on 30 October 2026, was detected on 31 October and was secured on 1 November. The company was informed of the incident on Friday 6 November and notified customers the following day.

Chief executive Simon Griffiths fronted the disclosure. He said: "Certain personal information of our customers was accessed without permission during a security incident involving one of our marketing software vendors." No attacker group has been named, and no attack method has been described in the reporting reviewed.

The company said it disconnected the provider from its systems and changed access credentials. It said it continues to communicate with the provider about the investigation and would engage with relevant regulators if necessary. No regulator has been named in the reporting, and no regulator has commented publicly on the incident as of 8 November 2026.

## The data involved

The company lists five categories of data that may have been viewed: first and last names, email addresses, phone numbers, postal addresses and total spending with Who Gives A Crap. The wording is "may have been viewed". The company has not said that every customer was affected, and it has not published a number of affected customers.

Three categories were not exposed, according to the company: payment information, order details and passwords. Customer accounts were not directly compromised, and the company said accounts remain secure.

The total-spending figure stands out. A spending total, added to a name, an email address, a phone number and a postal address, lets a sender tailor a message to the recipient: a refund lure for a heavy buyer, or a loyalty reward for a long-standing subscriber. The figure alone opens no account.

The company also said it does not yet know whether the data was copied or downloaded. Access and copying are different outcomes, and the company has not stated which one occurred. The company said there was "no evidence of misuse at this point", which describes what it has seen so far and is not a guarantee about what happens next.

## The countries affected

Customers in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States may have been affected. The company said no personal data from Canadian customers was affected. It has not explained why Canada was excluded, and the reporting does not say whether the vendor held a separate data set for Canadian customers or whether the Canadian customer base sat on a different system.

## The vendor pattern

The entry point was a marketing software provider holding a copy of the customer list. Email and SMS platforms, customer-data platforms and loyalty tools hold the same material: a current list of real customers with contact details attached. Those platforms sit outside the retailer's direct control, so a shop can harden its own storefront and still lose its customer list through a vendor.

The unnamed vendor is the largest gap in the story. Other brands using the same marketing platform may be affected, and they cannot check without knowing which provider is involved. Nothing in the reporting links any other company to the affected provider, and this article does not speculate about which provider it is. [Which website leaked my email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/which-website-leaked-my-email) explains how a unique alias for each service traces a leak back to the service that leaked it. The company has not said whether the detection came from the vendor's own alerting or from its own monitoring.

## Actions for affected customers

The company advised customers to be alert to unexpected emails, messages, calls and postal mailings, and to verify communications that claim to be sent on its behalf. The exposed data is the material used to make a scam message convincing: a real name, a real email address, a real phone number and a real postal address.

The company advised customers to treat a message that mentions Who Gives A Crap, a refund or a loyalty reward with suspicion, and not to click links in unsolicited messages. It said to verify any message through the company's own website, reached by typing the address directly. One-time codes and card details should never be shared with anyone who makes first contact.

Passwords were not exposed, according to the company, so a password change is not the first priority on the strength of this notice alone. Anyone who reuses one password across sites still faces the wider risk, because the exposed email address is now a known-good address that can be tried against other services. Checking whether the same address appears in other breaches is worth doing, and [what to do when your email is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach) sets out the steps in order. The company's advice points to phishing as the risk to watch here. [How phishing uses your leaked email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email) explains the mechanics of the messages to expect.

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## The investigation

The investigation continues, and the company is still communicating with the provider. Four facts remain unknown as of 8 November 2026: the name of the vendor, the number of affected customers, whether the data was copied or downloaded, and whether any regulator has been engaged.

The company has not published a public notice page. The disclosure was made by customer email and carried by ABC News Australia, and the company's own site showed no notice on its homepage when checked on 8 November 2026. A public notice page may appear as the investigation develops, and the facts above should be re-checked against it when it does.

## Sources

- [ABC News Australia, "Who Gives A Crap confirms customer data exposed in third party software breach", by Anna Cox, published 7 November 2026 17:13 UTC, via GhanaSummary](https://ghanasummary.com/international/who-gives-a-crap-confirms-customer-data-exposed-in-third-party-software-breach)
- [tech-insider.org, "Who Gives A Crap Data Breach: 3 Countries [2026]", published 7 November 2026](https://tech-insider.org/au/who-gives-a-crap-data-breach-marketing-software-vendor-2026/)
- [Who Gives A Crap, company website](https://au.whogivesacrap.org/)]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Vendor Breach</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Protect Your Email When You Sign Up for a Password Manager</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-a-password-manager</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-a-password-manager</guid>
      <description>The email used to create a password manager is the most consequential address. One stable alias and recovery set up on day one keep the vault reachable.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A password manager account is created with an email address. Protecting that address comes down to three things: a dedicated address used only for the manager, an address that stays active for the life of the vault, and recovery options set up on the first day. That address becomes the login identifier, the destination for verification codes, and the recovery channel for the vault. The four managers covered here, [1Password](https://support.1password.com/secret-key/), [Bitwarden](https://bitwarden.com/help/forgot-master-password/), [Proton Pass](https://proton.me/support/reset-password) and [Dashlane](https://support.dashlane.com/hc/en-us/articles/115003111325-I-forgot-my-Master-Password), all use zero-knowledge encryption. Three of the four offer no provider-side reset of a forgotten master password; Proton offers an email or SMS reset that restores the password but not the encrypted data. A vault holds logins, passkeys, card details and secure notes, which means losing the vault means losing the keys to every account stored in it at once.

## Recovery limits at a glance

| Manager | Provider reset of a forgotten master password | Main recovery options |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1Password | No reset. The Secret Key cannot be recovered. | Recovery codes, Emergency Kit, family organiser or team administrator |
| Bitwarden | No reset. Without a set-up option, the account and its data are unrecoverable. | Emergency access, master password hint, two-step recovery code, organisation administrator |
| Proton Pass | Email or SMS reset restores the password. Encrypted data may stay locked without a separate method. | Recovery phrase, emergency contacts, signed-in reset |
| Dashlane | No reset. No traditional reset process exists. | Account recovery key, biometric recovery, admin-assisted recovery |

## The signup address and the vault

Three functions run through one address. It identifies the account at login, it receives the codes that confirm a new device or a password change, and it is the channel recovery uses. Dashlane states the point in its help centre: even when a contact email is changed, the login still uses the email address used to create the account.

A strong master password guards the vault, but the email address is what keeps the vault recoverable. Recovery options set up in advance are the only way back in, and most of them depend on access to the signup email.

## Recovery options by manager

### Bitwarden

Bitwarden's help page is blunt: the company [has no way to access, retrieve, or reset a master password](https://bitwarden.com/help/forgot-master-password/). Zero-knowledge encryption is the reason. The page lists the options in order: check the server region, try another device, use a PIN or biometrics on a device that is still signed in, request the master password hint by email, use emergency access, or ask an organisation administrator if account recovery is enrolled. If none of these grant access, the account and its data cannot be recovered. The account must be deleted and a new one created.

[Emergency access](https://bitwarden.com/help/emergency-access/) is the planned route for individuals. It is available to premium users, including members of paid organisations. The [trusted contact](https://bitwarden.com/help/add-and-manage-trusted-emergency-contacts/) needs only a free Bitwarden account on the same server region.

The contact receives either view access, which gives read access to all items in the vault including passwords and attachments, or takeover access, which lets the contact set a new master password and removes the existing two-step login methods. The invitation is valid for five days. When the contact requests access, the account holder can approve or deny it. If there is no response, access is granted automatically after the wait time, which has a minimum of one day.

The [two-step login recovery code](https://bitwarden.com/help/lost-two-step-device/) is generated when a two-step method is set up. It must be saved outside the vault, and Bitwarden cannot retrieve it.

### Proton Pass

Proton Pass is recovered through the Proton Account, so its options follow [Proton account recovery](https://proton.me/support/reset-password): email or SMS recovery, recovery phrase, emergency contacts on a paid Proton plan, and signed-in reset. Password and data are separate problems here. Verification by email or SMS resets the password, yet the encrypted data already in the vault may stay locked until a separate method recovers it.

The [recovery phrase](https://proton.me/support/recovery-phrase), a 12-word sequence, does both at once: it resets the password and [recovers the encrypted data](https://proton.me/support/recover-encrypted-messages-files). Each phrase works once, so a fresh one is generated after use.

Where the account is still signed in on a device, a [signed-in reset](https://proton.me/support/signed-in-reset) applies. With another recovery method enabled, the password changes at once. Without one, 72 hours pass before the reset completes, and Proton notifies the other signed-in devices in the meantime.

### 1Password

1Password pairs an account password with a [Secret Key](https://support.1password.com/secret-key/) to protect a vault. The key is a 128-bit code generated on the device when the account is created, and it is stored on signed-in devices and in the [Emergency Kit](https://support.1password.com/emergency-kit/), a PDF holding the account details and a place to record the account password.

> "We don't have a copy of your Secret Key or any way to recover or reset it for you." - 1Password

Without the Secret Key, no one can access the data, including the account holder. For individual and family accounts, [recovery codes](https://support.1password.com/recovery-codes/) are the fallback. A code is generated while signed in, and using it requires access to the email address associated with the account.

Timing matters. A recovery attempt made after a recent sign-in is blocked, and 1Password advises waiting at least one hour after creating the code before using it. A blocked attempt leaves the code unusable for 24 hours. After recovery, the account receives a new Secret Key and a new account password. Team and business accounts cannot use recovery codes. A family organiser or team administrator recovers those accounts instead.

### Dashlane

Dashlane holds no copy of the Master Password. The company states that it [never stores or shares the Master Password](https://support.dashlane.com/hc/en-us/articles/115003111325-I-forgot-my-Master-Password) and runs no traditional reset process. Recovery therefore depends on three options, all of which must be switched on before the password is forgotten: the account recovery key, biometric recovery, and admin-assisted recovery for professional plan members.

The [account recovery key](https://support.dashlane.com/hc/en-us/articles/39845033262098-Use-your-account-recovery-key) works once, and only one key is active at a time. A recovery attempt needs an email verification code or a two-factor token, and the step must be completed within 15 minutes. Once recovery succeeds, a new key is generated and stored offline.

With no recovery method switched on, the account must be reset, and the reset erases every saved login and all data. The reset still runs through the email address: a code goes to the login email and must be entered within 15 minutes. [Admin-assisted recovery](https://www.dashlane.com/blog/admin-assisted-recovery) is on by default for professional plans, yet each member still has to acknowledge the prompt in the web app before it covers that member's account.

## Choosing the signup address

Three properties define a good choice for the signup address: it is permanent, it is used for one purpose only, and it forwards to a real inbox that the owner controls and checks.

### Permanence

The signup address has to keep receiving codes for as long as the vault exists, a period measured in years rather than months. Job changes, lapsed domains and abandoned inboxes all end addresses, so none of them is a safe home for the recovery channel.

<Callout type="warning" title="The alias must stay alive permanently">
The alias used for the password manager is the recovery address for the vault that holds every other password. Deleting it, disabling it, or letting it lapse breaks the recovery chain, and the vault can become unrecoverable. Separation is the goal, but the separated address must be a managed, persistent identity, never a short-lived one.
</Callout>

### One purpose only

Sharing the address with newsletters, shopping and social accounts widens its exposure with every breach. Each one puts the address into another dataset. An address reserved for the manager stays narrow: mail that arrives on it from any other sender stands out at once. The same isolation principle applies to [banking](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-banking), where the bank gets a permanent real address used only for financial accounts.

A check on [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) reports whether an address has already appeared in a breach. An address with a clean record is a better starting point than one already circulating in breach data.

### A destination inbox that is checked

Codes arrive on a clock. Dashlane verification codes expire after 15 minutes, and the recovery flows of 1Password and Proton send their codes to the account email. An inbox opened rarely makes a working recovery option useless. The inbox behind the alias therefore needs its own recovery options in place, including a second factor kept somewhere other than inside the vault.

## Recovery setup on the first day

A lockout is too late for setup. Every provider states the same rule in its own words, and the whole setup takes a few minutes on the first day.

The kit comes first. 1Password asks for the Emergency Kit to be saved at account creation; it holds the Secret Key and the setup code. Proton generates a recovery phrase and a recovery kit at signup. Dashlane generates the account recovery key on demand. Paper or encrypted storage outside the vault is where these documents live. A recovery document kept only inside the vault is unreachable at the moment it is needed.

The trusted contact comes next, where the manager offers one. Bitwarden emergency access needs a premium account on the grantor side, and the invitation must be accepted within five days. Proton emergency contacts, available on a paid Proton plan, can change the account password once a waiting period set by the owner has passed. Dashlane admin-assisted recovery covers professional plan members. The contact needs to know where the recovery documents are kept and what to do with them. A contact who does not know the plan cannot carry it out.

Recovery codes and keys follow one rule across all three managers that issue them: they are generated while signed in and stored somewhere reachable without the vault. A 1Password recovery code should not be used straight after a recent sign-in, and 1Password advises waiting at least one hour after creating the code before using it, so the code is generated and then left alone until it is needed.

The second factor is a separate lockout of its own. Losing the device that holds it leaves the account unreachable even with the password in hand, so the second-factor recovery codes are stored with the other recovery documents, outside the vault. Bitwarden's help page notes that losing the two-step device leaves limited options. A saved recovery code and a trusted emergency contact with takeover access are the main routes back.

## Testing the setup

Testing the setup shows whether the plan works. The test is simple: sign out on one device, sign back in with the account password and the second factor, and confirm that the verification code arrives at the signup email. The Emergency Kit or recovery phrase should also be findable in under a minute from outside the vault.

Proton notes that some recovery methods can only be used once, so a real recovery is followed by regenerating the method that was used.

## AliasFleet and the signup address

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides managed email aliases that forward to a real inbox. An alias made for the password manager, used only for that manager and kept active permanently, matches the setup this article describes. The pattern is one alias per service, as described in [How to Use Email Aliases: 12 Practical Examples](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-use-email-aliases). The manager sees a dedicated address, the real inbox stays unexposed, and the alias can be paused or disabled if mail that is not from the manager starts arriving on it. The [free tier](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing) includes 10 active aliases, 1 verified destination inbox, 3 managed subdomains and 100 MB monthly forwarding, which covers a dedicated alias for the manager alongside aliases for other services.

The limit sits behind the alias. It is only as reliable as the destination inbox it forwards to. If that inbox is lost, the alias forwards nowhere, and recovery codes sent to the manager address go unread. An alias replaces none of the recovery documents, the recovery code, or the trusted contact. It gives the signup address isolation and permanence, and the rest of the recovery plan is still built around it.

## First-day checklist

1. Create a dedicated address used only for the manager, confirm it forwards to a real inbox that is checked regularly, and keep it active permanently.
2. Save the Emergency Kit or recovery phrase outside the vault.
3. Generate the recovery code or key while signed in, and store it where it is reachable without the vault.
4. Set up a trusted contact where the manager offers one, and tell the contact where the documents are.
5. Store the second-factor recovery codes with the other recovery documents.
6. Sign out on one device, sign back in, and confirm the verification code arrives at the signup address.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Password Managers</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Account Recovery</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Signing Up for a VPN</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-a-vpn</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-signing-up-for-a-vpn</guid>
      <description>Use a dedicated alias for your VPN signup so billing, renewal and recovery mail stays contained and your main inbox stays private.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Signing up for a VPN with a protected email address means using a dedicated alias as the signup address instead of the main inbox address. Verification links, password resets, renewal notices and support mail go to the alias, while the main address never enters the provider's records. Most commercial VPNs ask for an email address at signup, and that address remains tied to the account for the whole subscription. Because a VPN subscription is paid and runs for years, the signup address has to keep working for years. One alias per VPN meets that need: it handles verification, billing and recovery, and the account stays recoverable while the alias stays active.

## What the signup email is used for

At most commercial VPN providers the signup email serves as the account identifier and as the route for verification, password reset, billing and support mail. [NordVPN](https://support.nordvpn.com/hc/en-us/articles/19571345334033-What-is-a-Nord-Account-and-how-do-you-use-it) says one email address and one password cover its services, and a new subscriber gets a registration link at the address used at signup. [ExpressVPN](https://www.expressvpn.com/privacy-policy) says in its privacy policy, last updated 2 October 2026, that an email address and payment information are required to provide the service.

The same policy lists the uses of the address: password reset or verification emails, order confirmations, renewal notifications, price increase notices, updates, account communications and marketing mail. Data from transactional communications is retained for ten years. The address is therefore used whenever money is taken, whenever the price changes and whenever access has to be restored, not only at signup.

## Signup requirements at the main providers

| Provider | Email address required at signup | Notes |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| NordVPN | Yes | One email address and one password cover NordVPN, NordPass and NordLocker |
| ExpressVPN | Yes | Email address and payment information are required to provide the service |
| Surfshark | Yes | An email address, or a Google or Apple account link |
| Proton VPN | Yes | The account email is the identifier for the whole Proton account |
| Mullvad | No | Comparitech reports a randomly generated 16-digit account number replaces the email address |

NordVPN runs its services through one Nord Account. A single email address and password sign the user in to NordVPN, NordPass and NordLocker, and subscriptions and auto-renewal are managed from the account page. Website buyers choose a plan, enter their details, pay, and then get a Nord Account registration link at the signup email address. The link must be clicked and a password created before the account is ready.

Buying from a retailer takes a different route that still depends on email. [NordVPN](https://support.nordvpn.com/hc/en-us/articles/19685995851665-How-to-get-NordVPN-with-activation-code) says a purchase from Amazon, Best Buy or Target includes a 25-character activation key, and the activation page asks for the key and an email address. A verification code goes to that address and must be entered before setup completes, and the address entered at that step becomes the account address.

ExpressVPN states in its privacy policy that personal data may include the name, email address and payment information submitted when the account is created or updated. The email address is still required in the ordinary signup, even when the payment method is chosen to limit other data.

[Surfshark](https://surfshark.com/blog/surfshark-login) asks for an email address to create an account, or a link to a Google or Apple account. Signing in with credentials means entering the email address and password in the app. The account's subscription page shows the current plan, the expiration date and the renewal date, and [Surfshark](https://support.surfshark.com/hc/en-us/articles/17673853278226-Manage-your-subscription) says auto-renewal can be cancelled there. Surfshark says a confirmation email may arrive after cancellation, and the subscription remains active until the expiration date.

[Proton VPN](https://protonvpn.com/) sits inside the Proton set of services, and one Proton account covers Proton VPN, Proton Mail, Proton Drive, Proton Calendar and Proton Pass. The account email identifies that whole set, so the address given at VPN signup is also tied to the rest of the Proton account.

## Mullvad and the no-email exception

Mullvad is the exception among the providers checked. [Mullvad](https://mullvad.net/en/) charges 5 euros per month and describes its accounts as anonymous, with no logging. [Comparitech](https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/proton-vpn-vs-mullvad-vpn/) says Mullvad gives each user a randomly generated account number instead of an email address for account access, and the number is the only credential, so losing it loses the account because there is no recovery. The same comparison says Proton VPN signup asks for an email address and a secure password, the ordinary pattern for most VPNs.

Mullvad's model removes the signup email problem by removing the signup email, and it removes email recovery with it. A user who loses the account number has no email address on file for a reset link. An email address at signup gives the provider a way to restore access and a lasting identifier, while an account with no email address on file has no email route for recovery.

## Renewal and recovery

A VPN subscription renews on a schedule, and the provider sends renewal and price increase notices to the signup address. Surfshark shows the renewal date on the subscription page, and auto-renewal is cancelled from the same page. A subscriber who cannot read the signup inbox misses the renewal notice, the new price and the renewal date, and cannot act on them in time.

Recovery is the other place the signup address matters. [Proton VPN](https://protonvpn.com/support/reset-protonvpn-account-password) says a user locked out with no password needs a recovery method set in advance. A signed-in password reset takes a 72-hour wait, and recovery by email sends a code to a verified recovery email address that had to be set and verified before the lockout. A signup address that has stopped working cannot receive that code, so the recovery path is closed.

[Surfshark](https://support.surfshark.com/hc/en-us/articles/360011448319-How-to-enable-2FA-on-your-Surfshark-account) two-factor authentication by email sends a six-digit verification code to the inbox, and the code must be entered to confirm the setup. The account email is therefore used for login security as well as billing.

## The breach record

[TechRadar](https://www.techradar.com/news/whats-the-truth-about-the-nordvpn-breach-heres-what-we-now-know) reports, from NordVPN's own account, that one server in Finland was affected, the attack ran between 31 January 2018 and 5 March 2018, NordVPN said it learned of the breach on 13 April 2019, and it audited its 5,000 servers. NordVPN said the intruder had no access to user credentials, billing details or other profile information, and the TLS keys obtained in the attack expired in October 2018.

A signup email address is stored with the provider for years, and it links the VPN account to the person who holds it. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) listed 1,049 pwned websites and 17,847,746,941 pwned addresses on 7 November 2026. An address that appears in one breach can be matched against other breaches, and one address used for many accounts links those accounts together. A dedicated alias for the VPN breaks that link at signup, because the provider is given an address used for that provider only.

## The dedicated alias method

The method is [one alias](https://aliasfleet.com/docs/email-aliases/creating-aliases) per provider, created before signup and entered as the signup email address, kept active for the life of the subscription while provider mail is checked to still reach the main inbox through it, with a different alias for each other service so the VPN alias receives mail from the VPN provider only.

The provider stores the alias, so verification links, password resets, renewal notices and support replies go to it and forward to the main inbox. The main address is never typed into the VPN signup form, so the provider's account records never hold it. The alias must keep working for years. It is not closed, paused or allowed to lapse while the subscription is active, or recovery and renewal mail stops arriving.

<Callout type="warning" title="Signup address lifetime">
A VPN subscription is paid and long-lived, so the signup address must stay active for the whole subscription. An address that stops working leaves the account unrecoverable by email and the subscription unmanageable, since a short-lived inbox does not last for the life of a paid account.
</Callout>

The same setup includes a password manager and two-factor authentication. Each VPN account gets a password used nowhere else, and two-factor authentication is switched on wherever the provider offers it. Surfshark offers two-factor authentication by authentication app or by email, and the app option does not depend on the inbox. The alias still matters even then, because the password reset still goes to the signup address.

## AliasFleet aliases

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com/) supplies email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox. Every service gets its own address, and an alias that starts receiving spam can be disabled in one click. The Free plan includes 10 active aliases and 1 verified destination inbox. A VPN alias fits that model: it is created once, kept for the life of the subscription and used for that provider only. The [guide to using email aliases](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-use-email-aliases) covers the same one-alias-per-service pattern across twelve practical examples. AliasFleet does not make the VPN account anonymous, since the provider still holds the alias address, the payment details and the subscription record.

## Keeping the alias alive

If the destination inbox changes, the alias forwarding must point at the new inbox, or renewal and recovery mail goes to an address that is no longer read.

When the VPN provider is changed, the old alias stays active until the old subscription has ended and any refund or final bill has arrived, and only then is it closed.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>VPN</category><category>Guides</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Is GMX Mail Safe?</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-gmx-mail-safe</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-gmx-mail-safe</guid>
      <description>GMX Mail is a free, ad-supported German email service with strong transport security and optional PGP encryption, but unencrypted mail stays readable.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[GMX Mail is a free email service run by 1&1 Mail & Media in Germany. It holds Gold status in the BSI Hall of Fame of Email Security and offers [free two-factor authentication](https://www.gmx.com/security/2fa/) and [optional PGP encryption](https://www.gmx.com/security/encryption/). Mail that is not encrypted with PGP is stored readable on GMX servers, and advertising pays for the free service.

## What GMX Mail is

GMX Mail launched in 1997. It is a subsidiary of United Internet, the German internet group behind 1&1 and mail.com, and [Wikipedia lists about 11 million active users](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GMX_Mail). Accounts use the domains gmx.com, gmx.net and gmx.de, and are available in a limited list of countries that includes the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States and Canada.

The free account includes [65 GB of email storage](https://www.gmx.co.uk/mail/create-email-address/), attachments up to 50 MB, up to 10 alias addresses, a spam filter and an antivirus checker. Mail is stored in European data centres, and the service operates under German data protection law and the [GDPR](https://www.gmx.com/company/privacypolicy/). A paid ProMail tier exists. Signup asks for personal information, so the account is not anonymous from the start.

## Transport security

The [BSI Hall of Fame](https://bsi.bund.de/dok/E-Mail-Hall-of-Fame) lists GMX under GOLD status. The BSI defines Gold as a commitment to implement two technical guidelines: TR-03108 on secure email transport and TR-03182 on email authentication. GMX, WEB.DE and mail.com entered the Hall of Fame in the [second round in September 2026](https://emailexpert.com/gmx-web-de-and-mail-com-listed-in-bsis-2026-email-security-hall-of-fame/), after a first round in 2025 that listed around 150 organisations.

The BSI public E-Mail-Checker scores gmx.de 7 out of 7 across SPF, DKIM, DMARC, DNSSEC, DANE, TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3. Three unweighted extras are marked unmet: MTA-STS, TLS reporting, and switching off TLS versions below 1.2. The Hall of Fame listing covers transport security and authentication only. It is not a privacy certification, and it says nothing about how GMX handles the contents of a mailbox.

## Encryption in GMX Mail

GMX offers end-to-end encryption free of charge, built on OpenPGP and delivered through the [Mailvelope](https://mailvelope.com/en/coop_gmx) browser extension. The [setup wizard](https://support.gmx.com/security/pgp/set-up-encrypted-communication.html) creates a public and private key pair in three steps. The private key stays in the browser extension, not on GMX servers. GMX states that encryption takes place in the browser, so neither GMX nor Mailvelope nor government agencies have access to encrypted message content. GMX also states that the procedure is audited by external security experts, but no audit report is linked from the encryption page.

Attachments are encrypted with message bodies. Both sender and recipient need encryption set up before an encrypted message can be exchanged, and GMX automates the key exchange through a personal invitation process or through its key directory of GMX users who have already set it up. Encrypted communication can only be set up for the default GMX address, not for the extra alias addresses, and it cannot currently be set up inside the webmailer itself. The mobile apps support it through a QR code or recovery code from the setup document. Encryption is off by default, so it does not change the privacy position of ordinary unencrypted mail.

## Two-factor authentication

GMX offers two-factor authentication free of charge on gmx.com and gmx.net accounts. After setup, login needs the account password plus a 6-digit code from an authentication app on a smartphone. GMX uses time-based one-time passwords (TOTP), and each code expires after 30 seconds. [GMX states that even if an attacker obtains the password, the attacker cannot access the mailbox without the second factor](https://support.gmx.com/security/2fa/about-twofactor.html).

[Setup runs through My Account, then Security Options, then two-factor authentication](https://support.gmx.com/security/2fa/setup-twofactor.html), and includes verification of a mobile phone number by SMS. External mail programs such as Outlook or Thunderbird need an app-specific password instead of the normal password when two-factor authentication is on, because those programs cannot prompt for the one-time code. Setup also produces a secret key as a PDF recovery document, which restores access if the phone or the authentication app is lost. Entering the secret key deactivates two-factor authentication, so it has to be set up again afterwards. Two-factor authentication is opt-in, so an account that never enables it relies on the password alone.

## Spam and virus protection

GMX includes a spam filter with adjustable criteria and an antivirus checker on incoming mail and attachments. The signup page lists both as standard parts of the free account. GMX also offers a Mail Collector for gathering mail from other accounts and a MailCheck browser add-on that gives one-click access and new-mail notifications.

Third-party mail help pages report that POP3 and IMAP access is switched off by default and switched off again after a long period without use, and that GMX requires TLS 1.2 or 1.3 for mail client connections. That report comes from a third-party help site rather than a GMX page, so it is stated here as reported rather than confirmed. Two-factor authentication and PGP encryption are off by default.

## Advertising and data use

Advertising pays for the free service, and GMX says so directly on its [advertising page](https://www.gmx.com/company/data-collection/advertisement/): revenue from the advertisements on the GMX portal and homepage allows GMX to offer free services. Interest-based advertising uses the information given at signup, such as name and date of birth, plus visitor usage data and user group structure. GMX works with named advertising partners that include Google, Amazon, Criteo, Taboola, Xandr and PubMatic, and data is saved anonymously and confidentially on European servers.

Interest-based advertising can be switched off in the mailbox under My Account, or through the partner opt-out pages GMX lists. The advertising page does not state that message bodies are scanned to target ads, and this article does not claim that they are. The free mailbox is funded by advertising built on account and usage data. GMX also shows popup ads at login, including for premium users, according to Wikipedia.

The privacy policy states that GMX servers are hosted internally at 1&1 with no transfer of data abroad in the website analytics context, and that customer care data is documented until the account is deleted. The policy gives GDPR as the legal basis for processing and lists opt-out routes for analysis and interest-based advertising.

## Breach record

No public breach of GMX Mail itself was found in the research for this article. That is absence of a public record, not proof that no breach has ever happened, and readers can check their own address on [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/). GMX publishes no transparency report on government data requests that was found in this research, and no independent audit report was found in this research.

<Callout type="warning" title="Same name, different company">
The widely reported July 2025 exploit in which about $42 million was taken from a GMX liquidity pool hit GMX the decentralised crypto exchange, a different company that shares the name. It has nothing to do with GMX Mail, and no reporting connects the two.
</Callout>

## AliasFleet and GMX Mail

AliasFleet aliases forward to the GMX mailbox, so the GMX address is not shared with websites or services. [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) creates managed, persistent email aliases that forward to the GMX mailbox, so each website or service gets its own alias and the GMX address stays private. If one alias starts receiving spam or appears in a breach, that alias can be paused or closed without touching the GMX account or any other alias.

The same pattern is described in the companion trust pieces on [Gmail](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-gmail-safe), [Outlook](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-outlook-safe), [iCloud Mail](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-icloud-mail-safe), [Yahoo Mail](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-yahoo-mail-safe) and [Zoho Mail](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/is-zoho-mail-safe). GMX already offers up to 10 alias addresses inside one account, but those are tied to the GMX account and the GMX domain, while AliasFleet aliases sit in front of the mailbox and can be managed independently of it. The [AliasFleet documentation](https://aliasfleet.com/docs) explains how aliases forward and how replies are routed, and pricing is on the [AliasFleet pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing).

GMX Mail holds BSI Gold recognition for transport security and offers a free PGP option. Unencrypted mail is readable by GMX, the service is funded by advertising built on account and usage data, and two-factor authentication and PGP encryption are opt-in features that stay off unless the user enables them.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Security</category><category>GMX</category><category>Privacy</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>M1 data breach exposes NRIC numbers and email addresses</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/m1-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/m1-data-breach</guid>
      <description>M1 disclosed a data breach on 30 October 2026 that exposed customer names, NRIC numbers, dates of birth, mobile numbers, email addresses and home addresses.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The M1 data breach is a 30 October 2026 incident at M1, a Singapore telecommunications company, in which customer personal data was exposed. M1 told affected customers on 6 November 2026 that names, NRIC or FIN numbers, dates of birth, mobile numbers, email addresses and residential addresses were involved. Payment card details, financial or banking information and customer account access were not compromised, according to the company. The breach has been contained. M1 gave no victim count, and none has appeared in reporting. The Personal Data Protection Commission (PDPC) said on 6 November that it is aware of the incident and is investigating.

## Disclosure of the M1 breach

The disclosure came by email. No public notice page was found at the time of writing. M1 sent the email to affected customers on 6 November 2026. [AsiaOne](https://www.asiaone.com/singapore/m1-data-breach) reported that one reader received it at about 8pm that evening. [CNA](https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/doctor-anywhere-data-breach-6530871) saw the same email. It published the contents the same day. [The Straits Times](https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/m1-hit-by-data-breach?ref=more-on-this-topic) and [The Business Times](https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/companies-markets/telcos-media-tech/m1-hit-data-breach) carried the same account on 6 November, and a search found no public notice page from M1 at the time of writing, so the customer email as reported by the four outlets is how the breach reached the public.

M1 apologised in the email. CNA quoted the passage as follows:

> "M1 takes the security and confidentiality of information entrusted to us very seriously. We regret that this data breach has occurred and apologise for the concern it has caused you." Affected customers will be alerted by email or letter, according to M1. A customer who has received neither has no confirmation from M1 either way. No victim count and no full notification list have been published.

## M1 breach data categories

Six categories of customer data appear in the email. They are residential addresses, email addresses, mobile numbers, dates of birth, NRIC or FIN numbers and names. An NRIC number is a Singapore identity card number. A FIN number identifies a foreigner resident in Singapore. The Straits Times listed the same items in its own wording: customer names, identity card details, dates of birth, mobile numbers, email addresses and addresses. The email gave no breakdown of how many customers had each category exposed, and no source said whether every affected customer had all six categories exposed or only some of them.

| Data category | Status in the breach |
| :--- | :--- |
| Email addresses | Exposed |
| Customer names | Exposed |
| NRIC/FIN numbers | Exposed |
| Dates of birth | Exposed |
| Mobile numbers | Exposed |
| Residential addresses | Exposed |
| Payment card details | Not compromised, per M1 |
| Financial or banking information | Not compromised, per M1 |
| Customer account access | Not compromised, per M1 |

M1 also stated what the breach did not touch. No payment card details were compromised, and no financial or banking information was compromised. Customer account access was not compromised either. The four outlets repeated the statement. The file holds identity data, not payment data, and its use is impersonation and targeted phishing rather than direct theft from a bank account.

M1 described the data as exposed. No source states whether the data left M1's systems or was only accessed. This article claims neither.

## M1 response to the breach

The breach has been contained, according to M1. Services and business operations were unaffected throughout the incident, according to the company. Both statements were reported by The Business Times and The Straits Times on 6 November.

M1 told customers to remain vigilant. Customers should exercise caution when responding to unsolicited calls, messages or emails, and verify the identities of those who contact them through official channels. That advice sits at the centre of the response. The exposed data gives an attacker the details needed to make a fake call, message or email look genuine.

M1 said it has been working closely with the relevant authorities and third-party specialists on the ongoing investigations. The email and the reporting that followed it gave no further detail about the investigation.

## PDPC response to the M1 breach

In a media reply on 6 November, the Personal Data Protection Commission said it is aware of the incident and is investigating the case. The Straits Times and The Business Times reported the media reply. AsiaOne reported that the PDPC told it the same. The PDPC regulates personal data protection in Singapore. No statement from the PDPC beyond the media reply was available at the time of writing. No enforcement action has been reported.

AsiaOne also reported a remark from Gwenda Fong, chief executive of the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore. She urged businesses on 6 November to review their security. The remark was made on the same day as the M1 disclosure, against the background of a recent run of reported breaches in Singapore.

## Phishing risk from the M1 breach

That combination is dangerous for phishing. Together, a name, a date of birth, a mobile number, a home address and an email address give an attacker enough detail to write a message that appears to come from a bank, a delivery company or a government agency. The recipient is addressed by name, with correct personal details. The NRIC number adds a document number to that set. That makes impersonation attempts harder to spot.

An email address on its own does not open the mailbox behind it. Reading mail needs a password, a live session or provider access. The address alone supplies none of those. The guide on [whether someone can read emails with only an email address](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-someone-read-my-emails-if-they-only-know-my-email-address) sets that out. Reading M1 customers' email is not the risk here. The risk is convincing messages sent to those addresses, made to look legitimate with the other exposed details. The phone numbers and home addresses serve the same purpose by call or text. The guide on [how phishing uses a leaked email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email) describes that mechanism. A leaked address becomes the delivery channel. The other leaked details become the material that makes the message persuasive.

## Steps for M1 customers

Receipt of the email confirms that a customer's data was involved. Customers without the email have no confirmation either way. M1 said it will alert affected customers by email or letter, and no victim count or full notification list has been published.

M1's stated advice is vigilance and caution with unsolicited calls, messages or emails. Senders should be verified through official channels before a customer responds. The advice covers every message that claims to come from M1, a bank, a delivery service or a government agency and asks for action, a password or a payment.

The guide on [how to check if an email was leaked](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked) describes how to check whether an email address appears in known breach data. The check uses [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com). That database records which addresses appear in known breach datasets. Have I Been Pwned held no listing for the M1 breach at the time of writing. For this incident, the check has no answer yet. Once a listing appears, the guide is the method to use.

Each account that uses the exposed email address should have its own password, and a second factor should be switched on where one is offered. No passwords were exposed in the M1 breach, according to M1, so no password reset follows directly from the breach itself. Bank accounts need separate treatment. A bank account should keep a permanent real dedicated address used only for financial accounts, never an alias. Recovery, statements and fraud alerts depend on that address.

An M1 customer address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## M1 breach investigation

The investigation continues. M1 said it is working with the relevant authorities and third-party specialists. The PDPC said it is investigating. The attack vector remains undisclosed. How the attacker gained access has not been reported anywhere. M1's email dates the intrusion to 30 October 2026. No source has stated a wider window. This article does not claim the access lasted one day, or longer than one day.

No confirmed misuse has been reported for the exposed data. M1 has disclosed no victim count. Whether the data was copied out of M1's systems or only accessed has not been stated. This article claims neither. Only a fresh statement from M1 or the PDPC will close those gaps. A follow-up must be measured against a fresh statement, not against speculation.

## Other Singapore disclosures in November 2026

A separate breach was disclosed the same day, 6 November 2026, by Doctor Anywhere, a Singapore healthcare provider. The statement gave no date for the unauthorised access. It gave no customer count. It did not name the type of data compromised. Doctor Anywhere reported the incident to the PDPC and filed a police report. Clinical records were not affected, according to the company. The Doctor Anywhere incident is separate from the M1 breach.

AsiaOne also recorded a recent run of reported breaches in Singapore. It named MoneySmart and Amadeus. Amadeus supports booking processes for Singapore Airlines. MoneySmart's disclosure came on 3 November 2026. Those incidents are separate, and this article does not cover them.

A telco breach took place on 30 October 2026 and was disclosed on 6 November. Identity data was exposed. Payment data and account access were unaffected according to M1. No victim count was disclosed. The PDPC is investigating. Affected customers will hear from M1 by email or letter, and customers who have already heard should treat unsolicited contact with the caution M1 described.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>M1</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Singapore</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>NTT Docomo breach leaks up to 300,000 customer records</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/ntt-docomo-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/ntt-docomo-data-breach</guid>
      <description>NTT Docomo confirmed unauthorised access to Docomo Online Shop and My docomo leaked up to 300,000 customer records, including email addresses and bank details.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The NTT Docomo data breach is an unauthorised access incident at Japan's largest mobile carrier in which customer information leaked from Docomo Online Shop and My docomo, with a maximum of about 300,000 records affected. Docomo confirmed the leak on 5 November 2026, after detecting the access the previous day and suspending procedures on both services for emergency maintenance. The company's [third report](https://www.docomo.ne.jp/info/notice/page/261106_00_m.html), published on 6 November, listed a wider set of leaked fields than the report of the previous day, and the wider list now includes email addresses, identity document numbers and, for some customers, bank account numbers.

The third report added email addresses, identity document numbers and contract details to the list in the previous day's report. No confirmed misuse of the leaked data had been reported in any source read for this article.

## Detection and suspension chronology

Docomo detected an alert about a large volume of access at about 10:30 JST on 4 November 2026, according to the timeline given at the press conference on 6 November. The company blocked access from overseas IP addresses at 14:30, but the access did not stop. At 18:10 Docomo identified and blocked the attack path and reopened My docomo at 20:32. At 23:16 the company detected the possibility of further unauthorised access, and suspended both services again at about 01:05 JST on 5 November. The leak was confirmed at about 02:10 JST on 5 November.

Both services were suspended a second time at about 01:05 JST on 5 November, after My docomo had reopened at 20:32 on 4 November. Docomo reopened My docomo on the evening of 4 November after blocking the first attack path, then found signs of a second method of access later the same night and suspended both services a second time. [Kyodo News](https://english.kyodonews.net/articles/-/90436) reported the disclosure and the suspension on 5 November, and [Jiji Press](https://www.nippon.com/en/articles/-/56982) reported the detection of unauthorised external access on the same day. Docomo blocked all access to the affected systems and states that no new leakage has been confirmed since the emergency maintenance began.

## Scope and record count

Docomo states a maximum of about 300,000 records. At the press conference on 6 November the company gave the more precise figure of 294,839 lines, split between 204,157 individual contracts and 90,682 corporate contracts. Lines are contracts rather than people, so the number of unique people affected is not stated. The figure is a maximum, not a confirmed count, and Docomo says the investigation into the scope and number continues.

Former subscribers are also among those affected, according to the company. Docomo said it would contact affected customers individually by SMS and direct mail, with SMS notices sent to affected individual customers on 6 November. A dedicated inquiry line is open on 0120-451-360 from 09:00 to 20:00.

## Fields listed in the third report

The third report, published at 18:00 JST on 6 November, divides the leaked information into fields that apply to all affected customers and fields that apply to some customers.

| Group | Leaked fields |
| --- | --- |
| All affected customers | Names, dates of birth and ages, addresses, contact phone numbers and email addresses, identity document numbers, mobile numbers and contract start dates, rate plans, options and discounts |
| Some customers | Names and contact details of legal representatives and procedure agents; names and addresses of workplaces or corporations; financial institution names, branch names, account numbers and account holder names; child-rearing support programme information |

President Yoshiaki Maeda [confirmed at the 6 November press conference](https://www.nippon.com/en/articles/-/57060) that bank account numbers and account holders' names were among the leaked information. The company has not stated how many customers fall in that subset.

The [second report](https://www.docomo.ne.jp/info/notice/page/261105_03_m.html), published at 18:30 JST on 5 November, listed only names, addresses, dates of birth, mobile numbers and contact phone numbers, with the cause listed as under investigation. The third report added email addresses, identity document numbers, contract start dates, rate plans, options and discounts for all affected customers, and the representative, workplace, bank account and child-rearing programme fields for some customers.

## Fields outside the leak

Two categories of data did not leak, according to Docomo. Credit card information was not compromised, because card numbers were masked and did not leak. My Number, Japan's social security number, was not stored as an image or a number, so it is outside the scope of the leak. Docomo confirmed both points at the 6 November press conference.

The types of identity documents whose numbers leaked were not disclosed. Docomo declined to specify them, citing privacy, so affected customers know that an identity document number is in the leaked set without knowing which document it belongs to. The company has also not stated whether the leaked data has been published, sold or misused.

## Entry through d-account linkage

The entry point was the d-account sign-in system, according to Docomo vice president Juichi Tsuboya at the press conference on 6 November. The attacker exploited the way several of Docomo's systems link together, using that linkage to search for and retrieve customer information mechanically. The attacker has not been identified, and Docomo says the cause and the entry route remain under investigation.

The leaked information was unencrypted in one system. Data is encrypted while it passes between systems, but the data that leaked had been decrypted in one system before transfer, according to the account given at the press conference. The company has not published a fuller technical account of the linkage or of the system in which the data stood unencrypted.

## Suspension of services and notification of customers

Docomo Online Shop and My docomo remain suspended, and the company has not given a restoration date. From 18:00 JST on 6 November the company also suspended the ahamo new-signup site as a preventive measure, although no unauthorised access was confirmed on that site. The three services will reopen once system repairs and safety checks are complete, according to the company.

President Maeda apologised at the press conference on 6 November and said the company is considering condolence payments to affected people. The recipients, the amounts and the method are undecided, and the company will announce the details separately. Docomo sent SMS notices to affected individual customers on 6 November, with the outline of the incident and precautions, and will follow up by SMS and direct mail.

## Standalone 5G disruption

Docomo's 5G standalone service, known as 5G SA, was unstable nationwide from about 11:18 JST on Thursday 5 November until about 01:20 JST on Friday 6 November, a disruption of about 14 hours. Voice calls, data communications and text messaging on 5G SA were affected. The disruption was caused by [congestion in switching equipment](https://english.kyodonews.net/articles/-/90581) serving subscribers to the service, according to the company, and its investigation found no signs of unauthorised access or a cyberattack in the outage.

Other 5G and 4G services were unaffected, as were mobile networks offered by other businesses using Docomo's network, and emergency calls. The outage and the breach overlapped in time. Docomo has treated them as [separate incidents](https://english.kyodonews.net/articles/-/90581) throughout. The breach concerns Docomo Online Shop and My docomo, and the outage concerns the 5G standalone network. No source read for this article links the two incidents.

## Guidance issued to customers

Docomo warned customers that the leaked information could be used in suspicious emails, SMS messages and phone calls impersonating Docomo or related parties. The company's notice tells customers not to open links or attached files, and not to enter or provide personal information, passwords or credit card details in response to a message or a call. It also recommends passkey-based two-step authentication on d-account, and asks customers who notice an unfamiliar login, purchase or contract to contact the company. Customers should also check the password on the mailbox tied to the leaked address, change it if it is reused anywhere else, and enable two-step verification on that mailbox.

A message that quotes the customer's name, address or contract details is not proof that it comes from Docomo. Those details are in the leaked set. Affected customers can check whether an email address has appeared in known breaches through [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com). It lists the breaches that named an address and the data each one exposed. A clean result is not a guarantee, and the Docomo breach is still under investigation. An email address alone does not open a mailbox. The AliasFleet guide to [whether someone can read emails from only an address](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-someone-read-my-emails-if-they-only-know-my-email-address) sets out what an address alone allows and what it does not. There is no self-check tool for individuals to confirm whether they are affected. Whether Japan's Personal Information Protection Commission has been notified is not stated in the sources read for this article.

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Per-site email addresses

AliasFleet is an email alias service that provides one forwarding address per site, so each site holds a different address and the real inbox address is never exposed. A leak from one site exposes only the alias given to that site, and that alias can be paused or closed in one click without affecting the mailbox or the other aliases. The service does not prevent a site from leaking the alias address, and it does not protect data a customer gives a site directly, such as a name, address or bank account number.

In the Docomo case the leaked set includes the customer's real contact details and contract information. An alias cannot remove those from a carrier's records. What an alias changes is the email address itself. A phishing message sent to a Docomo-only alias arrives on an address that names Docomo as its source. The alias can be switched off when the messages start. The guide to [checking what a site does with an email address first](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-what-a-site-does-with-your-email-first) sets out the pre-signup check behind that choice.

## Remaining investigation items

Docomo's third report states that the cause and the entry route, and the scope and number of leaked records, remain under investigation. The final count is not set, the attacker is not identified, and no confirmed misuse has been reported. The company has not given a restoration date for Docomo Online Shop, My docomo or the ahamo new-signup site, and has not decided the recipients, amounts or method for the condolence payments under consideration. The document types behind the leaked identity document numbers have not been disclosed.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>NTT Docomo</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Japan</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Should You Give Your Email Address to Online Surveys?</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-give-your-email-address-to-online-surveys</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-give-your-email-address-to-online-surveys</guid>
      <description>Survey panels need a lasting address for invitations and payouts, yet their policies allow it to be shared or sold. One alias per panel limits the exposure.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[An email address given to an online survey panel is the address that runs the account. Panel privacy policies permit that address to be shared with partners and, in some cases, sold, and two panels have had member data exposed since 2024, with a third leak possible but unconfirmed. Invitations, reward balances and payout confirmations all travel to the address on file, and the panel keeps it for the whole membership. A working address is required, and the form of it that limits the exposure is an address used for that panel alone.

## Survey scams and the FTC warning

An unsolicited survey invitation that promises a reward deserves a check before anything is clicked. The US Federal Trade Commission warned in [an alert dated 8 August 2022](https://consumer.ftc.gov/consumer-alerts/2022/08/dont-click-random-text-its-scam) that unexpected texts claiming to come from the Postal Service, Costco or The Home Depot, and offering a survey to claim a free gift card or a power tool, are impersonation scams. The messages direct the reader to a link, ask for answers to questions, and then demand payment for shipping. People who followed those steps found unauthorised charges on their accounts instead of a reward.

<Callout type="warning" title="FTC advice">
The FTC advises never to click links in unexpected texts, including ones asking for surveys to get free items, and to contact the company through a website or phone number already known.
</Callout>

The test holds for every survey invitation, not only for text messages. A genuine panel never asks a member for a password, a card number, a one-time code or any payment. A request for a password, card number, code or payment is not part of a genuine survey.

## How panel membership works

Joining a survey panel creates a membership that runs for months. A member registers once, completes profile questions, and then receives invitations at intervals. Rewards build up as points, which are redeemed for PayPal transfers, bank transfers or gift cards. [Survey Junkie describes the arrangement](https://www.surveyjunkie.com/how-insights-are-shared) as members sharing opinions while its parent company DISQO packages the resulting data for market research clients. Across all of that, the email address is the link between the account, the invitations and the payout.

An inbox that stops receiving mail after a few days breaks the arrangement. Invitations stop arriving, password resets go nowhere, and payouts cannot be confirmed. The panel therefore needs an address that keeps working for the life of the membership. The choice is not whether to give an address, but which address to give.

## Privacy policies of four panels

The four panels covered here take different positions on the address. The table below gives the position of each panel, and the subsections that follow give the wording behind each row.

| Panel | What happens to the email address |
| :--- | :--- |
| Prolific | Researchers never receive it; participants are identified by a Prolific ID only |
| YouGov | Shared with the companies that provide the technology used to send survey invitations, under contractual safeguards |
| Swagbucks | May be disclosed to partners or sold, with a Do Not Sell or Share opt-out offered |
| Survey Junkie (DISQO) | Sold and shared for cross-context behavioural advertising |

### Prolific

Of the four panels, Prolific restricts the address most tightly. According to its [data protection guidance](https://researcher-help.prolific.com/en/articles/445118-data-protection-and-privacy), a researcher receives neither a participant's name, email address nor physical address, and is barred from requesting direct identifiers. A Prolific ID is the only identifier a researcher sees. Account data, including email addresses, is processed to run the service and pay rewards, but the address itself is not passed to the researcher.

### YouGov

YouGov passes the address on, but to a narrower set of recipients than Swagbucks or DISQO. Its [compliance page](https://corporate.yougov.com/esg/governance/compliance-faq/) says panel member email addresses go to the companies that provide the technology used to send survey invitations, with contractual safeguards against other uses. Client results are aggregated under its [privacy notice](https://yougov.com/en-us/about/terms/privacy), with directly identifiable data such as names removed before delivery, and identifiable insights are provided only with the panellist's permission.

### Swagbucks

Prodege operates Swagbucks. Its [privacy policy](https://www.swagbucks.com/privacy-policy), effective 1 September 2025, treats an email address as Personal Information and permits disclosure to affiliates, vendors, advertisers, merchants, survey partners, joint business ventures and other trusted third parties. The policy also states that the company may disclose or sell aggregate or individualised information about the user. The US State Privacy Notice in the same policy says the company may sell or share Personal Information, and provides a Do Not Sell or Share or Target opt-out request.

### Survey Junkie and DISQO

DISQO, a consumer insights company, owns Survey Junkie. [DISQO's privacy policy](https://www.disqo.com/privacy-policy), last updated 26 September 2025, says the company sells and shares personal information for cross-context behavioural advertising. Survey Junkie's own page says responses are collected directly by the party conducting the research, while DISQO packages data for its clients for market research purposes. Researchers receive the responses, and personal information is sold and shared for advertising.

Every panel needs the address to run the account. Some panels keep it inside the service, while others pass it to partners, advertisers and data buyers under terms the member accepted at signup. The privacy policy is the only document that says which kind a panel is, and none of the four panels publishes how many member addresses it has sold or shared in a given year, so the scale of lawful sharing cannot be measured from public sources.

## Breach record

Sharing under a policy is one route out of a panel database. A breach is the other, and survey panels have been breached repeatedly.

SurveyLama, a paid survey site, lost data in a breach in February 2024. The exposure covered 4.4 million customer email addresses, together with names, physical and IP addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth and passwords stored as salted SHA-1, bcrypt or argon2 hashes. Have I Been Pwned [added the breach on 2 April 2024](https://haveibeenpwned.com/Breach/SurveyLama), and SurveyLama told the service it had already notified users by email. A larger SurveyLama dataset of about 15.8 million rows was the subject of an unverified claim [reported on 3 October 2026](https://undercodenews.com/surveylama-data-allegedly-offered-for-sale-158-million-user-records-raise-fresh-privacy-concerns-video/), but the reporting states there is no independent evidence that it is authentic or newly obtained, and it may be recycled 2024 material. It is not treated here as a second breach.

In October 2026, two Japanese panels were hit in the same month. GMO Research and AI operates the survey panel infoQ. Attackers gained unauthorised access from 2 October 2026 through a vulnerability in software used on the site, and the intrusion was discovered on 3 October after members reported problems with their points. The first notice, published 5 October, gave a maximum of 948,498 records. [The second report, published 14 October](https://japancyberwatch.com/articles/gmo-research-infoq-breach-point-fraud-2026), confirmed that personal data of 894,082 members was taken, including email addresses, names, dates of birth, addresses, phone numbers and encrypted passwords. The attackers also converted 611 members' points into Amazon gift codes worth 2,869,500 yen, which the company said it would compensate in full. All member passwords were invalidated on 7 October.

A fortnight later, Qzoo, a survey site run by Monitas Inc., reported unauthorised access that began on 17 October 2026, with the database viewed and updated through SQL injection. A summary of [the company notice of 21 October](https://itdef.net/en/learn/qzoo-data-breach-2026) puts about 400,000 records in scope, which is all records held in the Qzoo system. The database that may have been affected held names, dates of birth, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, member IDs and passwords, bank account numbers, branch names and account holder names, and survey answers including income and occupation. The company states that the leak is at the possible stage and the exact items are still being identified, so the Qzoo figures describe a scope, not a confirmed loss.

Two panels had member data exposed since 2024, and a third reported a possible leak in October 2026. A panel database holds the fields that make phishing convincing: a name, an address, a date of birth and a record of what the person does for small rewards. The infoQ attackers did not only copy the database. They used it, converting points into gift codes inside the service itself.

## Uses of a sold or leaked list

A list of addresses from a survey panel differs from a scraped list in one respect. Every address on it belongs to a real person who signed up, confirmed the address and answers surveys for small payments. That makes the list useful for spam, phishing and sale to other marketers. A phishing message sent to a panel list can quote the panel name, the member's name and the points balance. The methods spammers use to obtain addresses and the way phishing uses a leaked address are covered in the AliasFleet guides on [how spammers get an email address](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-do-spammers-get-your-email-address) and [how phishing uses a leaked email](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email).

## One alias per panel

The setup that fits the facts is one alias per panel. [An email alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-is-an-email-alias) is a forwarding address that delivers mail to the primary inbox. The panel receives a working address that stays live for the life of the membership, so invitations and payouts arrive as normal. The primary inbox address is never given to the panel, so it never appears in the panel's database or in a breach file. The steps are described in the AliasFleet guide on [how to set up an email alias](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-set-up-an-email-alias).

The alias also identifies the source of any leak. When spam or phishing starts arriving at the alias created for one panel, the panel is identified by the address itself. The alias can then be paused or replaced, which stops the mail. The panel account still exists, because the alias is the address on the account. This is the same principle as using [a different email for every website](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/different-email-for-every-website): the address itself becomes the record of where it was given.

Managed aliases from [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) forward to a verified destination inbox. An alias created for a survey panel serves as a persistent identity for that panel rather than a short-lived inbox, and it keeps working for as long as the membership lasts, which is what a panel account requires. Pricing for paid plans is listed on the AliasFleet [pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), and the free plan includes 10 active aliases.

An alias covers the email address only, not the rest of the profile. The panel still holds the member's name, date of birth, address, phone number and survey answers, and a breach exposes those fields whether the email address is an alias or not. The alias also does not stop the panel from sharing the alias itself with partners under its policy. What the alias does is confine the damage to one address that belongs to one panel, and make the source visible when the address is misused. Reading the policy before joining and using the opt-out where one is offered reduces the rest of the exposure. When a breach does happen, the AliasFleet guides on [checking whether an email was leaked](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked) and [what to do when an email is in a data breach](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach) give the order of steps.

## What should you give a panel?

A panel cannot function without a working address. The primary inbox address should not be that address, because the policies allow the address to travel and the breach record shows that it does. One alias per panel gives the panel an address that works for invitations and payouts, and gives the member an address that names the panel when it appears somewhere it should not.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Surveys</category><category>Data Breaches</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Can You Receive Two-Factor Codes at an Email Alias?</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-receive-two-factor-authentication-codes-at-an-email-alias</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-receive-two-factor-authentication-codes-at-an-email-alias</guid>
      <description>Two-factor codes sent to an email alias arrive like any other message. A short expiry window and a deleted alias are the two ways the setup fails.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A two-factor authentication code sent to an email alias is a message addressed to a forwarding rule. It reaches the real inbox with no sign that the address is an alias. Two limits: email codes expire in minutes, so slow delivery can arrive too late, and a deleted alias stops receiving mail at once.

## Expiry windows and delivery timing

Email codes live for minutes, not hours. Auth0 states that its email verification code for multi-factor authentication is hardcoded to time out after [5 minutes](https://support.auth0.com/center/s/article/Increase-the-email-verification-code-expiration-time-beyond-5-minutes), and the timeout cannot be extended. Ory states that its email and SMS codes are valid for a short amount of time, usually [15 minutes or less](https://www.ory.com/docs/network/kratos/mfa/mfa-via-sms). NIST sets a ceiling for the whole category: an out-of-band authentication must be completed within 10 minutes or it is invalid, under [NIST SP 800-63B-4](https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html). Each service picks its own number inside that range, and the same shape holds everywhere.

SMTP, the protocol that moves email, was built for eventual delivery rather than fast delivery. [RFC 5321](https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321/), the SMTP standard, says the retry interval after a failed delivery attempt should be at least 30 minutes, and the give-up time generally needs to be at least 4 to 5 days. That design suits a letter. It is a poor fit for a code that expires in 5 minutes. The risk sits in the tail of the distribution: greylisting, spam filtering, or a busy server on any hop. No provider publishes a forwarding-latency figure, so there is no measured number for how often a code arrives late. The delay risk is stated here as a property of email delivery generally, not as a figure for any one service.

One documented case shows the failure in practice. A Jotform user reported that a verification code email took 11 minutes to arrive while the security request allowed only 5 minutes, and Jotform support confirmed the expiry was fixed and could not be extended, so the code arrived useless. The [Jotform support thread](https://www.jotform.com/answers/37239541-security-verification-email-code-delivery-delay-exceeds-expiration-time) records the exchange from 7 April 2026. A 5-minute window leaves almost no room for a slow hop, and the window is set by the site sending the code, not by the alias service.

## Email codes in the ranking of second factors

Email codes are the weakest second factor on offer, with or without an alias in the middle. NIST states: "Email SHALL NOT be used for out-of-band authentication", because of access using only a password, interception in transit, and rerouting attacks such as DNS spoofing. The [NIST FAQ](https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-FAQ/?ref=blog.sean-wright.com) gives that answer under Q-B11.

An email code and a password reset both prove the same thing. Each proves the reader can open a mailbox. Both factors sit in the same inbox, behind the same password and the same recovery flow. Taking over the inbox defeats both at once. [Is email safe for two-factor codes](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-email-safe-for-two-factor-codes) reaches the same conclusion: email codes beat no second factor at all, but sit at the bottom of the ranking. An alias changes the address that receives the code, not the channel the code travels through. That does not make email codes useless. A weak second factor still blocks the attacker who holds the password and nothing else, and some sites offer nothing else at all, in which case the email code is the option to use. Email codes are the fallback, not the first choice.

## Delivery through a forwarding rule

When a site sends mail to an alias, the alias service looks the address up in a routing table and re-sends the message to the real inbox attached to the account. [How email aliases actually work](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work) sets out the three pieces: the forwarding rule, the reply trick, and the kill switch. The forwarding rule is the piece that matters here. The message is an ordinary email carrying a numeric code, and the alias service forwards messages addressed to an active alias. Forwarding is transparent to the receiving application: [OTP codes, login links, and security alerts arrive in your inbox the same way direct emails do](https://www.securetoolsguide.com/simplelogin-vs-addy-io-vs-firefox-relay-email-alias-comparis/), according to an independent comparison of alias services.

The alias also changes what the site holds. When every site gets its own alias, the address that receives a site's codes is not the address in every breach file. [One alias per site](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/different-email-for-every-website) keeps a breach at one site from handing an attacker the address used everywhere else. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) lists 1,049 pwned websites and 17,847,746,941 pwned addresses as of 6 November 2026. A leaked alias also names its source: spam on one site's alias tells the owner [which website leaked it](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/which-website-leaked-my-email).

## The deleted alias

Turning an alias off or deleting it removes the address that receives the codes, and that is where the second failure becomes permanent. Mail sent to a deactivated alias [bounces back](https://www.aliasfleet.com/docs/email-aliases/activating-deactivating-alias) and never arrives, even after the alias is switched back on. Deletion goes further: a deleted alias stops working at once, cannot be recreated or recovered, and the [deletion guide](https://www.aliasfleet.com/docs/email-aliases/deleting-an-alias) states that deletion is immediate and irreversible. The same control that lets an owner shut an alias down is therefore the risk when the alias is the address on an account, since the address that receives the codes is then gone for good.

<Callout type="warning" title="A deleted alias strands the account">
Deletion of an alias that is the address on an account removes the destination for its codes. Mail sent to the deleted alias bounces, so a code sent at the next sign-in never arrives. Recovery then depends on a backup method, recovery codes saved offline, or a second device with an authenticator app. Without any of those, recovery means the site's support process, which is slow and not guaranteed. An alias that is still the address on a live account should not be deleted, and the accounts attached to an alias should be checked before it is deactivated.
</Callout>

Deactivation is reversible, so it is the safer of the two, but mail sent while the alias is off is gone, and a code sent in that window is gone with it. An alias that receives codes is load-bearing. It should not be deactivated casually or deleted while the account is live.

## Stronger second factors

The better setup puts the second factor on a channel apart from the inbox. An authenticator app generates codes on the phone from a secret shared with the site during setup, mixing that secret with the current time to turn out a six-digit code every 30 seconds. No message travels anywhere at sign-in time. Taking over the inbox reveals none of it. The algorithm is TOTP, defined in [RFC 6238](https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6238/), which recommends a default time step of 30 seconds. GitHub's documentation recommends exactly this approach. [GitHub's 2FA docs](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-server@3.15/authentication/securing-your-account-with-two-factor-authentication-2fa/configuring-two-factor-authentication) state that the service strongly recommends using a time-based one-time password application to configure two-factor authentication. [Google's 2-Step Verification help](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/185839?hl=en&ref_topic=2954345) says the same.

Passkeys sit above the authenticator app. A passkey is a public-key credential: the private key stays on the device, and the site holds the matching public key. There is no code to type and nothing to intercept. GitHub's docs state that passkeys satisfy both password and two-factor requirements, so sign-in completes in a single step. Google's help states that signing in with a passkey bypasses the second authentication step. Where a site offers a passkey, the passkey is the option to use, and otherwise the authenticator app is the fallback, with email codes after that.

| Second factor | How the code travels | Main weakness |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Passkey | No code travels anywhere | Not offered by every site |
| Authenticator app | Generated on the device | A lost phone needs recovery codes |
| Email code to an alias | Forwarded through email | Short expiry and a deleted alias |

Recovery codes belong in the same plan: a set saved offline, on paper, before they are needed. A second factor that cannot be recovered turns a lost phone into a lockout.

## Checks before relying on an alias

A few checks make the alias setup workable. First, test the timing: sign in once with the alias in place and time the code. If codes arrive expired, the account needs a different second factor. Second, keep the alias active, as described above. Third, keep a second method on every important account: an authenticator app, a passkey, or recovery codes stored offline. Fourth, give the bank a different treatment entirely: a permanent real dedicated address used only for financial accounts, never an alias. Recovery, statements and fraud alerts depend on that address.

The setup guides for the three big providers cover the mechanics: [Gmail](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-set-up-two-factor-authentication-on-gmail), [Outlook](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-set-up-two-factor-authentication-on-outlook) and [Apple ID](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-set-up-two-factor-authentication-on-apple-id). Chaining every login to one provider also creates a [single point of failure](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/sign-in-with-google-risk) in the same way a shared inbox does: split the identity into pieces controlled separately instead of stacking everything behind one door.

## Aliases in practice

[AliasFleet](https://www.aliasfleet.com) is an email-alias service: one forwarding address per site, every one landing in the real inbox, each manageable on its own. A code sent to an AliasFleet alias is forwarded to the destination inbox like any other message. The service does not treat codes differently from other mail. Mail sent to a deleted alias bounces too, because the address no longer exists.

The service cannot speed up delivery or recover a code sent to a deleted alias, and delays elsewhere on the path are outside its control. AliasFleet's own account security follows the same ranking: the [two-factor authentication documentation](https://www.aliasfleet.com/docs/security-privacy/two-factor-authentication) offers an authenticator app or an email one-time passcode, and states that the authenticator app is the recommended choice. The free tier covers 10 active aliases.

The answer is yes, with two conditions attached. Codes arrive at an alias like any other mail, and the alias keeps the real address out of the files. But a short expiry window and a slow hop can eat a code, and a deleted alias strands the account behind a second factor nobody can receive. The safer setup is an authenticator app or a passkey first, with email codes as backup, and an alias that receives codes should never be the only second factor.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Two-Factor Authentication</category><category>Email Aliases</category><category>Account Security</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>DigiCert data breach exposes customer records</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/digicert-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/digicert-data-breach</guid>
      <description>DigiCert confirmed unauthorised access to archived customer records, including business contact details and identity documents for a small minority of accounts.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The DigiCert data breach exposed archived customer records after an unauthorised account read them between 27 June and 2 July 2026. DigiCert, a certificate authority, confirmed the access on 19 October 2026. The records held names, business email addresses, telephone numbers and business addresses, with identity documents for a small minority of accounts. DigiCert disclosed no number of affected customers and called the affected portion of its archive small. The confirmation appeared in DigiCert's own incident report, published in Mozilla's public Bugzilla compliance tracker as [bug 2084460](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2084460). The preliminary report was filed on 20 October, the full report was posted on 1 November, and public reporting followed on 5 November 2026.

## Exposure of the archive

On 4 February 2025 DigiCert moved an internal business system from a network segment restricted to VPN traffic into a different availability zone. The move left the system reachable from the internet, although it was never meant to be externally accessible. The system archives identity-validation information that customer representatives provide to DigiCert.

That business system runs its own instances of an account manager platform also used for customer-facing products. The platform includes an optional self-service registration flow, and after the migration the flow became available on the business system by mistake. Staff sign in with multi-factor authentication, but accounts created through self-registration received none of that protection: no application assignment, no multi-factor authentication, and read-only access by default. Those unassigned accounts could then read archived customer data because of an authorisation flaw.

DigiCert's report states the lesson in a single sentence: "Authorization for a business system must not be delegated to its network position." The migration changed the network position of the system without a security review, and monitoring for new account creation was not reassessed after the move. The authorisation model treated the absence of an application assignment as proof of no access. That assumption was wrong, and an exposed registration endpoint became a data breach.

## Timeline of discovery and confirmation

External accounts on the business system came to DigiCert's attention on 18 June 2026, when its internal team noticed accounts that did not belong to DigiCert staff. The reviewer concluded that the accounts could not reach data because they were not assigned to an application. That conclusion was incorrect. The same day, DigiCert placed the system behind a web application firewall, blocking new account creation from outside.

On 21 June 2026 a report through DigiCert's managed security research program warned that accounts could be created on the system through external access, and DigiCert verified that ability on 24 June. The unauthorised reading of archived records then took place between 27 June and 2 July, according to the later investigation. A software patch with an authorisation restriction was released to production on 2 July, the same day the access window ended, requiring account-manager token validation and returning HTTP 401 responses to accounts with no assigned application. From 9 July, only VPN traffic could reach the business system hostnames through the web application firewall, apart from approved external endpoints.

At the time, DigiCert had no knowledge that archived data had been read. The report states the point directly: "The incident was initially handled as an account-creation issue rather than a data-access event." Suspicion of possible unauthorised access first arose on 12 October 2026. On 15 October, DigiCert added alerts at application level for file access and request volumes, and deleted the remaining accounts that did not belong to its staff. Password resets for all business system users were completed on 17 October.

Confirmation followed on 19 October 2026, when DigiCert confirmed unauthorised access to a subset of archived data and determined the event was reportable under browser root program requirements. DigiCert filed its preliminary incident report on 20 October, followed by the full report on 1 November. In early November 2026, DigiCert started sending notices to customers. Fabian Bader, a cloud architect, posted his notification on X, while Troy Hunt, creator of [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com), posted the notification there too and asked if others had received one.

## Customer records in the affected archive

Most of the accessed records held business contact information: names, business email addresses, telephone numbers and business addresses. A small minority of customer accounts included additional personal data in the form of a customer-provided document, such as a driving licence, passport, utility bill or other document carrying a name and address. Those documents had been submitted during identity validation before some certificates were issued.

According to DigiCert, review of the identity documents continues, with notification of everyone affected to follow once it finishes. The notification quoted by [BleepingComputer](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/digicert-data-breach-exposes-customer-information-identity-documents/) states that the information involved was limited to names, business email addresses, phone numbers and business address shared with DigiCert and, if provided, may have included an identification document.

No source has disclosed a customer count. DigiCert calls the affected portion of its archive small, and gives no further measure of it. Its appendix says summary statistics can be supplied to root program representatives on request. When BleepingComputer published on 5 November 2026, it had asked DigiCert for the number affected and had no answer. Until DigiCert publishes a figure, none can be attached to this breach.

The people affected are customer representatives whose details sit in DigiCert's archived business records, including anyone who bought a certificate from DigiCert or through a reseller and provided business contact details or identity documents during validation.

Even with no password exposed, a business email address in a breach file gives attackers material to work with. The address can be used for targeted phishing messages quoting the real name, telephone number and business address, and referencing a real DigiCert certificate order. That pattern is described in the [guide on how phishing uses a leaked email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email): the leaked address makes the message possible, and a fake sign-in page or fake payment request does the rest. Identity documents raise the stakes for the small minority whose documents were in the archive: a document combines a name and address with identification harder to replace than a contact detail.

## Certificate services and issued certificates

DigiCert states that its certificate authority services, CertCentral and DigiCert ONE were unaffected and remain secure. Customer login credentials stay secure, DigiCert says, as do DigiCert-issued certificates, which remain valid and fully trusted, with no action needed on active certificates. Zero certificates were affected, the incident report records, with none issued, modified or revoked because of the incident.

Reading records was all the unauthorised account could do. Writing records, approving validations and issuing certificates were all beyond it. Logs of certificate authority and validation activity, reviewed by DigiCert, showed no validation actions, certificate issuance or revocation activity linked to the account.

## Remediation and system changes

DigiCert updated its policy on 28 August 2026, so that network access changes for internal tools require security sign-off. An external penetration test was completed on 31 August.

File-access and request-volume alerts were added on 15 October, and password resets for all business system users were completed on 17 October. Self-registration was disabled on all instances on 24 October, and the remaining endpoints were moved behind private-IP load balancers on the same day. The company assigned a single named owner for the system's security on 29 October and completed a least-privilege review of the permissions model on 30 October.

## Company instructions to affected customers

DigiCert's notification tells affected customers that the company is still reviewing identity documents and will notify them once that review is complete. A notice received should be kept, since it records what DigiCert says was exposed for that account. From public information, customers who bought certificates from DigiCert or a reseller and have not received a notice cannot yet tell whether their records were in the affected portion.

Published breach guidance recommends treating unexpected messages that mention DigiCert, a domain name or a certificate order as suspect, even when the message quotes a real name and telephone number. Ignoring links in such messages and reaching DigiCert through its own website, or through the account contact already known to the customer, is safer. The AliasFleet guide on [how to check if your email was leaked](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked) describes a check of whether an address appears in known breach listings, not whether a specific DigiCert record was included.

Customers who submitted a passport or driving licence during validation are advised to ask DigiCert in writing whether their document was among those reviewed, and what support the company offers. Recovery details shared with the business email address make those accounts worth reviewing: the [guide on whether someone can read emails with only an email address](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-someone-read-my-emails-if-they-only-know-my-email-address) sets out why an address alone does not open a mailbox, while a password entered on a fake sign-in page does. Whether an address is safe to hand over is decided by the pre-signup check covered in the [guide on how to check what a site does with your email first](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-what-a-site-does-with-your-email-first).

Published breach guidance also covers passwords and account access. A password reused anywhere the business email address was used is changed, and multi-factor authentication is enabled on the mailbox and on the DigiCert account where available. A changed password limits reuse after a leak, while multi-factor authentication keeps a stolen password from opening the account alone.

Your business address may be in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Outstanding items from the incident report

DigiCert's incident report lists two action items due 6 November 2026, which is today. First, an internal audit to confirm that no business-system origin server is externally accessible. Second, a final review of automated alerting for unexpected account creation and changes to account or user permissions, routed to security operations with a defined escalation path. As last read, the report listed both as ongoing, with no published result for either item at the time of writing.

Customer count is the second open question. No number of affected people, organisations or documents has been published, and the identity-document review is still in progress. The scale cannot be stated beyond the company's own description of a small portion of its archive until a count is published or the review completes.

Notification is the third open question. Beyond the emailed notices that began in early November, the sources read give no account of how DigiCert notifies individual customers, or whether customers who bought through resellers are notified directly or through the reseller.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>DigiCert</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Identity Documents</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Getting Loan Quotes</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-getting-loan-quotes</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-getting-loan-quotes</guid>
      <description>A loan quote form passes an enquiry to several lenders at once. One alias per quote round names the source of the later mail and closes when a lender is chosen.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Protecting an email address while getting loan quotes means keeping shopping mail apart from loan mail. A quote form passes the address to several lenders at once, so one alias serves each quote round and closes when a lender is chosen. The loan itself sits on a permanent address used only for financial accounts. Closing payment instructions are checked by phone, never from the email thread alone.

## Closing fraud at the end of the transaction

The closing payment is the largest single payment in the transaction, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau describes how spoofed emails target it on its [mortgage closing scams](https://www.consumerfinance.gov/archive/blog/mortgage-closing-scams-how-protect-yourself-and-your-closing-funds/) page: criminals compromise the email of real estate professionals, watch the correspondence to identify upcoming transactions, then send spoofed messages posing as the agent, settlement agent or legal representative, with false instructions for wiring closing funds.

The FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center recorded real estate fraud losses of $275,110,419 across 12,368 complaints in 2025, up from $173,586,820 in 2024 and $145,243,348 in 2023. Business email compromise, the method behind most closing wire fraud, cost $3,046,598,558 across 24,768 complaints in 2025. Those figures come from the [FBI IC3 2025 Internet Crime Report](https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2025_IC3Report.pdf), and they cover reported losses only.

<Callout type="warning" title="Payment instructions are verified by phone">
A title company will never change its bank account or wiring instructions during a transaction. Before wiring money, always confirm the account name and number in person or by phone using a number agreed in advance. Instructions in an email are never followed on their own, and phone numbers or links inside an email are not used for verification.
</Callout>

Buyers identify two trusted individuals ahead of closing and, before wiring money, confirm the instructions, including the account name and number, with those representatives in person or by phone using a number previously agreed. The American Land Title Association states the same rule in its handout on [protecting your money from closing scams](https://alta.org/business-operations/marketing/unbranded/protect-your-money-from-closing-scams-when-buying-a-home-usa.pdf): detecting a misdirected wire within 24 hours gives the best chance of recovering the money.

## Lead generation behind the quote form

A rate-quote form asks for a name, an email address, a telephone number and loan details. The site running the form is often not a lender. Comparison sites and lead generators make their money from the enquiry itself. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau described this model in Circular 2024-01: lead generators sell information about prospective customers to lenders, and some send leads to providers who bid the highest for a specific type of lead. The full text is in the [CFPB Circular 2024-01](https://www.consumerfinance.gov/compliance/circulars/consumer-financial-protection-circular-2024-01-preferencing-and-steering-practices-by-digital-intermediaries-for-consumer-financial-products-or-services/).

Mortgage comparison platforms drew a specific ruling in February 2023. The Bureau issued an advisory opinion on digital mortgage comparison-shopping platforms, stating that platforms generate potential leads for participants through consumers' interaction with the platform, and that an operator receives a prohibited referral fee under section 8 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act when it steers shoppers to lenders in exchange for payment. The opinion is published as the [CFPB advisory opinion on digital mortgage comparison-shopping platforms](https://www.consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/real-estate-settlement-procedures-act-regulation-x-digital-mortgage-comparison-shopping-platforms-and-related-payments-to-operators/), and the [CFPB press release](https://www.consumerfinance.gov/archive/newsroom/cfpb-issues-guidance-to-protect-mortgage-borrowers-from-pay-to-play-digital-comparison-shopping-platforms/) states that companies operating these platforms appear to shoppers as if they provide objective lender comparisons, but may illegally refer people to only those lenders paying referral fees.

The sharing itself is written into the policy of the site that collects the form. LendingTree is the clearest example because its policy is explicit. Its privacy policy, last updated 8 July 2026, states that when a person submits a request for a loan, insurance or another financial product, LendingTree may disclose personal information to lenders and other third parties in its network, called Network Partners. It also states that Network Partners that interact with the person may use and retain personal information whether or not the person uses their services. The text is in the [LendingTree privacy policy](https://www.lendingtree.com/legal/privacy-policy/).

An address handed to one site can remain in the hands of companies the shopper never contacted, under their own policies, after the quote round is over, and no retention period is published.

How many recipients receive the details varies by site. An industry guide for 2026 describes LendingTree enquiries as shared, with three to five other lenders usually receiving the same data, per the [Zeitro mortgage lead generation guide](https://www.zeitro.com/blog/best-mortgage-lead-generation-companies). That is a reported figure from an industry source, not a fixed count.

Insurance quotes run on the same mechanism, covered in the guide on [how to protect your email when getting insurance quotes](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-getting-insurance-quotes). Loans add two things insurance quotes do not have: the credit inquiry creates a second channel for the same flood, and the closing stage adds a fraud risk.

## Trigger leads after a credit inquiry

A mortgage application creates a second route for the address to travel, one that does not pass through the quote form at all. When a lender pulls a credit report, the inquiry signals to the credit bureaus that the person is shopping for a mortgage, and the bureaus could sell lists of such consumers to other lenders making prescreened offers. The FTC explains this in its [shopping for a mortgage FAQs](https://consumer.ftc.gov/articles/shopping-mortgage-faqs), which state that a mortgage application may trigger competing offers, and that the offers are based on information in the credit report suggesting the person meets criteria set by the creditor.

That channel changed in 2026. The Homebuyers Privacy Protection Act was signed on 5 September 2025 and took effect in March 2026. It amends the Fair Credit Reporting Act so that a consumer reporting agency may not furnish a prescreened report based on a residential mortgage credit request unless the transaction is a firm offer of credit or insurance and the recipient either holds documented authorisation from the consumer, originated or services the consumer's current mortgage, or is an insured bank or credit union holding the consumer's current account. The exact effective day is reported as both 4 March and 5 March 2026 in different sources, so this article states the month only.

The law has a limit. It restricts lists furnished by credit bureaus after a credit inquiry, not contact that follows from a form submitted directly to a comparison site, where consent is given on the form itself.

The opt-out for the bureau channel still exists and is worth using before applying. A person can opt out of prescreened offers for five years, or permanently by returning a signed form, through [OptOutPrescreen.com](https://optoutprescreen.com/) or by calling 1-888-5-OPTOUT. The FTC page on [how to stop junk mail](https://consumer.ftc.gov/articles/how-stop-junk-mail) states that requests are processed within five days but that prescreened offers can take up to 60 days to stop. The [National Do Not Call Registry](https://www.donotcall.gov) covers calls, not email.

| Route | Trigger | What travels | Control |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Quote form | Form submitted to a comparison site | Name, email, phone, loan details to Network Partners | One alias per quote round, closed after the decision |
| Credit inquiry | Lender pulls a credit report | Prescreened-offer lists from the bureaus | Opt-out before applying; 2026 law limits bureau lists |

## One alias per quote round

A distinct alias is created for each quote site before the form is submitted, and the form receives that alias instead of the main inbox address. Mail from the site and its lead buyers arrives on the alias and forwards to the main inbox, so quotes still arrive. When mail from unrelated sellers begins arriving on an alias, the source is already recorded: the alias name identifies the site that received that address.

The alias stays active until the purchase decision is reached, because quotes arrive over days, not minutes. Closing an alias early can cut off a quote still under consideration. After the decision, the aliases for sites not chosen are closed, and the alias for the chosen lender stays active until the loan documents have arrived.

Closing the alias is the control that the opt-outs cannot provide. It stops the whole stream from that site and its buyers in one action, with no need to unsubscribe from each sender separately and no need to change the main address. The sequence for closing an alias safely is set out in the guide on [what to do when an alias starts getting spam](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-an-alias-starts-getting-spam): identify the source, update the account address first, then pause or delete the old alias. The order matters, because mail sent to a paused or deleted alias bounces.

## The permanent address for the loan

A bought loan changes the position, in the same way a bought insurance policy does. Loan mail is not marketing mail. Statements and fraud alerts attach to a contract. Loan mail therefore moves to a permanent address used only for financial accounts once a lender is chosen. That address serves no other purpose, and it is never handed to a quote site.

The loan account also sits under the permanent financial address, not under the quote alias, because the quote alias was a shopping tool. The full reasoning is in the guide on [whether to use a separate email for banking](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-banking), which states the canonical position: the bank gets a permanent real dedicated address used only for financial accounts, never a masked or relay alias, because recovery, statements and fraud alerts depend on it, and aliases are for everything else.

## What an alias cannot do for a loan quote

An alias governs where mail arrives and whether that mail can be stopped. It does not govern what a quote site does with the other details on the form. Name, telephone number, date of birth, income details and property details still pass to the site and its buyers. An alias does not recall those details, and it does not remove an address from a list that already holds it.

Breach exposure is a further boundary. An alias that appears in a breach of a quote site or a lead buyer can be checked at [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com). Closing the alias ends that exposure. A report of fraud, if it happens, goes to the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center at [ic3.gov](https://ic3.gov/).

## AliasFleet for loan quotes

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox. A separate alias serves each quote site, and a control disables it when the quote round ends. The free plan includes 10 active aliases. The [pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing) states the free tier as 10 active aliases, 1 verified destination inbox and 100 MB monthly forwarding. AliasFleet is not a disposable email service: aliases are managed, persistent forwarding addresses that last for years, receive password resets and receipts like any address, and stop forwarding the moment they are paused or deleted. What an alias is, and how it differs from plus addressing and relay addresses, is set out in the guide on [what an email alias is](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/what-is-an-email-alias).

AliasFleet does not control what a quote site does with the other details on the form, and it does not verify wiring instructions. It does not replace the phone call to the title company before a wire is sent.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Loan Quotes</category><category>Email Aliases</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Joining a Sports Club</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-joining-a-sports-club</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-joining-a-sports-club</guid>
      <description>Joining a sports club hands an email address to volunteers, shared lists and team apps. One alias per club keeps that mail contained and closable if it leaks.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Joining a sports club requires a personal email address, and the practical protection is a separate email alias for each club. The alias forwards club mail to the main inbox and can be closed if the club list leaks, so the main address is never exposed. The address is then held on lists run by volunteers, shared in group mail and entered into team apps, and it stays in those places after the member leaves.

## Registration and use of member email addresses

A sports club collects an email address at registration and uses it for fixtures, training changes, cancellations, subscriptions, social events and sponsor offers. The Sport and Recreation Alliance's Sports Club Survey 2013 counted [151,000 sports clubs in the UK](https://www.healthclubmanagement.co.uk/health-club-management-news/Report-number-of-sports-clubs-in-the-UK-reaches-151000/307313), each with an average of 141 adult members. The figure is from 2013 and no newer UK-wide count was found. The people handling those addresses are usually volunteers, and the list is often kept on a personal laptop or in a personal email account. [Swim England's data protection guidance for clubs](https://www.swimming.org/swimengland/data-protection-guidance/) says committee members should use a role email address such as secretary@clubname rather than a personal address, and that files containing personal data shared by email should be encrypted. The same guidance discourages committee members from creating their own contact lists, and says member information should be kept central to the club's online management system.

## Cyber incidents in sport

The UK National Cyber Security Centre's report on the cyber threat to sports organisations found that at least 70% of sports organisations surveyed had suffered a cyber incident in 12 months, against a 32% average for UK businesses. About 30% of incidents caused direct financial damage, averaging more than £10,000 per incident, and the biggest single reported loss was over £4 million. Business email compromise was the most common outcome of attacks in the sector. In one case, the email of a Premier League club managing director was hacked before a transfer negotiation, and a £1 million fee was nearly diverted before the club's bank blocked it. The full findings are in the [NCSC press release on the report](https://www.wired-gov.net/wg/news.nsf/articles/Defences+tested+as+cyber+attackers+take+aim+at+UK+sports+sector+23072020141500?open).

[Town Sports International, a gym chain, exposed 600,000 records](https://www.comparitech.com/blog/information-security/gym-chain-town-sports-exposes-personal-details-of-600000-members-staff-online-report/) of members and staff in an unsecured Amazon S3 bucket with no password, holding names, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses and limited card details. The database was first seen in the wild in November 2019 and was only secured on 22 September 2020. [West Ham United supporters had their full names, dates of birth, telephone numbers, addresses and email addresses displayed](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/west-ham-supporters-personal/) to other supporters on the club's ticketing website in March 2021, after a technical issue with a third-party provider; no payment details were exposed.

Madison Square Garden Sports was hit by a ShinyHunters extortion campaign in June 2026, and the group published the data. [Have I Been Pwned lists 9.8 million affected email addresses](https://haveibeenpwned.com/Breach/MadisonSquareGardenSports) from that breach, added on 24 June 2026. A leaked address gives an attacker a working address tied to a real interest: raw material for phishing. After a breach, the address is checked on [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) and passwords reused with it are changed. No public record was found of a small community club's email list leaking; the risk for a small club is shown by the sector pattern and by governing-body guidance rather than by a small-club breach count.

## Data protection rules

A club that holds member email addresses is a data controller under UK data protection law, even if it is run entirely by volunteers. Swim England's guidance states that a loss of data is a breach of GDPR, while noting that not every breach is notifiable to the ICO. The [ICO's own guidance on personal data breaches](https://cy.ico.org.uk/for-organisations/report-a-breach/personal-data-breach/personal-data-breaches-a-guide) says a notifiable breach must be reported to the ICO without undue delay and no later than 72 hours after the organisation becomes aware of it. If a breach is likely to result in a high risk to individuals, those individuals must also be informed without undue delay. The member cannot audit the club's security: committees change every year, and the list lives on in old inboxes and spreadsheets. The member can only control which address the club was given.

## Team apps and member data

Many clubs now run communication through a team app instead of plain email, and Spond is one of the common ones. A [Spond Club member profile](https://intercom-help.eu/spond-club/en/articles/182663-managing-member-information) holds a name, date of birth, contact details and membership status, plus custom fields such as allergies and medical needs. Several email addresses can be linked to one Spond profile, and all notifications go to the profile's primary email address. The club admin cannot see the emails registered in a person's main Spond profile. [Spond states that personal contact details are only visible to verified team members](https://www.spond.com/en-us/news-and-blog/best-youth-soccer-team-communication-app/) and that the platform is GDPR-compliant, and it claims over 3.3 million global users, the vendor's own figure.

Not every team app handles data the same way. In February 2026 a [joint investigation by The Markup, CalMatters and the Los Angeles Times](https://beerleagues.app/blog/your-league-app-shouldnt-sell-your-data) reported that TeamSnap, a popular youth and recreational sports management app, had been sharing user data with advertisers and third-party marketers, including names and contact information, purchase history and geolocation data. Common Sense Media gave TeamSnap its lowest rating, Warning, for personal information sold or rented to third parties and shared for third-party marketing. The finding is reported from a secondary summary, not from the original reporting. The member rarely gets a say in which app the club chooses.

## Shared mailing lists

A common exposure in a club is a group email: a fixtures secretary sends a message to the whole squad with every address in the To or CC field, and every recipient can see every other member's address. A single reply-all then shares every member's address with the whole list. [Spammers collect email addresses](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-do-spammers-get-your-email-address) from exactly these kinds of exposed lists, and a list that circulates among dozens of members reaches people outside the club sooner or later.

<Callout type="info" title="CC and BCC in Gmail">
[CC in Gmail shows every recipient's address to all other recipients, while BCC hides recipients from each other](https://clean.email/blog/email-providers/how-to-cc-in-gmail). A volunteer sender may not know the difference.
</Callout>

A member can ask the club to use BCC for group mail, which costs the club nothing, but the member cannot enforce it, and one mistake by one volunteer undoes it. The address is already shared the moment it appears in a CC field.

## One alias per club

The method is one email alias for each sports club joined, given to the club in place of the main address. The alias forwards to the main inbox, so fixture changes and training notices still arrive in the same place. If the club's list leaks, the damage is limited to that alias, and the member closes it. If the club starts sending sponsor offers or social mail the member did not agree to, the alias is paused or closed without touching the main inbox. If a phishing email arrives addressed to the club alias, the member knows at once which club's list it came from. That is the same principle as using a [different email for every website](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/different-email-for-every-website), applied to a club instead of a website.

The same alias covers the club app: registration on the team app uses the club alias, not the main address. If the app later shares data with advertisers, the address it shares is the alias. An alias is a managed, persistent forwarding address under the member's control that stays active for as long as the membership lasts. [Email aliases work](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work) by forwarding mail sent to the alias on to a real inbox, and the member can reply from the alias so the main address never appears.

An alias protects the email address, not the rest of the membership record. A club that leaks its list leaks names, phone numbers and any medical or emergency contact details it holds alongside the address, and an alias does nothing about those. An alias also does not stop a club from sharing data with a third party if the member agreed to it at registration. The alias makes the email address replaceable: a member who can replace the address the club holds does not have to trust the club's security, the app's privacy policy or the volunteers' mailing habits.

## Response to a club list leak

When a club announces a leak, or when phishing mail arrives that names the club, the response has four parts. The club alias is checked on Have I Been Pwned, and the password is changed on the club account and on any other account that shares it. Phishing mail that uses club details such as team names or fixture dates is watched for, because that detail makes the message convincing. [How phishing uses a leaked email](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email) explains the pattern. The alias is closed if the leak is confirmed, and the club is given a fresh alias if the membership continues. A member who gave the club a main address has a harder job: the address cannot be closed without changing it on every other account that uses it.

## AliasFleet and sports clubs

AliasFleet provides email aliases that forward to a real inbox. A member creates one alias per club, and the alias stays active for as long as the membership lasts. AliasFleet's free tier includes 10 active aliases, and the alias can be paused or closed from the dashboard at any time. AliasFleet does not stop a club app from collecting other data such as a date of birth or location, and it does not protect an address already given to the club before the alias was created. AliasFleet is available at [aliasfleet.com](https://aliasfleet.com), where a member creates one alias per club and manages it from the dashboard.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Sports Clubs</category><category>Email Aliases</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Iris Plaza breach may expose 7.7 million customer records</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/iris-plaza-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/iris-plaza-data-breach</guid>
      <description>Iris Ohyama said up to about 7.7 million Iris Plaza customer records may have been exposed after unauthorised access to an external cloud service.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[On 5 November 2026, Iris Ohyama disclosed unauthorised access to an external cloud service used by Iris Plaza, its official online store, that may have exposed personal information of up to about 7.7 million customers. Iris Ohyama, a household goods maker based in Sendai, suspended the store and related systems when the access was found, and the store stays suspended until the cause is identified and prevention measures are in place, while the number of records actually leaked is still being confirmed.

Each record pairs an email address with a name, a home address and a phone number, a combination that lets a stranger address a message to a customer by name and write it as though it came from a company the customer used. The file covers customers registered since May 2001, including people who left the service years ago.

## Timeline

The sequence began on 28 October 2026, when a suspicious file turned up in the external cloud service used by Iris Plaza, and the store and related systems were suspended while the company investigated. That investigation confirmed unauthorised access by a third party, and further investigation found that data stored in the service may have been viewed or obtained externally. [Nikkei reported the disclosure on 5 November](https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOCC05B230V01C26A1000000/), and the [Kyodo wire carried the same account](https://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/1960188).

Nikkei reported the temporary suspension of Iris Plaza on 29 October, when the scale of the possible exposure was not yet known. A further week of investigation passed before the company announced on 5 November that up to about 7.7 million customer records may have been affected.

Iris Plaza, the group company, operates the store, and the affected data sat in the external cloud service rather than on Iris Ohyama's own servers. Neither the cloud service nor the attack method has been named, and beyond unauthorised access the company has described nothing about how the access happened. [NTV Miyagi reported](https://news.ntv.co.jp/n/mmt/category/society/mmc62f3cf7f52a4123af84b1064efb4efb) the same sequence: the suspicious file was found on 28 October, the site and related systems were stopped, and the investigation then confirmed the unauthorised access.

## Customer records in the affected store

Names, addresses, phone numbers and email addresses were in the records that may have been viewed or obtained, while member records held more: dates of birth, gender and passwords. Some items, including passwords, were encrypted, according to NTV Miyagi, although which items were encrypted and how has not been reported, and the company has not published those details.

No credit card information was exposed, because the cloud service did not store card data, a point Nikkei, Kyodo and FNN all report. [FNN reported](https://www.fnn.jp/articles/-/1146997) that no misuse of the data and no financial harm has been confirmed so far.

An email address next to a real name, a home address and a phone number lets a stranger write a message that looks as if it comes from a company the customer actually used. The company warned about that impersonation risk in its announcement.

## Affected customers

Possibly affected records fall into two groups: about 5.8 million member records, former members included, and about 1.9 million non-member records covering people who bought goods without registering and people who entered campaigns, adding up to about 7.7 million records in total.

The member group is the one with the extra fields, since member records hold dates of birth, gender and passwords, while the sources list those fields for members only and whether non-member records hold them is not stated. The counts are counts of records held in the service rather than confirmed counts of unique people, and how many records belong to the same person has not been stated by the company.

Customers registered since May 2001 are in scope, according to Sankei, which is more than 25 years of registrations. A customer who bought one item from Iris Plaza in the 2000s and never returned is still in the file, as is a customer who registered, left and forgot the account existed. Former members sit in the same position as current members, because their data was stored in the same service and faces the same possible exposure.

Retention is the other point the file raises, since records from May 2001 onward were still stored in the service, including records of former members.

A customer can read a privacy policy, check the signup boxes and look at a site's breach history, and still end up in a file stored on a cloud service the customer never heard of, run by a provider the customer never dealt with. The AliasFleet guide on [how to check what a site does with your email first](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-what-a-site-does-with-your-email-first) describes that pre-signup check and its limit: a clean check reduces risk without proving that a site keeps its promises.

## Company instructions to affected customers

Iris Ohyama said it will contact customers who may have been affected individually by email, and the company also said it will never ask for a password or PIN and that customers should not respond to suspicious mail or calls.

The password measure comes first in the company's advice. NTV Miyagi reported that the company called on customers to change the password on other services if the same password was used there. Some items including passwords were encrypted, according to NTV Miyagi, but the encryption method has not been reported, so the protection it gives is unstated. Changing the Iris Plaza password alone does not fix reuse, because Iris Plaza is suspended and the password cannot be used there, so the passwords that need changing under the company's advice are the ones on other services.

The second measure is watching what arrives, since an email address, a name, a home address and a phone number together are enough to build a convincing impersonation of Iris Plaza, a delivery company or a bank. The company advised customers to treat unexpected mail about the breach with care and not to follow links in messages they did not expect. It gave a contact line for customers who want to check: 0120-108824, open weekdays and Saturdays from 09:30 to 17:00, according to [Kahoku Shimpo](http://kahoku.news/articles/JY72BB2S0RKHN.html).

Separate from the company's measures, published guidance covers checking whether an address appears in known breach data. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) lists breaches as they are confirmed and added, and the AliasFleet guide on how to check if your email was leaked explains how to run that check and read the result. This incident has no Have I Been Pwned listing yet, so a check today will not show it. The check still shows what else is already circulating for the same address. An address in this breach and in earlier breaches has been exposed more than once, and the password work above covers all of them at once.

What an address alone can do is a separate question from the password question, since an address on its own does not open a mailbox. The AliasFleet guide on [can someone read my emails if they only know my email address](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-someone-read-my-emails-if-they-only-know-my-email-address) sets out the routes that do open a mailbox: a password, a session, or provider access.

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Separate addresses and the next leak

AliasFleet provides one forwarding address per site, so each site holds a different address and the real inbox address is never exposed. A breach of one site exposes only the alias given to that site, and that alias can be paused or closed without affecting the mailbox or the other aliases. AliasFleet does not prevent a site from storing the alias address, and it does not replace a password or two-step verification, since a password entered on an imitation sign-in page still opens the mailbox.

## Unresolved items in the investigation

The company is still confirming the actual number of records leaked. The figure announced on 5 November is an upper bound on records stored in the service rather than a confirmed count of records taken. Until the investigation separates records that were viewed or obtained from records that were only stored, the scale of the leak is unknown.

The company has said the site will stay suspended until the cause is identified and prevention measures are in place. What the cause was and which service was affected has not been said. The attack method is undisclosed, and no report to Japan's Personal Information Protection Commission is mentioned in the sources read for this article.

A further question is how the company will reach the non-member group, since members have accounts and email addresses on file, while non-members bought without registering or entered campaigns. The company plans to contact possibly-affected customers individually by email, although whether every non-member record holds a usable email address is not stated, and the company has not said what happens for records where it holds no contact details.

The incident will also be watched for a Have I Been Pwned listing, which would confirm the data reached circulation and give affected customers a way to check a specific address. Until then, the password work and the watch for impersonation mail are the measures that matter, and those measures do not depend on the investigation finishing. The official Iris Ohyama notice was not located for this article, so all facts above come from reporting of the announcement by Nikkei, Kyodo, NTV Miyagi, Sankei, FNN and Kahoku Shimpo.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>Iris Plaza</category><category>Email Privacy</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Should You Use a Separate Email for Health and Fitness Apps?</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-health-and-fitness-apps</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-health-and-fitness-apps</guid>
      <description>Health apps collect weight, location and medication data, and several shared it with advertisers. One alias per app stops a breach joining it to one identity.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A separate email address for each health and fitness app is a practical response to a documented pattern. Apps that collect weight, cycle dates, medication lists and location have shared that data with advertising platforms. The address links the data to one person. Giving each app a distinct address limits the damage when a list is sold or a database is breached.

A fitness app logs where a person runs and when. A period tracker logs cycle dates and symptoms. A medication app logs the drugs a person takes and the times they take them. Together, those records describe a body, a condition and a daily routine.

## The enforcement record

In January 2021, Flo Health settled allegations from the United States Federal Trade Commission. Flo, a period and fertility app used by more than 100 million consumers, had shared health information with Facebook, Google, Google Fabric, AppsFlyer and Flurry. The information included the fact of a pregnancy. Flo had promised to keep the data private. Sharing ran from February 2016 until press reports exposed it in February 2019. The settlement required an independent review of Flo privacy practices and user consent before further sharing. The case is recorded in the [FTC announcement](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2021/01/developer-popular-womens-fertility-tracking-app-settles-ftc-allegations-it-misled-consumers-about).

GoodRx followed in February 2023. The company, a prescription discount and telehealth provider, shared prescription and health condition data with Facebook, Google, Criteo, Branch and Twilio from at least 2017. It had promised never to share personal health information with advertisers. In August 2019 it uploaded email addresses, phone numbers and mobile advertising identifiers for people who had bought heart disease and blood pressure medication to Facebook. The upload let the platform identify their profiles and target them with health-related ads. GoodRx paid a $1.5 million civil penalty and received a permanent ban on sharing health data for advertising, after more than 55 million consumers had visited or used the service since January 2017. The action was the first under the Health Breach Notification Rule, according to the [FTC case](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/02/ftc-enforcement-action-bar-goodrx-sharing-consumers-sensitive-health-info-advertising).

BetterHelp, an online counselling service, was ordered in July 2023 to pay $7.8 million for disclosing health data to advertising platforms. The service had disclosed email addresses, IP addresses and health questionnaire information to Facebook, Snapchat, Criteo and Pinterest. It had promised the data would be used only for limited purposes. The order also banned BetterHelp from sharing health data for advertising, closing the channel the company had used to send questionnaire information to four platforms. The terms are set out in the [FTC final order](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/07/ftc-gives-final-approval-order-banning-betterhelp-sharing-sensitive-health-data-advertising).

A fourth case remains unresolved. On 29 July 2026 the FTC, joined by Utah and California, sued telehealth provider Hims and Hers. The complaint alleges the company shared sensitive health information about medical conditions with Meta, Snap and other advertising platforms, through uploaded customer lists and tracking technologies on its site, despite promising privacy. The allegations are unproven. The case is pending and Hims and Hers denies them. The [FTC announcement](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2026/07/ftc-states-act-against-hims-hers-deceptive-unlawful-privacy-practices) is a complaint, not a finding.

In five years, the FTC brought cases against four different kinds of service: period tracking, prescription discounts, counselling and telehealth.

## Scale of collection

Sharing was already widespread before any of these apps reached a regulator, and the studies below measured it at scale across thousands of apps. A peer reviewed study in [the BMJ](https://www.bmj.com/content/364/bmj.l920) tested 24 top rated medicines related apps in 2019. It found 19 of 24, or 79 percent, shared user data outside the app. Seventeen of 24 transmitted user data outside the app. Email addresses were among the data types shared most often, and 55 unique entities owned by 46 parent companies received or processed the data. Sixty seven percent of those entities provided services related to collection and analysis of user data, including analytics or advertising. Third parties advertised the ability to share the data further with 216 so-called fourth parties. The study concluded that sharing of user data is routine, yet far from transparent.

More recent work shows the same scale. A 2026 study of more than 10,000 mobile health apps on Google Play, published on [arXiv](https://arxiv.org/html/2610.23851v1), found 69.15 percent requested at least one permission unrelated to their stated purpose. Over 52.9 percent requested location data. Nearly 93 percent failed to provide users with a consent form. The figures describe permissions and consent, not confirmed sales. They still show how much access these apps request before a person has used them.

A 2025 study from the University of Bremen examined 20 popular health apps in Germany and tested how each one handled consent and data transmission. Several transmitted personal data such as advertising identifiers before users had given consent. All 20 apps contained at least one manipulative design trick in obtaining consent. The findings are summarised in the [report on the study](https://nachrichten.idw-online.de/2025/10/22/new-study-uncovers-data-protection-gaps-in-popular-mhealth-apps).

The address is present in every one of those transfers, from the first signup to each later sale or breach of user data.

## HIPAA coverage

Many people assume health data is protected by law wherever it sits. For most consumer health apps, that assumption is wrong. The United States Department of Health and Human Services states that the HIPAA Rules generally do not protect health information accessed through or stored on a personal cell phone or tablet. The same applies to data downloaded or entered into mobile apps for personal use, regardless of where the information came from. The full statement is in the [HHS guidance](https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/cell-phone-hipaa/index.html).

HIPAA applies to covered entities. The category covers health plans, most health care providers and health care clearinghouses, plus their business associates. An app downloaded directly from an app store, and not provided by a doctor or a health plan, is generally none of those things. HHS adds that information collected by a device or app may be viewed or collected by other entities, used by the vendor to send specific ads, and sold to a data broker.

Other laws reach these apps instead. The FTC Act and the FTC Health Breach Notification Rule are the laws behind the cases above. That is why the Flo, GoodRx, BetterHelp and Hims and Hers matters were brought by the FTC rather than by HHS. A person who reads an app privacy policy should therefore check its sharing disclosures directly, rather than assume the category is protected.

## Email address as the join key

An advertising platform does not need a name to identify a person. It needs a field that already exists in its own records. The email address serves that purpose. When an app shares a user list, it uploads addresses alongside the health facts. The platform matches those addresses to accounts it already holds. GoodRx did exactly this in August 2019. Email addresses were the key that let Facebook identify people who had bought specific medication.

The same joining happens after a breach. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) now counts 1,049 breached sites and 17.8 billion exposed addresses. An address that appears in a health app breach alongside a name and a condition is more useful to an attacker than an address alone. It connects the condition to the person, and to every other service that holds the same address.

Tracking widens the link further. The FTC consumer guidance explains the mechanism in its [page on how websites and apps collect information](https://consumer.ftc.gov/articles/how-protect-your-privacy-apps). Cookies, pixels and advertising identifiers track activity across sites. A separate address per app breaks the join at the source, so the address held by one app cannot identify the person anywhere else. The address in the health app records belongs to that app only.

## Separate address per app

A distinct alias for each app works in three ways.

- Containment. When an app is breached or sells its user list, the exposed address belongs to that app and nothing else, and it cannot be used to log in to other accounts.
- Attribution. When marketing mail or spam starts arriving on the alias given to one app, the alias names the source without any investigation.
- A kill switch. The alias can be paused or closed when the app is deleted or its mail turns unwanted, without changing the main inbox address.

Setup follows the same pattern as for any other app. The alias is created before signup, labelled with the app name, and kept for that app alone for as long as the app stays installed. The app receives the alias instead of the real address. When the app is deleted, the alias can be closed with it. The same logic is set out in the piece on [using a different email address for every website](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/different-email-for-every-website), applied here to the most sensitive category of data. It is also the habit described in the piece on [whether a second email address is needed at all](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/do-you-need-a-second-email-address): separation without a second inbox to manage.

## Limits of a separate address

A separate email does not stop a health app collecting health data. The app still receives the weight, the cycle dates, the medication list and the location, because the person entered them at signup and during daily use. It does not make the person anonymous to the app itself. The app still holds the name and payment details given at signup. It does not remove data already shared or sold.

Anyone whose real address has been used for health apps for years should check it on Have I Been Pwned first, using the method in [how to check if your email was leaked](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked). Aliases act as containment from here on, not as a repair of the past. The app behaviour itself is also unchanged. If an app shares data with advertisers, the data still moves. Only the identifier it carries changes. An alias controls the handover of the address, nothing else.

No verified count of health apps that reject alias addresses at signup was found for this article. Some apps may refuse an alias domain. That gap matters for planning, and it is stated here rather than filled with a guess.

## Patient portal rule

<Callout type="warning" title="Patient portal rule">
The patient portal keeps a permanent address, and the alias is for the app signup and marketing stream only, never the medical record identity.
</Callout>

The patient portal is a different thing from a health app. The two must not be confused. The portal holds the medical record, test results, prescriptions and messages with clinicians. It needs a stable address the clinic can rely on for account recovery, for identity checks, and for clinical communication about results and prescriptions. The alias covers the app signup and the marketing stream only. It must never be presented as the medical record identity.

The full reasoning is set out in [how to protect your email when booking medical care](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-booking-medical-care), which carries the same rule: a permanent address stays on the portal. The same split applies elsewhere. A bank account keeps a permanent real address used only for financial accounts. Aliases cover everything else, which keeps the sensitive address isolated.

## AliasFleet and health apps

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox. A person creates a distinct alias for each health or fitness app, labels it with the app name, and gives that alias at signup. Confirmations, reminders and marketing mail for that app arrive through the alias, and replies route back through the alias so the destination address stays out of the app records. The mechanism is described in [how email aliases actually work](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work): the alias is a forwarding address under the person's control, not a separate inbox.

AliasFleet does not hold the medical record and does not replace the patient portal. The free tier covers 10 active aliases, one verified destination inbox, three managed subdomains and 100 MB of monthly forwarding, per the [pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing). Aliases are persistent addresses the person manages, with pause and delete controls. The safety question is judged the same way as for any alias provider, and [are email aliases safe](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe) sets out the test: what the provider stores and logs after delivery matters more than the alias itself.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Health Apps</category><category>Email Aliases</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Can Someone Read Your Emails With Just Your Address?</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-someone-read-my-emails-if-they-only-know-my-email-address</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-someone-read-my-emails-if-they-only-know-my-email-address</guid>
      <description>Knowing an email address does not open the mailbox behind it. Reading mail needs a password, a session or provider access, and the address alone supplies none.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[An email address alone does not open the mailbox behind it. Reading the mail in a mailbox requires a password, a passkey, an active signed-in session, or access at the provider, and an address supplies none of those. An address is a public identifier, not a credential: it names the account, while the password proves who is asking to open it. The address and the mailbox are separate things, and knowing the first does not open the second.

This article describes the authentication a mailbox requires, the actions an address alone makes possible, the routes that do lead to mail being read, and the controls that block those routes. The statements below come from Google and Microsoft documentation and from Have I Been Pwned.

## Mailbox authentication

A mailbox opens by one of four routes, and an address on its own is none of them. The first route is a password or a passkey. The second is an active session in a signed-in browser or app that has already passed the check. The third is a recovery process that proves ownership through a channel already on the account. The fourth is access at the provider itself, covered in the piece on [whether an email provider can read mail](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-my-email-provider-read-my-emails).

[Google's sign-in help for Gmail](https://support.google.com/mail/answer/8494) states the steps: the Google Account email or phone number and the password are entered, and then the inbox opens. The address identifies which account to open, and the password proves who is asking; without the password, the sign-in page displays no mail.

## Uses of an address alone

An address alone still allows several things, and none of them reads mail. Someone who knows an address can send mail to it, check whether it appears in known breach data, test the address on service sign-in pages to see whether an account exists there, send phishing messages that use the address and the name attached to it, and start a password reset, which sends a code or a link to the recovery channel on the account. Whether a given sign-in page confirms an account varies by provider and by sign-in flow.

Sending mail puts a message in the inbox and does not display the messages already there. Checking a breach database shows where the address has appeared, not what is in the mailbox. A password reset sends a code to a channel the attacker does not control, and the reset stops there unless the attacker can also read that channel. Spam is the most common result; [how spammers get email addresses](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-do-spammers-get-your-email-address) covers that subject. Phishing is the more serious result, because a phishing message can lead to the password being given away. The address makes the message possible, and the password is what opens the mailbox.

## Breach data

The service's own [FAQ](https://haveibeenpwned.com/FAQs) states that when breach addresses are loaded into the service, no corresponding passwords are loaded with them, and that 90 breaches are classed as sensitive and can only be searched by the verified owner of the address. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) holds 1,049 pwned websites and 17,847,746,941 pwned addresses in its index, as checked on 5 November 2026. An address used for years is likely to appear in at least one breach, and the risk depends on what leaked with it.

<Callout type="info" title="Have I Been Pwned FAQ">
Have I Been Pwned states that an email address on its own is "not enough to gain access to someone's online accounts".
</Callout>

A breach entry lists which kinds of data were exposed. An entry listing only the address points to more spam and more convincing phishing; an entry listing a password calls for changing it everywhere reused, starting with the mailbox.

## Password reset process

[Microsoft's password reset help](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/accounts-billing/manage/reset-a-forgotten-microsoft-account-password) states that Microsoft must verify identity before a reset, by sending a verification code to a recovery email or phone number already on the account, and the code is needed before a new password can be set. Microsoft also states that its support agents may not send password reset links or access and change account details.

[Google's account recovery help](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/7682439) states that recovery asks questions to confirm ownership, and that a password reset is offered after those questions are answered. Changes to recovery information may take up to 7 days to take effect. Google also states that nobody can call Google for help signing in to an account, and that passwords and verification codes should not be given out. The reset code goes to a channel the account owner set up, which an attacker who knows only the address does not have, so the reset cannot be completed. An unrequested code is a sign that someone tried, and it is useless to the attacker unless the inbox or phone it was sent to can also be read.

## Phishing and password capture

[Google's phishing help](https://support.google.com/mail/answer/8253) defines phishing as an attempt to steal personal information or break in to online accounts using deceptive emails, messages, ads, or sites that look similar to sites that the target already uses. A phishing message at a known address looks more convincing because it uses the real address and sometimes the real name, and a fake sign-in page then asks for the password. The route works by capturing the password, not by using the address: the address made the message possible, and the password is what opens the mailbox.

A password entered only on the genuine sign-in page, after the address bar has been checked, breaks this route; a password entered after following a link in a message does not. A password entered on a fake page opens the mailbox in the same way as the real one. The takeover methods piece, [can someone hack my email without my password](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-someone-hack-my-email-without-my-password), treats phishing as a central method. Without the password, it fails.

## SIM swap and phone numbers

A SIM swap is the one documented route that reached an account without a password, and it worked through a phone number rather than an email address. In September 2019, attackers took control of the phone number attached to the Twitter account of Jack Dorsey, the company's chief executive, by tricking his mobile provider into handing the number over. They then posted messages from his account by text message, without logging in. [SecurityWeek's report](https://www.securityweek.com/sim-swapping-blamed-hacking-twitter-ceos-account/) records that Twitter stated its own systems were not compromised, and quoted the company: "The phone number associated with the account was compromised due to a security oversight by the mobile provider."

The attackers did not read Dorsey's mail, and they did not use his email address to get in. They took control of a phone number and used a text-to-post feature that accepted messages from that number. A phone number on an account functions as a second key: SMS codes sent to a controlled number go to the attacker, so a SIM swap can complete a password reset that uses SMS codes. An address alone does not allow this, and a phone number has to be taken over as well.

## Two-step verification

[Google's setup page for 2-Step Verification](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/185839) states that a new phone number added for the second step may take up to 7 days for Google to trust. Google prompts can help protect against SIM swap and other phone number-based hacks, because a prompt is a push notification to a signed-in device, not a text message to a number.

[Google's page on protecting personal information with 2-Step Verification](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/10956730) states that signing in with a password and a second step protects against password-stealing scams, and that even if someone gets the password online, they will not also have the phone. It does not make the address secret, and it does not stop phishing messages from arriving. It stops a stolen password from being enough on its own.

## Per-site aliases

When [each site gets its own address](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-hide-your-email-address-online), the address that leaks from one site is a forwarding address for that site only, and it is not the address that signs in to the mailbox. A stranger who knows the alias for a shopping site knows an address that receives mail from that site, not the mailbox address, and the alias is not an account, so it cannot be used to sign in anywhere. Per-site aliases therefore change what an address exposes, because they change which address a stranger holds.

The effect is containment. If an alias starts receiving phishing messages, it can be paused or closed, and the mailbox and every other alias keep working. The address that the attacker holds becomes useless, because it was only ever connected to one site.

## Signs of mailbox access

A reset code that arrives without a request is a sign of an attempt, not of access. Access looks different: mail marked as read that was not read, sent mail that was not sent, forwarding rules or filters that were not created by the owner, a changed recovery address, or sign-in alerts from unfamiliar devices.

[Someone using an email address](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/someone-is-using-your-email-address) covers the signs that an address is being used elsewhere, a different problem from mailbox access that needs a different response. [Whether someone can send emails from an email address](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/can-someone-send-emails-from-my-email-address) covers the neighbouring question of what an address can be used for once it is known.

## AliasFleet address handling

AliasFleet provides per-site forwarding addresses. Each site receives its own address, mail sent to that address forwards to the mailbox address, and the mailbox address is not shared with the site. An alias that starts receiving phishing messages can be paused or closed without affecting the mailbox or the other aliases. AliasFleet does not make the mailbox address secret from a provider, and it does not replace a password or two-step verification: a password entered on a fake sign-in page still opens the mailbox.

## The address and the mailbox

An email address is a public identifier. It is typed into forms, stored in company databases, and copied into breach lists that hold billions of records. A mailbox is a private store that opens with a password, a passkey, a session, or a verified recovery, and none of those things is contained in the address.

Knowing the address lets a stranger send mail, check breach lists, try a reset, and write a convincing phishing message. It does not let them read the mail: the routes that do need a password, a session, a phone number, or a device. Protecting mail is therefore a matter of the password, the second step, and the recovery details, not of keeping the address itself a secret.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Email Security</category><category>Account Security</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Harvard data breach: 850,537 emails listed in November 2026</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/harvard-data-breach</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/harvard-data-breach</guid>
      <description>Have I Been Pwned listed 850,537 email addresses on 3 November 2026 from the November 2025 Harvard Alumni Affairs and Development intrusion.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The Harvard University data breach is the November 2025 intrusion into the university's Alumni Affairs and Development systems, listed by [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/PwnedWebsites) on 3 November 2026 with 850,537 email addresses. Harvard discovered the intrusion on 18 November 2025 after a phone-based phishing attack, and notified potentially affected people by email on 22 November 2025, according to Harvard's incident notice as reported by [eSecurity Planet](https://www.esecurityplanet.com/threats/news-harvard-breach-851000-emails-hibp/) and ZeroDayFeed. The listing is not a new intrusion into Harvard systems. The November 2026 development is the public catalogue entry and its count, nearly a year after Harvard disclosed the incident, and the count refers to email addresses in the dataset, not to a confirmed number of affected individuals.

## November 2025 intrusion

Harvard discovered the intrusion on 18 November 2025 in systems used by its Alumni Affairs and Development office, the office that handles fundraising and contact with graduates, according to Harvard's incident notice as reported by eSecurity Planet. Harvard attributed the entry to a phone-based phishing attack, in which a caller persuades an employee to hand over access, and the reports of the notice name no software flaw as the entry method. Harvard notified potentially affected people by email on 22 November 2025, and stated that it had found no evidence of further unauthorised access, according to the same reporting. The notice was last updated on 19 December 2025, according to [ZeroDayFeed](https://zerodayfeed.com/article/harvard-phishing-breach-850000-have-i-been-pwned-november-2026), which cites an [archived copy of the notice](https://web.archive.org/web/20260601092442/https://www.huit.harvard.edu/news/2025/11/recent-cybersecurity-incident-information-and-faq) after reporting that the live Harvard page returned Access Denied. The groups Harvard listed as possibly affected are alumni, alumni spouses and partners, donors, parents of current and former students, some current students, and some faculty and staff, according to eSecurity Planet.

## Data in the listing

Have I Been Pwned lists the Harvard dataset with a breach date of November 2025 and a pwn count of 850.5 thousand, and the exact count of 850,537 accounts is confirmed by the HIBP-derived listing at [Acidpeak](https://www.acidpeak.com/threats/breach-harvard/) and by [ISec News](https://www.isec.news/2026/11/04/have-i-been-pwned-harvard-breach-850537-accounts/). The data categories in the listing include names, email addresses, dates of birth, phone numbers, physical addresses, donation information, employers, citizenship statuses, ethnicities, family members' names, education levels, job titles, marital statuses, and genders, according to the same HIBP-derived listing. Not every record necessarily contains every category, and Have I Been Pwned counts unique email addresses found in the data rather than confirmed affected individuals. Harvard's original notice grouped much of this material under a broad biographical information heading, so a reader of the notice alone would not have seen citizenship status, ethnicity, and family members' names itemised separately. Harvard said the affected systems do not generally contain Social Security numbers, passwords, payment card information, or financial account numbers, according to eSecurity Planet and [2-spyware](https://www.2-spyware.com/harvard-alumni-breach-851000-emails-have-i-been-pwned). The exposure in this dataset is therefore contact detail and relationship detail, not credentials or payment data.

## Attribution claims

ShinyHunters claimed responsibility for the breach, claimed to have taken more than one million records, and published a 1.1GB archive in early February 2026 after Harvard refused to pay a ransom, according to reporting by BleepingComputer and TechCrunch as summarised by ZeroDayFeed. These figures are the group's own claims and have not been independently confirmed, and Harvard has not publicly attributed the attack to ShinyHunters. The claimed record count and Have I Been Pwned's tally of unique email addresses measure different things, since a stolen database can hold several rows per person, although no source explains the gap between the two figures directly. No source cited in this article reports a confirmed phishing campaign using this dataset.

## Steps for affected people

Checking an address on Have I Been Pwned shows whether it appears in the Harvard dataset. A result naming Harvard means the address appeared in that dataset, and it does not prove that a password was stolen, since Harvard says passwords are not generally held in these systems. Messages that mention Harvard, a donation, a reunion, or a fundraising campaign can be checked through contact details found independently, rather than through a number or link in the message itself, and a caller who quotes a graduation year or a past gift has not thereby proved identity. Codes, passwords, and card numbers are not shared with a caller on the basis of quoted biographical detail, and email accounts carry two-step sign-in because email is used to reset other accounts. The use of leaked contact detail in impersonation messages is described in [how phishing uses a leaked email address](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email), and the separation of a donation from a permanent address is described in [how to protect an email address when donating to charity](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-donating-to-charity).

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the checks above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Response and open questions

Harvard has not publicly commented on the Have I Been Pwned number, and ZeroDayFeed notes that Harvard did not immediately respond to The Register's request for more information on the new figure. The original notice left open precisely what information was accessed for each person, and the Have I Been Pwned listing does not close that gap, since it gives data categories for the dataset as a whole rather than per-person contents. The chronology stands as follows: the intrusion dates to November 2025, an attacker claim followed in February 2026, and the Have I Been Pwned listing on 3 November 2026 gave the HIBP count of 850,537 email addresses.

| Date | Development |
| --- | --- |
| 18 November 2025 | Harvard discovered the intrusion in its Alumni Affairs and Development systems. |
| 22 November 2025 | Harvard notified potentially affected people by email. |
| Early February 2026 | ShinyHunters published a claimed 1.1GB archive after Harvard refused a ransom, according to reporting summarised in this article. |
| 3 November 2026 | Have I Been Pwned listed the Harvard dataset, with 850,537 email addresses. |

The biographical and donation detail in the dataset cannot be reset in the way a password can, and that detail remains in circulation.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breach</category><category>Harvard</category><category>Have I Been Pwned</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Check What a Site Does With Your Email First</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-what-a-site-does-with-your-email-first</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-what-a-site-does-with-your-email-first</guid>
      <description>A short pre-signup check of a privacy policy, signup boxes, sale opt-out and breach history decides whether an email address is safe to hand over.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A pre-signup email check is a short routine run before an address is given to a website. It covers four checks, the sharing clause, consent boxes, sale opt-out and breach history, plus a warning on later changes. It ends in one of three outcomes: the real address, a dedicated alias, or refusal. The five-minute figure is a practical estimate, not a measured average.

The check exists because an address handed over at signup is difficult to take back. Once entered, it is copied into databases, forwarded to other companies and sold onward, and none of that is visible from the signup form. The privacy policy states what happens next, but it is long and written in legal language, so the routine reads only the parts that govern the address.

## Privacy policy sharing clauses

The check starts with the privacy policy, usually linked in the site footer. The relevant part is the section on sharing, disclosure or third parties, often headed with a phrase about sharing. Searching the page for "share" and then for "third part" reaches it directly. The clause names the recipients, or at least their categories, and the purpose of each transfer.

Under the UK GDPR, a site must tell people who it will give their information to and why, at the point it collects the data. The [ICO states this duty in its guidance on the right to be informed](https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/individual-rights/the-right-to-be-informed/what-common-issues-might-come-up-in-practice/). Where a site collects data with the intention of selling it to third parties or sharing it with them, it must say so in the privacy information it provides. Articles 13 and 14 require controllers to provide information about "the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data". Categories must be as specific as possible, covering type, industry, sector and location. Generic labels such as "business partners" were found not to give people enough information in an ICO enforcement decision, as [a Mayer Brown analysis](https://www.legal500.com/intelligence/united-states/privacy/personal-data-sharing-what-information-about-recipients-do-we-need-to-provide-to-individuals-under-the-gdpr) records.

The [ICO's Data Sharing Code of Practice](https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/data-sharing/data-sharing-a-code-of-practice/sharing-personal-data-in-databases-and-lists/) adds a further point. The transfer of a database or a list of individuals counts as data sharing whether money changes hands or not, so handing a customer list to another organisation counts as sharing even without payment. A clause that promises never to "sell" data is therefore not a promise never to share it. A policy with no sharing section, or one that describes sharing only in vague terms, leaves the question unanswered, and that gap is itself an answer.

## Signup form consent boxes

The second check is the signup form itself. Every box is read before the form is submitted, including boxes below the email field and on the confirmation screen. A pre-checked box is the most common pattern: the box is already ticked when the form loads, so doing nothing counts as agreement, and the text beside it often covers partner offers or sharing details with selected third parties. The FTC has warned that a pre-checked box does not constitute affirmative consent, in its negative-option marketing policy statement. [Kelley Drye's summary of that statement](https://www.kelleydrye.com/viewpoints/blogs/ad-law-access/ftc-to-increase-enforcement-on-subscription-services) quotes the footnote directly: a pre-checked box "does not constitute affirmative consent".

Unticking a pre-checked box removes that consent. The box is often worded so that unticking it feels like losing something, with phrases such as "keep me updated" or "send me offers". Where a form has more than one box, each one is read separately: one box may cover the site's own emails, while a second covers partner marketing. Some forms place the sharing consent in the terms and conditions link instead of a box, so that link is opened at least once for a long-term signup.

## Sale and sharing opt-outs

Under the California Consumer Privacy Act, as amended by the California Privacy Rights Act, California residents can direct a covered business to stop selling or sharing their personal information. The business must display a link titled "Do Not Sell or Share My Personal Information" on its website, usually in the footer. [LegalClarity's guide to the right](https://legalclarity.org/do-not-sell-my-personal-information-under-the-ccpa/) states that once the request is submitted, the business has 15 business days to comply, and it cannot penalise the person for exercising the right. [Cookiebot's guide](https://www.cookiebot.com/us/do-not-sell-my-personal-information/) confirms the same deadline and notes that the business must also notify third parties it sold or shared the data with.

"Sell" and "share" have specific meanings under the CCPA. A sale is a transfer for money or other valuable consideration, while sharing is a transfer for cross-context behavioural advertising even when nothing is paid. A site that hands browsing data to an advertising network has therefore shared it under the CCPA although no payment was made. The opt-out covers both acts and stops future sales and sharing. It does not delete data already held; deletion is a separate request under a different part of the CCPA.

The CCPA does not apply to every business. It covers for-profit businesses operating in California that meet at least one threshold: revenue above $26,625,000, the personal information of 100,000 or more California consumers or households, or 50 percent or more of annual revenue from selling or sharing personal information. A site below all three thresholds is not covered and carries no such link. A browser-level version also exists. [Global Privacy Control](https://globalprivacycontrol.org/) is a browser signal that tells every site visited not to sell or share personal information. When it is switched on, the browser sends the HTTP header `Sec-GPC: 1` with each request. Brave and the DuckDuckGo browser send it by default and Firefox has a built-in setting, according to [UniConsent's explainer](https://www.uniconsent.com/global-privacy-control). Under the CCPA regulations, covered businesses must treat the signal as a valid opt-out request.

## Breach history

[Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com) is a free breach search service run by security researcher Troy Hunt. A search by site name or email address shows whether the address appeared in a known breach and what data was exposed. As of 5 November 2026 the homepage lists 1,049 breached websites and 17,847,746,941 pwned addresses. A site in that list has already lost its users' addresses at least once. The [AliasFleet guide to reading a HIBP result](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked) explains how to read each breach entry, including the date, the data classes and the difference between verified, unverified and fabricated breaches.

A clean result is not a guarantee: a breach has to be found, verified and loaded before it shows up, and many breaches are never detected. Breach history is therefore one input to the decision, alongside the policy and the form.

## Policy changes after signup

A privacy policy read at signup is a snapshot, and policies change. On 13 February 2024 the FTC addressed this in a post titled "AI (and other) Companies: Quietly Changing Your Terms of Service Could Be Unfair or Deceptive". [The post states](https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy-research/tech-at-ftc/2024/02/ai-other-companies-quietly-changing-your-terms-service-could-be-unfair-or-deceptive) that it may be unfair or deceptive for a company to adopt more permissive data practices, for example to start sharing consumers' data with third parties, and to only inform consumers of this change through a surreptitious, retroactive amendment to its terms of service or privacy policy. The post cites two enforcement cases, Gateway Learning in 2004 and a genetic testing company in 2023, in which policies changed to wider sharing without notification or consent.

<Callout type="warning" title="Policy date check">
The date line at the top of a policy is checked alongside the sharing clause. A policy updated after signup can add sharing terms that were absent when the address was given.
</Callout>

The OkCupid case shows the limit of the policy check. On 30 March 2026 the FTC alleged OkCupid shared personal information, including profile photos and location data, with Clarifai Inc., an AI company that fit no category its privacy policy disclosed, in a transfer of nearly three million user photos with no payment and no written agreement. [The account of the complaint](https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ftc-cracks-down-on-privacy-policy-3334542/) states the details. A clean policy check reduces risk, and it does not prove that a site keeps its promises.

## Outcomes of the check

The checks above lead to one of three outcomes, set out in the table below. The real address is reserved for sites that need it for recovery and fraud alerts, the alias covers sites that share data but still offer something worth using, and refusal covers sites that fail the check.

| Check result | Outcome |
| :--- | :--- |
| Policy names no third-party sharing, boxes are unticked, no breach history | Real address |
| Policy shares with partners or advertisers, or the site has a breach history | Alias for that site |
| Policy sells data broadly, or sharing is with unnamed partners for their own marketing | Refusal |

The real address is for sites that need it: a bank, a government service, an employer. Recovery and fraud alerts depend on an address the owner controls directly.

The alias is for everything else that passes the check but still shares data: a shopping site, a newsletter, a forum, a free trial. The alias receives the same mail the real address would receive, and it can be switched off when the site starts sending mail it should not. The [AliasFleet guide to how aliases work](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work) describes the mechanism: the alias is a forwarding address, mail sent to it arrives in the real inbox, and replies go out from the alias. The [guide to how spammers get addresses](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-do-spammers-get-your-email-address) sets out the four supply lines behind a shared address: breaches, scrapers, brokers and guessing.

Refusal is for sites that fail the check badly and offer little in return: a quiz site that sells data to unnamed partners, a download gate that demands an address for a file, a competition that shares entries with sponsors. The exception is a service in this group that is wanted despite the result. An alias is used instead of the real address, and spam on that alias is expected.

## AliasFleet and the pre-signup check

AliasFleet is an email alias service. It provides one forwarding address per site, so each site holds a different address and the real inbox address is never exposed. [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) offers a free tier with 10 active aliases, 3 managed subdomains, and 1 verified destination inbox. When spam arrives on an alias, the alias names the site that shared the address, and the alias can be switched off in one click.

The service does not prevent a site from sharing the alias address. It limits what the sharing exposes: a breach exposes that alias and nothing else, while the real address stays out of every database the site touches.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Privacy Policy</category><category>Email Aliases</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Contacting Car Dealers</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-contacting-car-dealers</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-contacting-car-dealers</guid>
      <description>A car dealer enquiry puts your email in a CRM shared with sales staff and finance partners. One alias per dealer keeps the follow-up killable.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A car dealer enquiry puts a buyer's email address into a customer relationship management system, the CRM, alongside a name and a phone number. Sales staff work from that record, and at the finance stage it is shared with lenders. Protecting the address means giving each dealer a separate alias instead of the real inbox address, so mail from one dealer stops without touching the real inbox. Before any finance or purchase paperwork is signed, the buyer moves to a permanent address.

## Dealer enquiry records

The minimum a dealer needs to answer a question about stock is a name, an email address and a phone number, and those three fields open the enquiry form. The form does not end with the person who replies. It becomes a record in the dealer's CRM, tracked from first contact through test drive, negotiation, sale and delivery, with every message in the lead's timeline. [Dealix](https://www.dealix.co.uk/) tracks enquiries across stages named New, Contacted, Test Drive Booked, Negotiating, Sold and Lost, and the owner, the manager, the sales team and the business development team all work from the same records.

[MotorComplete](https://www.motorcomplete.co.uk/features/customer-relationship-management) describes its CRM as covering the full customer life cycle, from enquiry to order to renewal. A web form address is therefore not read once and forgotten; it is stored in a shared system. Dealer guidance on GDPR states that vehicle sales often involve sharing buyer data with finance companies, warranty providers, insurance brokers and vehicle history check services, and that a finance application leads to sharing with credit providers and credit checks. The buyer is supposed to be told this before the application is completed, not after, and the privacy notice on the enquiry form is where the statement appears.

## Finance applications and the Safeguards Rule

Finance is the stage that sets a car purchase apart from most online enquiries, because it changes the data the dealer holds: an enquiry asks for contact details, while a finance application also asks for identity and financial details. Under the US Federal Trade Commission's [dealer FAQ on the Safeguards Rule](https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/resources/automobile-dealers-ftcs-safeguards-rule-frequently-asked-questions), dealers who finance or lease vehicles count as financial institutions, because lending money is a financial activity. A finance application includes the customer's name, address, Social Security number and financial account information.

Since May 2024, a notification requirement has applied: a breach involving the unauthorised acquisition of at least 500 consumers' unencrypted information must be reported to the FTC within 30 days of discovery, as the FTC explained in its [announcement of the rule change](https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/blog/2024/05/safeguards-rule-notification-requirement-now-effect). The FTC's complaint against Franklin Toyota alleged that customer files for about 95,000 consumers, including names, Social Security numbers, addresses, dates of birth and driving licence numbers, reached a peer-to-peer network after the dealer failed to secure its systems. The complaint is published in full by the [FTC](https://search.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/10/121026franklinautomallcmpt.pdf).

The alias method stops at this stage. An alias forwards mail during the enquiry; it cannot stand in for the identity a lender requires. The buyer therefore gives the dealer a permanent address before signing finance or purchase paperwork, because the signed contract, the payment schedule, the statements and any fraud alerts all depend on an address the buyer still controls years later.

<Callout type="warning" title="Before signing">
An alias is for the enquiry stage. Finance and purchase paperwork need a permanent address, because the signed contract is a record the dealer, the lender and the buyer rely on for years.
</Callout>

## Enquiry follow-up and retention

Dealer sales guidance treats an e-lead as live for months after first contact, and follow-up can continue after the buyer has lost interest. A study cited by [Canadian Auto Dealer](https://canadianautodealer.ca/2026/01/dont-give-up/) found that 68 per cent of e-lead prospects had not yet purchased after 30 days, while most dealerships mark an e-lead as dead after three or four replies. The same guidance gives dealerships up to six months to follow up a client who has made contact, contacting dormant enquiries once a month until the buyer purchases or asks to stop.

GDPR requires personal data to be kept only as long as necessary for its purpose, but no single fixed period governs dealer enquiries, so records can be kept after follow-up ends. One dealer guide sets out three months for unsuccessful enquiries, six months for enquiries that reached a test drive and six years for completed sales records; a second guide gives 12 to 24 months after last contact as typical for unconverted enquiries. The Information Commissioner's Office sets no exact period, so the ranges are reported rather than a single figure.

Under GDPR, marketing emails to someone who enquired six months ago without buying need explicit consent, according to dealer guidance on [buyer enquiries and GDPR](https://carslink.ai/blog/gdpr-best-practices-vehicle-dealers-buyer-enquiries). Consent only helps when the buyer can separate marketing mail from service mail and identify the sender; a separate alias per dealer makes both facts visible. The same pattern appears in other high-contact enquiries, covered in the AliasFleet guides on [contacting rental agents](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-contacting-rental-agents) and [getting insurance quotes](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-getting-insurance-quotes).

## Breach history in the automotive sector

Buyer email addresses in the automotive sector have been exposed repeatedly. In December 2020, the dealership service provider DriveSure lost 26GB of data, downloaded and later shared on a hacking forum. The data included 3.6 million unique email addresses, names, phone numbers, physical addresses, vehicle makes, models, VIN numbers and odometer readings, according to [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/Breach/DriveSure).

In June 2021, Volkswagen disclosed that a vendor had kept information gathered between 2014 and 2019 for sales and marketing in an unsecured file for years, and the breach affected 3.3 million people in North America. Phone numbers and email addresses were exposed, with vehicle leasing, purchase and purchase inquiry details in some cases. Sensitive data was also accessed for 90,000 Audi customers, including driver licence numbers, Social Security numbers, account or loan numbers, tax identification numbers and dates of birth, reported by [Infosecurity Magazine](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/vw-vendor-leaves-data-unsecured/?utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=twitterfeed).

In October 2022, Toyota disclosed that an access key had sat in source code mistakenly uploaded to GitHub from December 2017 to September 2022, exposing the email addresses and customer control numbers of 296,019 T-Connect telematics service users. Toyota said there was no evidence the data was accessed by a third party, but added that this could not be completely ruled out, according to [Infosecurity Magazine](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/toyota-data-leak-customers/).

In June 2024, ransomware attacks on CDK Global, a software provider for more than 15,000 dealership locations across North America, took dealer management systems offline and sent dealers back to pen and paper for days, as described by [BlackFog](https://www.blackfog.com/cdk-global-ransomware-attack/). In October 2026, Recruit, operator of Japan's Carsensor used-car marketplace, said unauthorised access detected on 17 October 2026 may have leaked up to 3,709,551 personal-information records, including 3,210,421 records of users who sent enquiries to dealers, of which up to 447,670 may include a full street address. Recruit has not confirmed that data left its systems, so the figures are maximums, documented by [Safeguard](https://safeguard.sh/resources/blog/carsensor-c-match-breach-3-7-million-records-nissan-mitsubishi).

Also in October 2026, General Motors agreed to pay $220 million to settle claims from 35 states and the District of Columbia that it sold drivers' location and driving data to brokers whose customers included insurers, as reported by [Motoring Chronicle](https://motoringchronicle.com/gm-will-pay-220-million-to-settle-claims-it-sold-driver-data-to-insurers/). The Smart Driver programme ran from 2016 to 2024, and more than 370,000 drivers were told they were not enrolled when they were. These cases run from December 2020 to October 2026, and the DriveSure data alone included 3.6 million email addresses; a buyer with an exposed address can check it with the guide on [how to check if an email was leaked](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked).

## One alias per dealer

The method gives each dealer a different alias, or one alias for the whole search when only one dealer is involved. That alias goes on every enquiry form, test drive booking and email thread with the dealer. Quotes, availability answers and test drive confirmations still arrive at the real inbox through forwarding, and the dealer's CRM works as normal. Nothing about the purchase changes at the enquiry stage.

The benefit appears after the purchase, or after the buyer stops looking. Because each alias belongs to one dealer, the address a message arrives on names its source. Pausing or deleting the alias stops the mail, without touching the real inbox or any other dealer's alias, and without an unsubscribe form or a request to delete the record. The alias label names the dealer, so aliases stay distinguishable months later, and one alias is never shared across several dealers, because a shared alias cannot identify the sender. Aliases stay active until the purchase is complete and any warranty or delivery messages have arrived, then the ones for dealers who were not chosen are paused.

An alias hides the real inbox address, not the buyer's name, phone number or the car being sought, because the dealer needs those to answer. It does not stop the dealer from sharing the alias with a finance partner, nor does it protect data handed to the dealer directly, such as a driving licence shown at a test drive. Spam from other routes is also unaffected; the AliasFleet guide on [how spammers get your email address](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-do-spammers-get-your-email-address) lists those routes. The alias does one narrower thing: it gives the buyer a way to stop mail from one dealer without touching the real inbox or any other dealer's mail.

## AliasFleet and dealer enquiries

AliasFleet provides email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox. A user creates an alias for a dealer, and mail to that alias arrives in the real inbox. The alias can be paused or deleted at any time, and mail to a paused or deleted alias stops. Two-way reply routing lets the user reply from the alias, so the dealer never sees the real address. The free plan includes 10 active aliases, enough for a search across several dealers. The product page is at [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com/).

Three things AliasFleet does not do in this case: it does not stop a dealer from keeping the alias on file after the buyer pauses it; it does not remove the buyer's data from a dealer's CRM; and it does not replace the permanent address needed at the finance and signing stage. The guide on [whether email aliases are safe](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/are-email-aliases-safe) covers the general limits.

## The change before signing

Before signing finance or purchase paperwork, the buyer switches to a permanent address. The signed contract creates a record the dealer, the lender and the buyer all rely on for years, covering payment schedules, statements, warranty documents, recall notices and fraud alerts. Those messages must reach an address the buyer still controls in five years, and an alias tied to one purchase search is the wrong address for that job.

The order is an alias for the search and a permanent address for the contract. That order keeps the enquiry stage private and the signed stage reliable, and it matches the position that financial accounts always get a permanent address, never an alias.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Car Dealers</category><category>Email Aliases</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>MUJI breach widens: card numbers in 1.09 million records</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/muji-data-breach-second-report</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/muji-data-breach-second-report</guid>
      <description>Ryohin Keikaku widened the MUJI breach disclosure on 4 November 2026 to card numbers in about 1.09 million MUJI Card records, after 27.26 million app records.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[The MUJI data breach is an unauthorised access incident disclosed by Ryohin Keikaku on 30 October 2026, in which up to about 27.26 million records including email addresses may have leaked, widening on 4 November 2026 to card numbers in about 1.09 million records. Ryohin Keikaku is the operator of MUJI, and the incident concerns the official MUJI app and, from the second report, the MUJI Online Store. All figures in both company reports are worded as information that may have leaked or may have been accessed from outside, not as confirmed exfiltration, and the company said that no leak to the dark web and no damage from misuse had been confirmed at the time of the second report.

## First disclosure

On 30 October 2026, Ryohin Keikaku disclosed unauthorised external access to the official MUJI app, with up to about 27.26 million customer records that may have leaked, including records of customers who had cancelled their memberships. The data in that first report comprised email addresses, dates of birth, gender and member IDs, as summarised in the [SmartScope summary of both company reports](https://smartscope.blog/en/blog/muji-app-data-leak-up-27-26-million-2026/). The figure is a maximum for records that may have leaked, not a count of confirmed leaked records and not a count of unique individuals. At that stage the company said credit card details, names, addresses and phone numbers were not included, and it warned that spoofing emails misusing the information could be sent. That exclusion was superseded by the second report and no longer stands as the current position.

## Second report

Ryohin Keikaku published the second report at 16:36 on 4 November 2026, titled "Possible Leak of Customer Information in the Official MUJI App (Second Report)", according to the [company notice on PR TIMES](https://prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/000001880.000000987.html). Further analysis after the first report found that the affected records include MUJI Online Store customers, including people who do not use the MUJI app, and that names, addresses and phone numbers were included for some of those customers. The company notice confirms those categories for some customers, while [JapanCyberWatch](https://japancyberwatch.com/articles/japan-data-breaches-2026) puts the group with names, addresses and phone numbers at about 520,000 people, attributed here to the JapanCyberWatch summary.

The second report also found that credit card information for some customers may have been accessed from outside, covering some holders of the MUJI Card issued by Credit Saison and some customers who registered card information in the MUJI app or the MUJI Online Store. [The Straits Times](https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/credit-card-numbers-may-have-leaked-in-cyberattack-on-japans-muji?ref=latest-headlines), reporting from the company announcement, put the card records at about 1.09 million customer records including credit card numbers that may have leaked, with about 345,000 of those MUJI Card records containing full numbers of currently valid cards and dates of birth. The MUJI Card portion covers people who joined the MUJI Card by July 2021, because before July 2021 the company obtained card numbers, MUJI Card IDs and dates of birth of MUJI Card members to grant its own benefits and confirmed that information remained in its system, as stated in the [company notice on PR TIMES](https://prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/000001880.000000987.html). Cardholder names, expiry dates and security codes are not included in those records, according to the company. The company has not stated how the card records relate to the 27.26 million records or to the online store group, so the figures in this article are not added together into a single total.

| Report | Scope added | Data categories |
| --- | --- | --- |
| First report, 30 October 2026 | Official MUJI app customers, including former members | Email addresses, dates of birth, gender, member IDs; up to about 27.26 million records that may have leaked |
| Second report, 4 November 2026 | MUJI Online Store customers, including people who do not use the app | Names, addresses and phone numbers for some customers; credit card information for some customers, including full card numbers in about 1.09 million MUJI Card records |

## Response, monitoring and customer contact

Ryohin Keikaku said it has blocked the unauthorised external access and strengthened monitoring, which continues, including checks on systems beyond the affected system for impact, and that the MUJI app and MUJI Online Store can be used normally, according to the [company notice on PR TIMES](https://prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/000001880.000000987.html). Affected customers will be contacted individually in sequence, by email or postal mail, and Credit Saison will contact MUJI Card members whose contact details the company does not hold. The company asks affected customers to check credit card statements and to contact Credit Saison, the card issuer, about any use they do not recognise, and Credit Saison has strengthened monitoring, with reissue requests directed to Credit Saison. The company also warns about suspicious mail and phone calls pretending to be from the company or a card company, and states that it never asks for credit card information by email or phone.

## Customer protection steps

The company contact, card statement check and suspicious message measures are described in Response, monitoring and customer contact above. Email addresses paired with dates of birth, and for some customers names and addresses, make impersonation mail easier to build, so messages claiming to be from MUJI are safer checked by opening the app or the official site directly rather than by clicking a link in the message. Passwords were not listed in either company report, but changing a password reused on other services is sensible general practice. The way leaked addresses get used for impersonation is covered in [how phishing uses a leaked email](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-phishing-uses-your-leaked-email). For loyalty and membership accounts in general, [how to protect your email for loyalty programs](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-loyalty-programs) covers keeping one address per program.

Your address is probably in this file. [Check whether it is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked), do the password work above, and then fix the part you control: the address you hand out next time. One [AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) alias per service means the next leak can only point back to the service that leaked it. [Founders Club is $7 a month, locked forever](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing), instead of $12. Early members only.

## Outstanding investigation details

The investigation remains open, and several points are not yet stated in the sources for this article. The company has not stated the attack vector or the intrusion window, and neither point is guessed at here. The company has not stated whether the data was actually taken out of its systems or published anywhere, only that the information may have been accessed from outside and may have leaked, and it has not given a way for an individual customer to check whether a specific record is included, beyond waiting for the individual contact. The second report superseded the first report exclusion of card details, names, addresses and phone numbers, and any further report could change the scope again, so the figures here are the company position on 4 November 2026, not a final count.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Data Breaches</category><category>Email Privacy</category><category>Japan</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Should You Use a Separate Email for Bills and Utilities?</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-bills-and-utilities</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-bills-and-utilities</guid>
      <description>A separate email for bills and utilities means one alias per biller, so a leak names its source and its mail can be stopped.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A separate email for bills and utilities is a forwarding alias belonging to one biller, in use for the whole life of that account, carrying statements, payment reminders and account notices. Bills repeat every month, so the address handles dated mail, from password resets to disconnection warnings. The bank stands outside the method: its address is a permanent real dedicated address, never a masked or relay alias.

One shared bills inbox leaves every biller holding the same address, and a leak at one supplier exposes it to the rest. A different alias per biller contains a leak to the supplier that held the exposed address. Utility and telecom suppliers store customer email addresses in large databases, and breaches of those databases in 2024 and 2026 supply the evidence.

## The address on a utility account

One address on a utility account performs several jobs at once: it receives the monthly statement, the payment reminder, the direct debit confirmation, the password reset link and the disconnection warning, and it serves as the login name on many utility portals. Most households hand the same personal address to the electricity, gas and water suppliers, the broadband provider and the mobile carrier, and the address then sits in each customer database and in the databases of the marketing platforms and email distribution services they use. A breach at any one of them exposes the same address, and the spam that follows gives no indication of which company leaked it. Spam arriving on the electricity supplier's alias names that supplier.

## Utility and telecom breaches, 2024 to 2026

A dataset with personal information on about 73 million people appeared on a forum in March 2024. AT&T confirmed coverage of about 7.6 million current and 65.4 million former account holders, with data from 2019 or earlier, and reset passcodes for those 7.6 million customers ([SC Media report](https://www.scworld.com/news/att-confirms-theft-of-73m-records-7-6m-current-customers-affected)). Troy Hunt counted 73,481,539 lines in the leaked file, with 49,102,176 unique email addresses ([Troy Hunt analysis](https://www.troyhunt.com/inside-the-massive-alleged-att-data-breach/)). The file also held names, addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, account numbers and passcodes. AT&T has not established whether the data came from its own systems or a vendor ([Security.org summary](https://www.security.org/identity-theft/breach/att/)). A second AT&T incident, disclosed on 12 July 2024, covered call and text records of nearly all wireless customers from May to October 2022, with no call or text content ([TechCrunch report](https://techcrunch.com/2024/07/12/att-phone-records-stolen-data-breach/)).

Southern Company disclosed on 5 October 2026 that unauthorised access to its online customer portal had affected about 400,000 customers of Georgia Power, Alabama Power and Mississippi Power, exposing names, contact details and the last four digits of Social Security numbers ([SecurityWeek report](https://www.securityweek.com/georgia-power-alabama-power-data-breach-hits-400000-accounts/)). The full incident is covered separately ([Southern Company breach analysis](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/southern-company-data-breach)). ENGIE confirmed on 27 October 2026 that attackers stole customer data from a marketing platform used by its business partners in France. Its internal IT systems were not compromised and no banking data was affected. Notification letters listed names, mailing and email addresses, phone number, delivery point or metering point identifiers, customer ID and contract number. ENGIE published no victim count ([BleepingComputer report](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/energy-giant-engie-discloses-data-breach-affecting-customers/)).

## Arara Message and the distribution list

Paycloud Holdings reported on 2 November 2026 that unauthorised access to Arara Message had taken or may have taken about 77 million email addresses from 97 servers ([Japan Times report](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/11/03/japan/society/japan-firms-report-more-data-breaches/)). Arara Message is an email distribution service for up to about 380 client companies. The service sends newsletters and account notices for its clients, so one compromise exposed hundreds of brands' subscriber lists at once. The count is of email addresses, not people, and Paycloud describes it as preliminary ([TSN report](https://tsnmedia.org/arara-message-data-breach/)).

Hokuriku Electric, one of the clients, announced on 2 November 2026 that about 550,000 email addresses from its Hokulink member service were exposed through unauthorised access to the contractor's email distribution platform between 28 and 31 October 2026. No other personal data was affected ([Hokuriku Electric report](https://signal.oueway.com/events/703cf844-319b-52c3-93a5-b9d3aa3c0011)). The full Arara incident is covered separately ([Arara Message breach analysis](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/arara-message-data-breach)). The Hokuriku figure rests on a news summary of the announcement, not the company's own English-language notice. Attackers also used the service to send up to about 7.13 million emails posing as a credit card company between 28 and 30 October 2026. The messages carried genuine authentication because they passed through the legitimate sending platform. A list pairing an address with a name and a brand makes the next message more convincing.

## One alias per biller

One alias per biller, rather than one bills inbox, follows from these cases. A shared bills inbox leaves every biller holding the same address, so one leak exposes it to every other biller's mail, while a separate alias fixes the attribution: spam aimed at the electricity supplier's alias names the supplier, and the other billers' mail keeps arriving. Forwarding supplies the mechanism: the alias passes mail to the real inbox and the biller holds only the alias, so the real inbox address never appears in the biller's database or breach. The mechanism is explained in general terms separately ([what an email alias is](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-is-an-email-alias)), with forwarding covered alongside it ([how email aliases actually work](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-email-aliases-actually-work)).

<Callout type="info" title="Persistence condition">
The alias has to stay alive for as long as the account exists, because bills recur monthly and the address carries statements, payment reminders and password resets for the life of the account. An alias that stops working while the account is live strands it: password resets go nowhere and disconnection warnings never arrive.
</Callout>

The alias therefore remains in use until the account closes or the biller moves to a fresh alias, and the same condition holds for other long-lived accounts. A second inbox on its own is a weaker version of the same idea ([do you need a second email address](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/do-you-need-a-second-email-address)). A leaked alias is handled by moving the biller to a fresh alias and then stopping the old one, in that order: the portal has to hold the new address before the old one stops, or statements and resets will be lost in between. Utility portals generally allow the email address to be changed in the online account; Octopus Energy states that customers can update their email in their online account ([Octopus Energy contact page](https://octopusenergy.nz/contact-us)).

## Financial accounts and the bank exception

The bank receives no alias. Its address is a permanent real dedicated address used only for financial accounts, never a masked or relay alias, because recovery, statements and fraud alerts travel through it and it needs to stay tied to a verified identity. A masked address is built to be changed or abandoned, which breaks recovery at the point it matters most. The full argument is set out separately ([should you use a separate email for banking](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-use-a-separate-email-for-banking)).

A utility bill is a recurring payment, but the utility account does not hold the money, while the bank holds it and verifies identity under regulation. A leaked utility alias can be replaced, because the account moves to a fresh alias and the payment method is re-entered. The bank address cannot be replaced in the same way, because recovery, statements and fraud alerts all depend on it.

Government guidance points the same way: the Hong Kong government's InfoSec site lists as a standing recommendation: "Do use separate email addresses for different purposes whenever feasible" ([InfoSec guidance](https://www.infosec.gov.hk/en/best-practices/person/handling-emails)). India's CyberDost, the cyber safety handle of the Ministry of Home Affairs, advised the public to keep one email account for trusted communication and financial transactions and a separate account for social networking registrations ([Times of India report](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/gadgets-news/government-has-an-email-tip-to-protect-your-bank-account/articleshow/77799930.cms)). No regulator was found publishing guidance specific to email addresses for utility bills, so the guidance cited here is general rather than utility-specific.

## Paperless billing and the phishing test

Paperless billing leaves email as the only route for the statement. SSE Energy Solutions recommends paperless bills where possible, and warns that criminals send phishing emails that look like they come from a bank or a utilities supplier ([SSE guidance](https://www.sseenergysolutions.co.uk/customer-help-centre/help-and-advice/keeping-your-information-safe)). A message quoting a real account number, service address and bill amount reads as genuine; a disconnection threat adds urgency.

A per-biller alias gives the recipient a channel test. Mail claiming to be from the electricity supplier, arriving on an address the supplier never held, identifies itself as forged. Mail arriving on the right alias can still be forged, so the sender domain still has to be checked and the account opened through the supplier's own site or app. A separate alias does not stop phishing or a breach at the biller; it limits the damage to one biller and names the source.

The NDSS 2026 study tested 28 email providers and 18 online platforms and found only Gmail fully documents its aliasing rules, while 11 providers silently support undocumented alias behaviour. In the user study, 31.65% of participants with alias knowledge mistook phishing emails as legitimate alias mail: the alias in the message matched the one they expected ([NDSS 2026 paper](https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/one-email-many-faces-a-deep-dive-into-identity-confusion-in-email-aliases/)). The alias is a filter rather than a verdict: a match between the address in the message and the address on file does not establish that the sender is genuine.

## Administrative cost and other limits

A separate email for bills does not protect the other data the biller holds: a breach exposing names, service addresses, account numbers and payment details is not contained by an alias. The arrangement also adds a small administrative cost: each biller holds a different address, the owner keeps a record of which alias belongs to which biller, and if the forwarding service stops, every alias stops with it. The steps after a breach are set out separately ([what to do when your email is in a data breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/what-to-do-when-your-email-is-in-a-data-breach)).

The inbox itself still needs a unique password and two-factor authentication, because every biller reset flows through it. A check on whether an address has been leaked is also available ([how to check if your email was leaked](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-check-if-your-email-was-leaked)). The general case for a different address for every website is set out separately ([different email for every website](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/different-email-for-every-website)); delivery notifications carry the same logic for parcels ([how to protect your email for delivery notifications](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-for-delivery-notifications)). No utility was found publishing a policy on accepting alias addresses at signup, so whether a given biller accepts an alias at registration is untested here.

## AliasFleet and bills

AliasFleet provides forwarding aliases that stay active for as long as the account holds them, with a separate alias per service and a pause control on each alias, and a biller holds only its own alias while the real inbox address is not given to the biller. If an alias starts receiving spam, it can be paused once the biller has moved to a fresh alias, and the other billers are unaffected. AliasFleet does not provide an address for a bank account: the bank gets a permanent real dedicated address, and aliases are for everything else.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Aliases</category><category>Privacy</category><category>Bills and Utilities</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Can You Use an Email Alias for Account Recovery?</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/can-you-use-an-email-alias-for-account-recovery</guid>
      <description>An email alias works as a recovery address only while it stays live and forwards to a controlled inbox; a deleted alias breaks the reset route.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Recovery by email alias means placing a forwarding address on file as the contact route back into an account. Recovery through that address succeeds only while the alias stays in service at least as long as the account it guards and the onward route to a controlled destination inbox keeps working. When a password is forgotten or access is lost, the service sends its reset message to that address, the alias provider passes the message onward, and the holder opens it in a destination inbox. If the alias closes, the provider stops operating, a domain lapses, or the destination inbox becomes unreachable, the reset message has nowhere to go. A closed alias therefore leaves no working route back into the account.

## Recovery contact and sign-in contact

Provider documentation keeps the recovery contact separate from the contact used to sign in, and the two must not be confused. [Google describes](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/183723?hl=en-GB&co=GENIE.Platform%3DDesktop) a recovery email as the address that helps a holder return to an account after a forgotten password or another sign-in difficulty. Its advice is to pick an address in regular use, distinct from the sign-in address. Recovery details cannot be added during a lockout or during the recovery process itself, on the same page, so the choice has to be made in advance. A reset that never lands in the destination inbox amounts to the same outcome as never having recorded a recovery address at all.

Microsoft draws the same kind of boundary, with an added delay. [Microsoft states](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/accounts-billing/manage/what-does-security-info-change-is-still-pending-mean) that all security information removed and replaced puts the account into a restricted state for 30 days, that the period cannot be shortened, and that cancellation by the person who requested the change is the only way to end it early. A recovery address change is therefore not immediate on a Microsoft account. An additional address used to sign in is a different item again: [Microsoft describes](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/account-billing/add-an-alias-6c851fbc-95bb-4bdd-af65-6bc8af948824) an alias as another address belonging to the same account, usable for sign-in. Verification codes by email, however, go only to a primary username or to an address added as a verification method, according to the page on [adding an email address to a Microsoft account](https://support.microsoft.com/en-gb/accounts-billing/manage/how-to-add-an-email-address-or-phone-number-to-your-microsoft-account). Holding a sign-in alias does not by itself make that address a verification address.

Apple imposes a waiting period of its own. [Apple states](https://support.apple.com/en-us/118574) that account recovery applies when a password cannot be reset through a trusted device or another recovery factor. Confirmation arrives by email within 72 hours of starting recovery, and the full wait can run for several days or longer. Apple Support cannot shorten that wait, and a further request without extra recovery factors may lengthen it. [Apple also states](https://support.apple.com/en-ph/102529) that a new or changed address receives a verification email before it can be used, so an unverified address offers no help in a lockout.

## Domains and destination inboxes

Before provider deletion rules, the structure of the route itself creates two points of failure: the domain and the destination inbox. A recovery address on a custom domain rests on three items staying live together, namely the domain registration, the domain DNS records, and the alias service account. [Fastmail states](https://www.fastmail.help/hc/en-us/articles/4406536368911-Masked-Email) that removing the custom domain from an account also deletes the masked addresses at that domain, and messages to those addresses then bounce. An address on a provider shared domain depends instead on the provider keeping that domain in service and continuing to forward its mail.

Destination inboxes create the same kind of dependence. [Proton](https://proton.me/support/pass-email-alias) permits editing the forwarding address of an alias, and [Fastmail](https://www.fastmail.help/hc/en-us/articles/360060591073-How-to-set-up-aliases?u=3c944116) permits changing an alias delivery target. When the new inbox is verified before the old one is abandoned, the route survives the move. When the new target is an inbox the holder no longer controls, the route breaks exactly as it would if the alias had been deleted. Alias, domain, and destination inbox form a chain, and the chain holds only as long as its weakest part, which is usually the part changed without updating the protected account at the same moment.

## Deletion and deactivation outcomes

Deletion rules vary by provider, and the variation decides whether a closure can be undone after the event.

| Provider | Paused or blocked address | Removed address |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Proton | Temporarily deactivated, unable to receive or forward mail | Removed permanently from the vaults, with no recovery |
| Fastmail | Blocked masked addresses send mail to the Trash folder; disabled aliases bounce mail | Mail bounces, but removed masked addresses can generally be restored |
| Apple Hide My Email | Mail is returned to the sender; reactivation is possible at any time | Removal is permanent and only available for inactive addresses |

For Proton, [its support page](https://proton.me/support/pass-email-alias) draws a hard line: disabling pauses an alias for a time, while deleting takes it out of the vaults for good. A protected account tied to a deleted Proton alias has no paused route to switch back on; recovery must come from another method, or it does not come at all. Fastmail is more forgiving. [Its Masked Email page](https://www.fastmail.help/hc/en-us/articles/4406536368911-Masked-Email) defines three states, active, blocked, and deleted, with blocked mail landing in Trash and deleted mail bouncing, and states that deleted masked addresses can be restored at any time, apart from an address created but never used, which can be removed permanently from the review screen. [Its alias setup page](https://www.fastmail.help/hc/en-us/articles/360060591073-How-to-set-up-aliases?u=3c944116) adds that a disabled alias bounces incoming mail. Apple follows a third pattern: [its iCloud guide](https://support.apple.com/guide/icloud/stop-using-or-reactivate-addresses-mm3adb030cbf/icloud) says a stopped Hide My Email address returns mail to the sender and can be started again, while deletion, open only to inactive addresses, removes the address from every device set up for Hide My Email and cannot be reversed. In every case, an active alias with a monitored destination inbox is the only dependable state for recovery.

## Banking and government accounts

<Callout type="warning" title="Banking and government accounts">
Under the AliasFleet canonical position, a bank account and a government account keep a permanent real address used only for financial accounts, never a masked or relay alias. Recovery, statements and fraud alerts depend on that address.
</Callout>

Government accounts fall under the same position, because identity checks, official notices, and recovery all rest on an address that stays fixed when an alias service changes. Support recovery for a bank or government account is harder than for a shopping or forum account, and a missed fraud alert costs more than a missed newsletter. Where the address forms part of the identity record an institution holds, an alias that serves most accounts well is not the suitable recovery address. Keeping the permanent real address apart from aliases used elsewhere isolates the banking address from leaks at other services. The earlier AliasFleet article on [whether to change an email address after a breach](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/should-you-change-email-after-data-breach) gives the supporting reason: a leaked address remains in stolen data after a replacement address is adopted, so isolation, rather than frequent change, protects the banking address.

## AliasFleet recovery position

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) supplies managed, persistent identities, one alias per online account, with mail to an alias forwarded to a destination inbox and replies sent from the alias rather than the real address. Its live homepage on 2026-11-04 lists the free tier at 10 active forwarding privacy aliases, 3 auto-provisioned personal subdomains, 1 verified destination inbox, 100 MB of monthly forwarding bandwidth, and two-way reply forwarding, while Pro lists unlimited active forwarding privacy aliases. Those homepage figures are the only AliasFleet-specific figures in this article. This article asserts no rule about restoring a deleted AliasFleet alias, because that behaviour was not checked against AliasFleet documentation in this run. The general condition applies regardless: the alias remains active, the destination inbox remains verified and watched, and the protected account is updated before the alias closes, not afterwards. A related distinction appears in the AliasFleet piece on [SimpleLogin](https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/is-simplelogin-worth-it), where, in SimpleLogin's case, aliases already created keep working after a plan lapses, although no new alias can be created beyond the free limit. A lapsed plan and a deleted alias are different events, with different effects on recovery.

## Records and second methods

Forgetting the alias itself is a separate risk. Random-looking aliases are easy to lose track of when an account goes unused for months, and a recovery form asking for the full address cannot be completed from a half-remembered address. Secondary guidance in the [comparison of alias services](https://editorialge.com/email-alias-services-private-replies/) points to a password manager record holding alias, password, and website together, so the complete address is at hand when needed. The same guidance recommends testing the route soon after adding an alias, by requesting a verification or reset message and confirming its arrival before depending on the alias for an important account. It also recommends a second recovery method standing outside the alias chain, naming passkeys, authenticator-based two-factor authentication, printed backup codes, or an independent secondary email.

The companion point from secondary guidance on password managers is that the main email account functions as the reset route for most other accounts, in the piece on [password managers and email aliases](https://paulobrien.com/what-password-managers-do-and-why-aliases-matter/). Changing a recovery address without a second method in place leaves a gap rather than a clean handover. No primary source gives a failure rate for alias-based recovery, so none is stated here, and no blanket acceptance rule is stated either, because acceptance of a particular alias domain differs from service to service.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Aliases</category><category>Account Recovery</category><category>Privacy</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Joining an Association</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-joining-an-association</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-joining-an-association</guid>
      <description>A member directory can publish a member&apos;s email address to the open web. One alias per association keeps the listing reachable and the primary inbox out of it.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[A professional association directory lists members by real name, designation and employer, and some directories publish a contact email address. Using one dedicated alias as that published address keeps the member reachable while the primary inbox address stays out of it.

## Member directories

Associations publish directories as a networking tool, and the amount of contact detail shown depends on the association and on the software it uses. The [Casualty Actuarial Society](https://www.casact.org/article/new-public-member-directory-privacy-options-now-available) relaunched its public directory in April 2025 with four member settings: Full Profile Display, Limited Profile Display, Limited Profile + Email, and Do Not Display My Profile. Full Profile Display includes the member's primary email address. Limited Profile Display leaves out contact details and location. Limited Profile + Email adds the email address back to the limited display. Do Not Display My Profile removes the record from the public directory altogether.

Other associations leave the choice to administrators rather than to individual members. Documentation from the [Junior League](https://support.jl.org/support/solutions/articles/61000279993) states that administrators control which personal information fields are visible, that members can hide specific fields including an email address where the administrators have enabled that option, and that members should be told when a previously hidden field, such as an email address, is switched on. A [Novi AMS](https://help.noviams.com/articles/5302661912-cheat-sheet-member-directory-privacy-and-data-protection) cheat sheet lists three visibility levels: listings open to the public, listings visible to the public with contact information restricted to logged-in members, and listings restricted to certain member types, with separate settings for hiding a record, hiding contact information, and hiding an address. A directory listing and a published email address are therefore two separate settings, and neither should be assumed private without checking the member's own profile.

## Harvesting of published addresses

An email address on a public web page can be collected by automated software. [MembershipWorks](https://membershipworks.com/data-privacy-security/) states that spammers look for addresses to add to spam lists and that an address shown in a members directory can be harvested with ease, and its default is not to display email addresses in a directory. The same reasoning sits behind contact form features on membership platforms, covered in a later section.

A harvested address tends to stay in circulation after collection. Copies can be resold and reused by senders the member has never dealt with, so unsubscribing from one sender does nothing about the other copies already held elsewhere. [Suped](https://www.suped.com/learn/email-deliverability/what-are-the-dangers-of-scraping-emails-and-ignoring-can-spam), a deliverability vendor, notes that a scraped list gives no guarantee that an address still belongs to the person or company expected, and that a public email address alone does not establish permission to send marketing. No published count exists of how many association directories expose email addresses, and no source measures spam volume caused specifically by directory harvesting, so this article states the mechanism and gives documented examples rather than a prevalence figure.

## United States law

The CAN-SPAM Act, the United States federal law on commercial email, sets rules for senders rather than a barrier against collection. Commercial messages must carry accurate sender information, a valid physical postal address, and an opt-out mechanism that stays working for at least 30 days after sending, with opt-out requests honoured within 10 business days. The address harvesting provision, section 7704(b)(1) of the statute, treats sending to addresses obtained by automated means from a website or online service that stated it would not transfer addresses for email marketing purposes as an aggravated violation where the sender knows, or has knowledge fairly implied by objective circumstances, that the addresses came through that harvesting method. The [statute text](https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/7704) sets out that provision together with the opt-out and postal address requirements.

Penalties under the Act fall on the sender after a violation. [MAJ Leads](https://www.majleads.com/blog/can-spam-cold-email-rules), which states it checked the Federal Trade Commission compliance guide on 3 November 2026, and Suped, updated 25 October 2026, both report that each separate email in violation is subject to penalties of up to $53,088. The figure is adjusted for inflation over time, so it should be confirmed against the guide before reliance. A penalty of that kind does not delete a published address from circulation, and it does not stop a scraper from collecting the address in the first place. Association rules on member data govern the association itself, not third parties. Guidance from the [American Psychological Association](https://www.apa.org/about/division/digest/leader-resources/emailing-members) to its division leaders, updated in May 2024, states that member email addresses may be used only for division-related business, for one-time use, and may not be given or resold to another user without permission from the chief executive or a designee. Those rules restrict how the association handles the data. They do not restrict what a third party does with a public page.

## Directory privacy settings

The directory setting itself is the strongest control available to a member, and it should be checked at joining, before the first directory refresh publishes the listing. The Casualty Actuarial Society example shows the range a member may find: full display, limited display, limited display plus email, or no display. A member who wants the networking benefit of the listing without publishing a contact address can select the limited display option, which keeps name, designation and employer visible while leaving out contact details. A member who wants to be contactable through the directory can select the option that adds the email address back, or use a contact form where one exists.

Where no per-member setting exists, the choice narrows to asking the association to hide the listing or accepting publication. [WildApricot](https://www.wildapricot.com/blog/member-website-security) documentation notes that members can hide a public profile altogether by unchecking the option to show the profile, which removes the listing as well as the contact details. A hide option cannot be assumed to exist. It has to be checked in the member's own profile.

## Contact forms

A contact form lets a visitor send a message without seeing the member's email address. [Novi AMS](http://help.noviams.com/articles/6266786580-member-directory-contact-form) states that its contact form option removes all email addresses from the member directory and replaces them with a link to a form, with the stated purpose of preventing web scrapers from harvesting members' email addresses. Novi's documentation also notes that messages sent through the form are delivered to the member's primary email, and that a member who replies reveals the reply address to the sender. MembershipWorks applies a similar design, with sender verification and a spam check before delivery, plus a report spam link in delivered messages.

A contact form reduces exposure to automated harvesting, but it does not remove exposure to senders who are people. Novi's documentation states the limit directly: the form curtails bots and web scrapers, while human beings still have access to use it.

## One alias per association

A dedicated alias per association sits between the directory controls and the primary inbox. The member gives the association one alias address, uses it as the directory contact address where the directory shows one, and keeps the primary inbox address out of the association's published materials. Mail sent to the alias forwards to the primary inbox, so the member stays reachable through the listing. If the alias starts receiving spam, the member pauses or deletes that alias and the spam stops, while the membership, the real-name listing, and the primary address are unchanged.

<Callout type="info" title="Membership identity">
The alias is the published contact address, not a different identity. The listing still carries the real name, designation and employer, and the membership itself is held under the real identity.
</Callout>

Separation also identifies the source of unwanted mail. Mail arriving on the association alias came through the association's directory, events, or mailing lists, because no other service was given that address. A directory breach or a scraped listing then affects one alias, not the primary address used for banking, work, and personal correspondence.

| Directory option | What visitors see | What happens when spam arrives |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Primary address published | The primary inbox address | Spam reaches the primary inbox directly, and the address cannot be changed without changing the inbox |
| Dedicated alias published | An alias that forwards to the primary inbox | The alias is paused or deleted, and the primary address is unchanged |
| Contact form only | No address, only a message form | Automated harvesting is reduced, but human senders can still use the form |
| No public listing | No record in the public directory | No directory exposure, and no networking benefit from the listing |

An alias has limits, stated here as properties of the method. An alias does not stop a human sender from using a directory contact form, and it does not hide a name, employer, or designation from a public listing. It does not protect an address the member gives the association for billing, voting, or internal administration, since those addresses are usually held privately by the association rather than published. It does not repair a primary address that is already published in a directory. For an existing listing, the member needs to change the published address to the alias and, where the association offers it, update the directory privacy setting at the same time.

## AliasFleet managed aliases

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides email aliases that forward to a verified destination inbox. A member creates one alias for an association, for example on a personal subdomain, and gives that alias to the association as the contact address. Mail sent to the alias arrives in the primary inbox, and replies can be sent from the alias so the primary address is not revealed in correspondence. When an alias starts receiving spam, the member disables it in one click, and mail to that alias stops. The free plan includes 10 active aliases, which covers one alias per association for most members, and the [pricing page](https://aliasfleet.com/pricing) sets out the free plan limits and the paid tiers. The [documentation](https://aliasfleet.com/docs) covers alias creation and management. AliasFleet does not hide a member's name from a directory listing, does not change an association's directory settings, and does not remove an address that is already published. Those remain the member's and the association's decisions.

## Listings published before the change

A member who has already received spam on a primary address through a directory should first check whether that address appears in breach data, before deciding whether the exposure is limited to directory harvesting or part of a wider breach. [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) provides a search of addresses against breach data, and its [frequently asked questions](https://haveibeenpwned.com/FAQs) explain what a result means and what it does not prove. If the address appears in no breach data, the likely route is directory exposure, and changing the published address to an alias closes that route. If the address appears in breach data, the member faces a wider exposure than one directory listing, and the alias change still applies, alongside the measures that follow from the breach itself.

At joining, the sequence is short. The member checks the association's directory privacy settings and selects the display option that matches the visibility wanted, then gives the association a dedicated alias as the contact address rather than the primary inbox address. If the alias attracts spam, the member disables it and, where the association allows it, replaces the published address with a fresh alias. A scraped copy of the listing then contains an address the member can delete rather than an address the member cannot change.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Email Aliases</category><category>Professional Associations</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to Protect Your Email When Registering for Webinars</title>
      <link>https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-registering-for-webinars</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-registering-for-webinars</guid>
      <description>Webinar registration gives a host an address that can feed a sales sequence after the event. One alias per host keeps that sequence out of a primary inbox.</description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[Webinar registration is lead capture attached to a live event, where the join link must keep working and post-event mail must stay separable from a primary inbox. One alias per host meets both needs, on one condition: the alias stays active until the event ends. A registrant trades a name and an email address for a join link, and the address can then carry a post-event sales sequence.

## Registration data

The form asks for few fields. The address is the channel that delivers the join link, the reminders, and the follow-up mail, so attendance depends on it working. A [United States government guide to GoToWebinar registration](https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/new-england-mid-atlantic/gotowebinar-registration-and-joining-instructions) describes a form that requests first name, last name, and the email address for meeting mail, and notes that the registration email holds the joining instructions and that each registration belongs to one registrant. A live [GoToWebinar registration form for an IOP Publishing and ECS webinar](https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/2040973296789451356?source=ECS+website) goes further, requesting country or region, organisation name, and occupation type, and asking how the registrant heard about the webinar.

Hosts are free to ask beyond the minimum. A [University of Connecticut guide to scheduling a Webex webinar](https://uconn.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/IKB/pages/10880581647/Scheduling+a+Webex+Webinar) describes registration as a means of gathering information from an audience rather than necessarily a form of security, and notes that hosts set their own custom registration questions. Whatever extra answers a registrant supplies are stored alongside the registration record.

## Sponsor sharing

Registration addresses also reach sponsors and partners named on the form, and that sharing is a separate permission from event mail. The live IOP Publishing and ECS form puts the point plainly: it carries distinct consent questions for sharing details with [The Electrochemical Society](https://www.electrochem.org/privacy-policy), BioLogic, and [Bruker BioSpin](https://www.bruker.com/en/legal/privacy-policy.html), each linked to that organisation's privacy policy, alongside a separate question about marketing updates from [IOP Publishing](https://ioppublishing.org/privacy-cookies-policy/). On that form, a registrant can accept event mail while refusing sponsor sharing. The three permissions, event mail, marketing mail, and sponsor sharing, are not one permission, and a single checkbox at the foot of a form does not always grant all three.

Once details pass to a sponsor, control splits. The sponsor holds the details in a separate mailing system under its own retention rules, so an unsubscribe sent to the host does not automatically reach the sponsor.

## Marketing permission

Whether a form separates event mail from marketing mail depends on the host's settings. [Zoom Webinars Plus registration settings](https://support.zoom.com/hc/en/article?id=zm_kb&sysparm_article=KB0058242) give the host three options for external registrants: ask them to opt in, ask them to opt out, or ask nothing about marketing at all. With opt-in, the box starts unchecked and the registrant must tick it. With opt-out, the box starts ticked and the registrant must untick it. The same settings page allows a host to attach up to 3 privacy policies to an event, which means the host's own policy governs, not the platform's policy alone.

The starting state of the box matters most for registrants who move fast. A pre-ticked box creates marketing consent out of inaction, while an unticked box demands a deliberate action. The [United Kingdom Information Commissioner's Office guidance on electronic marketing](https://cy.ico.org.uk/for-organisations/direct-marketing-and-privacy-and-electronic-communications/guide-to-pecr/electronic-and-telephone-marketing/) requires valid consent to be knowingly and freely given, clear and specific, and given by a clear positive action such as ticking an unticked opt-in box, and states that pre-ticked boxes do not give valid consent. The [ICO step-by-step guide for small businesses](https://cy.ico.org.uk/for-organisations/advice-for-small-organisations/direct-marketing-and-data-protection/step-by-step-guide-to-direct-marketing-for-your-small-business/) adds that marketing mail requires consent or a soft opt-in, and that every marketing message must include a way to opt out or unsubscribe.

## Retention periods

No single retention rule covers every webinar, because host notices differ widely. [Valmet's GoToWebinar privacy notice](https://www.Valmet.com/content_folder/privacy-notice/gotowebinar-privacy-notice/) states that registration always processes first name, last name, and email address, that the processing may feed direct marketing combined with data in Valmet's CRM system, and that Valmet will typically maintain customer and supplier relationship information for more than 10 years. The same notice states that a data subject can object to processing including direct marketing. A [GoToWebinar privacy notice from AutoForm](https://www.autoform.com/fileadmin/public/Redaktion/all/legal/DataPrivacyPolicy_Webinar_en.pdf) covers registration data, participation data including duration of participation and questions asked, and use of the email address for a newsletter with an unsubscribe option, and points to [GoTo's privacy policy](https://www.goto.com/company/legal/privacy/international) for the platform's own processing.

| Host notice | Retention stated |
| :--- | :--- |
| Valmet GoToWebinar notice | Customer and supplier relationship information typically kept for more than 10 years |
| University of the Arts London GoToWebinar notice | Registration details stored on the platform for 24 months after the webinar; marketing details kept until unsubscribe or two years after the intended year of study, whichever comes first |
| Inclusion Scotland webinar notice | Personal information kept until the person states that marketing is no longer wanted |
| SESAR Webex notice | Name and user ID kept for 7 years from contract termination; technical assistance information stored for up to 10 years |

The [University of the Arts London notice](https://www.arts.ac.uk/general-data-processing-information/virtual-open-event-and-discovery-webinar-privacy-notice-for-participants/gotowebinar-privacy-notice-for-online-open-day-participants) marks the shorter end of the range, while the [Inclusion Scotland notice](https://inclusionscotland.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/6-Privacy-Notice-Virtual-Events-and-Webinars_1__2__6_.pdf) ties retention to the registrant stating that marketing is no longer wanted. A [SESAR Webex privacy notice](https://www.sesar.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Privacy%20notice%20-%20Webex.pdf) and the [Cisco Webex Meetings privacy data sheet](https://geschaeftskunden.telekom.de/tgkp-resource/blob/43666/b602f0f40ba5251460db2a070a84dfae/b-cisco-webex-meetings-datenschutzblatt--data.pdf) list name and email address as registration information used to provide the service. Across these notices the span runs from 24 months to more than 10 years. A registration address is therefore a long-lived record rather than a temporary pass for one evening.

## Opt-out requirements

The rules for stopping follow-up mail differ by jurisdiction. In the United States, the [Federal Trade Commission CAN-SPAM compliance guide](https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/resources/can-spam-act-compliance-guide-business) requires a commercial message to include a clear and conspicuous explanation of how to opt out, requires the opt-out mechanism to process requests for at least 30 days after the message is sent, and requires the sender to honour an opt-out request within 10 business days. The guide also bars charging a fee for opting out, bars demanding identifying information beyond an email address, and bars requiring any step beyond sending a reply email or visiting a single web page. Each separate email in violation carries penalties of up to $53,088, according to the same guide.

A follow-up sequence that promotes a product or a paid course counts as commercial mail under that test, so it carries the opt-out duty. The sender must honour an opt-out request within 10 business days.

## One alias per host

An email alias is a forwarding address that routes mail to a real inbox without revealing the real address to the sender. A [guide to email aliasing](https://techlore.tech/email-aliasing-how-to-stop-handing-out-your-real-email-address/) sets out the chain: the sender holds only the alias, mail to the alias lands in the real inbox, and replies can be sent so the alias appears as the sender. A [guide to email aliases](https://leavemealone.com/blog/email-alias-explained/) puts the same mechanism as one inbox with many front doors, each of which can be closed without touching the rest of the inbox, and lists webinars among the sign-ups suited to an alias.

For webinars the method is one alias per host. That alias alone receives the join link, the reminders, and the follow-up sequence for that host's events. If the sequence turns into unwanted sales mail, the alias itself identifies the source, because no other host holds that address. Pausing or removing the alias stops that host's mail at the forwarding layer, with no unsubscribe request to each sender in the chain and no change to the address used for other hosts.

<Callout type="warning" title="Timing">
An alias paused before the event blocks the join link and the reminders, because those messages go to the registered address. The alias stays active through the event, including the recording message if one is expected, and is paused or removed only after the event has ended and any wanted follow-up has arrived. A recording link that arrives days later is lost if the alias is removed too early.
</Callout>

Repeat attendance and repeat exposure stay separate under this method. A host running a monthly series keeps the same alias across the series, so the join links keep working, while a host that sends one aggressive sequence after a single event gets an alias that is paused once and never used again. The same keep-live-until-the-event-ends timing applies to [event ticket purchases](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/how-to-protect-your-email-when-buying-event-tickets), where the alias stays live until the event and any refund window have ended.

## Limits of alias use

An alias alters future delivery, not past collection. The host retains the registration record, the CRM entry, and any copy already passed to a sponsor, and those copies fall under the host's retention rules and under removal requests to the host and to each sponsor. An alias also leaves the form itself unchanged: name, organisation, and answers to custom questions are still supplied at registration. [Plus addressing](https://aliasfleet.com/blog/email-plus-addressing-vs-aliases), which adds a tag to a real address, is weaker than a separate alias, because the base address stays visible and some services strip the tag, according to the Techlore guide. A separate alias address carries no such weakness.

Acceptance is the second limit. No verified platform-by-platform result was found for whether every webinar form accepts every alias address, so acceptance cannot be guaranteed in advance. The working approach is to register with the alias and confirm that the confirmation mail arrives.

## AliasFleet webinar aliases

[AliasFleet](https://aliasfleet.com) provides email aliases that forward mail to a verified destination inbox. A registrant creates one alias for a webinar host, enters that alias on the registration form, and receives the join link, reminders, and follow-up mail in the destination inbox. After the event, the alias can be paused or removed, which stops further mail from that host to that alias without affecting aliases used for other hosts. AliasFleet does not delete the host's registration record or any copy passed to a sponsor, and it does not change the host's retention period. The alias remains a managed, persistent address for as long as the registrant keeps it active, and the registrant decides when it is paused or removed.]]></content:encoded>
      <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <author>support@aliasfleet.com (Ahsan Luqman)</author>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahsan Luqman]]></dc:creator>
      <category>Email Privacy</category><category>Webinars</category><category>Email Aliases</category>
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